eye-opening article on the Caucasus resource hex in RTV

[gwgardner]

The specific oilfields that Hitler mentioned lay in the North Caucasus, a region in present-day Russiacomprising mainly steppes, rolling hills and desert lands. During theSecond World War it produced grain, cotton and heavy farm machinery.Its two main oilfields--Maikop, near the Black Sea, and Grozny, nearthe Caspian--produced about ten per cent of all Soviet oil.[4] South ofthe Caucasus Mountains lies the densely populated region ofTranscaucasia, today comprising the nations of Georgia, Azerbaijan andArmenia. In 1942 this heavily industrialized region had a populationdensity almost as great as the state of New York.[5] Baku, capital ofAzerbaijan and situated on one of the world's richest oilfields, aloneproduced 80 per cent (in 1942, 24 million tons[6]) of all Soviet oil. Baku's oil flowed by pipeline westward through Tbilisi, capital of Georgia, to Batumi, a major oil transit port on the Black Sea. Oil going to Moscow, Gorkii and the main industrial centres in the west went by ship to Astrakhan at the mouth of the mighty Volga River, then up the Volga to its destinations. Oil bound for the industrial areas of the Urals and Siberia went by ship up the Caspian to Gurev, where it travelled by pipeline to Ufa, almost 1,000 kilometres to the north. From there it went by rail to its destinations.[7]


http://www.joelhayward.org/luftwaffevssovietoil.htm

from the same article, it's the write's opinion that even if the Germans had captured and held the Caucasus oil fields, it would not have done them any good, due to transport inefficiencies. If that's true, then practically every game done on the Eastern Front, giving the Germans an advantage for capturing the oil fields, is based on a false premise:

Hitler hadalmost certainly not read the March 1941 report by Lieutenant GeneralHermann von Hanneken of the War Economy and Armaments Office, which wasappended to a letter sent by Generalfeldmarschall (Field Marshal)Keitel to the High Command of the Army (OKH). This report warned that,even if the Caucasus oilfields could be captured intact, very littleoil (only 10,000 tons per month) could be carried overland toGermany.[11] Moreover, even if the Black Sea could be made safe forshipping, there would be no ships available for the transport ofCaucasus oil up the Danube because the Danube river tankers werealready working to capacity transporting Rumanian oil.[12] The onlyremaining route was across the Black Sea, through the Dardanelles, andon to Mediterranean ports. Accordingly, the report concluded, "theopening of the sea routes and the security of the tankers in the Black Seais the prerequisite for the use of Russian supply sources in sufficientquantity to support the further continuation of the war." Clearly, toattain this prerequisite was virtually impossible by early 1942; theGermans would have had to wipe out the powerful Soviet Black Sea Fleet(which still had, according to Grossadmiral Raeder, "naval supremacy... [allowing] great freedom of movement"[13]) and to eliminate Britishair and sea power from the eastern Mediterranean.

[Chocolino]

Very interesting find. Never heard about the transportation issue before. Most historians that I have read agree on that while oil fields are indeed important strategic targets, it was a mistake to go after them at the time the Germans did for at least two reasons. One being that there were too many targets identified at once (e.g. in the south also Stalingrad) for too few German forces and by splitting the forces, none was achieved. The second criticism is that Germany should not have gone after economic and political targets before dealing with the military thread posed by the Red Army. To deal with the Red Army as the first priority, other targets would have been more important (view also supported by v.Manstein). Your information adds another reason.

[BlueMak]

Well, if the germans had captured all soviet soil by the black sea, where would the navy go? They couldn't stay forever in there. Would Turkey allow them to pass through?
If Turkey blocked access to the soviet fleet and allied fleet to attack any shipping in the blacksea, wouldn't it make it possible that they would perhaps even forced to attack Turkey? Would it be worthwhile to do so? I don't know. Also I don't know how easy it would be to destroy the soviet army first, it's not like they would stand still to get shot at. If it was that easy they would capture Moscow the first time they approached it.

