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In reply to an earlier post the japanese have only realized that THE CV was the most important warship only after Midway, same time the USN I think. According to SS the IJN looked at CVs as disposable assets to weaken the main US battleline. Same as with subs.

That's very true for both sides. Many battleship admirals looked at the carrier as a means of augmenting their search capability, not for its attack ability. Pearl Harbor helped change that reasoning as did subsequent engagements. I highly doubt that by the end of 1942 there were any battleship admirals left who didn't view the carrier as a major threat to their beloved ships.

Chez

FINE GENTLEMEN..., make up whatever nonsense you want. How about tossing in "Godzilla eats the Lexington"

A Feinder Original -

[X(]


The ultimate Japanese Fanboy

Hi, Gotta dance after that.

Stimson's message to Short..Nov 27

Negotiations with Japanese appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat can not, be avoided the U. S. desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action at might jeopardize your defense. Prior to Japanese hostile action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm the civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur, you will carry out task signed in Rainbow Five as far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.

And the order to Kimmel:

Consider this dispatch a war warning. The negotiations with Japan in an effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific have ended. Japan is expected to make aggressive move within the next few days. An amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo is indicated by the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of their naval task forces. You will execute a defensive deployment in preparation for carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46 only. Guam, Samoa and Continental Districts have been directed to take appropriate measures against sabotage. A similar warning is being sent by the War Department. Inform naval district and Army authorities. British to be informed by Spenavo.

So the way I see it, Short (and Kimmel) have authority to 1) put the ships out of harm's way (or at least ready a counterstrike) 2) conduct recon 3) ready airfields for attack and disperse aircraft...but he has to do this quietly. Hard for me to see how they could send all the ships out of PH quietly, but they would really get there cajones roasted if they did nothing, so they would likely alert the military but not tell the civies. [:)]

It does seem they would not be authorized to launch a pre-emptive strike.

ORIGINAL: bradfordkay

Mike, I can't agree with you at all. It is not completely ridiculous to postulate that insteead of shipping fighters to Midway and Wake Kimmel might have ordered his carriers to patrol the waters northwest of Oahu. After all, the earlier exercises had produced attacks from this direction - so why wouldn't he think about sending a carrier patrol out in that direction?

So you DO contend that of ALL the Allied shipping in the Pacific Basin the only ship that KB could meet during it's run to PH would be a US CV? Nothing else that could get off a sighting report and spoil the Japanese "suprise" could possibly be out there 500 miles North of Oahu..., but a CV could? I said it was extrodinarily unlikely that a US CV would be duncing around up there during the weekend of the 5th-7th; and get countered with all sorts of speculation about how this was a possibility. But where is the speculation on the much more likely event that something else might have been up there and spoiled Nagumo's day by crying "wolf"? You and Chez only seem to be interested in "what if's" that will hurt the US. What happened to the "other side of the coin"? The spotting report that totally destroys any hope of suprise on the 7th? Why no "speculation" on the equally far-fetched "possibility" of dawn on the 7th arising and KB finding a fully alerted US Fleet 10,000 yards to the windward planning live fire gunnery exercises? Very unlikely? Certainly! But NOT IMPOSSIBLE..., which seems to be your criterion. My suggestion was to keep the "what if's" fair and reasonable for both sides.

You and Chez only seem to be interested in "what if's" that will hurt the US. What happened to the "other side of the coin"? The spotting report that totally destroys any hope of suprise on the 7th? Why no "speculation" on the equally far-fetched "possibility" of dawn on the 7th arising and KB finding a fully alerted US Fleet 10,000 yards to the windward planning live fire gunnery exercises? Very unlikely? Certainly! But NOT IMPOSSIBLE..., which seems to be your criterion. My suggestion was to keep the "what if's" fair and reasonable for both sides.

Whoa!!! You need to lay off whatever substance is giving you these paranoid delusions about this "what if". In no way, shape or form was my hypothesis meant to be present anyone's fanboy supposition. I have no idea why you would choose to take it so.

