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I was watching this on the History Channel yesterday and I found out the rather large missconceptions of the battle that happened in Pearl Harbor. I also found out that the Arizona was hit 2 times, not just once. It would be nice to see a movie that actually tells the real story of that battle on Dec. 7, 1941. Also, has anyone read this book, "At Dawn We Slept"?

I've read it. Good book for background information. Explains some of the political problems the U.S. was having at the time. Also has a fair amount of detail about Japanese intelligence gathering efforts.

Kind of a dry read though.

Chez

Unless I am confusing this with other books I've read one of the author's goals was to argue that Roosevelt had no advanced knowledge of the attack, and he calls everyone a "revisonist" for arguing that Roosevelt did know. On the other hand, both my wife and I have taken history courses where the professors discussed it as a matter of fact that Roosevelt did know about the attack in advance. I suppose the debate will go on forever but there are two separable questions 1) did Roosevelt (and his key advisors, both civilian and military) have reason to believe that the Japanese were planning for an attack on Pearl Harbor - the answer to that is unequivocably yes; 2) did Roosevelt (or other key US leaders) know that the Japanese actually would attack Pearl Harbor - the answer to that is unclear. Kelly Turner, for one, said the Japanese would attack Pearl Harbor. A related question is whether the US leaders believed the Japanese would attack the US somewhere, - and the answer to that is unequivocably yes. Did the US leaders expect an attack on or about December 7th - based on alerts issued by the US, and intel they possessed - unequivocably yes. Did Short and Kimmel know the attack would be at Pearl Harbor - not clear.

That's interesting Who was Kelly Turner and what dept did he serve in?

ORIGINAL: Footslogger

That's interesting Who was Kelly Turner and what dept did he serve in?

He was in intelligence (navy). During the war I think he was promoted to admiral. As I understand it Roosevelt personally ordered the Pacific Fleet to be rebased to Pearl Harbor precisely because he anticipated an attack there and thought perhaps the presence of the fleet would dissuade the Japanese. Going with the majority view he supposedly ordered a buildup of air forces in the Philippines because it was assumed (by the majority) that the Japanese would strike there first, consistent with their standing strategic plan for war with the US. In some ways this is strange because our plans had been altered such that we planned to abandon the Philippines and make a stand in Hawaii. Various historians have pointed out that by shifting too many air assets from Hawaii to the Philippines we almost guaranteed that we would not be able to spot a Japanese fleet approaching Hawaii unless it came from a fairly narrow window. Other historians have also pointed out that we ran our own wargames about three times and they concluded a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor would devastate the fleet there. This included a surprise attack using carriers. Aother damning fact is that MacArthur was given warning about 8-9 hours before the Japanese attacked the Philippines and yet he refused to allow the air forces there to take any action, resulting in them being largely destroyed on the ground. He had been told about how the Japanese caught the air forces in Hawaii on the ground and yet he allowed the same thing to happen in the Philippines. It looks like we went out of our way to give the Japanese a sporting chance.

"Turner was Director of War Plans in Washington, D.C., in 1940-41 and achieved the rank of Rear Admiral late in 1941."

I have read the book. I thought it ws pretty good.

I read the book. IIRC At Dawn deals primarily with the diplomatic intelligence lead-up to the war. Prange, I believe wrote three books on Pearl Harbor and I think another dealt more with the military side of things. I thought it was excellent, but its a long, dry read.

1) did Roosevelt (and his key advisors, both civilian and military) have reason to believe that the Japanese were planning for an attack on Pearl Harbor - the answer to that is unequivocably yes;

Depends on what you mean by reason to believe. Certainly in a global sense one can say yes - everybody knew some reasons why it was a possibility - about war-gaming the attack on Pearl in 1940, the previous CINC had objected to moving the fleet to Pearl because of greater vulnerability, everyone knew that the Japs had started their first war with China and the war with Russia with a knockout blow to the enemy fleet - the fact that the location of the carriers was not pinned down while the rest of the fleet was. Kimmel had better knowledge of this than Marshall or Roosevelt. (He famously asked Layton shortly before the attack: "you mean those carriers could be rounding Diamond Head right now?" The possibility they might attack Pearl is why Pearl was included with Panama and the Philippines in the "war warning message of November 27th.

A related question is whether the US leaders believed the Japanese would attack the US somewhere, - and the answer to that is unequivocably yes. Did the US leaders expect an attack on or about December 7th - based on alerts issued by the US, and intel they possessed - unequivocably yes.

