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For the third iteration of this scenario, I have reduced the allocation of MMG to the Aus 19th Bde.

The existing allocation is equivalent to 156 vickers - it seems likely that the correct allocation for the British and Dominion infantry division should be a single MMG battalion of 48 weapons.

I reduced the line companies to the Australian Inf Coy (-), and increased their strength % to keep the personnel quantity as close as possible - I left the upper limit at 136 men, so the overall infantry strength was reduced by a few dozen men where the companies in the original force were near full strength - many were still below full strength, but nearer 90% than 80% as a result of the changes.

I left the supporting formations at the same strengths, but reduced the staff efficiency of the Supply echelon from 100 to 10% (although this doesn't seem to have made any significant change?). I also split 2/3Fd RAA into it's two constituent batteries 5.2/3Fd and 6.2/3Fd, which increases flexibility of the artillery, although it reduces the hitting power quite a bit overall I feel.

I missed one Vickers platoon (B2/8 coy was still listed as an Aus Inf Coy, and not the desired Aus Inf Coy (-) - I must have closed rather than ok'd the change - still the overall quantity of MMG is actually 1/3 of the total divisional allocation, so it doesn't make an enormous difference - I'll assume that D2/1MG has been broken down into platoons and one has been attached to this company).

German forces are the standard for the scenario - reinforced I Bn/433.

Situation:

With the German forces engaged to the South and West, and opportunity has arisen to strike their flank and threaten their lines of communication and supply. A brigade of 6th Australian Division has been tasked with forcing the river and securing a route for the Division to attack northwards. Enemy forces have been successful operationally so far, so may not be adequately prepared for this threat. It is suspected that the bulk of his supply, artillery and armoured formations are operating at his decisive point, and this may be our last opportunity to delay his breakout to the South. One Battalion of Australian troops detached for other duties has been replaced by an inexperienced, untrained but determined battalion of Greek troops.

Mission:

Secure crossings on the Sperkhios River, and routes north to Lamia for passage of follow-on troops. Attack enemy to deny the opportunity to attack or delay follow-on forces. Preserve strength for future operations exploiting to the North.

Crossings are located from East to West: Sperkhios Bridge, Yef Alamanas, Komma Bridge. Sperkhios and Komma are single lane bridges of modest capacity - Yef Alamanas is a higher capacity bridge and is considered a higher priority. Routes from Yef Alamanas all pass through the area of Anthili so it is necessary to deny this town to the enemy to open the MSR to the north.

Forces:
19 Australian Brigade HQ (84 officers and men - 4191 officers and men under command)
19 Australian Brigade Base (853 officers and men)
4th Infantry Battalion 2nd AIF (643 officers and men, 2 3" Mortar)
A Coy, 2/4 Infantry
B Coy, 2/4 Infantry
C Coy, 2/4 Infantry
D Coy, 2/4 Infantry
Mortar Platoon, 2/4 Infantry

8th Infantry Battalion, 2nd AIF (652 officers and men, 2 3" Mortar, 4 Vickers MMG)
A Coy, 2/8 Infantry
B Coy, 2/8 Infantry
C Coy, 2/8 Infantry
D Coy, 2/8 Infantry
Mortar Platoon, 2/8 Infantry

II Infantry Battalion, 82 Infantry Regiment (Greek) (803 officers and men, 2 65mm Guns, 12 8mm St Etienne MMG)
4th Coy, II/82 Infantry
5th Coy, II/82 Infantry
6th Coy, II/82 Infantry
2nd MG Coy, 82 Infantry
Mtn Gun Plt, 82 Infantry

C Coy, 2/1 MG Battalion (motorised, 125 officers and men, 12 Vickers MMG)
3rd Battery, 1st AT Regt (motorised, 90 officers and men, 12 2pdr AT guns)

8th Company RAE, 2nd AIF (motorised, 195 officers and men)
8th Company RAE Bridging platoon, 2nd AIF (motorised, 70 officers and men)

2nd NZ Division, Cavalry Squadron (mechanised, armoured, 236 officers and men, 28 Vickers Mk VIB, 44 Dingo Scout cars)

5th Battery, 3rd Field Arty Regiment, 2nd AIF (motorised, 220 officers and men, 12 25pdr Mk2)
6th Battery, 3rd Field Arty Regiment, 2nd AIF (motorised, 220 officers and men, 12 25pdr Mk2)

Force Capabilities:
With the exception of the support elements our infantry is equipped with weapons inferior in range and firepower to the defending forces. He has absolute superiority beyond 800m, and will dominate any fight beyond 500m. As most of the advance is over open ground and the pressure of time requires much movement during daylight hours it is apparent that the supporting arms will have absolute importance to any attack.

