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First of all, I like to mark, that simple cruzing arround command structures in bftb can be an interesting trip.
Having personas under your direct command like Lammerding (Proud Himmlers toady, who screens himself in evry ocasion with close relationship with Heinrich), or James Locket (golden boy determinated to proove his transfer) its a pearl in itself.

What points my attention though, is the relation of American - Wehrmacht command values (Especially SS)
Those from Schutzstaffel have their stats sky-high. While most of U.S. great commanders are reflected as far behind.
No secret, that at the time of late ´44 Axis structures was not the same, as their once was. Yet SS holding almost God-like minds in relation to the U.S. command.
Lets leave "Staff Efficiency" and "Staff Quality" as German those fairly point to Germans always. Schema´s stayed the same in Reich.
What is bit striking is the allround low deterination rate ffrom U.S. staff. Couldnt disagree more, as the peak that described U.S. commanders was Deterination, and Leadreship. Yes, the american allaround attitude was "its not our war", but when in critic situations (like Bulge) those two characteristics was the flag of american spirit lighting themself as big green diode on controll panel.

We have some huge names like R.O.Barton or B.C. Clarke that stats are lower from some spZJg Bn commander! wich is a mind blow itself.
Some stats like P.A.Ridge, Milkin etc are well/correctly -low reflected/ralated.
But we have the guy that made the turning point in St.Vith , and his stas are way beeeyond crumbled SS structures.

Now, if we look at the German side, we can draw the conclusion , that current SS (´44) in bftb was overrated, because....

As well as Volksgrenadier and the FJ commanders are tragic.
Hitler awareness of the nature that VG presented gave him no dubt, that he will need to put a good command over them. Wich he did..
He placed deserved veterans from eastern front (Charkov,Kursk etc)
-Franz Senfuss - who had the courage, and fought hand-to-hand when the situation demanded this. -great tactics resulted in Knight Cross for defenssive acts in Normandy,
- Kurt Möhring long time commander with G.Cross in god, K.Cross blahblahbla.. -terrible stats
And for what? For the reason, that he got himself KIA? or for low progress in Bulgge while comanding VG?
nigg..please...

Seems like some good quality commanders have their stats low just because their are commanding VG
Isnt the stats of men, and equipment that makes VG - VG?.. Or is it really neccesary to adjust/declass comanders to VG standards..

FJ is the worst case..

S.Ludwig Heilmann - (the man, who famously defended Monte Cassino) or Heilmann have the stats even worse than VG regular troop
Not mentioning K.Student who despite his turbulances still was an active legend.

FJ overally suffering in bftb. But stats of such commanders - such poor stats, are just sad.

Conclusion:

It appearses that despite some hardcores (excluding SS) -US command stats in relation to Axis are holding their ballance.
It is the SS wich is appeares to be sky-lunched without visible logic cover.

Is there any good reason for such design?
Im goin to repeat myself: "Isnt the stats of men, and equipment that makes VG - VG?.. Or is it really neccesary to adjust/declass comanders to VG standards.."
etc.. Clarke.. Senfuss.. 560 sPzJg comander...

Raen't there stats for both commander and stats for troops? If your not happy with them just change them...it was the scenario makers opinion on the officer in question...not sure if every commander was researched...probably not...so I say change them if you know better...then put it up for download...

...it was the scenario makers opinion on the officer in question
     

 
Hmm.. was it?..
 
Thats a reasonable sugestion. I didnt precived bftb trough editor voyages till now. Maybe thats an impulse.
Not sure about a rapid public upload. But this is definitly on my clipbord.
ty woodin
 

Oleg if you do change them and it fits in historically...I want them aswell;)

We set the unit quality parameters based on a generalized overall performance of the branch/organization during December-January 1944. Commander qualities don't necessarily pass down to subordinate troops so it's not (yet) worth the massive amounts of research needed to accurately set these based on character performance studies, which would need to also take into account the general mood of the commander at the time of the battle and his communications and logistics network.

You will recall at the St. Vith that there was quite a bit of confusion on the American side as to who was in charge, since the Sr. commander was Walter Lauer (99th) but the majority of the units were from 7th Arm'd. Throw Montgomery into the mix and you have quite a bit of power struggle within the command structure. Take away the overabundance of material available to the US on the Western Front and you are left with the US citizen soldier that wold rather be back home than anywhere else.

