NATO and nanotechnology (part 1)
Posted: Sat Jul 06, 2002 4:17 pm
I would like you to read this document: it's from NATO. You can find it on this web-site.
(if the link doesn't work this is the web-site: http://www.nato-pa.int/publications/com ... 223-e.html)
I marked with colour blue the interesting passages about nanotechnology.
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I. INTRODUCTION
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The past decade has witnessed remarkable advances in weapons technologies, predominantly in the United States, but increasingly in other parts of the world, notably Western Europe. Attention to these technologies has tended to focus upon their development, deployment and possible applications on the battlefield. However, their potentially profound implications for arms control or other international legislation have received far less attention.
Some of these emerging technologies seem to be only within the realm of science fiction novels: tiny robots, nanotechnologies, non-lethal weapons, stink bombs, super-adhesives, pepper sprays. Yet, these highly sophisticated and seemingly futuristic technologies are already being utilised in certain areas or are considered a viable option for defence ministry planning departments, not to mention in some local police departments. As technological developments alter the way that we deal with macro-societal problems such as war, social unrest and civil disobedience, it is important to understand 1) what technologies are being developed and why; 2) how they will possibly be used in the future; 3) how these technologies are governed by international law and treaties; 4) what their potential misapplications/misuses are; 5) what the implications are for future arms control regimes. The purpose of this report is to discuss briefly these issues, to provide the reader with a general overview of this topic, so as to offer a base for future discussions. In the Rapporteur's view, it is imperative that these developments do not go unnoticed.
It is well known that the quality and quantity of interventions in both conflict and post-conflict situations have changed in the post-cold war environment. One of the central concerns of foreign ministries has been a desire for states to limit the number of casualties sustained in any intervention, lest there be an immediate withdrawal of public support for an operation. Simultaneously, the civilian dimension of these conflicts - the need to protect large movements of refugee populations and avoid civilian casualties, as in Kosovo, or the need to control populations, as witnessed at the G8 summit in Genoa - provide operations planners with new problems to be confronted. Some common questions are: how can a military operation be conducted in a manner that limits the number of civilian casualties? How can populations be controlled in a way that limits injuries? Thus, a sort of paradox emerges: a desire to limit casualties while the new technologies being employed raise questions about their legality under international law because of their potentially harmful effects.
New technologies provide a different set of options for these types of problems faced by governments. And because the nature of operations has changed, there has been considerable convergence between the technologies employed by the military and the police. It is important to explore exactly what types of technologies are in development, to consider how they may be used in the future. Only once these issues have been fully considered and scenarios for future use and development fully explored can a discussion about new arms control regimes be started.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
II. REVOLUTIONISING THE MILITARY
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The leap forward in weapons technology is often seen as constituting a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). An RMA has been described as "a major change in the nature of warfare brought about by the innovative application of new technologies which, combined with dramatic changes in military doctrine and operational and organisational concepts, fundamentally alters the character and conduct of military operations".
There have been many previous instances of such revolutions. Some of those most frequently cited include the introduction of gunpowder and the development of the steam engine, the submarine, the internal combustion engine, the aeroplane and the atom bomb. These technologies alone do not constitute an RMA, but their innovative application in the conduct of warfare is said to have constituted a revolution, as opposed to an evolution, in military affairs. Two criteria must, therefore, be met in order to establish an RMA: firstly, that a modern technology exists, and secondly, that its innovative application bring about changes in the very conduct of warfare.
Proponents of the current RMA believe the development of Information Technology (IT) and the increased adoption of joint and combined military doctrine (designed to maximise the advantages of the available technology) are the driving factors behind the present RMA. The creation of new operational concepts is particularly significant. The United States has been the forerunner in this development, publishing in 1996 a document entitled "Joint Vision 2010" (JV2010). JV2010 outlines two key concepts relating to the conduct of warfare by the United States armed forces in the 21st century: the importance of technological superiority and the increased use of joint operations.
Other United States military publications that develop this concept include the Concept for Future Joint Operations (CFJO), Army Vision 2010 (AV2010) and the Army After Next (AAN). CFJO essentially builds upon JV2010, detailing follow-on assessments for future joint operations. AV2010, in the same vein, identifies the patterns of operations and technologies that the US Army will need in the 21st century to convert its joint vision into reality. AAN looks thirty years further ahead, building upon the ideas of AV2010. Other nations are reaching similar conclusions in the field of military doctrine. The United Kingdom, in its Strategic Defence Review (SDR) of 1998, highlighted the importance of "jointery" or joint doctrine, and is, among other things, developing Joint Force 2000 intended to combine Royal Navy and Royal Air Force fixed-wing aircraft.
