For thoses who care to know: Long Post
The Fleet Moves South
The mission of the Asiatic Fleet in the event of war was to support he defense of the Philippines, "as long as that defense continues." The actual employment of local naval defense forces was entrusted to the commander of the 16th Naval District, who was responsible for the Joint tactical and strategical employment of his forces in co-operation with the Army. The commander of the Asiatic Fleet, at his discretion and when the situation demanded, was authorized to "shift base to British and Dutch ports."[57]
The force assigned for this task was pitifully small and deployed aver a distance of more than 1,500 miles, form northern Luzon to Borneo. In the Manila Bay area were 5 destroyers, 2 of which were under repair and 3 on patrol; 27 submarines with their 3 tenders--3 of the underwater craft
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were being overhauled; 28 Catalinas (twin-engine patrol bombers or PBYs); 4 utility planes; and 1 observation plane. The planes were organized into Patrol Wing 10 under Capt. F.D. Wagner, with one full squadron operating from Sangley Point, Cavite, and the remainder from Olongapo. In addition, there were 5 gunboats, a similar number of motor torpedo boats, 5 minesweepers, and other auxiliary craft in the area. At Mariveles was the floating dry dock Dewey. The installations of the 16th Naval district, commanded by Rear Adm. Francis W. Rockwell, were centered in Manila and Subic Bays--at Cavite, Corregidor, and Olongapo--with approximately 2,000 officers and men assigned. The reorganized and strengthened 4th Marines, with a strength of 1,600 and commanded by Col. Samuel L. Howard, was at Olongapo.[58]
The bulk of the surface strength of the Asiatic Fleet, organized in Task Force 5, was based south of Manila Bay. The flagship of the task force, the heavy cruiser Houston, was at Iloilo, in Panay. The light cruiser Boise, which belonged to the Pacific Fleet, was also in the Visayas, off Cebu, where she had gone after her arrival in Manila on 4 December with an Army convoy. At the Dutch Borneo port of Tarakan was the light cruiser Marblehead accompanied by 5 destroyers, and at Balikpapan were 4 more destroyers and a tender.[59] The remaining 2 submarines of the Asiatic Fleet were on patrol off the Luzon coast, 1 in Lingayen Gulf and another in Sorsogon Bay. Patrolling to the south and linking up with the Dutch patrols from Borneo were 2 small aircraft detachments, 1 at Davao and another on a small island south of Palawan.[60]
On the morning of 8 December, the only portion of the Asiatic Fleet to come under fire was the small aircraft detachment at Davao with the tender Preston. After the attack from the Ryujo-based dive bombers and fighters, Preston let pass four Japanese destroyers, and then slipped out of Davao Gulf to escape southward.
Before noon of the 8th, Rear Adm. William A. Glassford, commander of Task Force 5 and recently arrived from China, left by plane for Iloilo to hoist his flag aboard the Houston. He was joined there by the Boise from Cebu. That evening the aircraft tender Langley, protected by two destroyers, slipped out of Manila Bay under cover of darkness to join the cruisers at Panay. From there Glassford, on orders from Admiral Hart, led his small fleet south to Dutch Borneo to pick up oil and to assemble the rest of his force. He met no enemy ships on the way, only a long line of merchant vessels making good their escape.[61] Thus, by the end of the first day of war, the striking force of the Asiatic
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Fleet, Task Force 5, was steaming south, and on 10 December had left Philippine waters.
The Japanese Gain Air and Naval Supremacy
The Japanese followed up their successes of the first day of war with a series of air attacks aimed at destroying or driving American air and naval power from the Philippines. Before dawn of the 9th 7 Japanese naval bombers struck Nichols Field near Manila. The Japanese had planned a larger attack but the fog had again rolled in over Formosa during the early morning hours. The 7 bombers were enough to do the job. The loss of 2 or 3 P-40s, as well as other planes, and the destruction of ground installations completed the havoc begun at noon the previous day.[62]
On the 9th ground crews worked desperately to patch up the damaged planes, and units were reorganized. Antiaircraft defenses, especially in the Manila area, were strengthened, and one battery of the 60th Coast Artillery (AA) which had left Corregidor after dark on the 8th was in position on the morning of the 9th to furnish local protection for the port area, Nichols Field, and the oil storage and railroad yards.[63] About five hundred men of the 200th Coast Artillery (AA) from Clark Field were dispatched to Manila during the day, supplied with equipment from the Philippine Ordnance Depot, and organized into a provisional antiaircraft regiment, later designated the 515th.[64]
The air attack against Formosa which General MacArthur had promised for the 9th never materialized.[65] At 0800 one B-17 took off from Clark Field for a photo reconnaissance mission over Formosa but was forced back because of mechanical difficulty. Army fighters flew reconnaissance missions over northern Luzon and the PBYs of Patrol Wing 10 continued their patrols to the west and northwest. Numerous reports of enemy sightings were received but on investigation proved to be unfounded. Such reports, Hart noted, placed all Japanese vessels in one of two categories, "either a Transport or a Battleship!"[66] The Japanese also searched north Luzon during the day for evidence of American air activities.[67]
On the 9th, the thirteen heavy bombers on Mindanao moved forward to Luzon. Six of the Flying Fortresses landed at ill-fated Clark Field at 1430; the rest reached San Marcelino, an emergency field along the west coast of Luzon, later in the afternoon. The B-17s at Clark refueled and took off immediately after their arrival, remaining in the air until dark to avoid being caught on the ground as had the others the day before.[68]
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JAPANESE AIR ATTACK ON 10 DECEMBER 1941 left warehouses on fire at Nichols Field, above; below, at Cavite Navy Yard, small-arms shells explode (left) as the torpedo-loaded barge (center) burns.
