Matrix Games Forums

I'm currently playing the OBC41 Campaign game (May, 1944) as the allies (even), and have noticed the following bugs:
1) 6000t "Marus" are showing up in LA.
2) I can send US MTBs to the pool, but can't retrieve them.
3) I can only access certain leaders based upon the current base HQ affiliation (ie, certain leaders are available to Central Pacific that aren't available to South pacific).
4) P-40E production doesn't switch to P-40N production.
5) When the 8th Army is created (7/43 for my game), the 6th US Inf. Div. (attached to 6th Army) appears in Japanese-occuppied Truk (but doesn't last long). After reconstitution, it is attached to West Coast.
6) Similarly, when the 6th Army is created (12/43 for my game), the 38th US Inf. Div. appears in Japanese-occupied Nanking.
7) After the Phillipines Div. is destroyed, it is reconstituted in LA, attached to West Coast. Later, it is assigned to 6th Army.

The APA (L) become available during 5/44.
When does the PB4Y Privateer factory come on line? The SB2U "Vindactor" should be "Vindicator."
Keep up the good work. I'm looking forward to "War in the Pacific."

Thanks,
Marauder

The P-40E won't switch over to the P-40N (Factories), so, I created new factories for the P-40N, PB4Y, Hurricane IIC, Ki-48-II, Ki-100 Tony, F8F, etc...

This means that when you get the new aircraft you will still be producing the old one (until the original replacement type appears!)

I noticed the same thing with the 38th Division. I have no idea why it does it.

Jeremy

Hi several things that really hurt USA in 2.0
not being able to change B-17 and B-24 production to B-29 and B-29 factories never growing limiting USA to about 3 groups that could fly B-29's and only after long period of building. PBY4 has no factory. Things that hurt Japan no AFV factory (such as they were their better then nothing) also Japan never gets Godzilla unit after US nukes them Whats up with that?

------------------
I'm not retreating, I'm attacking in a differant direction!

For the B-29's, maybe we could lower the cost? My understanding is that the more expensive something is, the fewer built per turn in a factory. The lower cost could represent high production.

Jeremy

B-26s.. There are only 3 or so groups that start off with the B-26. There are no factories for production, and the number given by the pool is extremely small. I would rather just see the B-26 'banished' and just utilize B-25s. This would prevent those initial groups equipped with 4 A/C each from idleing away.

The PCs can only be hit by AC cannon now! Yea!! Not that MTB TFs ever do anything useful, just good to see some balance back.

Airfield attacks... I believe that only 25% of aircraft 'hit' are actually destroyed; the remainder being only damaged. This should be brought up to 50-50. In addition, once an aircraft is 'damaged', it seems to be immune from being destroyed. The early attacks vs Clark field result in a huge number of damaged A/C. Somehow a damaged A/C has to be put at risk for destruction from later air raids. Perhaps a damage hit vs an already damaged A/C = destruction?? Actually I'd like to see a 75% destruction, but given the replacement limitations, 50-50 would probably work out best. Still, the limitation of damaged A/C being 'immune' from further adverse effects needs to be addressed. I usually hate seeing air groups flying the airfield attack mission, since the long term damage inflicted is so small, when compared to the immediate damage inflicted by flak. I have yet to see an airfield attack mission resulting in more enemy A/C being destroyed than friendly A/C.

Everything I've read, and all of the 'metalbenders' I've spoke with, indicate that once major structure is broken; wing spars, severed fuselage etc., the airframe becomes parts. If the A/C has fuel onboard, it becomes scrap, if it has munitions onboard, it becomes a hole on the ramp. I've seen non-load bearing skin patched with 'Coke' cans; but if a broken wing spar were to be 'welded' together, it would be time for an incentive flight for that welder.

One thing could help to make these attacks more profitable, make it possible for the capacity of the base to be reduced if hit hard enough, really hard. This would make repeated large attacks capable of reducing capacity. This would have the benefit of requiring engineers being present at a contested base, in order to keep it operational. Heavy shore bombardment could possibly do the same.

Fuel consumption... The air group 'intensive' training mission still consumes 1 fuel point per A/C per week. Hopefully this can be corrected...

