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Hi all,
I've been reading an interresting account of the American Expiditionary Force during World War I. The book talks a lot about General John Pershing and the challanges he faced. Also, it gives an account of the battle of Belleau Woods, the Fighting along the Marne, and the St. Mihiel Salliant. Briefly, I've paused just prior to reading about the Battle of the Meuse Argon. I have one question looming in my mind that the author does not answer.

Just prior to the Meuse Argon it gave an account of the 14 mile wide front that British General Haig attacked that was much further north of the American sector. It said that British, Anzac, and Canadian troops advanced nine miles and captured 15,000 Germans in one day. Three days later the advance was stopped but those same troops captured another 12,000 Germans. Once the advance stopped, Marshall Foch attacked with the French further north of the British position which met with great success aswell. The British and the French reclaimed all of the ground taken by the Germans earlier in March 1918.

As General Pershing planned the attack on the Meuse Argon, he noted the American soldiers killed in action, from the earlier actions listed above, totalled around 50,000. If succesful, He believed his campaign through the Meuse Argon would put the AEF right into Saarbrucken, Germany. Now here is my question. Did the AEF bring or introduce any tactics, training, or fighting style that their European allies did not posess? Did the AEF have better strategies? Or was it just that the Germans were so tired of war that the AEF could absorb man-for-man casualties with the Germans?

It seems to me that Haig and Foch's push in the north was a masterful stroke of brilliance not previously displayed by the France and Britain. I enjoyed reading about the battles of Belleau Wood, the Marne, and the St. Mihiel salliant. I think Pershing's attack into the St. Mihiel salliant was a good idea. However, I am not clear that if the AEF brought a better level of fighting or if they simply made many of the same mistake France and Britain made but were simply able to just absorb the casualties.

I don’t believe any of the troops irregardless of their origin were adequately trained for trench warfare, not to mention the quality of replacements by 1918.
The casualties of the nations involved in the west had reached a staggering level by 1918, combined with the new and untapped resource of American men and material flooding into the war ,Germanys had no other option .

General Pershing was in the right place/position at the right time, don’t get me wrong I am not calling Pershing’s credentials questionable. I am just pointing out that how far Americas involvement tips the scale. You could have “ filled in the blank “ with number of Generals of the time and basically had the same conclusions.

I don’t believe any of the troops irregardless of their origin were adequately trained for trench warfare, not to mention the quality of replacements by 1918.
The casualties of the nations involved in the west had reached a staggering level by 1918, combined with the new and untapped resource of American men and material flooding into the war ,Germanys had no other option .

Good point. Although on September 12, 1918 when the AEF effectively captured the saliant, they did it great percision. The Army and Marine Corps infantry mainted a steady march with their artillery just infront of them. One of the factors that helped them was the US Army Corps of Engineers. Just the bombardment started the engineers carefully laid chicken wire over the barbed wire. In some cases they did this while under fire. The Germans of course were catching the artillery while trying to stop the engineers. When the infantry came through the merely had to walk over the top of the barbed wire paved with chicken wire. Who else did that? Did the British and French or the Germans ever try that?

Chicken wire, I don’t know, maybe?

But if your referring to combination of arms the answer is yes. There is a whole host of tactics used by front line troops to clear wire, some successful ,some not.

This was no cake walk/route for Pershing, By the end of October he had traded 100,000 casualties for the ground. In fact Pershing was becoming exceedingly apprehensive with the pressures implied from the home front . I truly believe with out the pressure from Marshal Foch the offensive would have slowed to a stalemate by fall.

Once the Germans managed to get off their heals in October the American general inexperience started to rear its ugly head. Phase three of the offensive was basically a failure for the Americans, at best by October we started to trade man for man.

PS: what book are you reading, is it a new title. I would like to get a look at it. [:)]

"Did the AEF bring or introduce any tactics, training, or fighting style that their European allies did not posess? Did the AEF have better strategies? Or was it just that the Germans were so tired of war that the AEF could absorb man-for-man casualties with the Germans?"
---- Quoted from ShermanM4


In a manner of speaking, yes the AEF did bring something new to the battlefield that helped overcome the German defenses. However it wasn't a new weapon or tactic. (Or at least not intentionally so.) It was the Spanish Flu. In the Summer of 1918 A new malady began to infect troops on the Western Front. Doctors took to calling it the 'three day flu'. Few soldiers died of the disease through the Summer. However, in the fall of 1918 soldiers on both sides began to drop like flies to what Allied soldiers called the Spanish Flu, although it now seems likely to have been brought over with AEF troops from Kansas.