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The weather over Formosa on the morning of 10 December was threatening, but the Japanese, anticipating a change for the better, decided to press their advantage. Naval planes took off about 1000 to strike Luzon again. This time the target was the Manila Bay area.[69] First warning of the approach of Japanese planes reached the Interceptor Command at Nielson Field at 1115, and fighters were immediately dispatched to cover Manila Bay, the port area, and Bataan. A half hour later, the enemy aircraft hit the Del Carmen Field near Clark, and the Nichols and Nielson Fields, near Manila. So severe was the attack against Nichols and so great the number of bombs dropped that the men at Nielson, nearly two miles away, thought the bombs were falling on their own field. The pattern set at Clark Field two days earlier was repeated. High-level bombers came in first and hit the barracks, offices, and warehouses. The fighters then came in at low level to strafe the grounded planes and installations. American planes returning to refuel were attacked by Zeros and destroyed. There was no antiaircraft fire and no fighter protection over the field; all the pursuits were engaged over Manila Bay.[70]
The naval base at Cavite received no less attention than Nichols Field. The Japanese force had divided north of Manila, and part had turned east toward the army installations. The rest, 54 bombers attacked ships and small craft in the bay and the remainder went on toward the naval base. With maddening deliberation, the bombers flew over Cavite, dropping their bombs from a height of 20,000 feet, above the range of the 9 3-inch antiaircraft guns protecting the base. Almost every bomb fell within the navy yard. After the first run, the first flight withdrew and the other 27 bombers, having completed their attack against ships in the bay, flew in to strike the targets.[71]
The attack lasted for two hours. As at Clark and Nichols, the opposition was feeble and the damage extensive. The entire yard was set ablaze; the power plant, dispensary, repair ships, warehouses, barracks, and radio station received direct hits. Greatest damage was done by the fire which spread rapidly and was soon out of control. Admiral Rockwell estimated that five hundred men were killed or seriously wounded that day.[72] The large submarine Sealion received a direct hit, but Seadragon was pulled away in time by its tender. The most serious loss to the submarine force, however, was the destruction of well over two hundred torpedoes.[73]
Throughout the attack, Admiral Hart had watched the destruction of Cavite from atop the Marsman Building. That night, after receiving an account of the damage done, he reported to the Chief of Naval Operations in Washington that he regarded Manila untenable as a naval base since the
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enemy had control of the air, but promised to "continue submarine and air operations as long as possible."[74] He then sent 2 destroyers, 3 gunboats, 23 submarine tenders, and 2 minesweepers south to join Task Force 5. "It is unfortunate," he noted in his report, "that two or three additional small ships were not sent south at this time."[75]
The naval vessels were not the only ships to move south. At the start of the war there had been about forty large merchant ships, many with valuable cargoes, in Manila Bay. The Navy had promptly closed the bay to all outbound traffic, and had extinguished the lighthouses on Corregidor and two other outlying islands.[76] Fortunately the merchant vessels had escaped attack during the first day of operations.
In the next two days, many commercial vessels sought protection in Manila Bay and were guided through the mine fields by the inshore patrol. During the attack of the 10th, the Japanese had dropped a few bombs among these ships, scoring one hit. Admiral Hart had told the shipmasters on the 11th that their vessels would be safer in Visayan ports, and that evening the commercial vessels began to steam out of Manila Bay. All but one finally escaped.[77] The Japanese had missed a golden opportunity to cripple Allied shipping.
On the morning of the 11th the fires at Cavite were burning more fiercely than ever. Evidently there was no chance of saving the yard. When Rockwell reported to Hart in manila that day the two men agreed to salvage as much as possible from the ruins. remaining supplies were to be distributed among the installations at Manila, Corregidor, and Mariveles. The base at Sangley Point was to be maintained as long as possible, and when no longer tenable the radio station and fuel supply were to be moved to Corregidor.[78]
Meanwhile, the Japanese air force continued the systematic destruction of the air and naval forces remaining in the Philippines. There had been no raids on the 11th, largely because the weather over Formosa had been bad. The planes returning from the raid on the 10th had been forced to set down wherever they could, thus scattering units among the many Formosan fields. The next day was spent in reassembling the units.[79] On the 12th and 13th the Japanese again attacked in force. On these two days hundreds of Japanese Army and Navy planes struck targets on Luzon at will in a final effort to destroy the remnants of the Far East Air Force and the Asiatic Fleet.