Absolutely. The rationale of the war warning on November 27th was that an attack was coming soon.

PEARL HARBOR WARNING
27 November Message Sent by Navy Department, 27 November 1941:
This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan looking toward
stabilization of the conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move is
expected within the next few days. The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of the naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo. Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in War Plan 46 [The Navy’s war plan]. inform district and army authorities. A similar warning is being sent by the War Department.

It's why Halsey went to a war status when he sailed to Midway. The ironic thing is that the military was more concerned about an attack on Pearl Harbor six months earlier than they were in December - in December they though they knew what the Japs were doing and didn't think they would dare attack the Phillipines and Singapore without the support of carrier based air. But keep in mind, Marshall insisted that the Hawaii commanders get exactly the same war warning they were sending to the Philippines which they knew would be in the first attack.

Message sent by Chief of Naval Operations, 3 December:
Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instructions were
sent yesterday to Japanese Consular posts at Hongkong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila,
Washington and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and
burn...confidential and secret documents.

As far as Turner anticipating the attack on Pearl Harbor - that's Turner revisionist ass-covering. If there was an intelligence failure Turner is one of the central goats. Here's a quote re the views of one of the intelligence insiders most convinced that we should have anticipated the attack on Pearl:

And I Was There: Pearl Harbor and Midway – Breaking the Secrets, by Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton, USN (Ret.), with Captain Roger Pineau, USNR (Ret.) and John Costello

New York: William Morrow Quill, 1985. Pp. 596. Illus., maps, notes, biblio., index. 10.95. ISBN:0-688-06968-1.

Edwin T. Layton was probably the biggest unsung hero of the Pacific Theater of World War II. He was an intelligence officer for Admirals Husband E. Kimmel and Chester W. Nimitz during the war, and he was deeply involved with the high-ranking officers from the unprovoked sneak attack on December 7, 1941, to Japan’s unconditional surrender on September 2, 1945. Layton’s memoirs are an inside story, which he began writing thirty years after the end of World War II, when enough materials had been declassified. Layton’s views are intriguing, particularly where he lays blame for Pearl Harbor. In one of the major bombshells, Layton lays the blame upon then-Rear Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, who was director of war plans.


Given our lack of response to the actual outbreak of hostilities in the Phillipines for 6-7 hours, when the agreed plan was to respond immediately with an airstrike on Taiwan, it is hard to imagine what it would take to get a response from a military which after being warned that "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of the conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move is expected within the next few days." respond by closing down the radar for the weekend (and the following one when the attack occurred), continuing to return the ships to port for the weekend with the crews all given liberty, and keeping all the ammo under lock and key.

Nations rarely suffer surprise for lack of warning, but fall victim with astonishing
regularity because they fail to respond to warning.

Richard Betts

Surprise is a basic and recurring event in human life. Still, neither the repeated
occurrence of surprises nor our assumption that life has surprises...makes us any
less vulnerable to its impact. In most cases of surprise we do not ignore the
probability of a potential occurrence but rather tend to reject it as unlikely. Therefore,
when it actually does happen, it takes us “ by surprise” since we had expected it
to occur later or in a different place or manner. Sometimes our imagination is too
limited even to entertain the possibility of surprise, preventing us from
envisaging the event in any way.

Ephriam Kam: Surprise Attack. 1988. p. 7

Warning is a necessary but insufficient condition for avoiding surprise. Without
response, warning is useless. Warning is evidence filtered through perception;
response is action (alert, mobilization, and redeployment) designed to counter an
attack.

Richard Betts. Surprise Attack. 1982. p. 87.

The policy-maker, unlike an academic analyst, can rarely wait until all the facts
are in...He is very often under strong pressure to do something, to take some
action, even if all the facts are not yet available to him or where a careful
assessment of current data would provide useful results.
The capacity of human beings to deal with situations of vast complexity is very
limited. The human mind needs a highly simplified “map” of a situation if it is
going to be capable of taking any action or making a decision. These maps are
subjective, generally being based on and springing from deeply held values.

Robert Bowie, as quoted in Ernest R. May, Knowing One’s Enemies. 1986. p. 4

It was hard enough for Americans to believe that the Japs would have the nerve to attack the United States. To believe they would attack Pearl with the heart of their naval air force at the same time as attacking the heart of British Far Eastern power and the Philippines was beyond imaginative resources of any American of that time (during Jim Crow and European domination) to consider as a likely possibility.

