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Deep jungle

For the Japanese, things were even worse for, as their logistical system fell apart, great reliance was placed on capturing Allied medicines (and other supplea). The chance destruction of a Japanese medical dump during their 1944 Burmese offensive had a disastrous effect on the 53rd Division, which suffered the worst incidence of malarial infection of any Japanese unit in this theater. By 1945, 98% of Japan's 28th Army in Burma had caught the disease, complicated by dysentery.
The deep jungle also added to the miseries by rotting food, clothes and shoes, and rusting equipment, and causing foot-rot (which was not always treatable due to a lack of medicines). The Allies' "jungle green" clothing issued in New Guinea was found to cause ulcers by inhibiting air circulation. The fetid, nauseating smell of decay from rotting vegetation added to these discomforts and dangers, while noises from various jungle animals or even from dripping water assaulted raw nerves, especially at night, which "converted" them-with only a little imagination-into gunshots or footsteps (respectively), and these phantoms could terrify inexperienced troops. By degrees, the men had to learn to conquer these terrors, and this applied to Japanese as well as to Allied soldiers; one "green" and jittery Allied unit in Burma fired off all its ammunition in one night in response to such noises, leading to the loss of a critical position by default. During a post-war training exercise in Malaya, a British reserve officer (new to the jungle but still within earshot of a major highway) literally died of fright within an hour of entering the jungle!

Advantages of the jungle

Allied accounts speak of troops being bewildered by, unnerved in, or terrified of, the jungle . . . and yet others felt quite at home, and safe, in it. Contrary to the myths, even the Japanese could be afraid of it. But in time most men learned to live in the "green hell", realizing that, far from being hostile, it was really neutral and would treat all the ignorant with equal (pitiless) indifference, but would provide the enter-prising with welcome cover, bamboo and other growth for water, food, building material, and even tools and weapons. While the damp would rot batteries, it supplied fireflies or luminous leeches which (placed in a flashlight's reflector) made a good substitute; maggots, which eat only dead flesh, could be used to clean wounds. Having eventually grown accustomed to the jungle, many troops felt exposed and vulnerable when leaving its claustrophobic confines, even to cross a rice paddy.

Poor visibility in jungle

Due to the generally poor visibility in jungle, other senses like hearing and smell became of paramount importance. Silence was vital in order to hear the enemy first, but moving through the jungle was invariably noisy; whereas one veteran observed that the Japanese were particularly so (and a second tells of a Malayan Chinese finding it almost unbelievable that the Japanese could move as slowly, noisily, or clumsily through jungle), he subsequently admitted that other nationalities were too. One US infantryman practiced walking silently in the jungle, much to the amusement of other GIs until his greater survival prospects were demonstrated, but a British enthusiast of this observed that he found it very tiring and that it demanded much practice. To minimize noise and avoid detection by "jitter parties", some Allied units ordered their men never to talk or fire at night, and an American officer on Bataan withdrew all tracer ammunition at night for this reason! Other Allied troops were sometimes instructed to on no account ever leave their positions at night (even if wounded) and to treat all movement observed as hostile. In such circumstances, bayonets and grenades were of much more use, explaining why combat against the Japanese will almost always be hand-to-hand. However, the dangers of grenade-throwing were enhanced in jungle terrain; in a post-war tragedy, a British officer lost one eye when his grenade bounced back off a tree, and a few months later he lost the other eye in an identical mishap. Smell, too, could sometimes mean the difference between success or failure; due to different clothing, materials, food, tobacco and lubricants, it was easy to smell the enemy. Cigarette smoke, especially, lingered in the jungle. One British guerrilla liaison officer gave up smoking because it impaired his sense of smell. Allied sources refer to the fish-like odor of Japanese rations, the sickly-sweet perfume worn by officers (sometimes to prevent straying at night), and the "pungent fragrance" of their tobacco.

