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I've got this book I checked out "Eclipse of the Big Gun" that is about . . . well, title is pretty self-explanatory.

I didn't want to hijack Dili's thread on Armor thickness, but I was struck by this quote by Distiller

ORIGINAL: Distiller

As if the USA had suffered a shortage of anything in WW2 (ramp up time excluded of course). Class A has no place in anything resembling a TDS, because it's too brittle, that's all.

btw, i had thought that rejecting BB shells was the main purpose of a main belt. must have been a case of 'foresight' (luck? since the only time a treaty BB got hit by main battery fire was Guadalcanal, iirc, by 14" WW1 vintage guns.

Marky immediately said he thought that one of the SoDaks got hit by a Kirishima shell . . . But that raised the question for me: How many times in WWII did a Big Gun-Big Ship platform actually HIT anything, much less sink it? Related: How many times was a Big Gun-Big Ship damaged or sunk by other Gun systems versus other systems (torpedos, bombs, mines, rockets?).

As an anthropologist, it is amazing to me how this one technological avenue: Big metal ships with big caliber guns appears to have been a remarkable dead-end, the "eclipse of the big gun" and its big floating firing platform . . .

Remarkable as say, compared to the muzzle-loader, or the unrifled barrel, both of which were dead-ends, but both of which much longer cul-de-sacs which arguably had far more significance in history than the brief period of the Big Gun Arms Race. What seems remarkable about this arms race is how quickly it came and went, how much it captured the attention of the major players, the remarkable influence on national policy/expense/strategy that it had despite much in the way of realworld evidence for the battlefield effectiveness/power, how much it persisted despite their being pretty compelling 'counter-weapons' (destoyers and their torps) quite early in the period of the Big Gun Big Ship Evolution.

There are a number of specific ideas/questions that occur to me here but the main one that might get an interesting discussion going is: What is the ratio of naval gun caliber : kill rate during WWII?

Haven't thought it through mathematically, but it might be necessary to standardize the biggest gun out there would be transformed to a 1.0 and the highest kill rate for any single gun size would also be transformed to a 1.0 . . .

I know it is _possible_ for a naval gun to be responsible for "killing" a ship (Jutland, where two pears of the RN were sunk), but I also realize that when you start peltering a ship with lots of different armamanets (bombs, torps, guns etc.) that it might be difficult to establish which one earned the "kill." Not sure about that.

Would be interesting to know. I have always assumed that because of the dominating role played by the larger cannon carrying wooden sailing vessles over hundreds of years , followed by the then game changing advent of metal clad ships that it was almost too much to soon ( realatively speaking ) for most naval staffs to absorb the fact that in one decade big gunned ships were no longer lords of the ocean in WW2.
 
Sorry for that run on sentance. Not enough coffee yet.

One of the complaints about The Eclipse of the Big Gun is that it actually has little to say about the eclipse of the big gun. It surveys ship developments (chapter titles such as "The Battleship and Battlecruiser," "The Airceaft Carrier," The "Cruiser," etc.) but doesn't give much focus to the title concept.

I know a Japanese BB and some crusiers were in on the kill of the Gambier Bay, a U.S. CVE.  This occurred during surface action at Leyte Gulf in 1944.  The Japanese had a pretty bold and complicated plan in this battle.  Most of it didn't work well for the Japanese, but they did manage to have a strong combat TF intermix with an American carrier force.

ORIGINAL: Tiornu

One of the complaints about The Eclipse of the Big Gun is that it actually has little to say about the eclipse of the big gun. It surveys ship developments (chapter titles such as "The Battleship and Battlecruiser," "The Airceaft Carrier," The "Cruiser," etc.) but doesn't give much focus to the title concept.

Agree! Which is probably a big part of why I keep asking about the eclipse! [:)]

Any suggested bibliography?

