Matrix Games Forums

Anyone know anything about the routine that brings surface warships into battle with CV's?

If anyone got a few good examples on engagements where this actually happened, I'd appreciate it.

Here is my last experience on the issue plus a few other matters:

In a pbem game as Japan, my opponent is invading islands in the Solomons in late 43. He got 2 CV TF's in the area, a Britishwith 4 CV's and a huge US with 9 CV's and CVL's.
He also got several surface TF's.

When his CV's are out striking my bases and taking heavy air group casualties, I send the entire Combined Fleet out with the ambitious objective of destroying as many CV's as possible.

My CV's stumbles accross a single lightly damaged CVL and sinks it. No more CV vs CV battles takes place as the US groups are busy striking airfields.

Now the surface combat occurs:
Multiple engagements takes place: My biggest TF with the Yamato, Musashi, 2 other BB's and several CA's, CL's and DD's sinks 2 South Dakota? class BB's in a decisive engagement.

My 2 other major TF's with 1 BB's and several CA's engage other US TF's inflicting heavy damage with Type93 torps. My own TF's also take a mauling.

Then it happens: One of my TF's engage his huge 9 CV TF!
They're stationed at George island which has just reasonly been captured.
Ok, everything went according to plan except for one thing: It was a small 2 CL TF that engaged his carriers : (
This was a small decoy force operating from Tarawa.

The Yamato & Co TF had only engaged in a single engagement, damage was light and they should have both pp and ammo left, so why did the small CL TF engage his CV's and not the Yamatos?

Was it because of its small size, ammo load, pp status that exactly this TF engaged or was just a coincident?

I think the US had 3 surface groups that engaged the 3 groups of the Combined Fleet, then my 4th and tiny TF engaged his CV's.
Does all the surface TF's stand guard before you get to the ones containing carriers?

Me and my opponent also had a discussion about the efficiency of the Yamatos: They are grossly superior to the South Dakotas, landing massive hits with their 18.1" guns, sinking a BB with a single salvo.
This is a historical gray zone as there never was a surface battle vs the Yamatos and other BB's.
Is the lumbering and huge Yamatos given better fire controll and rate of fire than they really had?
Warhead size is much larger than the ones for the 16/45 and 16/50 guns. Historically they fielded a punch almost similar to the 16/50's.

On the other side I think that the Type93 torpedo is just as devastating as it was and should be in this game! : -)

"Is the lumbering and huge Yamatos given better fire controll and rate of fire than they really had? Warhead size is much larger than the ones for the 16/45 and 16/50 guns. Historically they fielded a punch almost similar to the 16/50's. "

Yes. The Yamato class armor ratings are overstated. The warhead weight of the Yamato class was substantially greater than both the 16L45 and 16L50 of teh US ships, but US munitions, rates of fire, accuracy, and integrated fire control on SoDaks and Iowa class vessels was very superior.

"On the other side I think that the Type93 torpedo is just as devastating as it was and should be in this game!"

The Type 93a torpedo was a great weapon. On the other hand its results in battle show that GGPW overrates the weapon. It had a statistical hit rate of mean: 5.8%, median:3.1%, mode: 0%. With a breakdon as follows: 8 engagements with zero hits, 1 engagement with a 1.8% hit rate, 1 with 2.2%, 1 with 3.9%, 1 with 4.1%, 1 with 6-8% (Java Sea see below), 1 with 25%(a single hit fired at long range from a 4-torp spread in 1943), 1 with 12.5%, 1 @ 12.7%, 1 @ 13.1%, 1 @ 13.5%.

see:http://www.warships1.com/W-Tech/tech-067.htm

I used this guys numbers but calculated different mean hit rates. But FWIW he says the mean hit rate was 6.7%. I agree with his substantive conclusions: the Type 93a, like all torpedoes, was most lethal at close range. Per force this also means it was much more effective at night than during the day.

The signature battles were Tassafaronga and Savo Island (that account for the two in the 13% range). Java Sea is a strange case because the Japanese (1) had the allies outnumbered 2xCA to 1 CA (Houston), 1x1 in CLs (Perth) and 9x0 in DDs. Of teh Allied ships, the Houston had 1 turrett out of train due to an air attack teh previous day, and both ships were virtually out of ammo. On that night the IJN fired 87 torpedoes, scoring 4-8 hits and sinking Houston and Perth. They lost 27,000 long tons of their own merchant/transports to their own torpedoes (to 17000 short tons "displacement" sunk in Perth and Houston). Had Houston and Perth been fully supplied with ammo and lacked previous damage, the Allies would likely have escaped and the Japanese would have lost a DD in the process.

Tassafaronga is a fair cop: the Allies just got beat.

Savo Island is a wierd case that would be the PacWar equivalent of a "surprise" engagement.

By 1943 the Allies were the equals of Japan in torpedo combat, primarily because US illusions about the superiority of gun combat had been altered, and because advanced radar sets had trickled down through most fleet units. Good radar gave the Allies an insurmountable lead in surface engagements.