Vickers MMG: Has a high firepower which extends to the full direct-fire range - in company strength they are superior to any other single infantry formation, particularly at longer ranges where their superiority is absolute. Shorter ranges enhance killing effect, but supressive and neutralising fires are effective at all ranges. As motorised troops they can be moved rapidly to cover the decisive points, and can deploy with minimal fatigue as the MT carries their considerable weight of weapons and ammunition. Where employed as a detached platoon in direct support of an infantry company they have an important ability to support their battalion during a movement or attack - they do however have much less effect in platoon strength than as a company, and slow the advance of their attached companies - both by the weight of equipment and due to the requirement to deploy and site the weapons for their supporting fires.
St Etienne MMG: Employed within the Greek Battalion as direct fire support in company strength. This is a poorer weapon than our Vickers gun, less capable of sustaining high rates of fire and with a shorter effective range. It is, however, vastly superior to our Bren LMG, and is comparable to the MG34 with a slightly higher maximum range. One company of these is roughly equivalent to a platoon of Vickers for planning purposes.
3" Mortar: A platoon of two weapons is in direct support of each Australian Battalion - these weapons are effective and can provide good suppressive fires to 2500m. Their effectiveness doesn't fall off with range in the same way as the direct fire weapons, so although they are less powerful at close range they become the most effective weapons at longer range, and can provide fires from or into dead ground. The effectiveness is reduced by their heavy weight which increases fatigue, particularly when in action, or after long approach marches. They also have limited ammunition supply and can easily expend all of it within a single heavy engagement if not carefully managed, and if isolated from their supply columns.
25 pdr: The backbone of the support fires - effective both as a direct fire weapon (one with a good AT capability), and as a light artillery piece. A 12 gun battery is perhaps a little light to achieve decisive results from a short preparation, but both firing together can provide sufficient suppression to allow our infantry to close with and assault their infantry positions. Their position well to the rear and near the supply echelon should allow a steady supply of ammunition. The shell size is perhaps too small for any permanent demoralising effect when fired in regimental strength - a divisional artillery group of 72 guns is known to be highly effective however. Best effect is seen when fired for suppression prior to and during an assault, or for neutralisation of enemy columns seen moving in the open.
65mm Mtn Gun: The direct fire artillery of the Greek Battalion. Only two guns, which require a direct LOS to their target. Roughly as effective as a St Etienne MG. Useful as additional long range firepower but not decisively strong - it should assist the infantry closing on the defended position, but is unlikely to cause any lasting effects.

Dingo SC: Light armoured car. Bren armed, but can manoeuvre more easily under fire than a dismounted infantry section.
Vickers MkVIB: Light tank. Armed with Vickers 50 calibre HMG and Vickers MMG. Both Vickers guns share similar properties to the MMG noted above, however they are armoured (albeit lightly) and require no deployment before firing. The 50 cal Vickers has a higher effectiveness, but a lower rate of fire and can engage light armour. Each 2 light tanks could be considered the equivalent to 3 Vickers MMG when both are stationary, but the ability to move and then fire immediately makes the tanks far more effective in the advance or withdrawal.

Aircraft:
Although these are unreliable, and may not be available when required, advantage should be taken to attack his suspected support weapons whenever the opportunity arises. Hitting units while they are moving, or those which are supporting units under pressure from our forces are the targets of preference. Casualties should be expected to be low, but the disruption caused can be considerable, and some equipment is often abandoned or destroyed in the attack.

Enemy Forces:

Known to be in the area is a KG based around I Battalion, Infantry Regiment 433.
Besides the usual Battalion level supports, the Regimental IG Company, a Divisional PzJg Company and a Flak Company are within the area of operations. The KG is also supported by several attached Companies from II Bn/433 and Engineers.

