Matrix Games Forums

Does anyone else find it strange that Napoleon and Wellington basically have equal ratings in terms of leadership?

I mean, I could understand the reasoning: the only battle they had against each other was a win for Wellington, but there were serious extenuating circumstances.

I feel like, maybe Napoleon should be 6/6 or something, since he is basically the greatest General to ever live. But, I haven't really played, and I am not sure how much of an advantage Napoleon already has...so, yeah.

The values between nappy and wellington seem equal but are not. Wellington can only handle 4 corp while nappy can handle 6. If you look at the size of any FR corps to any BR the FR are about twice the size. I think the design guys got it right![:)]

I agree with Mr Morvwilson. The corps a leader may command makes a tremendous difference. An example would be Ney. He is an excellent corp commander, but place him in charge of several and he performs abysmally. Which is historical!

Actually, Wellington can only handle 3 corps at full ability.
Napoleon was very good (perhaps the best ever), but combined with the best army in the world (moral, speed, corpssize, cavalry-percentage), he is downright scary. And thats only military leaderhip.
When Wellington and Nappy met, the french force was a shadow of its former glory and Frances enemies had catched up, though I still disagree with degrading Napoleon outside France rule (see below). He delivered some of his best performance in 1814. Weird rule. Step outside some invisible border, lose ability...[&:]


12.3.7.3 NAPOLEON'S RATINGS: Napoleon's military skill slipped noticeably as he got older. If this option is used, the NAPOLEON leader's tactical rating is reduced to “4" starting in January, 1809 and the strategic rating reduced to "4" starting in January, 1812. These reductions do not apply for combats fought within the original French home nation boundaries.

Norden

Napoleon's only problem was that by 1812 he believed so much in himself and the abilities of the French soldier that he seemd to have forgotten that he actually needed to think about strategy.  After 1812, he acted as if he just had to be present for a victory to occur.
 
It's that "Great Man" complex that some get.  They forget to do what it was that actually made them great.

Napoleon said it best when he stated that military leaders only have a short time for war. He simply stayed at the party for to long.

Napaoleon's 1815 Army was in many respects better than the Armies he had in 1813-14 as many veterans were back in the ranks that had been PoWs, and it was smaller thus having a better ratio of veterans and quality equipment.

The Army was fragile due to political and timing issues from being reconstituted so quickly.

Actually, a lot of historians have changed their opinion on the Waterloo army: many sources report it as being in poor discipline and poor supply status.
 
And, in my opinion, Napoleon's leadership never really declined at all - 1814 was not only his finest campaign, but probably the most brilliant military campaign ever waged. IIRC, his largest victory, and the one against the worst odds, was Dresden in 1813.
 
The reason he lost in the end, was not because his leadership declined, but because the forces arrayed against him were insurmountable.

The French were never really an Army that was ever in a "good" state of supply, and the 100 days of assembling the Army did create some supply difficulties. Still, the Army had the equipment it needed, had more veterans in the line formations than in 1814, and did perform well, much better than during the 1814 campaign IMHO.

And Napoleon's 1814 campaigns were some of his best, given that the line troops were of abysmal quality.

ORIGINAL: ktotwf

Actually, a lot of historians have changed their opinion on the Waterloo army: many sources report it as being in poor discipline and poor supply status.

And, in my opinion, Napoleon's leadership never really declined at all - 1814 was not only his finest campaign, but probably the most brilliant military campaign ever waged. IIRC, his largest victory, and the one against the worst odds, was Dresden in 1813.

The reason he lost in the end, was not because his leadership declined, but because the forces arrayed against him were insurmountable.

ORIGINAL: ktotwf

And, in my opinion, Napoleon's leadership never really declined at all - 1814 was not only his finest campaign, but probably the most brilliant military campaign ever waged. IIRC, his largest victory, and the one against the worst odds, was Dresden in 1813.

The reason he lost in the end, was not because his leadership declined, but because the forces arrayed against him were insurmountable.

With all respect I tend to disagree. I seriously doubt that Nappy of 1796 would have commited the mistakes of Wagram or Borodino. 1814 was a masterpiece, but in 1815 Grouchy could not have replaced Berthier. As someone said in his better days Napoleon was still better than anyone else, but these days were getting fewer and fewer. He was seriously ill.