I have a colleague who is also a bit of an evolutionary psychologist. He showed me a draft of an article he and some archaeologist friends were working on some years back. It dealt with the evolution of pre-historic and to a limited degree ancient technologies in a big picture kind of way, and sought to analyze if the big shifts made more sense in terms of an adaptationist or some 'non-adaptationist' (e.g., cultural diffusion, or symbolic prestige, or aesthetics) model.

Over the years playing these games I've come to the realization that the evolution of fire arms is really quite fascinating, and maybe a similar kind of analysis could be done. Obviously the big naval guns are a pretty special example of a firearm, but I guess you could argue it is an extreme elaboration of the technology. Anyway, that is the underlying reasons for my interest in these things; doubt it would actually turn into a publication, but maybe. In any event, I appreciate hearing the comments by you guys, and any suggested readings.

On the WE theatre, some examples come to my mind: the destruction of the Hood, battle of North Cap (not sure of the name, it led to the destruction of the Schanhorts) and some gun battles in the Med (Cap Mataplan - the night action, even though IIRC the targets were cruisers)

ORIGINAL: stuman

Would be interesting to know. I have always assumed that because of the dominating role played by the larger cannon carrying wooden sailing vessles over hundreds of years , followed by the then game changing advent of metal clad ships that it was almost too much to soon ( realatively speaking ) for most naval staffs to absorb the fact that in one decade big gunned ships were no longer lords of the ocean in WW2.

Sorry for that run on sentance. Not enough coffee yet.

It is challenging today to imagine a world in which airplanes are still regarded by traditionalists as inconsequential, but it seems obvious that that was a big part of the dynamic even still in 1941.

ORIGINAL: Anthropoid


Marky immediately said he thought that one of the SoDaks got hit by a Kirishima shell . . . But that raised the question for me: How many times in WWII did a Big Gun-Big Ship platform actually HIT anything, much less sink it? Related: How many times was a Big Gun-Big Ship damaged or sunk by other Gun systems versus other systems (torpedos, bombs, mines, rockets?).

I can recall over a half dozen times, but its not really a fair question since deployment was the biggest factor involved.

I'm probably stating the obvious, but it seems to me that the state of sensor technology in WW2 was such that the the eclipse of the gun ship can only be regarded as partial. When night fell, most naval strike aviators were tucked up in their bunks and the gun ship ruled the roost.  No doubt a case can be made that all this was about to change with the introduction of airborne surface search radar and guided weapons, but I can think of no significant WW2 naval action at night and at sea in which naval strike aircraft played a significant part (Taranto being a 'fixed address').
 
It also seems to me significant that, whilst gun ships might still be used to dominate a sea area at night, their ability to do so became increasingly constrained by the influence of aircraft during the day.  I suspect that Kurita, Koyonagi et al would have much preferred to be south of Samar whilst it was still dark, and that a night time clash between Centre Force and Taffy 3 might then have had a significantly different outcome.  However, I assume they were denied that opportunity by the threat posed to them in daylight hours by Halsey's carriers, which had already led to them backtracking in the Sibuyan Sea.  In other words, the ability to make effective use of gun ships in an environment in which they still held the advantage had, by 1944, become conditional upon whether they could get within range of their intended operating area by day.

So much of a nation's money and prestige was tied up in their capital ships that many nations imposed unreasonable limitations on how they could be used.  Germany and Italy are the two prime examples; Hitler ordered them to avoid conflict with any ship that could damage their ability to safely reach port, and the Italians had a similar restriction.  In the Pacific the presence of strong carrier forces or land based attack planes restricted the use of capital ships to a secondary role by both sides; the risk of another Repulse/Prince of Wales debacle was too strong in the minds of admirals to risk those ships.  Battleships were built primarily, however, because well, other nations were building them.  The era between WWI and WWII was all about nations building ships that "matched" a rival nation's newly built ship, rather than building ships that best fit with their navy's mission.  The British probably did the best in that regard with the KGV class, but the US and Japan got into an arms race with each other that didn't stop until the start of WWII.