The existence of a capability or technology gap between the United States and its European Allies has been well documented. The technology gap refers to the disparity between the United States' application of "high" military technologies such as stealth technology, long-range precision-guided munitions and uninhabited aerial/combat vehicles, compared to the European Allies' more lethargic up-take of new technology. The presence of this gap would seem automatically to imply that the US will take the lead on all developments of these new technologies.
However, as a result of the previously-mentioned convergence between technologies employed by the military and the police, it is possible that domestic developments in some European countries could impact the technologies employed in military operations abroad, ultimately influencing choices made, for instance, in future military operations undertaken by the European Union under the guise of its planned Rapid Reaction Force (RRF). And while large research budgets will be needed to develop sophisticated technologies like nanotechnologies, some of the new tools being developed today are relatively inexpensive. The United States is now clearly the leader in the revolution influencing technologies employed in military affairs. However, new technologies may offer potential opportunities for European Allies to take the lead in some types of weaponry. Thus, Europeans need to think more creatively about the possible implications of the capabilities gap on technology development.
At the same time, the technology gap between the United States and Europe may have serious political and strategic consequences in the transatlantic relations context. Not only because of its possible consequences - as your Rapporteur indicated in his 1998 report on RMA - on interoperability in the conduct of joint allied operations, but also in consideration of the direction taken by the Bush administration on US foreign policy. Recent decisions by the United States to withdraw from or reject international treaties and agreements (the ABM treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention Protocol, the Kyoto Protocol, and a small weapons control agreement) indicate, as William Pfaff has recently written in the International Herald Tribune, that "an ideological hostility to international law, evident for some time among members of what used to be called the extreme right, (...) under Mr. Bush's presidency has moved into the Republican mainstream." The association of this kind of political attitude toward multilateral security agreements and overwhelming US technological and military superiority is something that should be at the centre of the transatlantic debate in the very near future.
(if the link doesn't work this is the web-site: http://www.nato-pa.int/publications/com ... 223-e.html)
I marked with colour blue the interesting passages about nanotechnology.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I. INTRODUCTION
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The past decade has witnessed remarkable advances in weapons technologies, predominantly in the United States, but increasingly in other parts of the world, notably Western Europe. Attention to these technologies has tended to focus upon their development, deployment and possible applications on the battlefield. However, their potentially profound implications for arms control or other international legislation have received far less attention.
Some of these emerging technologies seem to be only within the realm of science fiction novels: tiny robots, nanotechnologies, non-lethal weapons, stink bombs, super-adhesives, pepper sprays. Yet, these highly sophisticated and seemingly futuristic technologies are already being utilised in certain areas or are considered a viable option for defence ministry planning departments, not to mention in some local police departments. As technological developments alter the way that we deal with macro-societal problems such as war, social unrest and civil disobedience, it is important to understand 1) what technologies are being developed and why; 2) how they will possibly be used in the future; 3) how these technologies are governed by international law and treaties; 4) what their potential misapplications/misuses are; 5) what the implications are for future arms control regimes. The purpose of this report is to discuss briefly these issues, to provide the reader with a general overview of this topic, so as to offer a base for future discussions. In the Rapporteur's view, it is imperative that these developments do not go unnoticed.
It is well known that the quality and quantity of interventions in both conflict and post-conflict situations have changed in the post-cold war environment. One of the central concerns of foreign ministries has been a desire for states to limit the number of casualties sustained in any intervention, lest there be an immediate withdrawal of public support for an operation. Simultaneously, the civilian dimension of these conflicts - the need to protect large movements of refugee populations and avoid civilian casualties, as in Kosovo, or the need to control populations, as witnessed at the G8 summit in Genoa - provide operations planners with new problems to be confronted. Some common questions are: how can a military operation be conducted in a manner that limits the number of civilian casualties? How can populations be controlled in a way that limits injuries? Thus, a sort of paradox emerges: a desire to limit casualties while the new technologies being employed raise questions about their legality under international law because of their potentially harmful effects.