[Michael the Pole]

On the question of Soviet shipping passing through the Straits, the pertinent treaty is the Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Turkish Straits, which became effective in June, 1936. It gives complete control of the Straits to Turkey, and allows the passage of commercial vessels, and a restricted number of naval vessels. The USSR was always unhappy with this regime and continually tried to break, revise or violate it. An excellent example, (and also an explanation of why the Russians insist that their aircraft carriers are actually "heavy aircraft carrying cruisers") is the clause in the treaty that prohibits the passage of aircraft carriers throught the Straits. There is an informative article on the subject (including some information concerning developments since the Russian invasion of Georgia) in the Wiki @ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Montreux_C ... since_1936
If push came to shove, the Soviet Navy, having lost all its bases in the Black Sea, would probably have been at the mercy of the Turks and would probably have been interned. The Allies would certainly have pressed the Turks to allow the passage of the heavy Soviet vessels, and they and the Soviets certainly had the naval muscle to insist, but 1915 showed that naval power wasn't very effective inside the Straits in the face of massive shore batteries and mines. Additionally, if the Germans had so badly beaten the Soviets as to have taken the Black Sea coast, they could have presented a believable and drastic threat to Turkey if they allowed Soviet passage throught the Straits.
I believe that Turkey would have done everything it could, in such cercumstances, to maintain its neutrality, and the Allies wouldnt have pushed the issue for the same reason.

As far as the availability of Soviet oil production to Germany following the potential capture of the Baku oil fields -- this seems like another example of a typical fuehrer decision. As someone once said, "there is nothing more dangerous than a little knowledge," and one of the most dangerous results of having your subordinates too frightened to tell you of facts that interfere with the leaders beliefs is the leader has to rely on his beliefs. And just to add another old truism to this post, as Omar Bradley once said, "Amatuers study strategy, professionals study logistics."

But something that mustn't be overlooked is that it can be almost as valuable to deny your enemy resources as it would be to convert it to your own use. Soviet logistics were sufficiently ossified that the loss of those POL sources would have been devastating to the Soviet war effort.

[Mike Parker]

I have not read the scholarly works on this, but several thing come to mind on the usefulness of capturing the Caucasian oil fields.
 
1.  To deny the use to the USSR would have hastned her collapse.  It would have virtually brought her military to a stop.
 
2.  While at the beginning German use would have been limited because of transport, as the railway situation were sorted out, I can imagine a large amount of crude oil would be brought via rail to the reich.
 
3.  With the capitulation of this region and the weakening of the USSR, I believe a serious effort to bring pressure to bear on India would have been in the offing.  It is not inconceivable that much of this oil could have been used by Japan to support her pacific efforts.
 
I agree capturing the Caucus would not have immediatly provided the Axis with all of this oil, but the benefits would have been quite effective.  It is the same with the Ukraine and its grain production.  These were seen as of some immediate benefit, but more as long term strategic assets for Germany.  I do not know how WWII might have gone had the Axis captured these oil fields, but I am fairly certain it would not have gone as well as it did.
 

[doomtrader]

It is not inconceivable that much of this oil could have been used by Japan to support her pacific efforts.

AFAIK Japan, during the whole war was using it's oil reserves that were bought before the war.

[Mike Parker]

Japan used alot of OIL from the DEI. But in retrospect it would have been hard to tanker all that oil back to the Home Islands. They had problems getting the Dutch oil back, so I shudder to think about a line of tankers going through the Indian Ocean.

[doomtrader]

IIRC they were using crude oil in some of the ships, but what I wanted to tell is that the Japans has got enough reserves for all their military actions in 1941-145.

[paullus99]

Well, pro-rated based on ship losses. By 1944, over 50% of the IJN was at the bottom of the Pacific, with a commensurate decrease in the need for oil.

[Joshuatree]

Thanks for the link Gwgardner. I was always puzzled by that same fact, if they would've been able to capture and hold it, they would have to rebuild it and transport it back to Germany. So now it seems they would never have been able to do such a thing. So maybe AH never read this report... but he must've been swamped by reports by then I reckon.

[gwgardner]

If, as the article states, the oil (and I suppose industrial products) from the Caucasus region had to be transported north on the Volga, then perhaps it was not a mistake for Hitler to focus on Stalingrad.   Close off the Volga traffic, and deny the Soviets those resources.  I obviously need to read more on these issues, because I had always thought Stalingrad was primarily a political objective of little actual worth, and therefore one of Hitler's follies.  It's often treated as a folly in the history books.