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Well the good news is that I finally ended the IJN's fun and games with Bombardment Missions yesterday. The BB's Hiei and Kirishima are now at the bottom of the Solomon Sea.

However, I remain convinced that these ships were equipped with some form of secret Romulan cloaking device at least in respect of LBA aircraft.

Quite apart from the immunity granted to them by the turn phasing I noticed that even when their choice of target left them within LBA air range at the end of a turn the LBA tended to ignore them preferring to bomb targets which were not only smaller (and therefore presumably harder to spot) but also much farther away like a DD approaching Kavieng.

In the end I was forced to cheat (at least from a gaming point of view) as I had noticed that the enemy BB's always ended their mission in a set hex depending upon the one they started from. So when I saw them forming up near Gasmata for another run I sheduled an ambush for them in hex 19:32.

Predictably, none of my LBA's spotted the Bombardment TF coming in despite the fact that they managed to spot and bomb an MSW off Rabaul.

My LBA strengths on New Guinea are currently:

Finchschafen: 24F
Buna: 12PA
Dobadura: 48DB:171LB:12PA
Port Moresby:24F:56DB:54LB:12RE
Gilli Gilli:47DB

The enemy shelled Lae that night and as expected ended up in Hex 19:32 the next morning out of range of my 151 land based DB's. And all 227 LB's once more ignored them to fly combat missions against DD's and AG's near Rabaul, Kavieng and Wewak.

However, this time the BB's were in for a shock because my Carrier TF229 (Hornet & Enterprise) had been placed on station 2 hexes away from 19:32 and these Navy flyers could tell the difference between a BB and a whale. They bombed the **** out of the bombardment group all day.

Then just to make sure, my newly arrived Battle Group TF227 was sitting in Hex 19:32 waiting for them, proving that the AI isn't the only one who can play the program for a sucker. TF227 consisted of the BB's Washington and South Dakota, CA Vincennes, CL's Boise and Cleveland and seven DD's. A fierce naval surface action ensued in which both the IJN BB's were blown to pieces plus most of their escorts.

No doubt the AI will continue to try and bombard New Guinea with its CA's in which case I shall have no hesitation in using the same gamey tactic again to send them to the bottom until the IJN final agree to stop using alien technology.

I'm fairly sure that at no point in the actual Solomons campaign, did Allied LBA successfully bomb a "Tokyo Express" fast bombardment group EXCEPT for units that had been damaged and slowed in a surface battle at their target.

Anyone confirm?

Originally posted by JohnK
I'm fairly sure that at no point in the actual Solomons campaign, did Allied LBA successfully bomb a "Tokyo Express" fast bombardment group EXCEPT for units that had been damaged and slowed in a surface battle at their target.

Anyone confirm?

And I'm fairly sure that during the period that the Tokyo Express was in operation there were no Allied LBA bombers available to bomb it. Which may explain why it was never bombed. Henderson Field was the only airfield in operation and it only had a fighter strip and 11 DB's operating from it. Furthermore, the entire strip was knocked out by the first bombardment mission for several days. And when it was operational all 40 odd planes based there were kept fully occupied on ground support and CAP duties.

It bears no comparison to a situation where the bombardment group is attacking a major allied base covered by 200+ long range bomber and search aircraft.

Hi John K,

From John Costello's - The Pacific War 1941-1945 (pg 334,2nd Paragraph) :

...The "Ant Runs" commenced on the night of August 28th. Alerted by Bougainville's Coastwatchers, The Cactus Air Force had plenty of time to find and derail the Tokyo Express that afternoon, sinking the lead destroyer, damaging two others, and forcing a retreat. ...

Seems possible based on this account and these were only destroyers.

Further reading shows how reluctant the IJN were to put their BB's in harms way. After all, they knew what great targets they make. The only time I can find BB's bombarding Henderson Field was on 10/13/42.

The main purpose of the Tokyo Express was to deliver troops and supplies. Of course, Tanaka being the commander that he was, he took advantage of the opportunity to lob some shells on his way out. His force was comprised of DD's.

How you dealt with them is textbook, or at least that's what I try to do.

If you trashed them that bad, it's unlikely they'll come back for quite a while, if ever.

