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Hi guys,
you may find "German Myth" article at wargamer.com site quite interesting, I think.
Enjoy
Maciej

Originally posted by czerpak
you may find "German Myth" article at wargamer.com site quite interesting, I think.

Hi Maciej,
I may be blind, but what article? Couldn't yet find it...

Dave

Originally posted by davewolf

Hi Maciej,
I may be blind, but what article? Couldn't yet find it...

Dave

http://www.wargamer.com/articles/german_myth_main.asp

Originally posted by czerpak
http://www.wargamer.com/articles/german_myth_main.asp

Thanks, Maciej. What was my disease called? I've forgotten...

Dave

Very interesting, indeed, Maciej.

I'd second the author's opinion. I read also about examples of german high level officers' behaviours similar to those mentioned in the article.

As also mentioned in that article, most wargames don't reflect that topics. WIR doesn't either IMO. Perhaps there is something to be changed.

Lack of logistics: At least from 1942 on, the german side shouldn't be able to supply movement of the whole front IMO (historically). (In general this is possible in WIR as we all know.) On the other hand reducing the supply wouldn't be a good idea as long as the soviet supply won't get reduced, because the Soviets weren't the champs of supply either, I think.

Ignorance of intelligence reports: Also quite right. But IMO it depended on the specific commander. Someone like Manstein wouldn't have just ignored the intelligence. So changing the recon values (range), as an example, would only make sense if it would relate the the army leader's values.

Dave

Dave,
I cant say I agree with everything in the article, but some good points inthere.
Anyways, good reminder game will never be reality.

Part of the "invincibility myth" is based on the usually unquestioned acceptance of seriously flawed memoirs, especially by Manstein and Guderian. Part of the problem also was the US Army's desire to "borrow" as much info from ex-Wehrmacht officers as possible once the Cold War began. Plenty of authors have since examined the myths of German mobility, tactical expertise, and military efficiency. The reality that most of the Heer walked or rode donkey carts just isn't as sexy as Panthers rolling through, and breaking down, in the countryside. The flip side was a lack of Russian sources, which in any case, must be carefully read depending on if they were written during or after Stalin's lifetime. Zetterling's "Kursk 1943" is a good example of better history through better research (just never enough maps, though).

Ciao.