Training for the jungle

There is no doubt that, initially, Allied units were often terrified of facing the Japanese in the jungle—and the Imperial Japan Army, considered before 1941 to be anywhere between second and sixth-rate by the Western Allies, became an army of supermen almost overnight. It was then thought that Allied troops were less than 50% as effective in the jungle as the Japanese, and even Churchill was moved to observe that entering jungles to fight the Japanese was like "going into the water to fight a shark". The myth was born that all Japanese were jungle-trained, but this was of course not so. In the spring of 1941, some of their troops received such instruction on Formosa or Hainan, but these facilities could never have trained all eleven divisions used against the Western Allies in the time available. The Taiwan Army Research Section on Formosa was only a small unit (created in January 1941) for researching various aspects of jungle war-fare, but if the Japanese had really been experts in jungle fighting "they would not have starved to death while nearby natives ate their fill". Certainly few (if any) Japanese troops in the early Bataan or Malayan campaigns were jungle-trained; and when Japanese logistics all over the PTO broke down (and the Allies no longer left behind sup-ply dumps for their use) Japanese personnel, especially the lower ranks, either starved to death in large numbers and/or ate grass, roots, bark, wood, rotten food, slugs, insects, tree sap and ultimately human flesh to stay alive. Even on Bataan in 1942, the Japanese had to eat their own horses, while in the Solomons by the end of that year 100 men were dying of hunger each day. On Guadalcanal alone 10000 starved to death, and a Japanese veteran of New Guinea observed that in such dire straits, the jungle "was no place for human beings".

Jungle equalizer role

Nor did the Japanese have any great love for the jungle. In the PTO, the good food and gentler climate of Java was preferred to Burma, the least popular' posting in the Imperial Japan Army. Here even the Japanese found the weather too hot; the British General Slim observed that it had the world's worst climate for at least six months of each year, breeding the world's worst diseases, and it contained some of the world's worst terrain. On Bataan, too, Japanese personnel were unaccustomed to the heat. But where the Japanese differed from the Allies initially was in attitude. For Japan, the jungle was the great "equalizer", "a shield" for her technologically inferior armies which gave them an edge over the nominally more mobile Allied forces possessing greater firepower. To the Allies, the jungle was almost universally regarded as impenetrable, despite some warnings and even limited experiments which cast doubts on the validity of this wishful thinking (based mostly on observations from the rear seat of staff cars). The Japanese had no such delusions and accepted the hardships of the jungle, living on captured or commandeered supplies and travelling as light as possible, mainly on bicycles but also using mules, native labor and even elephants. Motor vehicles were kept to a minimum. The Allies in the early campaigns were often over-equipped with motor transport and over-burdened with too much personal gear for the terrain, and thus were fatally dependent on the few roads in existence. Roads were, in any case, not necessarily a faster means of travel; the Japanese 31st Division took just four days to go through 15 miles of jungle to the Kohirna/Imphal battles in 1944 using narrow tracks across steep hills, but then needed another five days to go just 25 miles more by road in captured Allied transport.

Out-flanking movements

Throughout the war the Japanese amazed their foes by the speed they could move through jungle, enabling them to fully exploit their "hook" tactics (which entailed infiltrating their infantry past Allied positions to cut off lines of supply by means of road-blocks). These blocks forced Allied units to abandon their vehicles and heavy equipment and try to withdraw through the unfamiliar jungle, or face either slow starvation or hastier annihilation from other Japanese forces advancing down the road with (often) armor, artillery and/or air support. The "hook" was less successful against lightly equipped Allied units, like those of the Philippine National Army, which were more able to take to the jungle and so bypass the Japanese roadblocks, which more road bound formations would almost always try and clear at heavy cost in men and materiel. Later in the war, Allied units with TO&Es revised to dispense with many motor vehicles would simply dig in as a response to such tactics and rely on air support to sustain them, turning the tables on the Japanese who would invariably batter away at the Allied positions in a futile attempt to reduce them. Later still, the Allies even used similar tactics themselves against the Japanese and on occasion, because encirclement and infiltration tactics became "almost . . .dogma" with the Japanese, the Allies exploited this inflexibility by ambushing their foe's road columns and enticing the enemy into prepared ambushes as he tried to infiltrate and outflank the Allied positions. The Australians caught a number of Japanese columns in this manner in Johore in 1942, and throughout the war the Japanese were renowned for their lack of skill in dealing with out-flanking movements and for the ease with which they could be ambushed when on the move.