Originally posted by Didz


And I'm fairly sure that during the period that the Tokyo Express was in operation there were no Allied LBA bombers available to bomb it. Which may explain why it was never bombed. Henderson Field was the only airfield in operation and it only had a fighter strip and 11 DB's operating from it. Furthermore, the entire strip was knocked out by the first bombardment mission for several days. And when it was operational all 40 odd planes based there were kept fully occupied on ground support and CAP duties.

It bears no comparison to a situation where the bombardment group is attacking a major allied base covered by 200+ long range bomber and search aircraft.

On 13 October 1942 Henderson Field had ninty planes, divided equally between dive bombers and fighters.
After midnight the battleships Haruna (483 rounds 14" and 21 x 5") and Kongo (430 rounds 14" and 33 x 5") fired at the airfield. By daylight, only seven dive bombers and thirtyfive fighters were operational, with scarcely any fuel left to power them.

On 13 October 1942 Henderson Field had ninty planes, divided equally between dive bombers and fighters.
After midnight the battleships Haruna (483 rounds 14" and 21 x 5") and Kongo (430 rounds 14" and 33 x 5") fired at the airfield. By daylight, only seven dive bombers and thirtyfive fighters were operational, with scarcely any fuel left to power them.

Please note that this was part of a blockade to keep the Marines on Guadalcanal from being supplied during the ground offensive by the Japanese. The battleships had 5 carriers to protect them and heavy raids from Rabaul suppressed Henderson field on the afternoon before the BB's arrived. Even then, the surviving planes were able to attack the Tokyo Express the next day, although they scored no hits.

Originally posted by mjk428


Please note that this was part of a blockade to keep the Marines on Guadalcanal from being supplied during the ground offensive by the Japanese. The battleships had 5 carriers to protect them and heavy raids from Rabaul suppressed Henderson field on the afternoon before the BB's arrived. Even then, the surviving planes were able to attack the Tokyo Express the next day, although they scored no hits.

There were no air attacks from Henderson field on the following day. At dawn on 15 October Henderson had only four dive bombers and ten P-40 fighters, and no aviation fuel. They managed to find enough gasoline hidden in the jungle for the planes to make a one round trip. The japanese transports were attacked three times by carrier aircraft while unloading. This was by far the biggest threat. If my source is correct

There were no air attacks from Henderson field on the following day. At dawn on 15 October Hednerson had only four dive bombers and ten P-40 fighters, and no aviation fuel. They managed to find enough gasoline hidden in the jungle for the planes to make a one round trip. The japanese transports were attacked three times by carrier aircraft while unloading. This was by far the biggest threat. If my source is correct

From John Costello's - The Pacific War 1941-1945 (pg 352,4th Paragraph)

...By early afternoon the Seabee gangs had repaired "Fighter One" and the surviving planes were able to take off to raid that afternoon's Tokyo Express, whose six destroyers nonetheless pressed on to land their 1,000 troops...

Seems to be a discrepancy between the two sources:)

(I'm willing to concede to your source since it doesn't change the fundamental point that the Tokyo Express was vulnerable to attack.)

I'm experiencing the same agonizingly frustrating experience. The Japanese are sending BBs, CAs and DDs from Rabaul to Port Moresby without a single LBA strike against them.

The only way I've been able to slow them down is to gather a surface fleet at Port Moresby to protect it. Hopefully, it'll slow down some of the ships and then LBA can get them on the way back. I've NEVER seen them bomb anything going towards Port Moresby.

Sounds like fuzzy logic to me... Of course, when I try to send a fast bombardment group from PM to Rabaul, it gets pasted.

Go figure..

Originally posted by Marc

On 13 October 1942 Henderson Field had ninty planes, divided equally between dive bombers and fighters.
After midnight the battleships Haruna (483 rounds 14" and 21 x 5") and Kongo (430 rounds 14" and 33 x 5") fired at the airfield. By daylight, only seven dive bombers and thirtyfive fighters were operational, with scarcely any fuel left to power them.