Read it a few years ago. A good book. I would recommend it.

I have all of Prange books on PH and although dry (or 'scientific') indeed would recommend them. I find them more convincing than e.g. the works of Toland or the more recent book by the author that should not be named.[/align] [/align]IIRC Prange argues that the US commanders at Pearl knew that an attack was possible, including a carrier raid, but that they believed that the Japanese would not dare to openly attack the best-equipped US base outside CONUS and that sabotage was the most likely form of attack to be feared - and they prepared accordingly.   [/align]

ORIGINAL: Tomcat

Aother damning fact is that MacArthur was given warning about 8-9 hours before the Japanese attacked the Philippines and yet he refused to allow the air forces there to take any action, resulting in them being largely destroyed on the ground. He had been told about how the Japanese caught the air forces in Hawaii on the ground and yet he allowed the same thing to happen in the Philippines. It looks like we went out of our way to give the Japanese a sporting chance.

Not true. almost all planes were in air in the morning expecting attack at dawn which was japanese plan. weather over formosa delayed launch and when they arrived ally planes were on ground refueling.

ORIGINAL: wpurdom
As far as Turner anticipating the attack on Pearl Harbor - that's Turner revisionist ass-covering. If there was an intelligence failure Turner is one of the central goats. Here's a quote re the views of one of the intelligence insiders most convinced that we should have anticipated the attack on Pearl:

And I Was There: Pearl Harbor and Midway – Breaking the Secrets, by Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton, USN (Ret.), with Captain Roger Pineau, USNR (Ret.) and John Costello

New York: William Morrow Quill, 1985. Pp. 596. Illus., maps, notes, biblio., index. 10.95. ISBN:0-688-06968-1.

Edwin T. Layton was probably the biggest unsung hero of the Pacific Theater of World War II. He was an intelligence officer for Admirals Husband E. Kimmel and Chester W. Nimitz during the war, and he was deeply involved with the high-ranking officers from the unprovoked sneak attack on December 7, 1941, to Japan’s unconditional surrender on September 2, 1945. Layton’s memoirs are an inside story, which he began writing thirty years after the end of World War II, when enough materials had been declassified. Layton’s views are intriguing, particularly where he lays blame for Pearl Harbor. In one of the major bombshells, Layton lays the blame upon then-Rear Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, who was director of war plans.

I also have Laytons book. I may be mistaken but I believe that ->Turner<- is quoted as saying the Japanese would start by attacking Russia.
Another book I own (by an Army Jag officer that worships MacAurthor) blames Kimmel and Short. He says Kimmel withheld info from Short. Lots of interesting opinions out there even after all these years.

ORIGINAL: Marty A

ORIGINAL: Tomcat

Aother damning fact is that MacArthur was given warning about 8-9 hours before the Japanese attacked the Philippines and yet he refused to allow the air forces there to take any action, resulting in them being largely destroyed on the ground. He had been told about how the Japanese caught the air forces in Hawaii on the ground and yet he allowed the same thing to happen in the Philippines. It looks like we went out of our way to give the Japanese a sporting chance.

Not true. almost all planes were in air in the morning expecting attack at dawn which was japanese plan. weather over formosa delayed launch and when they arrived ally planes were on ground refueling.

Well, you seem to disagree with every historian I've read. I wasn't there so I can't say from firsthand experience, but it is hard for me to believe that so many historians got it wrong. Of the historians I've read the one most critical of MacArthur (Alan Schom in The Eagle and the Rising Sun) seems to paint a very strong picture of his negligence and culpability. While some planes were airborne, there seems to be a consensus that most were destroyed on the ground. Even in your scenario you'd have to argue for an incorrect usage of the planes if they were all caught on the ground refueling. Besides, Formosa being clouded over does not explain the lack of proper CAP over air bases in the Philippines.

ORIGINAL: rhohltjr

ORIGINAL: wpurdom
As far as Turner anticipating the attack on Pearl Harbor - that's Turner revisionist ass-covering. If there was an intelligence failure Turner is one of the central goats. Here's a quote re the views of one of the intelligence insiders most convinced that we should have anticipated the attack on Pearl:

And I Was There: Pearl Harbor and Midway – Breaking the Secrets, by Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton, USN (Ret.), with Captain Roger Pineau, USNR (Ret.) and John Costello

New York: William Morrow Quill, 1985. Pp. 596. Illus., maps, notes, biblio., index. 10.95. ISBN:0-688-06968-1.