Jungle warfare schools

It is also a myth that no Allied units were jungle-trained in 1941, although it must be said that those lucky few who were invariably undertook commando-type roles; the British 70th Division, for instance, was carved up for the first "Chindit" operation behind Japanese lines in Burma. Moreover, this unit (plus a handful of others, some jungle-trained as early as 1938) was but a drop in the military ocean. The Allies then established their own jungle warfare schools in various locations; but, as an example, during the first half of 1942 one such in Australia had the trainees spending 75% of their time constructing anti-invasion defenses rather than preparing for the Japanese and the jungle. The Australian bush was moreover, no real preparation for the "matted wilderness" of New Guinea. After this unhappy start, Australian methods improved so much that General Slim tried to secure the attachment of Australian officers with knowledge of jungle-training to all his units so as to pass on their skills, and the US 8th Brigade-although inexperienced in battle-benefitted greatly from their training in Australia when they saw combat in the New Guinea jungles.

Limited visibility of the jungle

Finally, the limited visibility of the jungle, coupled with the communications problems, endemic to the PTO, not only forced the siting of positions much closer together for mutual support than was necessary (or prudent) elsewhere, but also put a premium on good leadership and the exercise of personal initiative. One Chindit officer remarked that, paradoxically perhaps, air force personnel (especially those from the Commonwealth rather than from Britain) were better in the jungle due to greater self-discipline (even though the environment was somewhat more restricted than the wild blue yonder of aerial flight) than army personnel who were often incurably imbued with a herd instinct. In such circumstances, the Imperial Japan Army was less able to instill these qualities into its personnel and, ultimately, the jungle—far from being a shield—proved to be its grave when it failed to adapt its methods as quickly as most opponents did.

JAPANESE ARMOR

One of the main defects of Japanese tanks has to do with the often inadequate performance, technically and tactically, although (like the Italians) they had their moments, and the heroism of the crews saddled with such poor vehicles against their usually numerically, technically and tactically superior opponents cannot be overstated.
Japanese AFVs were handicapped in three basic areas: weapons, logistical support and tactical doctrine.
Japanese AFVs made poor weapons due to a number of factors. Firstly, size and weight restrictions were significant; most roads in wartime Japan were narrow and, being relatively few in number by Western standards, emphasis was placed on rail movement. Much of the rail network is laid to a gauge of only 3.5 feet, which imposed a severe eight-foot maximum width restriction on tanks designs. This was only relaxed much later, when the Type 4 Chi-To (9.5 feet wide) and the Type 5 Chi-Ri (10 feet wide) were produced at the eleventh hour. Moreover, Japan's island geography dictated sea transportation to the combat zones, which increased pressures to minimize vehicular weights and dimensions for ease of handling and stowage aboard ship. This was translated into smaller-diameter turret rings than found on many enemy vehicles (e.g., only 44 inches on the Type 97 Chi-Ha) which limited the power of the main armament. And, with even half-inch armor plate weighing a hefty 20-lb per square foot, the maximum armor thickness was limited.