Robrt E. Lee was also sick at Gettyburg -> check the known results.

As of Wellington he should be better than anybody in defence but his attack skills wouild be average.

A

How was Wagram a mistake? It was a massive, but bloody victory.
 
And Borodino was an unimaginative bloody assault for a specific purpose - to destroy the Russian army since it had been brought to battle. Basically, its like picking an escalated assault in EIA in order to cause massive factor losses, because you need to win quickly to avoid attrition.
 
Not only did Napoleon win, he captured the most important city in Russia.
 
So, while most people would agree that Russia was a massive mistake, which it obviously was, Napoleon's tactical, strategic, and administrational skills were intact.
 
After Russia, he rushed back to France, formed a huge army out of nothing, rushed back out, and defeated Russia and Prussia in two battles running. Then, he defeated the Au/Pr/Rus at Dresden while hugely outnumbered. The way the Allies unraveled his army was by not attacking armies where Napoleon was leading.

I don't think Borodino and the invasion of Russa was not the biggest mistake that Nappy made. In my opinion it was Spain. He invaded Spain in 07 and had 500,000 men tied up there until his abdication (well after the Russian campaign). The Russian army at the time of Borodino only had about 35,000 men to face Nappy. What if Nappy had an extra half million men to march into Russia with?

PS The chit picks were probably FR assault vs RU defend. I have made that mistake a couple of times!

I beleive that Soult was his chief of staff due to Berthier's untimely demise. That really caused some of the problems with orders tramission and interpretation during the 100 days.

Soult was no where near up to the task, as I believe he got that job as he was unreliable anywhere else.

ORIGINAL: Ursa MAior

ORIGINAL: ktotwf

And, in my opinion, Napoleon's leadership never really declined at all - 1814 was not only his finest campaign, but probably the most brilliant military campaign ever waged. IIRC, his largest victory, and the one against the worst odds, was Dresden in 1813.

The reason he lost in the end, was not because his leadership declined, but because the forces arrayed against him were insurmountable.

With all respect I tend to disagree. I seriously doubt that Nappy of 1796 would have commited the mistakes of Wagram or Borodino. 1814 was a masterpiece, but in 1815 Grouchy could not have replaced Berthier. As someone said in his better days Napoleon was still better than anyone else, but these days were getting fewer and fewer. He was seriously ill.

Robrt E. Lee was also sick at Gettyburg -> check the known results.

As of Wellington he should be better than anybody in defence but his attack skills wouild be average.

A

Soult would have been better than Ney or Grouchy in almost any capacity. What Ney would have done as chief of staff is kinda hard to imagine/amusing.

Some investigators think that It would be better Suchet in the place of Berthier, Soult against british (he know them very good) and Davout against prussians. The problem is the distrust. Ney wasn't confiable for Napoleon, remember that 40 days before was a royal army general.

I don´t like the 5-5-3 of Wellington, because he can withdraw with a 100% of posibilities too many times. He can withdraw a whole campaign and you can´t fight against the british army. I've wrote about this proble two years ago. I proposed that he can´t withdraw three consecutive times, another tactical selection for the next fight.

Nappy must drop in the last years. His tactical performance it's not so brillant than before. Many battles as wagram, Borodino or Leipzig, no more lighting victories as Austerlitz or Jena. And strategically are good, but with lathency periods alternate with euphory periods. Was an irregular leader in the last stages of the war.

Camille

Napoleon would have been better served with Suchet as his chief of staff, in that I agree. But again, Napoleon trusted Soult less than he trusted Ney. The distrust with Ney hurt the commincation of orders to Ney, and contributed to the a less than optimal performance for Ney during the campaign.

As for Wellington, he conducted as much of his campaigning "in reverse" as he did going forward. He was very able in choosing when not to fight as well as when to fight. That allowed him to achieve success with the smaller armies he commanded, keep his army intact(a critical task) while being pursued, and lived to fight another day. Every battle he fought was on ground of his choosing, and when it didn't suit him he didn't fight. Should the game not reflect this?

