Matrix Games Forums

I have heard many times the argument proposed that, aside from the "Tokyo Express" bombings of Guadalcanal, one can't find any instances of "drive by" naval bombardments.

ORIGINAL: Alfred

I stand to be corrected here by Gen.Hoepner but I thought I recalled the attack on Genoa occurred in 1940, fairly soon after Italy entered the war. Another instance where WWII imitated WITP [:D] would be the RN attack on on the Vichy fleet in its North African ports.

Alfred

ORIGINAL: rtrapasso

The US rather routinely had "drive by" bombardment missions throughout the Solomons Campaigns, and also bombarded the Home Islands (aimed at industrial targets). Also, from what i can tell, they weren't nearly as effective as the BB bombardment of Henderson Field by the IJN - probably because the USN didn't have a naval spotter with a radio sitting on a hill overlooking the target and calling in corrections as the IJN did that night.

The Japanese (from what i can tell from readings) could not afford to bombard in such a fashion due to:
1. fuel constraints
2. ammo constraints
3. gun tube constraints (just firing a couple of rounds per month for the BB gunfire practice might have been enough to stress IJ industrial output for guns/liners).

However, the IJN did a couple of bombardments of more limited success, iirc: one in Malaya, and one at Christmas Island (the Indian Ocean one).

BTW - my Uncle's DD during the Solomon's campaign (USS Charles Ausburne - Burke's flagship at the time) had pretty much burned up her guns on these kinds of bombardment/interdiction missions (as well as a couple of stiff naval encounters).

ORIGINAL: treespider

ORIGINAL: rtrapasso

The US rather routinely had "drive by" bombardment missions throughout the Solomons Campaigns, and also bombarded the Home Islands (aimed at industrial targets). Also, from what i can tell, they weren't nearly as effective as the BB bombardment of Henderson Field by the IJN - probably because the USN didn't have a naval spotter with a radio sitting on a hill overlooking the target and calling in corrections as the IJN did that night.

The Japanese (from what i can tell from readings) could not afford to bombard in such a fashion due to:
1. fuel constraints
2. ammo constraints
3. gun tube constraints (just firing a couple of rounds per month for the BB gunfire practice might have been enough to stress IJ industrial output for guns/liners).

However, the IJN did a couple of bombardments of more limited success, iirc: one in Malaya, and one at Christmas Island (the Indian Ocean one).

BTW - my Uncle's DD during the Solomon's campaign (USS Charles Ausburne - Burke's flagship at the time) had pretty much burned up her guns on these kinds of bombardment/interdiction missions (as well as a couple of stiff naval encounters).

I'll have to find my sources but IIRc the Japanese also bombarded Midway returning from PH as well as Canton Island on another occasion.

ORIGINAL: rtrapasso

ORIGINAL: treespider

ORIGINAL: rtrapasso

The US rather routinely had "drive by" bombardment missions throughout the Solomons Campaigns, and also bombarded the Home Islands (aimed at industrial targets). Also, from what i can tell, they weren't nearly as effective as the BB bombardment of Henderson Field by the IJN - probably because the USN didn't have a naval spotter with a radio sitting on a hill overlooking the target and calling in corrections as the IJN did that night.

The Japanese (from what i can tell from readings) could not afford to bombard in such a fashion due to:
1. fuel constraints
2. ammo constraints
3. gun tube constraints (just firing a couple of rounds per month for the BB gunfire practice might have been enough to stress IJ industrial output for guns/liners).

However, the IJN did a couple of bombardments of more limited success, iirc: one in Malaya, and one at Christmas Island (the Indian Ocean one).

BTW - my Uncle's DD during the Solomon's campaign (USS Charles Ausburne - Burke's flagship at the time) had pretty much burned up her guns on these kinds of bombardment/interdiction missions (as well as a couple of stiff naval encounters).

I'll have to find my sources but IIRc the Japanese also bombarded Midway returning from PH as well as Canton Island on another occasion.

Mostly with subs, iirc... i think at the time the USN thought it was DDs, but at any rate, not with BBs.

ORIGINAL: treespider

ORIGINAL: rtrapasso

ORIGINAL: treespider




I'll have to find my sources but IIRc the Japanese also bombarded Midway returning from PH as well as Canton Island on another occasion.

Mostly with subs, iirc... i think at the time the USN thought it was DDs, but at any rate, not with BBs.

Edit posted above..

ORIGINAL: rtrapasso

ORIGINAL: treespider

ORIGINAL: rtrapasso




Mostly with subs, iirc... i think at the time the USN thought it was DDs, but at any rate, not with BBs.

Edit posted above..