B-29s, I remember from some of my reading a number of years ago that a B-29 cost 1 million US (WWII Dollars), a B-17 and B-24 were $250,000 apiece, and single engine fighters were about $50,000 each. A M4 tank was about $50,000 for comparison. So... a B-29 should require about 4 times as much 'factory utilization' as a B-17/24. About 3,000 B-29s were produced during the war. In August '45, 6 B-29 wings were operational in the Pacific. Each wing had 192 TO&E with 4? groups with 48 A/C each. This would have about 1,200 operational B-29s in August 45. At most I've had 600 B-29s in the Heavy groups in PacWar. Looks like B-29 production needs to go way up!

For comparison, the Superfortress project cost 3 Billion US for 3,000 A/C. I believe the Manhattan Project costed out to 2 Billion US, all WWII dollars. Multiply WWII dollars by about 10 to get 2000 year dollars.

Originally posted by Major Tom:
For the B-29's, maybe we could lower the cost? My understanding is that the more expensive something is, the fewer built per turn in a factory. The lower cost could represent high production.

Jeremy

Jeremy,

I have been working on the WIR upgrade for Matrix, and we had an in-depth discussion there about what effect the "cost" has on production. I haven't been able to get in-depth yet on this release yet, and it has been years since I played the original release, but I think the factories work the same way in both (if not, ignore what I will say).

In WIR, the equipment "cost" is used each turn to determine the chance of the factory increasing in size, in conjunction with the overall heavy industry number. The higher the cost, the lower the chance of increase in output, all other things being equal. For factories under 15, the chance of buildup is boosted by 20 TIMES, which goes away at 15. Thus, factory growth is minimal at and over level 15.

A trick, which I did not know about, though, was that in converting factories from 1 item to another, the cost ratio of the items is used to determine the factory output. Thus, if a high cost item producint at 15 is converted to a low cost item, output would be greatly boosted over the 15 level(we had T34 factories pumping out 38 tanks a week, rather than the max 16-17 you would see from before, because the tank cost was dropped in our tweaks for the later versions of the T34, rather than increased).

I don't know if this can help you determine an easy way to boost the B29 production - just thought I would throw it out there, as I think the production in the 2 games runs very similarly. Lower cost in and of itself will not boost production in WIR, but it will allow quicker growth to the built-in optimum level (15 in WIR), or huge increases if a conversion is carried out. Good luck.

------------------
Rick Bancroft
Semper Fi

[This message has been edited by RickyB (edited October 12, 2000).]

[QUOTE]Originally posted by Mogami:

) also Japan never gets Godzilla unit after US nukes them Whats up with that?

Currently there ar'nt enough '*'s allowable in the game code to represent the damage caused by his radioactive breath when it hits a ship.

On the lets have more B-29`s Question..please, lets go slow on this.

They are very powerful and Game Unbalancing
if they A: Appear too early and B: Too many are in play.

Gary et al ( oldtime PacWar players )put alot of time into researching and testing the OB over many years and the original manual lists them ( B-29`s )as appearing in 9/43. If memory serves the AG`s fill out very slowly as well.

The B-26 equipped many Groups in the Pacific, and in the old Game it did much better then the B-25 in the Naval Interdiction role.
Maybe because it used torpedos ??
Why lose it ?

With all due respect for your hard work which has resulted in a better game in many ways, and as a newbie poster, any changes to the OB ( especially the LCU`s and Aircraft ) will have a "ripple effect" down the road in the Campaign Game.

On the questions on the low experience levels
of the Indian Army/Brit units in SEAC, necessary, because with old Ver x22 you could often cripple the Japanese with just SEAC LCU`s and Air by 1944 against the AI.

Rich

[This message has been edited by Blackjack (edited October 12, 2000).]

Re: Godzilla Unit

If Japs get "Godzilla" unit then Allies must get "King Kong" unit - fair is fair!

On the issue of B-29s being a) too powerful, and b) too many; this is exactly what the Japanese faced from Spring '45 to the end of the war. This issue is a classic 'operations research' question. What weapons were present at what time with what capability and with what logistical support. I pointed out that the US spent 3 Billion dollars (WWII dollars) on the B-29 project. Japan between 1935 and 1941 spent a grand total of 5 billion US on armaments, most of this went into the Chinese war. Between '42 and '44, Japan spent about 12.5 billion US total on armaments. So the effect of the B-29s was indeed great when pitted against this comparitively small armaments spending.

Retrospectively, it can be said that the Pacific war for the allies was the stemming of the Japanese conquest, followed by careful terrritorial reconquest, in order to allow the B-29s to hammer the Japanese into defeat. While there was a tremendous amount of hard fighting to get to the door step of Japan, the B-29s - and the Manhattan project - were the capstone of the effort to defeat Japan. Imagine if there wasn't a B-29 project and Manhattan project; operation Olympic would've been necessary, and the loss of life and destruction would've been even greater. I go through all of this to illustrate that it is necessary to have the B-29s destroying Japanese industrial production; in order to have a 'surrender' by August '45.