The German nation, already bled white by the horrific casualties of the previous years of war, were unable to replace the troops infected and/or killled by the flu. The Brits and the French had similar problems providing replacements. However the inflow of fresh troops from America, and the promise of more to come, proved a deciding factor in the outcome of the battle and the war.

[Source: http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/FWWinfluenzia.htm]

Btw, I finally got control of my PC back! It was a very hairy few months trying to debug my pc, but it finally is free of the malware that had taken over my mouse.

Its good to be back.

Cheers!
Eric Maietta

ORIGINAL: ShermanM4

... Now here is my question. Did the AEF bring or introduce any tactics, training, or fighting style that their European allies did not posess? Did the AEF have better strategies? Or was it just that the Germans were so tired of war that the AEF could absorb man-for-man casualties with the Germans?

ORIGINAL: Sarge

I don’t believe any of the troops irregardless of their origin were adequately trained for trench warfare, not to mention the quality of replacements by 1918.
The casualties of the nations involved in the west had reached a staggering level by 1918, combined with the new and untapped resource of American men and material flooding into the war ,Germanys had no other option .

General Pershing was in the right place/position at the right time, don’t get me wrong I am not calling Pershing’s credentials questionable. I am just pointing out that how far Americas involvement tips the scale. You could have “ filled in the blank “ with number of Generals of the time and basically had the same conclusions.

One of the things the AEF had going for it, as Sarge pointed to above, was that not only did America have tremendous manpower available - but most importantly - it was "fresh" manpower.

US troops had their own élan which did much to overcome their shortcomings in battle experience. This combination of 'lack of battle experience' but 'great fighting spirit' was noted by the Germans in early 1918, and was very troubling to them.

I wouldn't say that US troops were not properly trained (by summer 1918) because the troops entering the great battles of 1918 had been well trained by the French for many months (except for the II Corps troops, who were trained by and served under the British).

I don't think American troops showed themselves inferior to their European counterparts at all - their first time in battle. It's just that the Europeans all had a few years of very tough battle experience by 1918 and the US was still getting that initial lesson.

Also, compared to the shortcomings in the French and British Armies (that were never wholly corrected during the war - read Paddy Grifith, and John Mosier), The US Army developed a sound organization that served it well during the war and in the next war.
I would contend that, overall, the two soundest Armies in terms of organization, tactics, and practice were the German and US Armies - by the end of the war.

Also, compared to the shortcomings in the French and British Armies (that were never wholly corrected during the war - read Paddy Grifith, and John Mosier), The US Army developed a sound organization that served it well during the war and in the next war.
I would contend that, overall, the two soundest Armies in terms of organization, tactics, and practice were the German and US Armies - by the end of the war.

Interresting. One of the things the book mentions was the difficulty with the French transit, port, and telephone system. Pershing was able to bring thousands of American stevadors to work in the ports. Bell Atlantic and the engineers came and built a phone system just for the AEF. Railmen from Pennsylvania came and re-built parts of the French rail line! Amazing! It almost seems like what the US is doing abroad right now is not all that new.

ORIGINAL: Big B

{snip}
Also, compared to the shortcomings in the French and British Armies (that were never wholly corrected during the war - read Paddy Grifith, and John Mosier), The US Army developed a sound organization that served it well during the war and in the next war.
I would contend that, overall, the two soundest Armies in terms of organization, tactics, and practice were the German and US Armies - by the end of the war.

Yes agreed,

But also don’t forget to take into consideration, Germany had suffered 5,000,000 to 6,000,000 causalities by the time Americans entered the war.

ORIGINAL: ShermanM4

As General Pershing planned the attack on the Meuse Argon, he noted the American soldiers killed in action, from the earlier actions listed above, totalled around 50,000. If succesful, He believed his campaign through the Meuse Argon would put the AEF right into Saarbrucken, Germany. Now here is my question. Did the AEF bring or introduce any tactics, training, or fighting style that their European allies did not posess? Did the AEF have better strategies? Or was it just that the Germans were so tired of war that the AEF could absorb man-for-man casualties with the Germans?

Short answer, no. In some ways the AEF was a throwback to the problems experienced by armies in the earlier years of the war (e.g. insufficient artillery prep due to lack of numbers and weight of shell, unnecessarily slow and dense tactical formations, etc.). The lack of artillery (especially heavy artillery) couldn't be helped, the US wasn't producing sufficent quantities of artillery and had to rely on the British and French who were, understandibly, reluctant to short their own troops. However, some of it could. The Germans commented on how dense AEF formations were. That lesson could and should have been learned. Instructors detailed from the British and French noted amongst some commanders a "what they've been doing for 4 years hasn't been working so far, why should we listen to them" attitude.