Off hand, I can think of several instances where capital ships exchanged gunfire.  Scharnhorst and Gneisenau vs Repulse, North Cape, Bismarck vs Prince of Wales & Hood and later vs Rodney and KGV, Kirishima vs Washington, and Surigao Strait.  Those are just the ones where BB fired at BB (or BC), but of course there were other times they fired at lesser ships.

i think you are reading too much into my quote.

within the context of the topic of USN BB armor, i meant to say that the only time a USN (that was what the thread was about after all) BB got hit by heavy naval artillery was at Guadalcanal.

Surigao Strait, otoh, was very lopsided and no IJN BB got a hit, let alone on another BB.

PS: if the Japanese had sent Yamato, Nagato and Mutsu to Guadalcanall, chances are we wouldn't be having this discussion. everyone was very cautious with them and by the time the IJN got desperate enough, at Samar, they were completely overmatched by airpower and got crippled before arrival. Musashi sunk and Nagato slowed by torpedo hits was already deceisive damage, ie. the sortie was a failure.

Any suggested bibliography?

Perhaps the first book you'll want to read is Sacred Vessels by O'Connell. It is a fine example of monumentally bad history merged with superficial and myopic analysis--the perfect model for how not to approach this sort of topic. I have a review at Amazon, if you'd like details. I find it simply stunning thatthe man earned a PhD behind the weight of this drech.
Actually, the recent discussions her have constituted a better treatment of the subject than you are likely to find in many published texts. As in vocal Local Yokel's post above, you see a refusal to fly to all-or-nothing conclusions. If it's your intent to make this a serious pursuit, I would cast a wide net and get your own perspective rather than bother looking for other analyses. American writers are among the guiltiest when it comes to dismissiveness about a hidebound "gun club" navy prepared to die before acknowledging the capability of the aircraft. Fortunately, though, there are quite a few good books, especially recent ones, that deal with realities rather than stereotypes. Here are some titles that I've read or at least skimmed enough to warrant a recommendation:
Melhorn, Charles M. Two-Block Fox: The Rise of the Aircraft Carrier, 1911-1929. Naval Institute Press, 1974.
Wildenberg, Thomas. All the Factors of Victory: Admiral Joseph Mason Reeves and the Origins of Carrier Airpower. Brassey’s Inc., 2003.
Wildenberg, Thomas. Destined for Glory: Dive Bombing, Midway, and the Evolution of Carrier Airpower. Naval Institute Press, 1998.
Kuehn, John T. Agents of Innovation: The General Board and the Design of the Fleet that Defeated the Japanese Navy. Naval Institute Press, 2008.
Felker, Craig C. Testing American Sea Power. Texas A&M University Press, 2007.
There are also some dissertations worth a look. (Actually I know Felker's diss better than his published work, but the book is simply an improved version of the diss.) Even though it's opnly a master's paper, look at Mark Campbell's paper The Influence of Air Power upon the Evolution of Battle Doctrine in the U.S. Navy 1922-1941 (University of Massachusetts, 1992).

Thanks Tiornu. That'll keep me busy for a long time!

ORIGINAL: Distiller

i think you are reading too much into my quote.

within the context of the topic of USN BB armor, i meant to say that the only time a USN (that was what the thread was about after all) BB got hit by heavy naval artillery was at Guadalcanal.

Surigao Strait, otoh, was very lopsided and no IJN BB got a hit, let alone on another BB.

PS: if the Japanese had sent Yamato, Nagato and Mutsu to Guadalcanall, chances are we wouldn't be having this discussion. everyone was very cautious with them and by the time the IJN got desperate enough, at Samar, they were completely overmatched by airpower and got crippled before arrival. Musashi sunk and Nagato slowed by torpedo hits was already deceisive damage, ie. the sortie was a failure.

Oh sorry, if I was taking you the wrong way Distiller. Still interesting though, the issue of everyone being very cautious with them; arguably so cautious that they were not even used for optimum advantage.