How PacWar treats the problem of integrating the stratrgic air war into it's treatment of the greater conflict, is a 'design' question. I merely pointed out that the 'design' has left out a large number of airframes. If this is balanced by increased lethality per airframe, the design will hold relative to history.

'Blackjack' pointed out that any changes on the OB will have ripple effects as the campaign progresses. This is the beauty of a historical simulation. Any errors in design will make themselves obvious in the running of the simulation. Previous discussions focused on the ability of the British to defend Malaya. Changes were made in the combat effectiveness of land forces; in order to make the conquest more difficult for the Japanese. Everything I've read points out the primary obstacle the Japanese faced was their logistical situation. The Japanese had two very experienced divisions combating relatively inexperienced and ill-led Commonwealth forces. However, the logistical support that the Japanese gave these divisions in this campaign was very minimal. Representing this in PacWar would have the Japanese attacking at low readiness levels, with scant 'supply' efforts. Since the simulation doesn't do this, other means need to be taken in order to adequately reflect historical events. Currently, the effectiveness of Commonwealth land forces has been increased, and play testing will reveal if this solution works.

Personally, I believe that the Japanese logistical capability needs to be 'reeled in'. This is a major design issue. If this is done, it will have 'ripple' effects throughout the simulation. The ability of the Japanese to keep their LCUs at '99' readiness was almost fantasy. Historically, the Japanese had well trained, well led, infantry forces operating at the limits of logistical support. When defending in the latter part of the war, these men were able to inflict a considerable number of casualities on the allies. However when used in an offensive role against the well supported American and ANZAC forces, they were literally slaughtered.

In my opinion, PacWar doesn't adequately reflect the logistical difficulties the Japanese faced. In the early war period, the Japanese should be attacking inexperienced allied forces, with experience levels roughly twice that of the allies; but with readiness levels in the 50% range. The allies would be defeated primarily due to 'leadership failures', resulting in retreats before more experienced forces. The Commonwealth forces in the Malayan theatre didn't end up as casualities, they ended up in POW camps.

Playtesting will come up with an optimal solutions to all of these issues. The great thing about simulations, is that it allows an explanation as to WHY something happened, not just the fact that something happened. WitP by necessity will have to address these concerns; hopefully some of these things can be dealt with in PacWar.

[QUOTE]Originally posted by Ricochet:

[Personally, I believe that the Japanese logistical capability needs to be 'reeled in'. This is a major design issue. If this is done, it will have 'ripple' effects throughout the simulation. The ability of the Japanese to keep their LCUs at '99' readiness was almost fantasy. Historically, the Japanese had well trained, well led, infantry forces operating at the limits of logistical support. When defending in the latter part of the war, these men were able to inflict a considerable number of casualities on the allies. However when used in an offensive role against the well supported American and ANZAC forces, they were literally slaughtered.

Agree and disagree here. Correct me if i'm wrong but i think the major example of 'slaughter' here was the Guadalcanal campaign. While it cant be denied that the IJA had its doctorine badly skewed by its experiences in China, there were unique circumstances to Guadalcanal that affected them as well, mainly underestimating their numbers and resolve. Hard to say. Certainly the Japanese found out the hard way that the Banzai charge was not the best tactic when facing barbed wire and MG defences.

Also, would the SNLF forces also have this misconception? By all accounts they were highly trained and competant.

In my opinion, PacWar doesn't adequately reflect the logistical difficulties the Japanese faced.


Only have one problem with this. Readyness levels in the game are fickle enough as it is. If readyness levels are restricted to 50% or lower, even with high experience i see the Japanese player having difficulty taking *any* base that has an entrenched LCU on it.


Playtesting will come up with an optimal solutions to all of these issues.


agreed there, here's a suggestion, this ties in with Japan's logistical difficulties. Perhaps modifying the OBC file on the availability of both MCS and AP type units would better simulate Japan's difficulties. Scarcity of such vessels would make it much harder for Japan to romp around the map invading all. Given that MCS's tend to be more durable than real life (as even crippled/damaged MCS units can continue supplying the Empire) reducing them might better simulate Japan's greatest weakness for a prolonged war....her Merchant Marine and its very finite capacity and build rate.

