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RE: Biggest German East front mistake
Posted: Tue Aug 31, 2004 2:30 am
by Error in 0
ORIGINAL: IronDuke
ORIGINAL: JallaTryne
ORIGINAL: IronDuke
I just think the Germans attempted it with fewer resources than it required. If they couldn't find another 20-30 divisions to use, then it was a mistake to launch it.
Yes, its an interesting 'what if' if Germany had gone to war economy from the beginning. When they finally decided to use their industries, the production rate was rocketing. Change all those PzII and III's with Tigers, and later Panthers, add new divisions, air squadrons etc etc, and Barbarossa would have been a success. And then what?
JT
JallaTryne,
I don't think the Germans would have got the Tiger and Panther much earlier than they did (42 and 43) respectively. The Panther, in particular, was built after a study of the T-34, so was not even on the drawing board as Barbarossa started. The Tiger had a rather more complicated development history, which also made it a non-starter for Barbaross, although it was entering service by August 1942.
Operational needs can often drive Tank design and development, and the Germans weren't doing too badly with what they had in France etc. However, the T-34 and KV series came as a shock, and I think accelerated things, although in addition to these weapons, they also upgunned the MK III and MK IV.
The bit about the war economy is interesting. I think it might have made some difference. However, extra weapons require extra soldiers, and recruiting extra soldiers, means taking the skilled craftsmen and labourers who build the weapons, so it's a tricky circle. The Germans got around it with masses of slave labour, but this is not a perfect solution.
It might have helped them survive longer, but I don't know if it would have necessarily changed the result.
Regards,
IronDuke
Agreed on Panthers, but maybe not on Tigers. Both Henchel and Porche was working on panzers, Henchel on medium and heavy, porche only medium, since 1937. Not until 41, when Hitler asked them to, did they focus on the heavy tank. Yes, their experience from -37 came in handy, but im sure that Tigers would have been in massproduction in 1940 if they wanted to.
About the production. When they hit war economy in -43, they had already lost many men on the battlefields, and following your reasoning these had been replaced with skilled craftsmen from their insustries. But they nonetheless made it. I would assume it would have been easier to do this in ie 39.
Considering how close they came in achieving Barbarossa, I do believe they would have made it with 3x Panzer and air. And that would probably have generated some more inf. div....[:)]
JT
RE: Biggest German East front mistake
Posted: Tue Aug 31, 2004 11:16 am
by fjbn
About war production, maybe you´re right in tanks, but not in airforce. German production was increased in an incredible way, but you need time to train an air crew. When the bombardment offensive against Germany in 1944 was launch, german had many fighters, but not many good pilots. I mean, you can replace an aeroplane, not an expert pilot.
Rommel said many times that the difference between East and West Front was that war against Western allies was in three dimensions, including a serious and decisive air threat, that was not the case in Es¡ast front. Red Air Force was superior in number, not in skill, so it was possible to organize counterstrike against russians, and virtually impossible against US and Brit forces.
RE: Biggest German East front mistake
Posted: Tue Aug 31, 2004 5:26 pm
by baevans99
Another factor in training a competent air corps is to pull out experienced pilots to instruct raw recruits. Is there truth that Germany tended to fly their pilots till they died instead of transferring this knowledge into their pilot training program?
I know the western allies sent many veteran pilots back home to be instructors at their flight schools. No idea if Russia did the same.
RE: Biggest German East front mistake
Posted: Tue Aug 31, 2004 5:55 pm
by Poopyhead
Interesting discussion. As for the original questions: Halder explained the OKH plan to Guderian as an 8-10 week campaign in which the industrial western part of the Soviet Union would be over-run. In the autumn, a defensive perimeter would be built in the occupied zone and 60-80 divisions would return to the west.
The Luftwaffe and the Waffen SS made arrangements for winter clothing but only one in five German soldiers were expected to remain in Russia, and thus supplies for the Army were insufficient.
Twelve divisions were stationed in Norway defending access to Swedish iron. If more of these unit and others had been sent to the east, it would not have been a significant increase in forces (145 German divisions were used).
The German attache in Moscow had told them of the massive Soviet army and industrial capacity, but no one believed it.
RE: Biggest German East front mistake
Posted: Tue Aug 31, 2004 5:57 pm
by a19999577
Many of the better known veterans (Galland et al.) flew to the last days of the war. I really don't know who trained German pilots towards the end of the war, but veterans complained that they couldn't even trim their planes properly. The Luftwaffe simply couldn't spare the pilots or the fuel to carry out a proper training program. I don't know about the Russians though.
RE: Biggest German East front mistake
Posted: Tue Aug 31, 2004 11:02 pm
by IronDuke_slith
ORIGINAL: JallaTryne
ORIGINAL: IronDuke
ORIGINAL: JallaTryne
Yes, its an interesting 'what if' if Germany had gone to war economy from the beginning. When they finally decided to use their industries, the production rate was rocketing. Change all those PzII and III's with Tigers, and later Panthers, add new divisions, air squadrons etc etc, and Barbarossa would have been a success. And then what?