I think a huge factor and it might worth considering in the eclipse of the big gun in WWII is the Washington and subsequent naval treaties. It was a technological stop for the BBs and a rather big boost for naval-attack capable aircraft, mostly in the form of carriers. Also worth mentioning is that anti-air and anti torp rebuild features were limited to 3000 tons the torpedo and bomb warheads were not limited in the same way.
So if I might say like this the two competing technologies were not allowed with the same room/possibility for improvement. If there would have been more time, money etc spent on developing better anti-torpedo defenses (both active and passive) it could have made a differnece in WWII. Just think about a Bismarck with a tunnel stern or a Yamato with properly made TDS joints or USN modern BBs built with a Montana style protection - to continue the logic imagine these against much reduced torpedo and bomb warheads (reverse of the real life situation). 
Back to the point there were quite a few gunnery duels between capital ships and at least the same amount were sunk by gunfire (Hood, Bismarck, Graf Spee?, Scharnhorst, Kirishima, Hiei, Yamashiro as it was by airplanes (Yamato,Musashi,PoW,Roma) and at least Glorious and Gambier Bay are on the big gunss kill list.

For what it is worth this site reports 38 Battleships sunk in WW2, 8 in strictly surface battles, the rest by planes in open ocean or in port, combination of planes/ships, subs, other ( do not forget those enterprising italian frogmen  ! ).

http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?t=114533


One thing that stands out to me is the fact that the great majority of sinkings took place in harbors, or what I will call restricted waters. Perhaps it is this particular vulnerability of the big ships that contributed most to their somewhat limited ultimate usefulness.

The big ships were usefull even in Port almost like a nuclear weapon that isn't fired. See how much forces the British had to divert in North Sea in case Bismarck and others would get to Sea. Likewise it was silly to risk Bismarck like Kriegsmarine did.
Also the biggest advantage for the Royal Navy of Taranto raid wasn't the damege itself to Italian fleet were only one of Battlecruisers was never repaired, but the fact that Italian Fleet went to Naples far from a place that could easily intercept Malta bound convoys.

Even doing nothing it's mere existence changed what the enemy could do. For a country like Germany or Italy lacking resources to have replacements the "Fleet in Being" was the only solution. Specially Italy if they loose the BB fleet it means the end of War.

I think a huge factor and it might worth considering in the eclipse of the big gun in WWII is the Washington and subsequent naval treaties. It was a technological stop for the BB

I disagree. Most countries couldn't afford bigger ships.

Stuman, great link! That is exactly the sort of tally sheet I was wondering about. Great posts guys; this really is a fascinating topic. I totally get what you are saying Dili about "Even doing nothing its mere existence changed what the enemy could do." In this way, they are not totally unlike strategic nuclear weapons of a generation or two later.

The phrase is called "fleet in being".  The Germans were masters of this philosophy, not wanting to risk losing any surface ship for fear of the prestige loss that would result.  The British still had to devote a lot of effort in preparing for when Tirpitz and the other ships might sortie.

However, a "fleet in being" hardly needs to have all the effort and money spent on it if it will just sit in the harbor.  For example, the Italians would have done just as well with the refitted Cavours if they never intended them to actually engage enemy ships.  The Germans would have done as well with the Graf Spees and Scharnhorsts for the same reason.

I disagree that the Naval Treaties between the two wars were a "stop" to naval development.  Even nations such as Britain and the US were starting to feel the impact of larger and larger naval construction plans; putting limitations on displacement and scrapping older, obsolete ships made sense even to the most industrialized nations.  Also, it was inevitable that planes would become capable of carrying heavier and heavier payloads; what was believed at the time was that they would not be able to hit maneuvering ships on the open ocean no matter how large the bomb or torpedo was.  Admirals handwaved away the Ostrfriestland demonstration because the ship wasn't manned and wasn't moving, and failed to learn that a ship did sink from an aerial attack.  Clearly planes had developed and would continue to develop the ability to carry bigger and bigger warheads, but ships of the time were all vulnerable to aerial hits and the admirals didn't want to admit that.  Even as late as 1941 they still weren't admitting it.