Edwin T. Layton was probably the biggest unsung hero of the Pacific Theater of World War II. He was an intelligence officer for Admirals Husband E. Kimmel and Chester W. Nimitz during the war, and he was deeply involved with the high-ranking officers from the unprovoked sneak attack on December 7, 1941, to Japan’s unconditional surrender on September 2, 1945. Layton’s memoirs are an inside story, which he began writing thirty years after the end of World War II, when enough materials had been declassified. Layton’s views are intriguing, particularly where he lays blame for Pearl Harbor. In one of the major bombshells, Layton lays the blame upon then-Rear Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, who was director of war plans.

I also have Laytons book. I may be mistaken but I believe that ->Turner<- is quoted as saying the Japanese would start by attacking Russia.
Another book I own (by an Army Jag officer that worships MacAurthor) blames Kimmel and Short. He says Kimmel withheld info from Short. Lots of interesting opinions out there even after all these years.

The guy I've read that praises Turner was Alan Schom in The Eagle and the Rising Sun. If memory serves me well, Schom claims that Turner was warning of an attack on Pearl Harbor by mid-41 and asked that appropriate measures be taken, but he was overruled by his superiors. I guess Schom himself is a bit controversial. He doesn't paint a very nice picture of MacArthur, Fletcher, and a few others, but he does praise a few intel guys who were ignored, according to him.

ORIGINAL: Tomcat


Well, you seem to disagree with every historian I've read. I wasn't there so I can't say from firsthand experience, but it is hard for me to believe that so many historians got it wrong. Of the historians I've read the one most critical of MacArthur (Alan Schom in The Eagle and the Rising Sun) seems to paint a very strong picture of his negligence and culpability. While some planes were airborne, there seems to be a consensus that most were destroyed on the ground. Even in your scenario you'd have to argue for an incorrect usage of the planes if they were all caught on the ground refueling. Besides, Formosa being clouded over does not explain the lack of proper CAP over air bases in the Philippines.

Really? maybe you need new history because i did quick google and first thing i see is this:
http://www.worldwar2database.com/html/philip42.htm

The war warning of December 6 had put US Army General Douglas MacArthur into action. When Pearl was being bombed, his planes were in the air, his shore defense were manned, and he thought the first attack would come his way, as the war plans expected. Unfortunately for MacArthur and the War Department, the Japanese had written their own war plans that called for the attack on the Philippines in late morning. The Americans and Filipinos were stunned when the attack came as the planes were on the ground and refueling. Most of the US Army Air Corps was destroyed on the ground. Bombers hit Cavite Navy Yard very hard, and the bleeding of the US Asiatic Fleet began.

i google this: wwii phil air dec 8

ORIGINAL: Tomcat
1) did Roosevelt (and his key advisors, both civilian and military) have reason to believe that the Japanese were planning for an attack on Pearl Harbor - the answer to that is unequivocably yes; 2) did Roosevelt (or other key US leaders) know that the Japanese actually would attack Pearl Harbor - the answer to that is unclear. Kelly Turner, for one, said the Japanese would attack Pearl Harbor. A related question is whether the US leaders believed the Japanese would attack the US somewhere, - and the answer to that is unequivocably yes. Did the US leaders expect an attack on or about December 7th - based on alerts issued by the US, and intel they possessed - unequivocably yes. Did Short and Kimmel know the attack would be at Pearl Harbor - not clear.

No rational person who actually reads history, knows how to weigh evidence, and understands the difference between material evidence and ridiculous wild-eyed speculation, could believe that any American knew the Japanese would attack Pearl Harbor.

ORIGINAL: Marty A

ORIGINAL: Tomcat


Well, you seem to disagree with every historian I've read. I wasn't there so I can't say from firsthand experience, but it is hard for me to believe that so many historians got it wrong. Of the historians I've read the one most critical of MacArthur (Alan Schom in The Eagle and the Rising Sun) seems to paint a very strong picture of his negligence and culpability. While some planes were airborne, there seems to be a consensus that most were destroyed on the ground. Even in your scenario you'd have to argue for an incorrect usage of the planes if they were all caught on the ground refueling. Besides, Formosa being clouded over does not explain the lack of proper CAP over air bases in the Philippines.