And no one is talking about a US CV being all alone up there. No one is talking about a surprise attack so devasting that no message could be sent. You may have been mislead by my use of the word "carrier" rather than carrier task group. It certainly was not meant to imply no other ships were present. I chose "carrier" for expediency's sake only. The same as someone might say "Hornet steamed to Japan to launch Doolittle's Raiders." Sure doesn't mean she was by herself. And it could be a rowboat with a radio for all I cared. I chose a carrier for the simple reason that it would have been the only type ship capable of inflicting damage on KB in return.

The original premise was "What if KB encountered a US CV Task Group enroute Pearl Harbor? What would they have done?"

And the issue of surprise is exactly the question. Would Nagumo have thrown it away to sink a CV? Pure and simple. I think he would have, especially if he has been detected in return. Others don't think so. If he did attack, his reception at Pearl would most certainly have been a "little" warmer. Wait, let me rephrase that. His attack on Pearl Harbor would been hotly contested. Specific enough for you?

As far as why a CV TG would operate in that region, logic should have told US operational planners that the northern route offered the best chance of an enemy being able to approach the islands undetected. A look at the map clearly reveals that. The southern route contains too many shipping lanes for a covert transit and the US had several bases guarding the western route (Midway, Wake, Johnston, western HI islands, etc). So even though war hadn't started yet, it would have been very prudent to patrol ALL the approaches to Pearl.

And the other side of the coin is: "What would the US battlefleet have done in response?" Stay inport? Sortie towards safety? Sortie for sea room but remain near Pearl? Attempt to engage KB? Who knows?

These were the questions being asked. You chose to take it as a Jap fanboy "What if" conspiracy. Ridiculous.

Chez

Mike, now you're coming from out in left field. We were discussing A possible "what if," not the only possible "what if."

You were arguing that no way in heck would a US carrier would be in the waters to the northwest of Oahu, and we pointed out that there were reasonable scenarios where that could have happened. For you to misconstrue that as some "fanboy's wild desire" to put the screws to the USN is laughable.

How could I possibly be an Axis fanboy? I've never even opened up a game on the Japanese side... It's just that I am open to ideas that don't follow the straight and narrow...

To return to the original question. "What would KB have done if it had discovered a USN CV on say 12-05?" . OK..., we know that at duks on the 6th KB was 500 miles north of Oahu. So where was it 24-36 hours earlier? (On the 5th) Well on the 4th, 5th and 6th, until the speed run south, it was coming SouthEast at about 15 knots. So during the day of the 5th, KB was between 415 and 620 miles NorthWest of it's position on the evening of the 6th. So it was approximately 1000 miles NNW of Oahu on the 5th, or about 800 miles NNE of Midway. And it was still in the foul weather it had followed across the North Pacific. That's a long way out in the middle of nowhere. If you want to say that it is theoretically possible that a US CV COULD have been in that area during the 5th, I can't argue. But to say that it was in anyway a likely occurance is stretching credulity

If you want to say that it is theoretically possible that a US CV COULD have been in that area during the 5th, I can't argue. But to say that it was in anyway a likely occurance is stretching credulity

It was this kind of thinking that led the US to discount the possibility of a carrier attack on Pearl Harbor. Oops.

And who's talking about the 5th? We're talking within 24 hours of the historical attack.

Chez

ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez

If you want to say that it is theoretically possible that a US CV COULD have been in that area during the 5th, I can't argue. But to say that it was in anyway a likely occurance is stretching credulity

It was this kind of thinking that led the US to discount the possibility of a carrier attack on Pearl Harbor. Oops.
And who's talking about the 5th? We're talking within 24 hours of the historical attack.

Chez

Who's talking about the 5th? Feinder, the fellow who started this thread. "What would KB have done if it had discovered a USN CV on say 12-05?" comes straight from his initial post. You made the statement: The original premise was "What if KB encountered a US CV Task Group enroute Pearl Harbor? What would they have done?" I was just quoting the time frame Feinder mentioned.

Who's talking about the 5th? Feinder, the fellow who started this thread. "What would KB have done if it had discovered a USN CV on say 12-05?" comes straight from his initial post. You made the statement: The original premise was "What if KB encountered a US CV Task Group enroute Pearl Harbor? What would they have done?" I was just quoting the time frame Feinder mentioned.