ORIGINAL: stuman

For what it is worth this site reports 38 Battleships sunk in WW2, 8 in strictly surface battles, the rest by planes in open ocean or in port, combination of planes/ships, subs, other ( do not forget those enterprising italian frogmen  ! ).

http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?t=114533


One thing that stands out to me is the fact that the great majority of sinkings took place in harbors, or what I will call restricted waters. Perhaps it is this particular vulnerability of the big ships that contributed most to their somewhat limited ultimate usefulness.

So I did a bit of inferential analyses on these numbers. I did a simple Z-proportions test to see if the magnitude of skewing given the sample size is sufficiently large to achieve a high level of confidence that the majority of BB sinkings in WWII involved air attacks. For Majority I tested against 50%.

Out of the 96 serving ships, 38 were sunk. Comparing all sinkings in which air strikes were involved (sunk by air in port, sunk by air open water and sunk by air+surface combo) (n = 23 or 60.53% of all sinkings) with all sinkings in which no air strikes were involved (surface combat, subs, other) (n = 15 or 39.46%) and given the sample size of 38, the magnitude of the majority of sinkings involving air strikes (60.53%) is not so much different that there is a small chance that it could occur at random (P[Z >= 1.298] ~ 0.1 if I recall correctly . . . in any event Z => 1.645 is the critical value for P = .05, so it does not reach conventional "statistical significance" cutoffs.

Since history has a sample size of ONE, it is in some sense superfluous to perform an inferential test on what is effectively a complete population. It is clearly still conceptually valid to conclude that "a majority of sinkings involved air attacks" (60.53% in fact!) as clearly that is the case.

The point is simply that, IF this were a random sample of a larger hypothetical population, the magnitude of the majority would not be sufficient to be confident that it really was a majority. In sum, if this were a random sample the proportion of air attack sinknigns is not so large that it would clearly lead to the conclusion that surface combat, subs and other were superfluous, i.e., that a strictly air warfare strategy against BBs would have been sufficient.

Excluding sub, other, and combinations and comparing strictly air with strictly surface sinkings n = 27 total

Air Only Sinkings (n = 20 74.07%)
Surface Combat Only Sinkings (n = 7 29.63%) We get a Z = 2.502 which would have a P-Value somewhere around 1.75%.

In this case, the proportion of air strikes is highly improbable. It would be entirely reasonable to conclude that, excluding subs and special forces strikes, air strikes accounted for the majority of BB sinkings in WWII as compared to surface combat.

We would reach the same conclusion based on an analysis if we include the combination attacks (but still exclude sub and other) so that we are comparing sinkings with ANY surface combat to sinkings with ANY air (and thus the 3 "combo" attacks are counting twice into the total) n = 34 total sinkings
Any Surface (n = 11 32.4%)
Any Air (n = 23 67.7%) Z = 2.05 which again is a rather improbable ratio, somewhere in the 2% ballpark to happen at random.

So when you include subs and special forces into the mix, it is not so statistically clear that air strikes accounted for the majority of BB sinkings. But without subs and frogmen, it is quite clear that air strikes accounted for the majority of sinkings.

Consider that had the axis navies carriers they would have faired the same or even worse - a warship in a port, no matter what type is just a sitting duck.

Same goes to Pearl where a lot less damage would hvae occured if the fleet is at a war footing and in proper watertight condition.

So this list just merely states the losses. If we do a similar listing for fleet carriers (I'd leave out the CVEs now) or for fleet destroyers the results will probably nearly the same proportionately. For example the IJN lost all of it's fleet carriers. Does this mean they were obsolescent - definitely not. Obviously the BB loss list is a prime indication that these were high value targets that posed a risk - otherwise they would have been left idling at port.

Getting back to the list I'd also argue with Hiei and Bismarck. Former was crippled in the surface combat the night before and AFAIK the aircraft attacks did not immediately sink her. Also Bismarck's damage from the airstrikes dod not endanger her watertight integrity or firepower - it was a mission kill true but without the british BBs to deliver the gun kill she could have escaped.