Regarding IJA losses in offensive actions vs American and ANZAC; this also includes the New Guinea campaigns vs the Australians, and the battles on the northern side of New Guinea in '43.

One issue in PacWar that prevents Japanese actions such as Guadalcanal, at least for a human player, is the 'perfect' intelligence available. When land combat is initiated, the opposing sides 'hand' is displayed for all to see. It is as if the opposing side sends a situation report to your HQ, with the complete status of all units. This doesn't affect the combat at hand, but it definately gives the opposing side a very good indication of what it is facing in future attacks. If the Japanese had this type of intelligence regarding American force levels, they most likely wouldn't have attempted what they did.

SNLF... In my opinion, PacWar continues the 'myth' that the SNLF were Japanese versions of the USMC, but even better. The 'special' part of the SNLF seems to give the impression that they were elite, to western observers. The SNLF owed it's existance to the fact that the IJA and IJN operated more like co-belligerants rather than branches of the Japanese 'armed forces'. The IJN needed shore landing parties to carry out the functions of raiding and other 'naval' functions ashore. Rather than constantly create a detail from the ships' crew, the IJN created the SNLF. The SNLF were Navy personnel, equipped with light weapons and trained in ground operations. They were not Japanese 'marines'. These forces were not trained or equipped to engage in frontal assaults against well fortified islands. Often times they were used in opposed landings, but not to the scale of the amphibious assaults the allies launched later in the war. The experience ratings of these forces should be 60-70 range, roughly comparable to US marines before gaining the experience of the later war landings. The 90 experience ratings are a bit overblown, in my opinion.

As far as a Japanese LCU at 50% readiness being unable to take any base... Yes, if it up against a force with a competant experience level - 50 and up. The Japanese success in the East Indies and Burma was due primarily to the inexperience and poorly motivated colonial troops. When the Japanese tried offensive action versus trained and 'supplied' US and ANZAC forces, they failed. They were able to achieve local successes, but not success on the scale of PacWar vs the US and ANZAC. The superior training and leadership of the IJA infantry was not up to the task of offensive action against the logistically heavy Western forces. If the Allies were able to supply Bataan like they did Guadalcanal, I believe Bataan might have held. This assumes like force levels on both sides etc...

If the Japanese want to take an island that has a US or ANZAC division on it, they have to completely isolate it, bombard it, starve it, then assault it; and expect unfavorable loss ratios when the land forces try to take it. They tried this at the 'Canal', and obviously failed. If the IJN was capable of the isolation part, it might have taken the island. The USN and RAN were just able to keep enough 'logistics' flowing, while engaging in a battle of attrition with the IJN. If Midway didn't happen, the US probably would've been ejected from Guadalcanal, supposing that they would've even attempted a landing at Guadalcanal in that situation.

As far as modifing ship numbers, this would ruin the 'flavor' of PacWar. Given the limitations of PacWar in differentiating between 'plain' transports and amphibious assault ships, were just going to have to deal with it. The only solution I can see would be to implement a 'distance modifier' as I illustrated in another string. As far as damaged ships still being used, in a simulation of this scope, the statistical averaging takes care of the odd damaged ship.

In an ideal game of this scope, readiness levels for the 'squads', 'artillery' and 'AFV' would be separate. The Japanese would be able to keep the readiness levels for the 'squads' relatively high, the levels for the 'artillery' low to moderate, and readiness for 'AFV' low. In an even more ideal situation, the effect of 'noneffective' personnel due to disease and malnutrition would be modeled into overall readiness levels. The Allies suffered due to malaria, the Japanese suffered even more. The superior medical technology, and its application, improved troop effectiveness rates for the allies tremendously.

Finally, as I mentioned in my previous posting in this string; any changes will have ripple effects... Since overland march capabilities are directly linked to readiness levels, if the Japanese logistical capabilities were downgraded, Japanese LCUs would be immobilized. Then the formula for readiness loss for movement would have to change, and on and on... Hopefully in WitP.

[QUOTE]Originally posted by Ricochet:
Regarding IJA losses in offensive actions vs American and ANZAC; this also includes the New Guinea campaigns vs the Australians, and the battles on the northern side of New Guinea in '43.

***

yeah, thought you did still, the Japanese there did not do too poorly, Fighting and marching across some of the worst terrain imaginable, the IJA managed to get within 20-50 miles of Port Morosby before the combiations of said terrain, sickness, logistics problems and not the least the tenacious defence of the Australians halted the offensive. (that and the Guadalcanal operation taking priority over New Guinia ops) In that sitaution the Allied material advantage was not as askew. Now give the Allies time to dig in and set up extensive defences and yes, i'd agree, in that case the Japanese propensity for intense Banzai charges and damn the losses would be to their disadvantage.