Ok. Cool.

But if you go back to my first post on the subject, I stated that "Assuming that Nagumo was within 24 hours of striking PH", he would attack the carrier.

Personally, I think any attack by Nagumo prior to the afternoon of the 6th would have been a mistake. If he had been discovered prior to then, he most likely would have maneuvered to break contact. If he failed to break contact, he might have attacked the CV in the late afternoon on the 6th. This would give him the night to slip away and either (1) continue to Pearl or (2) reverse course. Continuing on to Pearl brings up the other questions: "What does the US fleet do in response?" and so forth.

He could also delay his advance and wait until the planned PH attack time to take out the CV because Nagumo also has to consider what effect an early attack would have on the Japanese plans for attacking Malaya and PI. The allied defences would have had severeal more hours to prepare and possibly get into position to inflict major losses on the Japanese, especially if POW and Repulse can engage the transports.

Its an interesting "what if." One that has no easy answers. One must place themselves in Nagumo's position and look at all the options available to him in order to generate an opinion. War is coming and Nagumo can't avoid attacking something significant without a huge loss of honor.

Chez

ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez

caused the army aircrews to suck up their seat cushions

Ah, where's Platoonist when you need him. Hey! Platoonist! *wanders off in search of him*

Here is the actual order (translated of course) for the action of The Carrier Striking Task Force date Nov. 23. I believe this was issud by Nagumo.

Carrier Striking Task Force Operations Order No. 1 [6]

23 November 1941
To: Carrier Striking Task Force

1. The Carrier Striking Task Force will proceed to the Hawaiian Area with utmost secrecy and, at the outbreak of the war, will launch a resolute surprise attack on and deal a fatal blow to the enemy fleet in the Hawaiian Area. The initial air attack is scheduled at 0330 hours, X Day. Upon completion of the air attacks, the Task Force will immediately withdraw and return to Japan and, after taking on new supplies, take its position for Second Period Operations. In the event that, during this operation, an enemy fleet attempts to intercept our force or a powerful enemy force is encountered and there is danger of attack, the Task Force will launch a counterattack.

IMHO this answers the question...upon encountering US forces doing recon, they were authorized to "counterattack" before Dec 7

This is interesting too..I didn't know there was a Midway bombardment contingency.

[Page 10]

ordered to return to the home base. Subsequent to the issuance of the order designating X Day (the day of the outbreak of hostilities), the force will proceed to the approaching point (32 N, 157 W).

[Page 11]

Around 0700 hours, X-1 Day the Task Force will turn southward at high speed (approximately 24 knots) from the vicinity of the approaching point. It will arrive at the take-off point (200 nautical miles north of the enemy fleet anchorage) at 0100 hours X Day (0530 Honolulu time) and commit the entire air strength to attack the enemy fleet and important airfields on Oahu.

Upon completion of the air attacks, the Task Force will assemble the aircraft, skirt 800 nautical miles north of Midway, return about X + 15 Day to the western part of the Inland Sea via the assembly point (30 N, 165 E) and prepare for Second Period Operations. In the event of a fuel shortage the Task Force will proceed to Truk via the assembly point.

The force may skirt near Midway in the event that consideration of an enemy counter-attack is unnecessary due to successful air attacks or if such action is necessitated by fuel shortage.

In this event, the 5th Carrier Division with the support of the Kirishima from the 3rd Battleship Division will leave the Task Force on the night of X Day or the early morning of X + 1 Day and carry out air attacks on Midway in the early morning of X + 2 Day.

If a powerful enemy force intercepts our return route, the Task Force will break through the Hawaiian Islands area southward and proceed to the Marshall Islands.




http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/myths/jm-097.html#3

ORIGINAL: Speedy

Hi all,

Does anyone know how close any ship was in coming near to KB during it's voyage? Transports? Steamers? Subs? Neutrals etc?