I Bn/433 HQ
1.I/433 Infantry Company
2.I/433 Infantry Company
3.I/433 Infantry Company
I/433 Mortar Platoon
I/433 PzJg Platoon

Attachments:
6.II/433 Infantry Company ?
7.II/433 Infantry Company ?
13.433 Infantry Gun Company
1.220 PzJg Company
2.220 Pnr Company
1.54 FlaK Company ?

Enemy Capabilities:
His forces are universally equipped with the excellent MG34, in two versions, the basic LMG and the tripod mounted sMG34 MMG with telescopic sight and belt feed.
Both weapons have excellent firepower for what is a relatively light weapon, and particularly the MG34 LMG version has a very large effective range.

MG34: Light weight, high rate of fire and high effectiveness for a magazine fed, bipod LMG. The effective range is much longer than that of our Bren and SMLE within our line companies at 1500m.
sMG34: The same weapon fitted with additional sights, a tripod and belt fed ammunition. The effective range is lower than the water cooled Vickers, and the weapon is less capable of sustained rapid fire due to the need to change the air cooled barrels after a few hundred rounds. However this weapon is nearly as effective over all and is provided in quantities we cannot match - each battalion has 12 of these excellent weapons, plus at least 36 of the LMG variant. The only real shortcoming is the huge appetite these weapons have for ammunition, which requires a constant supply of new ammunition - although this isn't a large weight it is a problem for isolated units or those on a tenuous supply chain.

8cm sGrW: A platoon of these is found within each Battalion, as in our forces. This platoon though appears to have 6 tubes, making this far more effective in breaking up attacks or suppressing defensive positions than our own organisation. The problems of weight and ammunition supply are similar however, and may be even more acute with the relatively small German formation (3 times as many weapons but only 50% more personnel).

7.5cm leIG18: The Regimental Gun Company has 6 of these weapons. They are relatively short ranged but provide a useful anti-personnel effect at direct fire ranges.
15cm sIG33: Two of these are present in the Regimental Gun Company. These are very dangerous against exposed infantry, but both types have limited ready ammunition. A steady infantry force should be able to close on this formation even if not on the first attempt.

3.7cm Pak: Present both within the Battalion PzJg platoons and at Regimental and Divisional PzJg Companies. Fires both AT and HE rounds to an effective range of 2km - the AT performance is modest, but sufficient for the armoured vehicles we have available at closer ranges. The suppressive effect of the HE rounds is only a nuisance from the three guns held in the PzJg platoon, but could cause problems in company strength (12 guns), or when combined with heavy AT guns.
5cm Pak: Present with the Divisional PzJg company of some formations. Effective fire can be delivered to 3km. The larger HE round and greater accuracy at extended ranges make this a serious threat to an infantry attack if unsuppressed. Too effective against our lightly armoured vehicles to risk approach without neutralisation or close assault by infantry formations.

Heavy Artillery: Not known to be operating within our AO.

Armour: Not known to be operating within our AO.

Terrain Analysis:

The Sperkhios is crossable only at the three target bridges, being in flood at present. The attached bridging company can rebuild the Yef Alamanas bridge if it is not taken intact, but the temporary structure will take over 24 hours to build and will have a much lower capacity than the present bridge.

The bridge at Komma is only approachable from the south over an open slope. The ridgeline is over 1000m to the south of the river, so an attack on this axis cannot be considered likely to succeed if it is heavily defended - While taking this crossing by a quick assault would offer minor advantages, it is only critical in the case that Yef Alamanas is not taken.  The town of Komma to the rear of the crossing area offers cover and concealment to the German forces in this area, although they are unable to cover the immediate area of the crossing adequately if they are positioned here. The Western EA is considered the area North and West of Anthili, encompassing the Komma bridge and town, and the routes north and west from this town.

Yef Alamanas, being on the inside of a large river bend is vulnerable to fires from multiple directions - it is overlooked by the Thermopylae ridge and direct fire supports here would render the hamlet untenable. As the decisive point of our initial assault this is to receive priority of fires of both the light armour and artillery and MMG supports. Approaches to the crossing are possible down the slope to the south, along the main road through the marshes and along the stream bed to the north of this route.

