Matrix Games Forums

It has been said that after the war, when Japanese command grade veterans gathered, the two battles they discussed as "turning points", were Midway, and Guadalcanal.


http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/USN ... nal-1.html

I think one of the big difference between Midway and Guadacanal is that neither side really planned on Guadacanal becoming anything more than just another island to take.

Midway was meticulously planned by the Japanese (every available ship in their fleet), and the Allies certianly knew that they had a chance of pulling off an upset due to their intercepts.

Guadacanal started small with both sides eventually committing their forces piecemeal in an attempt to force the other side off the island. Neither side realized at the time the ramifications of that small piece of land but in hindsight, you can understand the point of view of those officers you mentioned.

ORIGINAL: Knavey
Guadacanal started small with both sides eventually committing their forces piecemeal in an attempt to force the other side off the island. Neither side realized at the time the ramifications of that small piece of land but in hindsight, you can understand the point of view of those officers you mentioned.

Both sides went into the Guadacanal Operations "on a shoestring". What the Campaign showed was that the US was going to get better and better and bigger and bigger..., while Japan's efforts were going to continue to be of the "shoestring" variety. Midway meant the Japanese couldn't "win".., and Guadalcanal showed just how painfull and inexorable "losing" was going to be.

ORIGINAL: Knavey

... Midway was meticulously planned by the Japanese (every available ship in their fleet), and the Allies certianly knew that they had a chance of pulling off an upset due to their intercepts ...

That was some plan; every ship in the fleet sent into positons that couldn't support one another, not to mention the Aleutians attack, which was an add-on objective from higher HQ that was never intended as a feint.

Many consider the battle at Midway as pivitol, but the loss of the KB made the American stand at Guadalcanal posible; this battle really turned the turn against IJ.

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: Knavey
Guadacanal started small with both sides eventually committing their forces piecemeal in an attempt to force the other side off the island. Neither side realized at the time the ramifications of that small piece of land but in hindsight, you can understand the point of view of those officers you mentioned.

Both sides went into the Guadacanal Operations "on a shoestring". What the Campaign showed was that the US was going to get better and better and bigger and bigger..., while Japan's efforts were going to continue to be of the "shoestring" variety. Midway meant the Japanese couldn't "win".., and Guadalcanal showed just how painfull and inexorable "losing" was going to be.

Mike, I like the way you put that. I can't ever really get passed the notion of Midway being somewhat a "lucky" engagement for the allies. There's about a hundred ways that things could have gone much worse for the USN than it did. Still, there's something to be said for those with daring and courage making their own luck.

To me though Guadalcanal will always signify the turning point of the war. There was no question of luck involved. It was a long hard fought battle in which every service distinguished itself. I think the Japanese notion that the US would capitulate evaporated on that island.

Still, I was surprised to read recently that even in 1943, as Japan was fighting to hold on to Wewak, it was still planning on how to capture Port Morseby.

The IJN's plan for Midway may have been big, but it certainly wasn't meticulous...

ORIGINAL: Terminus

The IJN's plan for Midway may have been big, but it certainly wasn't meticulous...

"Byzantine" would have been a better description for this plan.

"Sieve-like"...

Nice documentary about Guadalcanel from the History Channel on YouTube, Lost Evidence:Guadalcanel. Contains actual footage and interviews with veterans.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7JhM5tpEVz0

Byzantine, in the sense that the IJN's battle plan for Midway was not only intricately complicated, but so deftly deceptive that it fooled its own planners into thinking this would ever work.

Just like their so called 9 phase strike plan.

ORIGINAL: niceguy2005
Still, I was surprised to read recently that even in 1943, as Japan was fighting to hold on to Wewak, it was still planning on how to capture Port Morseby.

You need to remember that "planning" of this nature is generally done by "Staff Wallah's" far behind the front, and primarily interested in justifying remaining safely behind that "armor-plated desk". [:'(]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: niceguy2005
Still, I was surprised to read recently that even in 1943, as Japan was fighting to hold on to Wewak, it was still planning on how to capture Port Morseby.

You need to remember that "planning" of this nature is generally done by "Staff Wallah's" far behind the front, and primarily interested in justifying remaining safely behind that "armor-plated desk". [:'(]

Probably true, but it was still the IJA's official stance at that point of the war, which was what, about Nov 43 that any day now they would be counter-attacking to take PM.

ORIGINAL: niceguy2005
Probably true, but it was still the IJA's official stance at that point of the war, which was what, about Nov 43 that any day now they would be counter-attacking to take PM.

Of course..., because "officially" they were "winning" the war. It was in all their press releases..., just like the Navy's big victory off Midway... A major problem with the Japanese Military was their total inability to deal with the concepts of defeat or retreat..., better to kill yourself than face the truth.

Death before dishonor was more than a slogan under bushido.

Rank and file Midway survivors were kept in seclusion when they returned home. However, the admirals who led them received no such treatment.

Casualty reports were released slowly over time; it was a difficult deception explaining away the loss of the kido butai after its "victory" at Midway!

trollelite: What was the 9 phase strike plan?

It kept getting more difficult as the "victories" moved ever closer to home.

[:D] Actually I always thought the IJN's planning for Midway was brilliant. With two little flaws. 1) the Americans were required to do exactly what the IJN wanted. 2) they neglected to tell the USN their role. Otherwise , Brilliant! [:D]

Well, I always wondered why they had a diversionary strike at the Aleutians if the plan was to entice the USN out to Midway for the decisive battle. If the idea was to lure the USN away long enough to effect the Midway landing and then have the land base for their own long range search aircraft then the Aleutian cmapaign needed to start at least a week before the Midway operation. To me, this was one of the biggest weaknesses of the plan.

The more recent thoughts behind the Aleution attacks are that they were not "diversionary", but rather a "concurrent" operation.

The Japanese were concerned from the start of the war from attacks in the north, based from Aleutions.  When Doolittle hit in April, they believed that the bombers had actually come from the Aleutions and the raid "proved" their concerns. Even if the raid -hadn't- come form Aluetions (which they would have found out by interrogating downed pilots), it still showed that they were threatened from the north.

The goal of Midway-Aleutions operation, taken as whole were to extend the perimeter away from the Home Islands against Allied air threat.  But the current thinking is that the Aleutions were in fact, -not- a diversion, but a concurrent part of a huge game plan.  I did subscribe to the common belief that Aleutions were a diversion, but evidence for "concurrent operation" is very compelling.

-F-

Naval personel regarded Midway as the turning point.  The Marines regarded Guadalcanal as the turning point.
 
Being neither, I always thought of Midway as the turning point.  Guadalcanal was a campaign rather than a battle.  Without the loss of four carriers at Midway, Guadalcanal would have looked much different.