You clearly have access to far more reliable information than I do as I have been unable to find a detailed assessment of the exact number and composition of the aircraft available at Henderson on a day to day basis. However, I thought I was being generous in allowing a figure of 41 operational aircraft as this was the figure quoted as available just before the final invasion attempt in November.

As far as I can ascertain on

20 August Henderson Field took delivery of VMF223 19 x F4F-4 and VMSB-232 12 x SBD-3.

22 August 67th FS 5 x P400
30 August 67th FS 9 x P400

11 Sept VF-5 with 24 Wildcats from Saratoga but only 5 of these remained by mid-October

VMF-224 also seems to have arrived at some point but both that squadron and VMF-223 were withdrawn in early October.

Whether what remained amounted to 41 operation planes or 90 I have found difficult to confirm. But to a large extent it doesn't matter because however many planes were actually operational on the morning of the 13 October it is seems from the following accounts that they were definately not available to search for IJN Bombardment Missions during the day and that by the morning of the 14th October they were not capable of doing anything.

Based on information from:
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USMC/Gu ... nal-7.html
and
http://www.gnt.net/~jrube/text/airwar.txt

The respite gained at the Battle of Cape Esperance was a short one. On 12 October the American positions were subjected to a two-hour air attack by four waves of enemy bombers under fighter escort.

On the morning of 13 Oct the 67th Fighter Squadron attacked landing barges which the enemy had beached during the night at the western end of Guadalcanal.

At 1200 hours the air raid came. The Mitsubishi G4M1, Navy Type 1 Attack Bombers (Bettys) were scarcely intercepted. The P-400's watched the show above from 12,000 feet (3,658 m); the P-39's struggled to 27,000 feet (8,230 m) and still were 3,000 feet (914 m) low; and insufficient warning prevented the F4F's from making contact in force.

At 1400 hours, while the fighters sat being refueled and rearmed, another wave of Japanese bombers made an appearance and was able to bomb at will, damaging aircraft at Henderson Field and causing casualties among the 164th Infantry, still moving ashore.

More serious, the Japanese field piece (Pistol Pete) had again begun to lob shells- this time into the area around the end of the runway. The Seabees of the 6th Construction Battalion had been racing up and down the strip with pre-cut Marston mat and preloaded dump trucks prepared for the expected craters, but their efforts had barely kept the field in operation. Pilots and mechanics were crawling from their foxholes to ready the P-400's for another mission-to track down "Pistol Pete," as the gun had already been named. Suddenly the mission was called off-no gasoline.

At sunset, a heavy bombardment of the perimeter and the airfield was begun by land-based artillery situated far up the coast. The effect of the bombardment was to deny the use of the airfield for the time being, and all air activity was switched to the newly completed fighter strip.

Just before 2400 hours came the main event. First the noise of a small plane overhead. Then three flares, a red one for the west end of the runway, green for the east, and white in the center. The men were scarcely in the foxholes when bedlam broke loose. Off Guadalcanal stood a Bombardment group consisting of 2 battleships, 1 light cruiser, and 8 destroyers.

Flares from observation and spotting planes illuminated the area, and the fire was accurate and heavily damaging. The scout-bomber aircraft suffered heavily, and the close of the action found only one SBD in operating condition. Forty-one dead were suffered, with many wounded.

For over 2 hours the bombardment continued. Runway and dispersal area were brought under fire; after a thorough pattern of shelling, the enemy shifted to the camp sites in the palm grove.

Gasoline and ammunition dumps took hits and all over the field aircraft went up in smoke and flame. For whole minutes the area was bright as day from the flares.

The Japanese let up long enough to cool their guns, then it began again. At 0315 hours, the enemy stood for home.

Then three bombers came overhead and dropped their sticks; then three more; and so on until dawn.

The morning of 14 Oct lit up a shambles.

Tents were collapsed or shrapnel-riddled. The aerial defenses were seriously reduced; in all, 57 aircraft had been destroyed or damaged [Unfortunately it does not say how many of these were operational prior to the attack]. To meet the Express, four SBD's remained, but no TBF's; to meet the Tojo Time raid, only a few F4F's.

The 67th Fighter Squadron had been fortunate-two P-39's damaged and none of the P-400's even hit. But only a few barrels of aviation gasoline remained.