Pershing insisted on keeping the Americans together, ignored offers of help and instruction, and re-learned the mistakes of 1915-1916 all over again. Americans tipped the scale to some extent with numbers, but not by combat effectiveness.

By the war's end, I think the British army was the most effective having worked out a method that worked and set about relentlessly applying it. The Germans were shot, and part of the Allied success was down to German defensive tactics not being feasible in light of the poor quality manpower left after their 1918 offensive.

I understood over half the Prisoners taken in the late war fighting were taken by Commonwealth forces, they enjoyed a long spell of victory and finished the war in effective shape.

regards,
IronDuke

Short answer, no. In some ways the AEF was a throwback to the problems experienced by armies in the earlier years of the war (e.g. insufficient artillery prep due to lack of numbers and weight of shell, unnecessarily slow and dense tactical formations, etc.). The lack of artillery (especially heavy artillery) couldn't be helped, the US wasn't producing sufficent quantities of artillery and had to rely on the British and French who were, understandibly, reluctant to short their own troops. However, some of it could. The Germans commented on how dense AEF formations were. That lesson could and should have been learned. Instructors detailed from the British and French noted amongst some commanders a "what they've been doing for 4 years hasn't been working so far, why should we listen to them" attitude.

I read that! It seems like the AEF was lacking in Artillery. Although, here is an interresting fact. During the pre-assault bombardment on the Meuse-Argone, more artillery was fired than during the entire American Civil War. Frightlful what breach loading French 75's can do.

Pershing insisted on keeping the Americans together, ignored offers of help and instruction, and re-learned the mistakes of 1915-1916 all over again. Americans tipped the scale to some extent with numbers, but not by combat effectiveness.

By the war's end, I think the British army was the most effective having worked out a method that worked and set about relentlessly applying it. The Germans were shot, and part of the Allied success was down to German defensive tactics not being feasible in light of the poor quality manpower left after their 1918 offensive.

I understood over half the Prisoners taken in the late war fighting were taken by Commonwealth forces, they enjoyed a long spell of victory and finished the war in effective shape.

regards,
IronDuke

What method was that?

The UK was free to experiment with new and more effective tactics primarily due to the fact, The Americans lightened the work load considerably . All considering, the Germans up till mid 17 were doing a pretty damn good job fighting a multiple front war.
America basically took responsibility for up to 1/3 of the front, along with the market share of material by early 18.

Now don’t get me wrong,

The UK was the ONLY thing between the front line trench and the Cannel for the critical war years. Even by early 17 the war was far from over. The Germans by 18 just could no longer supply a front that had settled into a stalemate ,where meters taken would equate into the decimation of the male population of countless villages back home.

But this much is true, Pershing basically had settled into a patronizing mentality towards the tactics France and the UK had employed.
I don’t know if I blame the decision, as we all know a slow moving defense posture is costly and ineffective if under any realistic time table restraints the penny pinchers like to impose back home.

ORIGINAL: ShermanM4

Pershing insisted on keeping the Americans together, ignored offers of help and instruction, and re-learned the mistakes of 1915-1916 all over again. Americans tipped the scale to some extent with numbers, but not by combat effectiveness.

By the war's end, I think the British army was the most effective having worked out a method that worked and set about relentlessly applying it. The Germans were shot, and part of the Allied success was down to German defensive tactics not being feasible in light of the poor quality manpower left after their 1918 offensive.

I understood over half the Prisoners taken in the late war fighting were taken by Commonwealth forces, they enjoyed a long spell of victory and finished the war in effective shape.

regards,
IronDuke

What method was that?

Bite and hold.

Part of the WWI problem was that the Allies continuously looked for chances to break through and exploit, but the churning of the ground under intense bombardments together with the new weaponry and unbroken lines of trenches meant this was difficult. Units would advance and attempt to continue advancing. Slow advances allowed the defensive rail and road net behind the front line to transport German reserves to threatened areas to avert breakthrough. These forces together with local reserves launched counterattacks and restored the situation.

the British ceased bombarding for days (which only alerted the Germans to the likelihood of an attack) and instead opted for ferocious but shortlived barrages that rolled forward with the infantry in their wake. More flexible infantry tactics proved more effective at rolling up trenches. The key, though, was more limited objectives. The initial objectives were set at 1500-2000 yards so that when the troops took them, they were still within range of their supporting artillery and machine guns and these elements together with reserves brought up for the job, could dig in, hold and then savage any German counterattacks.