The main routes north pass through and near the town of Anthili - this needs to be secured before our forces have freedom of manoeuvre and can turn to attack north, west or east. While the area of the Sperkhios bend is low-lying, there are minor ridges that restrict lines of fire - these will offer useful concealment for our forces as the move northwards. The Central EA lies between Anthili, Yef Almanas, the river and the central low ridge. There are two useful roads passing to the west and through Anthili from Yef Alamanas. The culverted crossings of the drainage ditches in this are would allow faster movement than a deployed movement across them, but at the expense of increased vulnerability.

The far side of the main break in slope contains the eastern engagement areas along the route north from the Sperkhios Bridge. The Sperkhios bridge can be approach by a wide move to the south over the ridgeline and beyond the marshy areas - this is secure but too far for an infantry formation to cover. Light motorised columns can use this to cover the southern approach to Sperkhios, and to provide observation of the Eastern EA.

Beyond Anthili the ground begins to rise towards Lamia. There are multiple small villages which might be secured by small units covering the withdrawal of the defeated enemy. This area is the Northern EA.

Tasking:

Yef Alamanas: 2 NZ cavalry to approach along the road firing on the defenders, supported by indirect fires from 6.2/3 Fd Artillery at the 'start line' position. Two battalions of infantry to move across the bridge from the march, deploying at small arms range against any encountered positions. II/82 to approach along the road from their start positions. 2/8 Australian Infantry to approach over the southern ridge and north through Koutseki. The C2/1 MG and 5.2/3 Fd Artillery take up positions on the ridge due south of Koutseki (east) and to provide direct fires on units within the Sperkhios bend. 2/8Fd Company Royal Australian Engineers moves along the stream to secure the bank at Yef Alamanas. 2/8Fd Bridging Platoon to approach from the south and assist securing the bridge.
Subsequent movements to be adjusted if required, but initial planning has II/82 approaching along the western road from Yef Alamanas to pass through Anthili from South West to take positions North East of the town. 2/8 Infantry to pass along the eastern route between Yef Alamanas to Anthili. 2/8 Fd Engineers to support the planned Komma attack.

Komma: 2/4 Infantry Battalion passes north along the Moskhorikhon road. If possible they are to secure the crossing with support from the 2/8 Fd elements. Fire support from Airstrikes, and 2/3Fd artillery to suppress the defending positions. Subsequent operations by 2/4 to secure Komma town.  C2/1 to move to cover the routes between Anthili and Komma once Yef Alamanas secured and the Central EA forces pass north of their support range. This to be performed from the south of the river near the tower. Sealing the Western Flank by the destruction of the Komma crossing is an acceptable outcome if the Yef Alamanas crossing is open. 2/4 would then become available for operations in the Sperkhios Bend.

Sperkhios Bridge: 3/1AT to approach from the southern route through the marshes. To take positions overlooking the Eastern EA but at a safe distance from the crossing. The defensive position to be taken in the flank by 2 NZ Cav approaching along the northern bank of the Sperkhios. 3/1AT to pursue and remain in contact with the retreating forces. They are to avoid decisive engagement of effective forces, but to prevent the rallying of broken units.

Brigade Echelon: To relieve line troops at Yef Alamanas (Supply) and Anthili (HQ) once they pass onwards. Moskhorikhon and Sperkhios Bridge to be secured by the two batteries of 2/3FD Artillery.

Conduct of Operations:

(This is a working draft document, and timings and corrections to the detail flow of the battle will be added as the intelligence is collated from the map overlays (screenshots)).

All troops embark on their planned operations just after 0600 hours. The 6.2/3 Fd Artillery takes position at the start line and 2 NZ Cav begin to engage the Yef Alamanas defenders from the marsh road through the Koutseki hamlets.

The German command displaced several of the Yef Alamanas defenders - one rifle company moving to support the PzJg platoon at Sperkhios Bridge and a second company displacing in the open to new positions closer to the bridge. This latter company was taken under heavy fire from the light armoured regiment and the support Fd Artillery battery and was dispersed to the North East. The mortar platoon and a gun company were observed moving down the river road from Anthili. Both were taken under fire and forced to go to ground well to the north of the crossing, preventing the replacement of the missing two companies of the original force. Neither support company is able to provide any substantial fires during this period.