[As you can see this bears little similarity to a scenario where the defending base has 151 DB's and 227 LB's operational both before and after the bombardment

With the bombardment of Oct 13-14 being the only major attempt by Japanese BBs to bombard US Marine positions at Guadalcanal, it is tough to say whether the game successfully portrays the situation or not. Since Henderson Field had been the recipient of relatively heavy air attacks on the 13th (to suppress the US a/c there), it is definite that the US squadrons defending Henderson Field were not up to strength. Even so, yes, the aircraft on Henderson Field did take off and make attacks on incoming destroyers on the 14th.

The following excerpts are taken from Richard Frank's "Guadalcanal: the Definitive Account of the Landmark Battle", 1990, Random House.

"It was on Guadalcanal itself, however, that the main effort would have to be made to meet this new crisis. A false air raid alarm at midmorning left American fighters sitting on the ground refueling with gasoline drained from wrecked planes when at 1213 a raid of twenty-six Bettys dumped their bombs on the desolation of Henderson Field. The failure of the bombers or their eighteen Zero escorts to encounter airborne American aircraft did nothing to diminish Japanese confidence in the efficacy of the battleship bombardment. A second raid attacked at 1300 with twelve bombers but three fewer Zeros, only to find every flyable American fighter waiting. American claims ran to nine bombers and three fighters: Japanese records confirm the destruction of four Bettys. One Wildcat and one Airacobra fell with their pilots; bomb damage was minor."

"The reinforcement convoy steadily closed Guadalcanal during the day with the only aircraft in sight float planes of the R Area Air Force and Zeros from the 11th Air Fleet. Nonstop exertion from first light by ground crews readied four SBDs, four P-39s, a trio of P-400s, and seventeen F4Fs for an afternoon attack."




Those who say that since no bombardment groups were ever intercepted by land based air during the campaign there is no problem with the way the game handles this are overlooking a significant detail. There was never an attempt by Japanese naval forces to bombard a MAJOR allied airbase with a significant amount of aircraft stationed there, and yet the AI does this regularly in the game. Watching a BB TF come sailing blythely in to bombard Port Moresby (an airbase with 250 a/c, of which over 100 are medium bombers with significantly greater range than the SBDs at Henderson) and withdraw beyond the range of the allied a/c before they can even search is a stretch of the imagination.

I've heard people talk about how long it takes to find enemy task forces and launch attacks, and yet on Aug 28th Marine SBDs on a search mission located an incoming DD TF at 1700 which was then attacked at 1805 (p.199 "Guadalcanal, the definitive account" Richard Frank).

There is a reason that the Japanese never tried to bombard the major bases: they were afraid of losing their ships to LBA. In UV, they need not worry. This problem has not changed any of my games in a major manner, but it could be exploited by a PBEM opponent. Therefore, I think that the situation should be repaired. Do I want a situation where no bombardments can safely occur (what is "safe" anyway?)??? Absolutely not, but I don't agree with the situation as it stands now.

I stand in complete agreement with Mr. Didz in his statement that the bombardment of Henderson Field on Oct 13-14 by the BB TF bears little similarity to a scenario where the base in question has huge amounts of medium and dive bombers available. Yes, it might be possible to pull off, but not likely. Unfotunately, in UV, it is not only likely, but a sure thing. That is where I find a problem.

Okay, so a Bombardment TF with 4 CAs (avg speed = 35) with Retirement Allowed orders.

Ordered to head to Rabaul from Dobadura moves 3 (??) hexes and gets pummelled by LBA.

Meanwhile, a IJN 2 BB fleet with accompanying CAs and DDs can sail from Rabaual to PM and back without getting spotted.

I give up.. My only hope is that there will be a flaw in the logic and we'll get it in the patch. Fingers crossed.