The FJ troops performed with mixed results, but, like the VG were still for the most part rabble. Where they showed their worth - like during the defense of the Bastogne perimeter, we bumped up certain traits like stubborness and determination. Look at the battles of Fouhren, Lanzarath, Krewenkel, and Weckerath on December 16 to see how poorly the FJ performed on the attack during this period.

The SS were the best trained troops on the German side, and we felt that the desperation of the political situation gives them an additional edge in the Ardennes battles.

If command traits could be passed down to subordinates I would agree that additional research into individual commanders might be worthwhile. Otherwise you are simply making an effective HQ to the benefit of only the HQ itself.

fwiw here are the baseline traits that we used for all units. The final numbers were given a +/- 10-15% variance. Again, where certain units stood out in the Ardennes battles, we made adjustments to these base values.

There is a possible problem arising from assuming poor relative training & experience for VGD etc divisions.

US studies indicated that relatively few troops actually fire their weapons, and even fewer fire them, aimed at a target. Given that the VGD and other late war expedient forces use a cadre of combat veterans, and these are quite likely to be the 'combat effectives' within the formation, there may be much less reduction in unit quality than the proportions of old-men-and-boys would suggest.

I'd be happy with a declining fitness (which has greater consequences for the predominantly foot Heer/VGD/FJ units), and lower Aggressiveness, but a less than half value for weapon effectiveness and therefore ability to remain supplied? Seems improbable (IMO), especially given the German propensity to rely on small numbers of infantry (with the LMG) for the bulk of their firepower - it wouldn't be beyond the wit of the unit leaders to ensure that each of these had competent crews, even if the ammunition carriers were as green as grass - again, just IMO.

The poor quality of German units at the end of the war isn't also a purely German problem, the UK and to a lesser extent the US were also scraping the man-power barrel in late 1944-45, with a lot of 'unfit' or LOC troops finding themselves promoted to combat replacements to cope with the shortfall in the supply of manpower.

ISTR Dupuy et al, indicating that except in isolated cases, the German "troop quality" remained at 110-120% of the western allies right up until the war's end - the conclusion they reached was this was largely due to small-unit leadership, rather than how good the individual people were.
My personal feeling is that the poor showing of VGD etc in attack is better represented by poor fatigue recovery, poor reconnaissance and spotting of stationary positions (and a consequent uncoordinated effort) and the ever-present discrepancy between Allied motorised/mechanised forces with many heavy weapons, and the German marching troops, with poor(ish) supply and during dreadful weather.

The fairly thin scattering of veteran troops would suggest that heavy casualties might reduce combat effectiveness more variably than for a more uniform formation as well... if the casualties are predominantly the raw troops, then combat power may be marginally affected. OTOH, if the relatively scarce veterans are depleted further, then the remaining troops would be very poor indeed.

Deleted - see my new post below

The discussion is turning for the mostly vast and interesting topic - wich is the unit values, but here I rather willing to stick to the main course.

Simovich thank you for your point of view.

Taking into account the general mood of the commander at the time of the battle and his communications and logistics network ofcourse, definitly a good argument for understating some stats, but only when applyed to both sides...
(And loud German enthusiasm at the ´Bulge´ was just a colorfull storry, In my personal opinion just for the purpouse of the whole wanted picture that was selled to the masses, so the elements just had to fit).

In your first sentance simovitch, Im not sure if you refer to main command value also when speaking of "unit". But if so, I personally think that such setting scheme is wrong from the base level. But it was your game-makers decision, and you had evry right to do it this your way. I wont get further in to this..

Ask for the U.S. citizen, and "I rather would be back home" attitude.. You have to forgive, but I have to polemize here hard.
This citizen was a soldier whenever he wanted it or not, and could presented such attitude back in the barracks, drinking his brandy, stumping his fit at the whole situation. I do not think, that in a situation ´under fire´ , when his very life was threaten, he would stay in his citizen-political form, and conciously miss the opportunity to waste an enemy tank, because he had in mind, that hes not belong here. I rather think, that in such situation crise-mode is enabled, and base characteristics are lunched to their best when fighting for its life. And Americans, what I recalled had those characteristics lunched very high when needed.
I do understand your stand, and I think you wont dissagree with this one. So this is just to mark the other side of the medal.