JAPANESE TANKS WEIGHT REDUCTION

No Japanese-built tank wider than seven-foot-eight or weighing over 17 tons saw action. Small wonder that a US Marine could disparagingly taunt his enemies on Peleliu by shouting that destroyed Japanese tanks were being used "to pack fish in", or that many Japanese tanks were vulnerable even to the wretched Boys ATR. A "medium" tank (like the Shinhoto Chi-Ha) weighing 16 tons, was the rough equivalent of the average foreign-built light tank (like the 12.5-15.5 ton US Stuart series), and that "heavy" tanks like the 30-ton Chi-To or 37-ton Chi-Ri were about as heavy as most foreign second-generation medium tanks.
This concern with weight reduction (and the associated benefit of a lower unit-cost) was partly responsible for the small number of 26-ton Type 95 heavy tanks built in 1925, a vehicle 8' 10" wide but armored to 30mm, which might have led to something much better. Instead, Japan neglected this category of tank for far too long, and then belatedly tried to "short-circuit" procurement (or at least design) by purchasing plans, manufacturing licenses and one example each of a German Panther D and Tiger I in late 1943, but shipping problems prevented delivery. These sophisticated, temperamental and heavy tanks were ever less suited to mass-production in resource-starved Japan than they were in the crumbling Reich (the Japanese 120-ton Oi heavy tank never got beyond the drawing board and the money spent on the German tanks would have been better invested in obtaining samples of the panzerschreck and panzerfaust. The resultant absence of more combat-worthy tanks forced the Japanese to use tankettes or the long-suffering Type 95 Ha-Go light tank in roles and situations that other armies tried to avoid altogether.

TANKS WAS UNDERESTIMATED

The Imperial Japan Army was essentially an infantry force modeled on the German Army circa 1918, and tanks were seen as nothing more than tools for infantry support and little was done to give them more important roles (like those that potential enemies were experimenting with) up to 1939. Hence a powerful AT armament, apart from the difficulties of fitting such weapons into the narrow Japanese vehicles, was regarded for too long as an expensive and unnecessary luxury by those responsible for design policy, procurement and, ultimately, use. Linked to this, the perceived threat posed by AT guns or tanks was considerably underestimated (not to say ignored altogether) due to Japan's experiences in China, where enemy tanks and AT guns were doled out in scarce penny-packets. Japan's drubbing by the Soviets at Nomonhan in 1939 should have pointed the way ahead, but the Japanese response was inadequate; AP ammunition was developed for existing gams and muzzle velocities raised (as much as barrels could safely tolerate), but the introduction of a much higher-velocity 57mm gun (a sort of Japanese 6- pounder) was rejected in favor of mounting the less-potent 47mm AT gun in the Chi-Ha for the sake of ammunition standardization with the towed AT weapon. Perhaps the Japanese would have been less complacent and short-sighted if the Russians already had T-34s and KV1s available at Nomonhan, and such a shock might have induced them to upgrade the Type 97 tankette, with its excellent sloped hull front, into something with a nastier bite and a thicker hide. But as it was, the Soviet 45mm guns used against the Japanese at this battle—powerful though they were by contemporary Japanese standards—failed to stimulate Japan into thickening the armor on its tanks. Nor did the British, Dutch and American vehicles encountered in 1941-42 have such an effect. Even the final Japanese tank designs were little snore than scaled-up, and hence more conspicuous and vulnerable, equivalents of Germany's aging PzKfw IVH or IVJ or Hungary's inferior Turan (to which Japan's tanks bore a superficial resemblance). Moreover, production suffered delays due to a bottleneck in gun manufacture, which lagged behind that of the vehicles and indicated poor industrial organization (since in other countries the reverse was usually the case).