Steven

Most evidence states that they steamed outside of normal shipping channels between the US and Japan. There was an article in the December 1991 issue of Naval History published by the USNI, about the USS Threasher meeting some of the screening ships for the KB on the evening of the 6th. The article was written, if my faulty memory serves me right, by the engineering officer on the Threasher. He remembers they were hooked by an anchor or some sort of other large hook and the Japanese ship attempted to bring them up. This was after sighting the KB. The captain was debating what to do, ie whether to go in and take pictures or shadow and send of sighting reports, when the tug of war started and after breaking free the ship beat feet back to PH. By the time that they got back was a few hours after the radio traffic came through about the attack on PH. The thing that the article made clear was that the US and the Japanese were operating on the same sort of terms as the US and Soviets did during the Cold War. In that they would harrass each other and maybe trade paint, lodge formal diplomatic complaints and that was about it. Most everyone was thinking of when the fleet would go to war against the Germans.

ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez

Who's talking about the 5th? Feinder, the fellow who started this thread. "What would KB have done if it had discovered a USN CV on say 12-05?" comes straight from his initial post. You made the statement: The original premise was "What if KB encountered a US CV Task Group enroute Pearl Harbor? What would they have done?" I was just quoting the time frame Feinder mentioned.

Ok. Cool.
But if you go back to my first post on the subject, I stated that "Assuming that Nagumo was within 24 hours of striking PH", he would attack the carrier. Its an interesting "what if." One that has no easy answers. One must place themselves in Nagumo's position and look at all the options available to him in order to generate an opinion. War is coming and Nagumo can't avoid attacking something significant without a huge loss of honor.
Chez

And my original point was that given what we know about the course of KB and that of the only two US CV's in the area, it would be an extrordinarily unlikely occurance for them to have encountered one another. And that the only likely way for a US CV to have had such an encounter would be if the Enterprise group had not been delayed 24 hours in it's return to Pearl Harbor and had arrived on the evening of the 6th rather than the evening of the 7th.

The only ship encountered by Kido Butai on it's route was a Japanese merchantman..., and the only Allied shipping they were likely to encounter in December would have been another merchantman.

lol.....i've seen many an example of people talking past each other on this and other forums, but i'm not sure i've seen a better example than this one. [:D]

the question posed by the poster was "What would KB have done if it had discovered a USN CV on say 12-05?"

To me, the poster is posing a hypothetical situation and asking a simple question. We all know where the USN CV's were on dec 5th. The poster is simply asking people what they think would happened had a CV been discovered by KB.....and "suggested" a date shortly before the attack for this event to occur.

Now if the poster had asked. "How likely was it for KB to have discovered a USN CV on say 12-05?" Then i'd see your viewpoint Mike since we know that the USN CV's were off doing chores that week and were saved from having to find out.

I see nothing that hints of any smacking of "fanboyism" involved in posing a hypothetical question based on a hypothetical positioning of USN assets on a given date. Given that such a scenerio happened to me in one WitP game (only two days after PH) I think i can give a likely answer too. [:D]

ORIGINAL: Nikademus
the question posed by the poster was "What would KB have done if it had discovered a USN CV on say 12-05?"

To me, the poster is posing a hypothetical situation and asking a simple question. We all know where the USN CV's were on dec 5th. The poster is simply asking people what they think would happened had a CV been discovered by KB.....and "suggested" a date shortly before the attack for this event to occur.

Very well. And had the original question been "What would KB have done had KAGA hit an iceberg and sank on the way to PH?" of course no one would have pointed out that there ARE no icebergs along the 43rd parallel in the North Pacific in December. It would all have been "Well, the Titanic his an iceberg, so it IS possible." It's certainly a hypothetical situation, and a simple question. My point was that it was a silly hypothetical, and the questioner would have done better to postulate something more reasonable....

So in the words of the song, "Let's Call the Whole Thing Off." Enought ink has been shed over an idea that really doesn't require or deserve it.

Hi, "What if Spartacus had a Piper Cub"?

ORIGINAL: Mogami

Hi, "What if Spartacus had a Piper Cub"?

It would have been an interesting artifact...., but as he had no avgas it wouldn't have done him much good.

ORIGINAL: Mogami

Hi, "What if Spartacus had a Piper Cub"?

LOL...THIS MADE MY MORNING!!!

Flipper