Really? maybe you need new history because i did quick google and first thing i see is this:
http://www.worldwar2database.com/html/philip42.htm

The war warning of December 6 had put US Army General Douglas MacArthur into action. When Pearl was being bombed, his planes were in the air, his shore defense were manned, and he thought the first attack would come his way, as the war plans expected. Unfortunately for MacArthur and the War Department, the Japanese had written their own war plans that called for the attack on the Philippines in late morning. The Americans and Filipinos were stunned when the attack came as the planes were on the ground and refueling. Most of the US Army Air Corps was destroyed on the ground. Bombers hit Cavite Navy Yard very hard, and the bleeding of the US Asiatic Fleet began.

i google this: wwii phil air dec 8

We're not talking about 1 history, we're talking about all historians, including yours, agreeing that the planes were destroyed on the ground. When MacArthur was asked by his subordinate for permission to attack the Japanese planes on Formosa he refused. This was several hours before the Japanese attacked the Philippines, and it was in defiance of the standing war plan to attack Formosa immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities. You keep using examples to illustrate a lack of CAP, so how can you also argue that he did anything useful? The facts that historians agree on seem to indicate that he refused permission to bomb Formosa, he did not take that action himself, he and his subordinates failed to organize proper CAP and search operations, he failed to adequately protect the planes on the ground, and the US air forces were destroyed in about 2 days. Even if it were true that "all" US planes were in the air "immediately", isn't that rather stupid? Planes do run out of fuel and unless you have strong reason to beleive that they are airborne when the attack is coming this is a big mistake, even if it is true, and I haven't seen any historian that believes it is true. I don't accept a Google search as legitimate scholarship. Anybody can put anything on the internet and much of it is simply rubbish.

ORIGINAL: Tomcat

We're not talking about 1 history, we're talking about all historians, including yours, agreeing that the planes were destroyed on the ground. When MacArthur was asked by his subordinate for permission to attack the Japanese planes on Formosa he refused. This was several hours before the Japanese attacked the Philippines, and it was in defiance of the standing war plan to attack Formosa immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities. You keep using examples to illustrate a lack of CAP, so how can you also argue that he did anything useful? The facts that historians agree on seem to indicate that he refused permission to bomb Formosa, he did not take that action himself, he and his subordinates failed to organize proper CAP and search operations, he failed to adequately protect the planes on the ground, and the US air forces were destroyed in about 2 days. Even if it were true that "all" US planes were in the air "immediately", isn't that rather stupid? Planes do run out of fuel and unless you have strong reason to beleive that they are airborne when the attack is coming this is a big mistake, even if it is true, and I haven't seen any historian that believes it is true. I don't accept a Google search as legitimate scholarship. Anybody can put anything on the internet and much of it is simply rubbish.

The sky is what color in your world? i say planes destroyed on ground. you say i said not? i never read anything where mac ordered no attack. state source please. if all planes were not in air in morning if attack had come you would say that not having them in air was stupid also no? i read in books long ago that planes in air at dawn not on internet. i do 1 quick google search that took 5 seconds to say what i saw years ago. maybe you should do research before you talk. who are your history writers that say no planes flew in am of dec 8? i would like to read this because i never have. i do more looking since you write and i still see nothing on no attack order. and i certainly not defend mac. but then us holdout at bataan last longer than it should so maybe did some things right. imagine how long they could hold if they were ready.

The idea that Roosevelt or his advisers, definitively knew about a specific Japanese plan to attack Pearl Harbor, is garbage, pure and simple.

That America as a whole was not as vigilant about a surprise attack as we should have been given certain clues is certainly true, but not because information was beleived but intentionally buried. This happened for any number of reasons that At Dawn We Slept does a pretty good job of laying out.

Anyone who believes that kind of conspiracy theory clap-trap probably believes the CIA killed Kennedy, or any number of ridiculous revisionist historical crap that's come down the pike. If it wasn't for Ben Affleck, maybe Oliver Stone would have produced a Pearl Harbor movie where the CIA arranged the whole thing to get us in the war.

Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision&nbsp; by Roberta Wohlstetter.&nbsp; That is all.

ORIGINAL: dorjun driver

Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision  by Roberta Wohlstetter.  That is all.

Exactly! From said book:

"It is much easier after the event to sort the relevant from the irrelevant signals ... Before the event [a signal] is obscure and pregnant with conflicting meanings . . . In Washington, Pearl Harbor signals were competing with a vast number of signals from the European theater ... In short, we failed to anticipate Pearl Harbor not for want of the relevant materials, but because of a plethora of irrelevant ones."

Noone intentionally ignored the intelligence. I think this sums it up well. No conspiracy here, move on everyone!