On the FJ topic. I agree with you. But I do not agree with Heilmann stats. And that take us back to this desing shceme, so It will be referd to in a moment.

Wich lead us to your conclusion. (Wich is nice done summary of your thought by the way)
But its the most painfull.
I have a question for it, but first lets exploit the painfull core.
If I understand you correctly. You wrote, that It would be worthwhile to place accurate commander data if this would have influence on other subordinate units/on the game.
Well, hmm.. In such way of thinking, you could place a Jeep picture to a Sherman unit , because it would not affect the game itself. Or place a "hello kitty!" image instead of unit icons.

I have a gentle smile on my face but my mind is not so happy if that was the true reason, why accurate stats of commanders was left behind , and left to be based only on mathematical equation of the overall table. Not in the game like bftb...

Now the question.. Because you wrote, that the stats would only affect HQ unit.
Again I am not sure about this one more than anything else, but did you just stated that command values doesnt affect subordinated at all?.. I must be mistaking

Again, thank you for your reply. I hope I didnt made my replyes to offenssive, as Ive tried to. Counting for an open discussion.

Im at the point, on wich I am sure about focusing on alltering those stats. If not for public, than for myself, and my on-line opponents.

And Yes.. Lieste is naturrally correct. This guy is holding his level as key of Liberators at 10000 ft on a bomb run. Sometimes its scares me [;)]

But Lieste, didnt you have in mind Panzer Grenadiers instead of VolksGren, when writing about veterans core of late German units?

From what I recall.. The valuated veterans, as well as soldiers from other services (lutwaffe etc) was a core of PZGren not VG.

----

My personal feeling is that the poor showing of VGD etc in attack is better represented by poor fatigue recovery, poor reconnaissance and spotting of stationary positions (and a consequent uncoordinated effort) and the ever-present discrepancy between Allied motorised/mechanised forces with many heavy weapons, and the German marching troops, with poor(ish) supply and during dreadful weather

And this is an example of his high altidude flights. brilliante

Just not sure if this is actual game reality, or a well fitting abstract.
Im so confused about whats realy real in bftb lately.
I am balancing on not understanding/trying to understand PantherGames approach to their product.
Ive just never seen something like this before. While bftb just dereves more.
Its like zodiacal Aries.. Focusing only initialization.
Gnawed apple.. only one bite.. second will be a party.. with no chance for thinking about the core.

ORIGINAL: Lieste

There is a possible problem arising from assuming poor relative training & experience for VGD etc divisions.

US studies indicated that relatively few troops actually fire their weapons, and even fewer fire them, aimed at a target. Given that the VGD and other late war expedient forces use a cadre of combat veterans, and these are quite likely to be the 'combat effectives' within the formation, there may be much less reduction in unit quality than the proportions of old-men-and-boys would suggest.

Remember that casualties were disproportionaltely high among the NCO's in the VGD during the assault leaving the line companies in a state of confusion and ineffectiveness after 1 or 2 days of fighting. If this was Combat Mission we could probably model this pretty well. It's just not really possible with BFTB.

I'm listening though.[;)]

ORIGINAL: Lieste

I'd be happy with a declining fitness (which has greater consequences for the predominantly foot Heer/VGD/FJ units), and lower Aggressiveness, but a less than half value for weapon effectiveness and therefore ability to remain supplied? Seems improbable (IMO), especially given the German propensity to rely on small numbers of infantry (with the LMG) for the bulk of their firepower - it wouldn't be beyond the wit of the unit leaders to ensure that each of these had competent crews, even if the ammunition carriers were as green as grass - again, just IMO.

The poor quality of German units at the end of the war isn't also a purely German problem, the UK and to a lesser extent the US were also scraping the man-power barrel in late 1944-45, with a lot of 'unfit' or LOC troops finding themselves promoted to combat replacements to cope with the shortfall in the supply of manpower.

This is only partially correct. It is true that especially late autumn and winter 44/45 proved to be problematic for the Allies, especially the US, regarding the preparatory training either in the UK or in the actual war Theater, the transport and the deployment of those replacements. The losses, e.g. in the Hürtgenwald (Hürtgen Forest), were unexpectedly high, which almost led to something I would call a "replacement crisis".