I do believe that there were further bombardment attempts by the IJN after the October attacks. On Nov 13-15 the IJN made a series of attempts to bombard Henderson. On Nov12-13 the IJN sent the BB's Hiei and Kirishima with supporting DD's to bombard Henderson. This force was intercepted by a USN Cruiser force and resulted in the bloody 1rst Naval Battle of Guadalcanal which saw the Hiei heavily damaged and then finished off by air strikes from Henderson and the Big E. The USN suffered the loss of something like 2Cl and about 5 DD with most of the other ships badly shot up. The IJN returned on the 13-14th with a cruiser force that did an ineffective bombardment of Henderson. The IJN tried for a last time on the night of the 14th-15 with the Kirishima and DD's but they ran into "Ching" Lee and the BB's S.Dakota and Washington which (mostly the Washington) blew the Kirishima out of the water. That was the last time the IJN tried to bombard Henderson. They were very aware about the threat of the planes at Henderson and only sent their fast BB's and/or cruisers down the slot.

Kevin

Originally posted by kverdon
I do believe that there were further bombardment attempts by the IJN after the October attacks. On Nov 13-15 the IJN made a series of attempts to bombard Henderson. On Nov12-13 the IJN sent the BB's Hiei and Kirishima with supporting DD's to bombard Henderson. This force was intercepted by a USN Cruiser force and resulted in the bloody 1rst Naval Battle of Guadalcanal which saw the Hiei heavily damaged and then finished off by air strikes from Henderson and the Big E. The USN suffered the loss of something like 2Cl and about 5 DD with most of the other ships badly shot up. The IJN returned on the 13-14th with a cruiser force that did an ineffective bombardment of Henderson. The IJN tried for a last time on the night of the 14th-15 with the Kirishima and DD's but they ran into "Ching" Lee and the BB's S.Dakota and Washington which (mostly the Washington) blew the Kirishima out of the water. That was the last time the IJN tried to bombard Henderson. They were very aware about the threat of the planes at Henderson and only sent their fast BB's and/or cruisers down the slot.

Kevin

Yes! This is quite correct. However, if you read the detailed account of the events on this occassion you will find yet again that the Aircraft on Henderson Field were busy elsewhere. This time I beleive they were fully committed against the accompanying invasion fleet near Rennel Island during the day and again were subject to air attacks to try and suppress the airfield.

It would appear on balance that Yamamoto had little faith in the Romulan cloaking devices that were supposed to be fitted to his BB's and was taking no chances.

Originally posted by bradfordkay
Those who say that since no bombardment groups were ever intercepted by land based air during the campaign there is no problem with the way the game handles this are overlooking a significant detail. There was never an attempt by Japanese naval forces to bombard a MAJOR allied airbase with a significant amount of aircraft stationed there, and yet the AI does this regularly in the game. Watching a BB TF come sailing blythely in to bombard Port Moresby (an airbase with 250 a/c, of which over 100 are medium bombers with significantly greater range than the SBDs at Henderson) and withdraw beyond the range of the allied a/c before they can even search is a stretch of the imagination.

I've heard people talk about how long it takes to find enemy task forces and launch attacks, and yet on Aug 28th Marine SBDs on a search mission located an incoming DD TF at 1700 which was then attacked at 1805 (p.199 "Guadalcanal, the definitive account" Richard Frank).

There is a reason that the Japanese never tried to bombard the major bases: they were afraid of losing their ships to LBA. In UV, they need not worry. This problem has not changed any of my games in a major manner, but it could be exploited by a PBEM opponent. Therefore, I think that the situation should be repaired. Do I want a situation where no bombardments can safely occur (what is "safe" anyway?)??? Absolutely not, but I don't agree with the situation as it stands now.

I stand in complete agreement with Mr. Didz in his statement that the bombardment of Henderson Field on Oct 13-14 by the BB TF bears little similarity to a scenario where the base in question has huge amounts of medium and dive bombers available. Yes, it might be possible to pull off, but not likely. Unfotunately, in UV, it is not only likely, but a sure thing. That is where I find a problem.

Thank you, thank you, thank you. I was getting thoroughly fed up of being the only person singing this song.

Unfortunately! you may find the flak rather heavy around here.

Originally posted by mjk428


From John Costello's - The Pacific War 1941-1945 (pg 352,4th Paragraph)

...By early afternoon the Seabee gangs had repaired "Fighter One" and the surviving planes were able to take off to raid that afternoon's Tokyo Express, whose six destroyers nonetheless pressed on to land their 1,000 troops...