AIRPOWER AND THE IMPERIAL JAPAN NAVY

In the capture of South East Asia, Japan foresaw little need for better vehicles since the initial Allied OBs were generally devoid of many vehicles capable of giving Japanese tanks a rough time. And besides, most PTO terrain militated against the bold armored tactics used by the Soviets at Nomonhan---or so the Japanese thought. Her short-war strategy also fostered a myopic view of future requirements and the threat from enemy tanks in places like Burma, the Pacific islands and even China/Manchuria until it was too late. In the Pacific, airpower and the Imperial Japan Navy-not the Imperial Japan Army-were the first lines of defense, while in Manchuria Japan hoped for far too long that the Soviet threat would be eliminated by a German victory on the Russian Front (or at least that the USSR's preoccupation with defeating Hitler would buy time for the Japanese defenses to be strengthened). As a result of this reasoning, light, small and cheap vehicles (in effect armored cars with tracks) were built in far greater numbers than was prudent; although detailed production figures for each type of Japanese tank are not available, it is reasonable to suppose that at least 3500 of the 6500 or so tracked tanks built between 1931 and 1945 were tankettes or light tanks, including not inconsiderable production runs of vehicles like the Ke-Nu (a modified Ha-Go), the Ke-Ni and Ke-To (further Ha-Go developments) which saw little or no action and were a great waste of design facilities, labor, material and time at the expense of fewer but tougher tanks. Similarly, Japan dabbled with designs for a host of other vehicles of questionable value (given her problems in matching the growing fleet of Allied tanks assembling for use against her); these luxuries included various sub-versions of the Type 89 Chi-Ro with relatively subtle improvements and sundry mine-clearance and bridging tanks, amphibious tanks, SP guns of diverse sorts, and APCs. The list is too long to name, let alone describe, them all.

MUCH LOWER PRIORITY

Third, tank and AFV production was accorded a much lower priority (as in Britain) than aircraft production or shipbuilding, and the replacement of merchant ship losses alone or—more accurately—attempts to do so consumed 17% of Japanese steel output in 1943. In terms of steel production, Japan was outmatched by the USA by a factor of 1:13.87. Although tank production, theoretically, gained greater importance in 1945, in practice nothing changed; by then it was, in any case, far too late. Japan was by then no nearer to rationalizing tank design in favor of one or two basic models than she had been a decade before.
Japanese tanks suffered from a lack of attention to detail that undermined combat effectiveness even further. While Japanese armored cars were, arguably, more useful in patrolling areas like China, Manchuria and other captured territory, their value in combat against the Western Allies was limited, particularly as they were for the most part rather crude truck conversions and not "armored cars" as the term was understood in the West, being neither low-slung nor silent, and lacking all-wheel drive. Their piece-meal production meant that there were eight versions of the Sumida model alone spread between three variants. Other poor features in heavier tanks included the absence of power traverse, the fitting of shoulder-controlled main armament (like British versions, tiring and even dangerous to use in action), cramped and uncomfortable vehicle interiors, poor crew communication devices (i.e., reliance on voice tubes rather than on an intercom system), poor vision devices (an absence of periscopes—especially in the lighter tanks), and terrible turret layouts (i.e., one or two-man turrets). Although their good-quality optical equipment made Japanese gunnery accurate, this was more than counter-balanced by these other poor features; Japanese tanks have problems spotting or acquiring targets quickly, especially if moving. In addition, the absence of a coaxial MG in most Japanese tanks is a serious drawback.

POOR LOGISTICAL SUPPORT

Japanese tanks suffered from their thin armor, and some Allied troops found HE ammunition, which literally tore Japanese vehicles to pieces, was sometimes more effective than an AP round (which might pass clean through the target tank without doing much damage). Other deficiencies included an absence of splash protection for vision devices, gun mantlets and turret rings, and little attempt to radically slope armor plates (often leaving ballistic "shot traps" due to its poor arrangement). There was a reluctance to weld armor plate despite the available expertise, and hence the abundance of steel or asbestos rivets to become detached and injure crew-men under the shock of striking projectiles (the asbestos rivets being part of the heat-proof lining fitted into some Japanese tanks, a rather expensive feature of only limited value).
Japanese tanks also suffered the poor logistical support from which all Japanese forces. However, the Type 92 Combat Car and Type 94 Tankette were exceptions to this, having a propensity to shed their tracks, which prevented the latter at least from executing high-speed turns. There were also complaints in 1933 of inadequate standards of crew maintenance during the Jehol campaign, suggesting that these duties were neglected, and the Chi-Ha was certainly more demanding than its erstwhile rival, the Chi-Ni, in this respect. The mechanical sophistication of some Japanese tanks was perhaps incompatible with the harsh environment in which they operated, and this was compounded by the tendency of the Imperial Japan Army to rely on very narrow logistical margins. Japanese officers saw themselves as warriors rather than the managers of stevedores (again a throw-back to the samurai attitude towards anything so mundane); "the counter and the abacus were abhorred" by them. But although the men could manage without food and munitions for a time by capturing Allied stocks, the latter held no spare Japanese vehicle parts and probably not much diesel fuel for their engines either, rendering somewhat hollow a Japanese writer's boast (in 1929) that "we can fight with our bare fists if necessary". The Imperial Japan Army was noted (like the Red Army) for its emphasis on "teeth" units at the expense of support functions, and while the Americans put many of their best men into such non-combat roles, the Imperial Japan Army preferred to misuse their skills in battle. In terms of off-road mobility, Japanese vehicles were sometimes inferior to their foreign counterparts; the first two Shinhota Chi-Ha tanks to see action—at Corregidor in 1942—had to be towed off the steep beach by a captured Stuart tank (though in fairness, it must be mentioned that they were prototype models).