Nappy's enemies were far larger in 1814, and many of the French losses were at the hands of some of his marshall's. This prevented him from really concentrating any force to anable any "grand" wins as in years past. 1814 was a much more difficult situation due to number of his enemies (essentially everybody in europe). His abilities kept him from getting steamrolled.

ORIGINAL: Camile Desmoulins

Some investigators think that It would be better Suchet in the place of Berthier, Soult against british (he know them very good) and Davout against prussians. The problem is the distrust. Ney wasn't confiable for Napoleon, remember that 40 days before was a royal army general.

I don´t like the 5-5-3 of Wellington, because he can withdraw with a 100% of posibilities too many times. He can withdraw a whole campaign and you can´t fight against the british army. I've wrote about this proble two years ago. I proposed that he can´t withdraw three consecutive times, another tactical selection for the next fight.

Nappy must drop in the last years. His tactical performance it's not so brillant than before. Many battles as wagram, Borodino or Leipzig, no more lighting victories as Austerlitz or Jena. And strategically are good, but with lathency periods alternate with euphory periods. Was an irregular leader in the last stages of the war.

Camille

I think it was both a case of his arnies getting so large as to not be easily handled and the general decline in health, both mental and physical. I don't think it is a coincidence that he handled the very small army in the 1814 Campaign so deftly. He was also not nearly as well served by his Marshals in later years and he couldn't be everywhere at once. I think The Hundred Days demonstrates all these points.

Its mostly off tangent, but my personal belief to explain Napoleon's performance in the days after Ligny is explained by his belief in destiny. The campaign until Ligny was typically and marvellously played by him with vim and vigour.

Then he hit the wall and he felt destiny was against him.

All through his life and career he'd been motivated and inspired to take bold risks through his belief in destiny. When you know luck or the Gods are with you, you will take greater risks and you will be alert, watching for moments to sieze.

When you lose that spark, when you don't see yourself as destined to win it doesn't just become not as aggressive. You instead see yourself as destined to fail gloriously and will work to enable it. Sending forward the Heavies and then the Old Guard at Waterloo was not the actions of one expecting to win, but rather of one who was playing out the part and not going to go out without throwing away all his chances.

I can't speak for others but I know that I'm exactly the same way when playing games. When I know in my heart that I won't win, there is a driving desire to make it so.

It is petulance and pettiness that exactly mirrors one's confidence and arrogance when in ascendance.

Well it would seem that Napoleon was still very confident on the morning of Waterloo when he stated that the battle would be no more serious than eating ones breakfast, so I don't think he had lost faith at that point; unless it was pure bluster to mask his own self-doubt. Also, Ney ordered the charges of the Heavy Cavalry after Napoleon basicly turned over command to him; because of fatigue and illness and maybe overconfidence . I think the Guard attack was a desperate attempt by Napoleon to clinch a victory over the British before the Prussian forces could be brought to bear.

The Hundred Days certainly started off with Napoleon seeming to posess the old magic, but things quickly started to fall short during on the 16th and certainly on the morning of the 17th. If Davout and Soult had been in a command capacity in this campaign, I think Napoleon would have almost certainly have achieved his objecives of defeating the English and Prussians before the other coalition armies could be brought to bear. What would have happened after a successful Waterloo Campaign is anyones guess.

ORIGINAL: Arinvald

Well it would seem that Napoleon was still very confident on the morning of Waterloo when he stated that the battle would be no more serious than eating ones breakfast, so I don't think he had lost faith at that point; unless it was pure bluster to mask his own self-doubt. Also, Ney ordered the charges of the Heavy Cavalry after Napoleon basicly turned over command to him; because of fatigue and illness and maybe overconfidence . I think the Guard attack was a desperate attempt by Napoleon to clinch a victory over the British before the Prussian forces could be brought to bear.

This is kind of deceiving - Napoleon himself stated that even at the beginning of the Waterloo campaign he just didn't believe he could win.

The bluster that he showed was probably overcompensating for his own doubt.

What would have happened after a successful Waterloo Campaign is anyones guess.

Still a 99/100 chance that Napoleon would ultimately lose the campaign - he would have had to deal with the huge Russian and Austrian armies that were bearing down on his borders.