By this time American air power was at a low ebb. There were only 22 P-40s in commission, with 6 more promised if they could be repaired in time. In addition, between 5 and 8 P-35s and a handful of the obsolete P-26s were operational. Sixteen heavy bombers were still in commission but 5 of these were suitable only for low-altitude flights and another 4 were not fit for tactical missions. With the Far East Air Force thus reduced in strength it
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wad decided to use the remaining planes for reconnaissance in order to conserve them as long as possible. The pursuit planes were based at Clark and Nichols, and the heavy bombers were withdrawn to Del Monte. On the morning of the 12th few American planes remained to hinder the Japanese.[80]
The enemy attack on the 12th came at noon, the hour when Clark and Cavite had been hit. Sixty-three naval bombers from Takao in Formosa arrived over Central Luzon between 1130 and 1200 and struck Iba and Clark Fields. Only a small number of planes flew over Clark; the remainder delivered the main attack against Iba, reporting the destruction of ten planes on the ground.[81]
That morning, the PBYs at Olongapo had been dispatched on a fruitless search for a nonexistent Japanese carrier reported off the Luzon coast. They were followed in by a Japanese force of Zeros which had been escorting a large number of bombers in a scheduled strike against one of the Manila fields. When the mission was canceled on account of poor weather over the target, the Zeros sought targets elsewhere. The returning PBYs offered an opportunity too good to be missed. Unseen by the Americans, the Japanese planes waited for the seven Navy patrol bombers to land, and then destroyed them at leisure.[82] These same planes then went on to attack Batangas before returning to Formosa. MacArthur reported at the end of the day that "the crescendo of enemy air offensive was rapidly rising," with attacks by at least 113 planes. "Pilots have been ordered to avoid direct combat," he explained, in order to make a "show of strength and to have air reconnaissance."[83]
The next day almost 200 Japanese planes were over Luzon. The first attack came at dawn against Del Carmen. At 1030 and at 1100 Clark Field was attacked. About the same time Baguio and Tarlac were hit. These early strikes were made by Army planes. At 1230 the naval bombers put in an appearance. During the afternoon, Del Carmen, Clark, Nichols, Cabanatuan, and Batangas were hit at least once. The fields, already strewn with wrecked planes, received further damage. Over Subic Bay additional PBYs were destroyed, leaving less than a full squadron in Patrol Wing 10. By the end of the day, American Army and Navy air power in the Philippines had been virtually destroyed.[84]
One thing was clear to Admiral Hart by this time: the United States forces in the Philippines were on their own. With the loss of air power the possibility of effective naval support was extremely limited and the sea lanes along which reinforcements could be expected to travel were closed. he felt, therefore, that he must salvage what he could of the Asiatic Fleet for later operations in the defense of the Malay Barrier. On 14 December he sent out the remaining bombers of Patrol Wing 10, together with three tenders and such extra personnel
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and spare parts as could be carried southward.[85] Staff officers, including the chief of staff of the Asiatic Fleet, followed by plane and by boat. All that remained of the Asiatic Fleet in Philippine waters were 2 destroyers (1 under repair), 6 motor torpedo boats, 2 tenders, 3 gunboats, and various small craft, in addition to the 27 submarines. Admiral Hart himself decided to remain in Manila as long as the underwater craft could be operated and serviced from there.[86]
The position of the heavy bombers in Mindanao had by now become precarious. The Japanese were flying extensive reconnaissance missions in an effort to discover the remaining American aircraft. Thus far they had been unable to find the Del Monte field, but it was only a question of time before this last haven would be discovered and destroyed. Moreover, it was becoming increasingly difficult to service the B-17s with the inadequate facilities at Del Monte. There were no spare parts, engines, or propellers for the B-17s in the Philippines; B-18s and damaged B-17s had to be cannibalized to keep the bombers flying. The only tools were those in the possession of the crews. The men who worked on the planes all night often got no rest the next day because of air alerts. On some days the heavy bombers had to remain aloft during the daylight hours to avoid destruction on the ground. They dodged back and forth between Mindanao and Luzon, playing "a game of hide-and-seek that wore out men as well as planes."[87]
Under these conditions, it was evident that the remaining heavy bombers could not operate efficiently in the Philippines. General Brereton therefore requested authority on 15 December to move the B-17s to Darwin in northwest Australia, 1,500 miles away, where they could be based safely and serviced properly. His intention was to operate from fields near Darwin, using Clark and Del Monte as advance bases from which to strike enemy targets in the Philippines. Sutherland approved the plan the same day and secured General MacArthur's concurrence. The planes were immediately prepared for the long flight southward, and two days later the first group of B-17s left Del Monte airfield. By the following evening ten of the bombers had reached Batchelor Field outside Darwin. They had left Mindanao none too soon, for on the 19th the field at Del Monte received its first major air attack from Japanese planes based on the carrier Ryujo.[88]
By 15 December the air strength of the Philippines had been reduced to a handful of fighters All hopes for preventing the main Japanese landings soon to come and for keeping the supply routes open rested now on these few planes and on the submarines of the Asiatic Fleet.
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