***

One issue in PacWar that prevents Japanese actions such as Guadalcanal, at least for a human player, is the 'perfect' intelligence available. When land combat is initiated, the opposing sides 'hand' is displayed for all to see. It is as if the opposing side sends a situation report to your HQ, with the complete status of all units. This doesn't affect the combat at hand, but it definately gives the opposing side a very good indication of what it is facing in future attacks. If the Japanese had this type of intelligence regarding American force levels, they most likely wouldn't have attempted what they did.

***

dont see this as being a serious issue. Granted, i'm biased somewhat as i 'like' to see info on whats going on. The Guadalcanal example is IMO a poor one given the IJA/N command was extraordinary in their underestimating the #'s of men stationed on the island. So much so that even today historians are at a loss to properly explain the lapse in their intelligence services. Given that PacWar has to encompass the entire scope and breadth of the war, i would not support the institution of such a vice like Fog of war. Besides which the Allies already have enough of an advantage there with their SIGNIT (Magic) allocation each game turn. For the Japanese they only find out what their facing after combat is initiated and in many cases , thats too late to do anything about it.

***

SNLF... In my opinion, PacWar continues the 'myth' that the SNLF were Japanese versions of the USMC, but even better. The 'special' part of the SNLF seems to give the impression that they were elite, to western observers. The SNLF owed it's existance to the fact that the IJA and IJN operated more like co-belligerants rather than branches of the Japanese 'armed forces'. The IJN needed shore landing parties to carry out the functions of raiding and other 'naval' functions ashore. Rather than constantly create a detail from the ships' crew, the IJN created the SNLF. The SNLF were Navy personnel, equipped with light weapons and trained in ground operations. They were not Japanese 'marines'. These forces were not trained or equipped to engage in frontal assaults against well fortified islands. Often times they were used in opposed landings, but not to the scale of the amphibious assaults the allies launched later in the war. The experience ratings of these forces should be 60-70 range, roughly comparable to US marines before gaining the experience of the later war landings. The 90 experience ratings are a bit overblown, in my opinion.

***

I'd want to see documented proof on that, but then we're not really in disagreement here , I never felt the SNLF were 'elite' up and beyond your well trained USMC equiv. More like near equiv in exp and training assuming both units being scrutinied had not actually preformed an amphib op under fire. 70-80 sounds about right. IMO (in general) the *only* formations that should get a 90+ rating or better are units with a good amount of actual combat experience (regardless of the title of the formation)

***

As far as a Japanese LCU at 50% readiness being unable to take any base... Yes, if it up against a force with a competant experience level - 50 and up. The Japanese success in the East Indies and Burma was due primarily to the inexperience and poorly motivated colonial troops. When the Japanese tried offensive action versus trained and 'supplied' US and ANZAC forces, they failed. They were able to achieve local successes, but not success on the scale of PacWar vs the US and ANZAC. The superior training and leadership of the IJA infantry was not up to the task of offensive action against the logistically heavy Western forces. If the Allies were able to supply Bataan like they did Guadalcanal, I believe Bataan might have held. This assumes like force levels on both sides etc...

****

the game pretty much does this already though. With the exception of atoll fighting, unless the attacker has overwhelming firepower (and a dose of luck) on the first turn they often wont take the objective first hand, after which readyness levels sink fast unless kept in constant supply. I had the Japanese AI invade the western most chain of the Hawaian islands with two trained (but unbloodied) full divisions and was only able to wrest control of the base back (with two of my own) after having isolated and destroyed most of the enemy's supply horde. Still the operation is taking a month and still ongoing.

I remain leary of reducing Japanese readyness levels. Granted i hav'nt visited PacWar for a number of years so my memories are not all they should be, however for the Japanese player to take a base thats being vigourously defended, they have to follow the same careful preperations as does the Allied player...otherwise its a waste of PP and supply....of which we know the Japanese have a finite supply of.

***


As far as modifing ship numbers, this would ruin the 'flavor' of PacWar. Given the limitations of PacWar in differentiating between 'plain' transports and amphibious assault ships, were just going to have to deal with it. The only solution I can see would be to implement a 'distance modifier' as I illustrated in another string. As far as damaged ships still being used, in a simulation of this scope, the statistical averaging takes care of the odd damaged ship.