There were 2 DDs that shelled Midway (briefly): Ushio and Akebono - they were reportedly hit in return (although the question of damage to the DD is unclear... the Philippine Clipper apparently spotted the DDs retreating and "saw below it an intense fire on the surface of the sea, by the light of which could also be discerned the wakes of two ships".

Both DDs made Japan under their own power.

US casualties: 4 killed, 10 wounded.

EDIT: These were the 2 DDs identified in the article, however, accoridng to Combined Fleets TROM - Akebono did not participate (being repaired) - Ushio did.

So, either the TROM is incorrect and Akebono did participate (possibly being damaged), or only Ushio did (unlikely), or maybe a different DD... multiple sources quote the two DDs, however... [&:]

ORIGINAL: rtrapasso

The US rather routinely had "drive by" bombardment missions throughout the Solomons Campaigns, and also bombarded the Home Islands (aimed at industrial targets). Also, from what i can tell, they weren't nearly as effective as the BB bombardment of Henderson Field by the IJN - probably because the USN didn't have a naval spotter with a radio sitting on a hill overlooking the target and calling in corrections as the IJN did that night.


3. gun tube constraints (just firing a couple of rounds per month for the BB gunfire practice might have been enough to stress IJ industrial output for guns/liners).


BTW - my Uncle's DD during the Solomon's campaign (USS Charles Ausburne - Burke's flagship at the time) had pretty much burned up her guns on these kinds of bombardment/interdiction missions (as well as a couple of stiff naval encounters).

ORIGINAL: crsutton



Perhaps the best and easiest solution is to just heavily up the sys damage taken by all ships involved in any bombardment runs. So that a couple of bombardment runs by a BB might pile on 11 or 12 sys damage. This would not elimate bombardments which should be in the game but would bring the frequency into a more realistic range.

ORIGINAL: Gen.Hoepner

ORIGINAL: crsutton



Perhaps the best and easiest solution is to just heavily up the sys damage taken by all ships involved in any bombardment runs. So that a couple of bombardment runs by a BB might pile on 11 or 12 sys damage. This would not elimate bombardments which should be in the game but would bring the frequency into a more realistic range.

Yes, that sounds really a good solutions, which is good for both parts.
In my game vs. Trollelite he has being running CAs and BBs from Bombay to Karachi every other day for 6 months now...their tubes must be very hot by now[:D]

However, i agree with the crsutton's solution[8D]

Second World War
The practice reached its zenith during World War II, when the availability of man-portable radio systems and sophisticated relay networks allowed forward observers to transmit targeting information and provide almost instant accuracy reports — once troops had landed. Battleships, cruisers and destroyers would pound shore installations, sometimes for days, in the hope of reducing fortifications and attriting defending forces. Obsolete battleships unfit for combat against other ships were often used as floating gun platforms expressly for this purpose. However, given the relatively primitive nature of the fire control computers and radar of the era combined with the high velocity of naval gunfire, accuracy was poor until troops actually hit the beach and were able to radio back reports to the ship — usually after sustaining heavy casualties.

The solution was to engage in longer and longer bombardment periods — up to two weeks, in some cases— saturating target areas with fire until a lucky few shells had destroyed the intended targets. This had the unfortunate effect of "telegraphing the punch", alerting an enemy that he was about to be attacked. In the Pacific War, this mattered little, as the antagonists were usually expecting their island strongholds to be invaded at some point and had already committed whatever combat resources were available. Bombardment periods were usually shorter in the European theater, where surprise was more often valued and ships' guns were responding to the movements of mobile defenders, not whittling away at static fortifications.

ORIGINAL: John Lansford

The Wikipedia article referenced is, as usual for Wikipedia articles, rather biased and inaccurate. WWII naval bombardments got longer and longer as the war dragged on not because the ships were inaccurate, but because the Japanese got better at digging and concealing their positions. There are many instances where battleships destroyed critical positions with just a few rounds fired throughout the Pacific War. Similarly, the Iowas found that those "primitive" analog firecontrol computers used to aim the big guns were as accurate as anything more "modern" could be developed for them.

The Japanese certainly appreciated the destructive ability that the USN's battleships delivered in these bombardments; it is one of the main reasons why they abandoned the "fight at the beach" type of defense in favor of a defense in depth and attrition. They realized that no matter how well prepared their beach defenses would be, they could be destroyed by the naval gunfire the USN would bring against them. I'm currently reading "Storm Landings" by Joseph Alexander, and he discusses how the Japanese revised their defensive plans after Tarawa and Guadalcanal to the more elaborate defenses at Pelieliu, Iwo Jima and Okinawa.