Hang on! Things are getting silly now. I thought the whole principle behind the invulnerable bombardment missions in UV was that aircraft from Henderson Field never managed to intercept the Toyko Express.

My argument was that this was because they never had the resources to do so, now it appears we are getting evidence that they actually did albeit in very small numbers.

So where does this leave the justification of Bombardment immunity?

The books "The First Team and the Guadalcanal campaign" by John B. Lundstrom and "Guadalcanal, island of fire" by Robert L. Ferguson give the following strenght for CACTUS force at Henderson Field in the evening of 13 Oct 1942:

39 SBDs from VMSB-141 and VS-71
8 TBFs from VT-8
14 P-39s and P-400s from 67th FS
12 F4F from VF-5
30 F4F from VMF-121 and 224

Of these 103, around 90 were operational and the rest under repair.
In addition, eight B-17s from 11th BG(H) based in Espiritu Santo had just landed in Herderson when returning from a raid to Buka, low on fuel. There was also a PBY-5A for casualty evacuation. Henderson was not just, of course, a fighter runway; it was even capable of receiving B-17s.

As a support for CACTUS other units were deployed at Espiritu Santo (B-17s from 11th BG(H), fighters from VMF-212, VMO-251 and VF-71, dive-bombers from VS-72, VB-6 and VS-3...), at Efate (some fighters from VMF-212) and at Tontouta in New Caledonia (B-26s from 69th BS). In all some 140 planes, of which 40 were from 11th BG(H).

Hope this helps,

Originally posted by Didz


...snip...

So where does this leave the justification of Bombardment immunity?

Probably right where it was with the posts Erik made in your "Bombardments Again!" thread some time ago, i.e. the designers believe the current method accurately simulates what happened. Just to refresh you memory here is what he said in that thread, referring to TF's slipping in and out at night:

"...This IS historical and it needs to be in UV. I used the term Tokyo Express because it has come to encompass all the high speed night runs down the slot. That is the same tactic being used against you. If you read a bit more, you'll find the Japanese also did this with Cruiser and, yes, BB led groups that were to bombard Lunga, wreak havoc on any ships there and then retire out of LBA range by morning.

By historical calculations, they could do it, they did it in fact. Only when their ships were damaged were they generally caught by the bombers from Henderson. If you keep only the fastest Japanese BBs, CAs and DDs in a TF, you can most definitely run in and out of range.

Any in depth study of the combat in this theater, particularly around Guadalcanal, will highlight the existence of this tactic and its effectiveness when not opposed at night by another surface force. Now, once you get P-38s and combined them with longer range bombers, you can catch them before they come in and after they leave. Until then, though, you'll have to rely on a combined strategy to defeat them."

Originally posted by entemedor
The books "The First Team and the Guadalcanal campaign" by John B. Lundstrom and "Guadalcanal, island of fire" by Robert L. Ferguson give the following strenght for CACTUS force at Henderson Field in the evening of 13 Oct 1942:

39 SBDs from VMSB-141 and VS-71
8 TBFs from VT-8
14 P-39s and P-400s from 67th FS
12 F4F from VF-5
30 F4F from VMF-121 and 224

Of these 103, around 90 were operational and the rest under repair.
In addition, eight B-17s from 11th BG(H) based in Espiritu Santo had just landed in Herderson when returning from a raid to Buka, low on fuel. There was also a PBY-5A for casualty evacuation. Henderson was not just, of course, a fighter runway; it was even capable of receiving B-17s.

As a support for CACTUS other units were deployed at Espiritu Santo (B-17s from 11th BG(H), fighters from VMF-212, VMO-251 and VF-71, dive-bombers from VS-72, VB-6 and VS-3...), at Efate (some fighters from VMF-212) and at Tontouta in New Caledonia (B-26s from 69th BS). In all some 140 planes, of which 40 were from 11th BG(H).

Hope this helps,

Thanks! that explains another mystery too, as the Catus Airforce website has pictures of B17's at Henderson Field in Oct 42 whilst maintaining that the base was not capable of sustaining large bombers until Dec. It appears the explanation is that they were merely using the base as a refuelling point on their return trip.