GOOD FEATURES ON JAPANESE TANKS

For the sake of balance, the good features on Japanese tanks must also be mentioned. The bellcrank "scissors" suspension (modified from the British Carden-Lloyd type) was a reliable, simple and relatively inexpensive system compared to, say, the more costly and sophisticated torsion bar system-which also raised a vehicle's height and weight-used on some German, Soviet and US tanks. Japan also pioneered the use of water-jet propulsion in amphibious vehicles, and also the use of air-cooled diesel power plants in tanks. A whole range of standardized engines were developed for trucks and tanks to optimize common parts usage, the stimulus being the problems envisaged with water-cooled engines in China's often and or sub-zero environment, the superior thermal efficiency of the diesel with a resultant lower fuel consumption, the greater availability of diesel fuel over gasoline and the former's easier and safer storage (not to mention lower evaporation losses). Although crew safety under combat conditions was only marginally improved by diesel engines (since most tank fires were caused by ammunition fires), there was a benefit in using such fuel; one-third of all US tank personnel who suffered bums in World War 2 did so while mishandling gasoline under non-combat conditions. The dangers of this volatile fuel were brought home to the Japanese in 1921 when two British engineers were badly burned when a Vickers Model C tank bought by Japan caught fire during testing.

JAPANESE TANKS OMITTED

A number of Japanese tanks have been omitted because they saw little or no combat. These include the French FT light tanks purchased or (later) captured and used in Manchuria, the Renault NC-1 tanks also thus acquired (and used in Shanghai in 1932 where the good 30mm armor proved no substitute for its chronic unreliability), the Vickers-Crossley Type 87 armored cars used in China and Manchuria, open-topped cargo carriers converted from Type 97 tankettes, and the Ho-Ha half-track APC (which bore a superficial resemblance to Germany's sWS series, albeit more thinly armored) on which data about combat use is contradictory. In any case, the notion of the Japanese using these vehicles like panzergrenadiers does not quite square with the historical tactics of the Imperial Japan Army. Other omissions include the amphibious tank Type 3 Ka-Chi, and the Type 4 Ka-Teu amphibious tracked APC, plus the US Smarts captured or salvaged on Bataan or in Burma in early 1942, and lastly the various other Allied tanks (also part of the spoils of war like the Vickers light tanks, Marmon-Herringtons, White scout cars and host of wheeled or tracked tanks left behind by the Dutch, Thai, French or the Chinese). In Singapore alone, about 200 British tanks (armored cars and Carriers), about 100 trucks and 10000 automobiles were captured, while the Allied retreat from Burma in mid-1942 yielded another 126 tanks or so, 6000 trucks and over 7000 automobiles. The Japanese were continually ordered to make the most of captured equipment, and generally made far less use of trucks than Western armies (their men usually marched to battle).