The NZ Cav Regt advanced along the main road, and their fires in conjunction with those of 6.2/3 kept the gun company and mortars pinned north of Yef Alamanas, and eventually broke the resolve of a second formation at Yef Alamanas.



With the approach of the infantry formations and engineers, the New Zealanders advanced faster than anticipated and arrived within the crossing area well in advance of their supporting infantry. Being able to focus their entire firepower on the sole defending company at the bridge they prevented the destruction of the bridge by the company, which according to intelligence reports later obtained from prisoners taken by the newly arriving engineers was a standard line infantry company - 2nd Company, I Battalion, Infantry Regiment 433.


Intelligence estimates.

It is presumed that the pioneer formation was the first engaged and driven off, and the KG HQ was also present at the bridge. With the breaking of the German command group there was no immediate or effective response to the forcing of the crossing and soon after the remaining defenders broke and retreated to the North East.



As troops from II/82 and 2/8 Infantry closed on and crossed the bridge at Yef Alamanas, the 2/8Fd RAE units broke contact and commenced moving to support 2/4 Infantry on their approach to the Komma crossing. C2/1MG supporting from the ridge south of Yef Alamanas receives orders to move to the Anthili bend on the south bank of the river, with a mission of support by fire and interdiction of the Yef Alamanas/Anthili/Komma routes.



With II/82 and 2/8 infantry driving up the Central EA, and 2 NZ tasked to drive East to Sperkhios Bridge the artillery support transferred to the defenders at Komma.

Soon after crossing the ridge-line south of Komma the advanced elements of 2/4 Infantry came under fire from multiple infantry companies and an unidentified artillery battery firing in direct fire. The Australian infantry demonstrated considerable professionalism, their rapid advance under this heavy fire forcing the German forces to blow the crossing.



Although this prevented our occupation of a second high quality route to the north, the loss of this crossing also secured our Western flank, and freed the engineers and 2/4 infantry for operations in the Anthili and Sperkhios Bend directions.

Retasking:
2/4 infantry to move south to Yef Alamanas, crossing and moving north to the West of Anthili. They are tasked to move into Komma town.
2/8Fd Company to pass north at Yef Alamanas crossing and move on the Sperkhios crossing along the northern bank. They will receive supporting fires from the 2 NZ Cavalry already moving on this axis.
2/8Fd Bridging platoon to approach Sperkhios Bridge from the south, taking a somewhat southerly route within the delta area. They are to join with and support 3/1AT once the Fd company and supporting Cavalry Regiment are successful in flanking the defending troops at the crossing.
6.2/3Fd to move north and take a direct fire position to the south of Komma bridge.



Conduct of Operations (continued):

2/8 Infantry moves rapidly north and meets the rallied defenders of Yef Alamanas - they are able to defeat these shaken formations from the march and continue driving to the north.
II/82 continues along the river and both formations arrive at Anthili early in the afternoon.

2/8 Fd and 2/8Fd bridging platoon force the crossing at Sperkhios, and the three motorised formations, in concert with the Cavalry Regiment drive northwards, prevent an organised resistance on the flank of 2/8 Infantry.

The two infantry battalions continue to close on Anthili, and although coming under sporadic fire from the Mor Platoon of I/433 suffer little delay. A fresh infantry company dug in in the north of Anthili town takes the lead companies under fire.
The Yef Alamanas garrison rallies around the marsh land on the Sperkhios-Rhoditsa route and a counter attack to the south west seems likely.
The gun company that had initially moved to assist at Yef Alamanas routs north of Anthili and was then seen to rally and move to join the Komma garrision.

Sperkhios Bridge is secured by the 2/8Fd Company elements and 3/1AT, and the motorised units continue to drive north in pursuit of the bridge garrison.



Both C2/1 MG and 6.2/3Fd Artillery Battery take up positions to the south of Komma. The garrison is too strong for the secure employment of the field artillery, and it is soon withdrawn to indirect fire positions near Moskhorikhon village.
C2/1 MG company is able to lay fires on the company north of Anthili town, and on the defenders of Komma, but the field of fire is disappointing, and their arrival had been somewhat delayed by their running out of fuel in dead ground. They only arrived after a fuel supply column caught up with them during the afternoon.