***

agreed its not a perfect solution, but one i suggested as it would probably be easier for the Matrix (or an independant) to implement vs your distance modifier which would mean signifigant changes to the game engine/code. Its a great idea but i dont see it getting implemented given that the team will be focusing on WitP.

***

In an ideal game of this scope, readiness levels for the 'squads', 'artillery' and 'AFV' would be separate. The Japanese would be able to keep the readiness levels for the 'squads' relatively high, the levels for the 'artillery' low to moderate, and readiness for 'AFV' low. In an even more ideal situation, the effect of 'noneffective' personnel due to disease and malnutrition would be modeled into overall readiness levels. The Allies suffered due to malaria, the Japanese suffered even more. The superior medical technology, and its application, improved troop effectiveness rates for the allies tremendously.


from what i've read, both sides suffered equally under the terrible conditions they were forced to endure. The key difference was the supply situation, the US was able to get full convoys in (for the most part), the Japanese had to trickle their supply via the Tokyo express and under constant interdiction. Had they control of the air, i think things would have been far different. Dont see the need to penalize them further in jungle fighting.


gotta disagree there, true 'technically' Japanese artillery was primitive compared to the west, but in close terrain it was'nt as bad as it would seem on paper. Japanese artillery for the most part was attached directly to the infantry and many of their pieces were lightweight and able to be setup in places that the Allies would'nt expect. Within their limitations the Japanese were quite good with it.

interesting debate ! i'm enjoying myself.


[This message has been edited by Nikademus (edited October 13, 2000).]

SNLF... Many psychological studies of men in combat point out that only 25% of men in combat do anything of effect. These men are usually called 'natural fighters'. Armies spend a great amount of time attempting to identify these men and to place them in positions where they can have the greatest effect.

In PacWar units which have trained to a specific level of competancy are given an experience rating. The rating of 50 makes a particular unit immune from readiness losses due to its own experience or leadership failures. Therefore the 50 experience level is the benchmark to identify a fully competant unit.

Armies have used methods such as selective recruitment, realistic training and tradition to increase the combat effectiveness of its forces. Examples of this would be the USMC, IJA, AIF, Canadian volunteers etc. Most operations research has concluded that these forces were 20-30% more combat effective than expectation. This would equate to experience ratings between 60 and 65 in PacWar. When these units are committed to combat, a further 20-30% increase in combat effectiveness can be gained, if relatively low loss rates are experienced. This is why the returning Australian Imperial Force divisions have experience ratings of or about 80.

In order to create combat units with greater experience ratings or combat efficiency, the natural fighters have to be cherry picked out of the main force units. This is what was done with the USMC raider battalions, the British commandos, the US Army ranger battalions and paratroop formations of all nations. This would create small units of about 50-70% greater combat effectiveness than normal expectations. This would give a PacWar experience rating of about 80. Through intensive realistic training, infrequent utilization and very low loss rates; these units can achieve a combat effectiveness almost twice that of a competant main force unit. This would equate to a PacWar experience rating of 90.

The SNLF were trained, but the men were not cherry picked, were not involved in combat operations prior to 12/41, and their selection profile wasn't any different from a IJA unit. Therefore experience ratings in the sixties would be appropriate; at most a rating of 70 in PacWar.

Artillery readiness rates... When comparing artillery, don't look at the guns, look at the national doctrine. The Japanese guns weren't less effective when employed in close terrain, just fewer could be brought to bear at any one moment. The Americans could direct the fire of multiple battalions at one time, and shift those battalions very quickly. The Japanese were lucky to have a field telephone to direct a single battalion. Japanese artillery, much like Russian artillery, was often employed in direct line of sight. The thrust of all of this is that if American artillery is going to have a very high 'readiness' level, Japanese artillery will have a much lower 'readiness' level. This would be an ideal for PacWar, a necessity for WitP. The Japanese simply couldn't mass the fires of large amounts of artillery at a given point, like the Americans could.

Disease... The Allies had two things in the combat zone that the Japanese didn't: anti-malarial drugs, DDT. When properly used, the combat ineffective rates for the allies were kept in check. There were times that the Americans did suffer high ineffective rates, but these were usually early in the war. The Japanese suffered high ineffective rates due to malaria, throughout the war. The popular literature seems to pass this over. When the synergy of malaria and poor nutrition is considered, the Japanese suffered tremendously.

[This message has been edited by Ricochet (edited October 13, 2000).]