New technologies provide a different set of options for these types of problems faced by governments. And because the nature of operations has changed, there has been considerable convergence between the technologies employed by the military and the police. It is important to explore exactly what types of technologies are in development, to consider how they may be used in the future. Only once these issues have been fully considered and scenarios for future use and development fully explored can a discussion about new arms control regimes be started.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
II. REVOLUTIONISING THE MILITARY
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The leap forward in weapons technology is often seen as constituting a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). An RMA has been described as "a major change in the nature of warfare brought about by the innovative application of new technologies which, combined with dramatic changes in military doctrine and operational and organisational concepts, fundamentally alters the character and conduct of military operations".
There have been many previous instances of such revolutions. Some of those most frequently cited include the introduction of gunpowder and the development of the steam engine, the submarine, the internal combustion engine, the aeroplane and the atom bomb. These technologies alone do not constitute an RMA, but their innovative application in the conduct of warfare is said to have constituted a revolution, as opposed to an evolution, in military affairs. Two criteria must, therefore, be met in order to establish an RMA: firstly, that a modern technology exists, and secondly, that its innovative application bring about changes in the very conduct of warfare.
Proponents of the current RMA believe the development of Information Technology (IT) and the increased adoption of joint and combined military doctrine (designed to maximise the advantages of the available technology) are the driving factors behind the present RMA. The creation of new operational concepts is particularly significant. The United States has been the forerunner in this development, publishing in 1996 a document entitled "Joint Vision 2010" (JV2010). JV2010 outlines two key concepts relating to the conduct of warfare by the United States armed forces in the 21st century: the importance of technological superiority and the increased use of joint operations.
Other United States military publications that develop this concept include the Concept for Future Joint Operations (CFJO), Army Vision 2010 (AV2010) and the Army After Next (AAN). CFJO essentially builds upon JV2010, detailing follow-on assessments for future joint operations. AV2010, in the same vein, identifies the patterns of operations and technologies that the US Army will need in the 21st century to convert its joint vision into reality. AAN looks thirty years further ahead, building upon the ideas of AV2010. Other nations are reaching similar conclusions in the field of military doctrine. The United Kingdom, in its Strategic Defence Review (SDR) of 1998, highlighted the importance of "jointery" or joint doctrine, and is, among other things, developing Joint Force 2000 intended to combine Royal Navy and Royal Air Force fixed-wing aircraft.
The existence of a capability or technology gap between the United States and its European Allies has been well documented. The technology gap refers to the disparity between the United States' application of "high" military technologies such as stealth technology, long-range precision-guided munitions and uninhabited aerial/combat vehicles, compared to the European Allies' more lethargic up-take of new technology. The presence of this gap would seem automatically to imply that the US will take the lead on all developments of these new technologies.
However, as a result of the previously-mentioned convergence between technologies employed by the military and the police, it is possible that domestic developments in some European countries could impact the technologies employed in military operations abroad, ultimately influencing choices made, for instance, in future military operations undertaken by the European Union under the guise of its planned Rapid Reaction Force (RRF). And while large research budgets will be needed to develop sophisticated technologies like nanotechnologies, some of the new tools being developed today are relatively inexpensive. The United States is now clearly the leader in the revolution influencing technologies employed in military affairs. However, new technologies may offer potential opportunities for European Allies to take the lead in some types of weaponry. Thus, Europeans need to think more creatively about the possible implications of the capabilities gap on technology development.
At the same time, the technology gap between the United States and Europe may have serious political and strategic consequences in the transatlantic relations context. Not only because of its possible consequences - as your Rapporteur indicated in his 1998 report on RMA - on interoperability in the conduct of joint allied operations, but also in consideration of the direction taken by the Bush administration on US foreign policy. Recent decisions by the United States to withdraw from or reject international treaties and agreements (the ABM treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention Protocol, the Kyoto Protocol, and a small weapons control agreement) indicate, as William Pfaff has recently written in the International Herald Tribune, that "an ideological hostility to international law, evident for some time among members of what used to be called the extreme right, (...) under Mr. Bush's presidency has moved into the Republican mainstream." The association of this kind of political attitude toward multilateral security agreements and overwhelming US technological and military superiority is something that should be at the centre of the transatlantic debate in the very near future.