II/82 and 2/8 Infantry battalions succeed in forcing the German infantry company from the town, but cause very few casualties and take some losses in the close in fighting. 2/8 begins to secure the town's northern outskirts and Elements from the rear of II/82 move to isolate Anthili from the forces on the Sperkhios route, according to their initial plan.

The advance of 3/1AT is checked by a hasty defence by 3.I/433 at Sperkhios Bridge, but the support of the New Zealand armour soon allows them to resume their pursuit of the retreating Germans.

A weak counter attack from the Yef Alamanas garrision is confirmed, and the bridging platoon moves to screen this axis. Fire from the artillery and NZ cavalry soon forces the abandonment of this, and the retreat of the troops involved.



2/4 Infantry, tasked with advancing into Komma town reaches Yef Almanas in the late evening and commences moving north.

2/8 and II/82 drive off the supporting PzJg platoon of I/433, and although they are briefly repelled by a counter attack from the German Anthili garrison this setback is only temporary and the advance of 2/8 soon forces this company north from Anthili.

As 3.I/433 breaks contact it moves to the north east, and the bridging platoon and AT company are tasked with isolating them and accepting their surrender.

2/8 Fd company and 2 NZ Cav continue their planned movements.



With the arrival of night, the support of C2/1 is lost so they are tasked to move on Komma in support of 2/4 infantry battalion.

The Anthili garrison is confirmed as 6.II/433 from prisoner interrogation. They continue launching minor attacks through the night, but are overwhelmed by the fire from 2/8 Infantry and the Greek II/82 battalion. 19th Bde HQ has arrived at Anthili and takes over responsibility for local security.

2/4 Infantry passes Anthili by 22:00 and continues towards Komma.



In confused actions the 3.I/433 company is overrun several times by the motorised columns - they appear to be very brittle and retreat from any serious contact.

2/8Fd Company takes up a blocking position on the Sperkhios road adjacent to the marshland. 2NZ passes north through their blocking position at 01:30

2/4 Infantry Battalion made initial contact at Komma and attacks from the march with support from 2/3 Field Artillery.

6.II/433 at Anthili continues to attempt to re-infiltrate into the northern fringes of the town. They are successful in repulsing the northerly advance of the Australian Battalion, but are taking more casualties which they cannot hope to sustain.



By 03:00 the town of Anthili is secured and the defenders have been forced well to the north.
II/82 is re-tasked to move East to block the retreat from the Sperkhios Road towards Rhodista

2/8 Fd company digs in and covers the rear of the forces to their West.

2/4 Infantry Battalion launches a series of company attacks from the march, and with artillery support breaks the 13.433 infantry gun company, and although it is unsuccessful initially the increasing pressure on the Komma defenders is beginning to show - each attack takes longer to be driven back in disarray. C2/1 MG moving up around Anthili closes on Komma in support of 2/4 and is expected to arrive before dawn.

2/8Fd Bridge company and 3/1AT continue to receive the surrender of elements of 3.I/433



By 04:30 the attack at Komma has forced the initial defensive line to withdraw - the defence is not broken and will be reformed in strength just inside the town, but a definite progress is discerned.

The Anthili defence is shattered, and the 6.I/433 company is in disarray and partially surrounded.
2NZ Cavalry is ordered to continue past Anthili and join the northern wing of the 2/4 Infantry Battalion to bolster the advance through Komma.

2/8Fd Company reports movement to their East, and prepares to engage.



A dawn attack by Pnr 2.220 is beaten back by 2/8Fd, and the HQ company is also taken under fire.

3.I/433 is trapped by the motorised columns and surrenders before sunrise.

At Komma, the newly arrived C2/1 MG deploys and supports the continued advance of 2/4 Infantry.

2/8 Infantry and II/82 Infantry are ordered to remain in contact with the German forces retreating to the North.

The final section of this report to follow:

Meh! Can't get the last images out of my .psd layers until later in the weekend... computer hassles.

Still coming though... Honest. [:D]