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why was there so much "empire building" in the..

Posted: Sat Jul 08, 2000 9:23 am
by sven
US Army in the second world war? I just read a fascinating (and scathing) indictment on US tank production and design in the war. It seems that the tank destroyer branch was very much responsible for holding up several follow up designs for the M4, and greatly delayed the advent of the M26 and M46 designs. i am hoping that some veterans from the 40's to early 60's can shed some light on the mentality of the WW2 era senior leadership. Tank destroyers were not very effective in their designed role, and I am curious as to how the TD generals helped delay the ascension of the tank as the premier anti-tank weapon in US doctrine.

regards,
sven

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Give all you can all you can give....

Posted: Sat Jul 08, 2000 9:12 pm
by troopie
There is always 'empire building' in any large. multi-departmented organisation. Look the Germans. Read Albert Speer's book. In every department there was a little Hitler who wanted to be bigger. It reached its worst and damnedest in the SS, a parallel army. Look at the Japanese, with the hostility between the Army and Navy. Each having its own weapons development. I do not know what country you're from, but I'm sure you can find many examples of "I'm going to build my department, get my pet projects through, and make a name for myself; and be damned to everyone else" in your own government and business structure.

I have to deal with it in my own company. People who are absolutely sure that they know the only way. People who want to make a name for themselves.

troopie

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Pamwe Chete

Posted: Sat Jul 08, 2000 9:23 pm
by sven
Originally posted by troopie:
There is always 'empire building' in any large. multi-departmented organisation. Look the Germans. Read Albert Speer's book. In every department there was a little Hitler who wanted to be bigger. It reached its worst and damnedest in the SS, a parallel army. Look at the Japanese, with the hostility between the Army and Navy. Each having its own weapons development. I do not know what country you're from, but I'm sure you can find many examples of "I'm going to build my department, get my pet projects through, and make a name for myself; and be damned to everyone else" in your own government and business structure.

I have to deal with it in my own company. People who are absolutely sure that they know the only way. People who want to make a name for themselves.

troopie

Actually Troopie I am a Canadian sympathizing Yankee. I also think the Luftwaffe did a pretty good job for themselves. No nation had a bigger case of the "my way or no way syndrome" than the US Army and Navy in the Pacific. "Eagle Against the Sun" is a good book on the subject of bifractured command structure in the PTO, luckily we could afford the lack of coordination between MacArthur and Nimitz with our material superiority.

regards,
sven


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Give all you can all you can give....

Posted: Sat Jul 08, 2000 10:10 pm
by Nikademus
gotta disagree there.

Dont think the US example is any more severe than examples in other nations.

When Guderian was appointed 'Inspector General of Armored troops' The artillery arm, fearful of their position and influence conspired to have the wording changed so that the STuG's and Jagdpanzers remained under their control.

The move half crippled Gudarian's efforts and thus impeeded Germany's lackluster attempts to better regulate her AFV construction and deployment.

The animosity and rivaly between the Japanese Army and Navy was such that they even set up differing production lines for essentially the same types of aircraft again impeeding production and distribution.

all nations have their examples of inter and intra-service rivalry and competing goals

Posted: Sat Jul 08, 2000 10:20 pm
by sven
Originally posted by Nikademus:
gotta disagree there.

Dont think the US example is any more severe than examples in other nations.

When Guderian was appointed 'Inspector General of Armored troops' The artillery arm, fearful of their position and influence conspired to have the wording changed so that the STuG's and Jagdpanzers remained under their control.

The move half crippled Gudarian's efforts and thus impeeded Germany's lackluster attempts to better regulate her AFV construction and deployment.

The animosity and rivaly between the Japanese Army and Navy was such that they even set up differing production lines for essentially the same types of aircraft again impeeding production and distribution.

all nations have their examples of inter and intra-service rivalry and competing goals
The American conflict in command structure altered overall national srtategy in the theatre possibly lengthening the conflict. The examples you gave led to inefficient production lines not a shift in overall strategy. MacArthur threatened to take his case for his ideas on proper assault of Japan to the public, and Nimitz was just barely less vehement in his assertion for island hopping.

Who was right? Thank God we never had to find out. If US industry had not been able to sustain both drives we may have been pointing out this flaw in overall US strategy. I am not as well versed in Germany's problems, and indeed you are correct in pointing out that ultimately Japan did indeed pay the piper for her production flaws.

regards,
sven

p.s. It has always amazed me that Japan wasted her air crews the way that she did. Does anyone know of any websites dedicated to IJN aviation? (IJN= Imperial Japanese Navy)



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Give all you can all you can give....

Posted: Sat Jul 08, 2000 10:26 pm
by Voriax
Originally posted by sven:

p.s. It has always amazed me that Japan wasted her air crews the way that she did. Does anyone know of any websites dedicated to IJN aviation? (IJN= Imperial Japanese Navy)
Here's one: http://www.danford.net/japan.htm

and from it's link list: http://www.combinedfleet.com/ijnaf.htm

This latter url is actually a part of a larger site of Japanese navy.

Voriax

Posted: Sat Jul 08, 2000 10:26 pm
by Nikademus
true, but they are all valid examples of how various departments and/or branches tend to 'protect' and promote their interests, even in the face of logic and common sense (easy for all of us to do in hindsight of course ;-)..) its human nature and not unique to any one nation.

fortunately we (the US) wer'nt badly affected by our own little 'rivalries' (army/navy, the quality faction vs the quantity faction, the TD arm vs the mech corp. etc)

having an industrial potential unmatched anywhere in the world helped too :-)

Posted: Mon Jul 10, 2000 7:03 am
by Tombstone
I don't think Germany counts when it comes to inter-departmental rivalries. It's in it's own classification. It goes way beyond... Late WWII Germany was a very mentally ill beast. I think the US command split in the pacific was awful. Pride can cause a lot of waste.

Speaking of US TD's... does anyone else love M-10's as much as I do?? 76L54 in 1942 for the price of a Sherman. Gotta love it. (probably means M-10 should be more expensive, but even then what else do you have that can penetrate german tanks from long range??)

Tomo

Posted: Mon Jul 10, 2000 7:39 am
by Kev
Originally posted by sven:
The American conflict in command structure altered overall national srtategy in the theatre possibly lengthening the conflict. The examples you gave led to inefficient production lines not a shift in overall strategy
Read Albert Speers book "Inside the Third Reich"

Not only did the interdepartmental/personal infighting inflict havoc on production, it interfered with strategy, planning, everything.

Once you have read the book you will wonder how Germany lasted as long as they did - I suspect that given heavy, early and speedy production of Panthers, Type XXI uboats, He 219 and Me 262 and a decent heavy bomber all in reasonable time the Germans would have still lost the war due to infighting and inefficiency.

The German infighting was in a class of it's own that makes Macarthur v the USN look like nothing.