JAPANESE CARRIERS

Japan produced fewer trucks than even the hard-pressed USSR, and the Imperial Japan Army relied on the humble bicycle to transport personnel and supplies in the PTO, each being capable of carrying a man, his weapon and 60 pounds of gear. So highly were they prized that some captured in Singapore were later found on Guadalcanal, and like the Vietcong in a later conflict the Japanese used the bicycle in terrain where motor transport could not go or would not survive long. The bicycle was easy to conceal, repair and needed no fuel. Bicycles were augmented by pack animals, hand- or bicycle-towed carts, and—in Burma alone-20000 ox-carts, plus hired or forced labour, and even Japanese personnel themselves, pressed into service as carriers. When things became desperate, they even resorted (in Burma) to staging a huge cattle-drive to provide meat on the hoof, but most animals died of disease, fell off the steep terrain, or drowned. On logistics, Lt.-General Kotoku Sato, a divisional CO in Burma, stated that, "the tactical ability of XV Army staff lies below that of cadets", and described their attitude towards supply as "completely irresponsible". The same could, perhaps, be said of the entire Japanese war machine.

JAPANESE TANK TACTICS

In the realm of tank tactics, the Imperial Japan Army's evolution as an infantry force from the samurai armies (which were largely composed of foot soldiers) left no tradition of bold, aggressive cavalry tactics as a model, and no Japanese cavalry units which fought in the PTO appear to have distinguished themselves in action as horse soldiers. Add to this the absence of influential mentors like a Guderian or a Liddell-Hart to plead the case for mechanization and the use of armor en masse, and the fact that most senior Japanese officers were infantrymen or gunners by training, and it is no real wonder that Japanese armor remained tightly shackled to the infantry-support role for most of the war. General Tomoyuki Yamashita, among others, advocated modernizing the Imperial Japan Army along German lines in respect of tanks, signals and military engineering, but Tojo's hostility (for largely personal reasons) ensured that the High Command ignored the advice.

FISH-BONE TACTICS

Against raw, demoralized and/or badly equipped forces, Japanese tanks sometimes achieved devastating results out of all proportion to their numbers, as on Bataan against the Philippine 21st Division in April 1942 and in various locations in the Malayan campaign (especially at Pant Sulong in January 1942) where the "fish-bone" or "filleting" tactics were used to provide flanking fire from the roads at night while infantry moved ahead to either side, and where the lack of undergrowth in the rubber plantations aided the bold use of armor. On Guadalcanal and Goodenough islands, even a handful of Japanese light tanks advancing down jungle paths at night very were effective against badly-armed local militia. However, where the defenders had the necessary equipment (and will), the Japanese usually suffered heavily when using such aggressive tactics, as at Taierchaung in China in 1938, at Bakri in Johore, or Meiktila in Burma, or at Baliaug on Bataan in 1942. But generally, Japanese tanks remained faithfully subservient to their infantrymen, or conducted half-hearted attacks alone against the Allies, as at Bataan's Orion-Bagan line in March 1942, or acted as mobile pillboxes.

JAPANESE TANK CREWS

A British writer describes Japanese tank crews as being "clueless" (i.e., devoid of common sense or logic), and they were prone to panic when surprised by Allied armor, seeking to escape rather than find cover and shoot it out, or even to abandon their vehicle intact upon occasions. Their tanks would often move carelessly in daylight despite Allied air superiority, and were sometimes lax in the use of camouflage (to their severe detriment), while at night they often blundered about with their headlights on too close to Allied positions and suffered the consequences. Like their infantry comrades, Japanese tank crews failed to modify or improve their tactics, and the nocturnal mechanized banzai charge was, not suprisingly, also the favorite ploy-the classic example occurring on Saipan on 17 June 1944 where, betrayed by their noisy deployment, 32 of the 44 attacking tanks were destroyed by the Americans in a "Turkey Shoot". As with Japanese infantry, such assaults were invariably launched along predictable lines of approach where the element of surprise had been lost.