Attacks were therefore built to not only take objectives but defeat German countermeasures. At that point, the process would start all over again.

What is interesting is that this is a fair description of British tactical and operational method as it evolved under montgomery during the second world war as well.

ite and hold.

Part of the WWI problem was that the Allies continuously looked for chances to break through and exploit, but the churning of the ground under intense bombardments together with the new weaponry and unbroken lines of trenches meant this was difficult. Units would advance and attempt to continue advancing. Slow advances allowed the defensive rail and road net behind the front line to transport German reserves to threatened areas to avert breakthrough. These forces together with local reserves launched counterattacks and restored the situation.

the British ceased bombarding for days (which only alerted the Germans to the likelihood of an attack) and instead opted for ferocious but shortlived barrages that rolled forward with the infantry in their wake. More flexible infantry tactics proved more effective at rolling up trenches. The key, though, was more limited objectives. The initial objectives were set at 1500-2000 yards so that when the troops took them, they were still within range of their supporting artillery and machine guns and these elements together with reserves brought up for the job, could dig in, hold and then savage any German counterattacks.

Attacks were therefore built to not only take objectives but defeat German countermeasures. At that point, the process would start all over again.

What is interesting is that this is a fair description of British tactical and operational method as it evolved under montgomery during the second world war as well.

I think there a several similarities between Haig and Montgomery.

As for the bite and hold method, was this not what Pershing did with the US Army and Marines in the Soissons Salient and the St. Mihiel Saliant?

As I stated earlier, Marhsall Foch and Haig mounted offensives north of the American sector following the German failure along the Marne and Belleau Woods during the Spring of 1918. In which, the British captured 27,000 German soldiers. Were the British already practicing this bite and hold method? Is this what made them succesful in that sector?

ORIGINAL: ShermanM4

ite and hold.

Part of the WWI problem was that the Allies continuously looked for chances to break through and exploit, but the churning of the ground under intense bombardments together with the new weaponry and unbroken lines of trenches meant this was difficult. Units would advance and attempt to continue advancing. Slow advances allowed the defensive rail and road net behind the front line to transport German reserves to threatened areas to avert breakthrough. These forces together with local reserves launched counterattacks and restored the situation.

the British ceased bombarding for days (which only alerted the Germans to the likelihood of an attack) and instead opted for ferocious but shortlived barrages that rolled forward with the infantry in their wake. More flexible infantry tactics proved more effective at rolling up trenches. The key, though, was more limited objectives. The initial objectives were set at 1500-2000 yards so that when the troops took them, they were still within range of their supporting artillery and machine guns and these elements together with reserves brought up for the job, could dig in, hold and then savage any German counterattacks.

Attacks were therefore built to not only take objectives but defeat German countermeasures. At that point, the process would start all over again.

What is interesting is that this is a fair description of British tactical and operational method as it evolved under montgomery during the second world war as well.

I think there a several similarities between Haig and Montgomery.

As for the bite and hold method, was this not what Pershing did with the US Army and Marines in the Soissons Salient and the St. Mihiel Saliant?

As I stated earlier, Marhsall Foch and Haig mounted offensives north of the American sector following the German failure along the Marne and Belleau Woods during the Spring of 1918. In which, the British captured 27,000 German soldiers. Were the British already practicing this bite and hold method? Is this what made them succesful in that sector?

First of all, by 1917 the British were already using bite and hold tactics.
But the distinguishing feature of British 'bite and hold' tactics of the First World War was to have very limited battles - usually battalion sized affairs, and by definition - these were not intended to be war ending breakthroughs.
What happened at Soissons and St Mihel were not the same - these were large Corps and Army sized battles (though still limited in scope - i.e. not intended to end the war with a breakthrough) aimed at hammering the hinges in German lines, or pinching off large salients.

Bite and hold attacks did not end the war, large offensives with limited scope - launched in a sequence of continuing hammer blows - is what won the war. But that was only possible once American forces entered the war in great numbers (over two million men sent to France - more than the entire British Empire had on the Western Front by the end of the war).
1918 started with German troops on the Western Front actually outnumbering the combined Western Allies for the first time. That is what the armistice of Russia meant for the Allies - freed a lot of German manpower which made the massive German 1918 offensives possible.