JT
JallaTryne,
I don't think the Germans would have got the Tiger and Panther much earlier than they did (42 and 43) respectively. The Panther, in particular, was built after a study of the T-34, so was not even on the drawing board as Barbarossa started. The Tiger had a rather more complicated development history, which also made it a non-starter for Barbaross, although it was entering service by August 1942.
Operational needs can often drive Tank design and development, and the Germans weren't doing too badly with what they had in France etc. However, the T-34 and KV series came as a shock, and I think accelerated things, although in addition to these weapons, they also upgunned the MK III and MK IV.
The bit about the war economy is interesting. I think it might have made some difference. However, extra weapons require extra soldiers, and recruiting extra soldiers, means taking the skilled craftsmen and labourers who build the weapons, so it's a tricky circle. The Germans got around it with masses of slave labour, but this is not a perfect solution.
It might have helped them survive longer, but I don't know if it would have necessarily changed the result.
Regards,
IronDuke
Agreed on Panthers, but maybe not on Tigers. Both Henchel and Porche was working on panzers, Henchel on medium and heavy, porche only medium, since 1937. Not until 41, when Hitler asked them to, did they focus on the heavy tank. Yes, their experience from -37 came in handy, but im sure that Tigers would have been in massproduction in 1940 if they wanted to.
About the production. When they hit war economy in -43, they had already lost many men on the battlefields, and following your reasoning these had been replaced with skilled craftsmen from their insustries. But they nonetheless made it. I would assume it would have been easier to do this in ie 39.
Considering how close they came in achieving Barbarossa, I do believe they would have made it with 3x Panzer and air. And that would probably have generated some more inf. div....[:)]
JT
Good point, but I seem to remember the original Tiger design was scrapped in 41 and a new one adopted that was even bigger. I just think up until Barbarossa there was not the urgency in this because they had coped with everything thrown against them up to that point. The T-34 introduced a new vein of urgency into the situation.
The figures for Tanks are also quite misleading. The Germans had about 10 Panzer Divisionen in France and 20 in Russia (roughly) but the extra divisionen were achieved by halving the number of Panzers in the existing Panzer divisionen, not by employing twice as many tanks.
Therefore, the Panzer Arm was not that much bigger in 41 than it was in 40, I think they needed more than three extra divisions, but I think the element missing was trucks and halftracks. Extra Tanks were not all that much use without motorised or mechanised infantry to accompany them. It was a chronic lack of motor trasnsport that hit the Germans most in Barbarossa.
Regards,
IronDuke
RE: Biggest German East front mistake
Posted: Tue Aug 31, 2004 11:09 pm
by IronDuke_slith
ORIGINAL: baevans99
Another factor in training a competent air corps is to pull out experienced pilots to instruct raw recruits. Is there truth that Germany tended to fly their pilots till they died instead of transferring this knowledge into their pilot training program?
I know the western allies sent many veteran pilots back home to be instructors at their flight schools. No idea if Russia did the same.
There were veterans in the flying schools, but some eye witnesses commented they were burned out. These were men with 3 years plus combat under their belts, and they had suffered for it. The key problem was essentially fuel. Lack of fuel meant the standard Luftwaffe pilot went into combat with around half the number of flying hours under his belt that his Allied counterpart had. It was not uncommon for a quarter or even a third of trainee pilots fail to finish a course, suffering death or serious injury during training, because too much was being packed into too short a time.
The conversion programmes, converting recce and bomber pilots into fighter pilots was very brief, barely giving time for the pilots to learn how to take off and land in the BF-109, and do basic maneuvres.
As the war progressed, the lack of fuel meant that only a few missions could be flown, and these were only flown by experienced personnel, exacerbating the problems of rookie pilots with few flying hours under their belts. Losses therefore tended to hit experienced pilots hardest, rather than rookies, as one would normally expect.
Regards,
IronDuke
RE: Biggest German East front mistake
Posted: Tue Aug 31, 2004 11:12 pm
by IronDuke_slith
ORIGINAL: fjbn
About war production, maybe you´re right in tanks, but not in airforce. German production was increased in an incredible way, but you need time to train an air crew. When the bombardment offensive against Germany in 1944 was launch, german had many fighters, but not many good pilots. I mean, you can replace an aeroplane, not an expert pilot.
Rommel said many times that the difference between East and West Front was that war against Western allies was in three dimensions, including a serious and decisive air threat, that was not the case in Es¡ast front. Red Air Force was superior in number, not in skill, so it was possible to organize counterstrike against russians, and virtually impossible against US and Brit forces.
A Good point about Rommel, it is what stood behind his conviction that the Allied invasion of France had to be defeated on the beach. He had experienced Allied air power in Africa and didn't think Rundstedt's strategy of a battle of maneuvre in the french interior stood much of a chance. Ther Germans could also gain tactical parity in certain sectors of the fron in the east into late 43. They certainly had air parity at Kursk for most of the week, although they pulled out all the stops to get it.
regards,
Ironduke