In the final analysis, it was only fresh American troops by the million which swung the war to Allied victory. Also don't forget that the USA was making the majority (or a large percentage) of all Allied munitions since the early days of the war - American factories were not geared up making lots of tanks, planes, and guns - but they did make most of the Allies ammo.

Wow..This is such a complicated and controversial subject.[;)]

There has already been a few things mentioned that i agree with on the impact of AEF forces on WWI.

The major contribution of American forces Was not fresh or innovative tactics.As a matter of fact they were a throwback to pre- and early war doctrines of the attack will carry the field.Right or wrong it fit well and that tactic worked with the numbers of fresh and motivated troops that the US brought into the theater.

Several drawbacks to the AEF,,and one plus,were the large and unweildy size of her divisions.Operationally it was a nightmare,and alot of the problems encountered during the final months of the war had less to do with German opposistion,then the fact that no one in the American army had any experience in leading forces that large or in how to best use and keep them supplied.The AEF was also given some of the worst terrain to fight through as a prize for it not being broken up among the French and British armies.French,British,and Commonwealth officers and NCO's were used to help drill it for combat..some of which was taken to heart but other advice was given short shrift as there was a bias among American officers that those armies had been too long in the trenches and adverse to offensive operations.

The AEF's combat casualties were actually fairly light,compared to the time spent on the line and the type of operations carried out compared to Entente casualties during similair operations.I also don't think that it is stretching things too much to say that the major impact of the AEF was psychological upon the General staff of the German Army.Once American forces took the field they were faced with what seemed like an almost unlimited supply of manpower compared to their own dwindling reserves.The main effect on the battlefield was to throw it from stalemate to Germany being forced into a constant defensive from its introduction as an independent fighting force.The other major impact of it introduction being that it helped shorten the war by several years.Another year or two for the Entente in securing victory may have proven just as devestating domestically,and socially,as eventual defeat did for Imperial Germany.

The major contribution of American forces Was not fresh or innovative tactics.As a matter of fact they were a throwback to pre- and early war doctrines of the attack will carry the field.Right or wrong it fit well and that tactic worked with the numbers of fresh and motivated troops that the US brought into the theater.

I do not know for sure wether the AEF brought better strategies or any fresh way to fight. Nonetheless, it never lost a major campaign, and it won many battles that counted. How do you account for the use of Chicken wire bridges?

Good point. Although on September 12, 1918 when the AEF effectively captured the saliant, they did it with great percision. The Army and Marine Corps infantry mainted a steady march with their artillery just infront of them. One of the factors that helped them was the US Army Corps of Engineers. Just the bombardment started the engineers carefully laid chicken wire over the barbed wire. In some cases they did this while under fire. The Germans of course were catching the artillery while trying to stop the engineers. When the infantry came through the merely had to walk over the top of the barbed wire paved with chicken wire. Who else did that? Did the British and French or the Germans ever try that?

Or What about the battle of Blanc Mont Ridge in which the 5 marine regiment (US Marine 2nd Division) suffered 90% casualties and the US Army 36th division mounted a counter assault to break off the attackers? This action caused the Germans to abadone Champagne.

I would like to note that much has been made of poor American tactics in 1918.

It is true that the bulk of the US Army was very 'green' in spring-summer 1918. The largest criticism of the troops was that in their first battles they forgot their training by bunching up or walking upright...

But there was nothing wrong with their tactics as taught - I own an original 1917 enlisted men's field manual. I was a former infantryman myself many years ago - and the tactics taught in the 1917 Field Manual are valid today (accounting for the lack of radios and night vision devices they never had).
Patrolling basics, cover and concealment, movement to contact, base of fire and use of terrain, camouflage from enemy observation...it's ALL there, and outside of the fact that hardware available has changed - the basic tactics have not.

Beyond that, US Army never suffered mass surrenders as the British and French did in the 1918 battles - though they did stem the German tide in bloody encounters at Belleau Wood, Chateau Thierry, Vaux, etc. As I recal reading, in those battles they met the French Army going the other way...(and the British Army was no sounder after the Germans finished with them in the spring 1918), nor did US Generals ever lead their Armies into mass slaughters the likes of Verdun, the Somme, Paschendael, or Nivelle's offensive of 1917.

I don't understand the controversy over the contribution of the US Army in WWI, the Western Allies at the time certainly understood. The USA came very late into the ground war, but their contribution was timely, and decisive.

All of the "controversy" about "effectiveness" is just clouding the issue long after the fact.