Still, compared to quite some German units, which got bootcamp training for 6 (plus X) weeks (less than 2 weeks, sometimes even less than 2 days during the last 3 months of the war), the US units were better off, if you look at how often a soldier would have fired his particular/assigned weapon, and at the level of drill involved.

Quite some divisional US commanders favoured constant drills and training (e.g. specific training to take mountain ranges in Italy, or cliffs in Normandy), but a US study revealed that units, which had received training in the UK (note: after being transfered from US bootcamps) and did without any further training during deployment (in R+R phases) on the European continent, performed as good as units who had constant drill and training scheduled regularly. Again, compare that to the average "Fritz" [;)] with some 2 or 4 weeks of basic training late in the war, then you'll clearly see, that there must have been quality issues, which in fact started to really show in late summer/autumn 1944.

Example as early as August 1944: If you look at the German units involved in the Battle of Falaise, you'll clearly see that there was a "cut", means that the quality deterioriated.
Despite the Allied and German propaganda (Allies: "We destroyed a crack SS unit", Germans: "They defended until the last bullet, inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy ... fought 'til the last man standing"), the majority of the troops of the Hitlerjugend division did not stay, but tried to break through the encirclement. Some sources say 1500 (of 2000 -> after Caen) troops made it back to German lines, most of the remaining inf troops actually pulled out of downtown Failaise at night, leaving the few remaining heavy weapons behind, while its few remaining armored units and other subordinated units had to fight their way eastwards through the bottleneck to the german lines for 3 days. This shows that they did not have the stubborness nor the experience of say a 1942 veteran unit. Understandable, as most of them were kids.

While that division's main cadre (NCOs, COs) consisted of ~1000 veterans from the 1. Panzer-Div LSSAH, the 16,000 troops were drafted directly from the Hitlerjugend. This particular unit, the 12th SS Hitlerjugend was committed ruthlessly in the hinterland area of Juno beach and near Caen, resulting in very high casualty rates, ~3500-4000 dead, 8000 wounded and quite some MIAs, before they retreated south towards Falaise.

These recruits had no experience before Caen, they were partially pretty aggressive, but less effective than units that consisted of older soldiers (above 19 or say 20) and were established in late 1943. It took until March 1944 (5 months) to get this unit ready for deployment, even though the last of the 16,000 recruits was drafted on 1st of September 1943.

Now, if you consider the difficulties and facts described above and the situation (very young recruits, plus reconvalescents and over-age troops, few veterans sprinkled in) of the VGDs, you'll get an idea of what kind of "quality issues" the Germans really had.
The German General (forgot the name) who commanded at least 3 attacks (from different directions) on Bastogne complained and reasoned to his superior - when ordered to take Bastogne after the initial attack failed - that his VGD units were too weak and exhausted to 1) attack again, and 2) that they wouldn't be able to take the objective.

ISTR Dupuy et al, indicating that except in isolated cases, the German "troop quality" remained at 110-120% of the western allies right up until the war's end - the conclusion they reached was this was largely due to small-unit leadership, rather than how good the individual people were.

I do not follow Dupuy there, as the German troop quality varied sometimes from unit to unit, sometimes even from platoon to platoon (e.g. when only some platoons of a company had to be filled with green recruits).

If you consider the numbers of volunteers (17 years old), as well as the number of kids from the Hitler Youth groups, the Reichsarbeitsdienst (RAD), and the "Flak-helper" kids (14-17) that were either pressed into the Wehrmacht or the SS or volunteering for one of these branches, and if you consider the numbers serving in the Volkssturm (the youngest Volkssturm members who fought during the Battle of Berlin were 14 years old) during the final stage of the war, then you'll figure that the amount of "kids" was actually relatively high. These kids were sometimes way smaller than adults, could not carry the same amount of say ammo, weapons, etc., and may not have had the same physical fitness as soldiers who were 20-26 years old.

For the VGD units, (afaik after Himmler and Goebbels intervened) the Germans had upped the upper age limit, they had lowered the minimum requirements regarding fitness, even down to the point where wounded, reconvalescent and lightly handicapped men could be drafted. The fact that the Germans had introduced "stomach"- and "ear"-battalions earlier is quite interesting, and displays how desperate the Germans really were, trying to deploy handicapped soldiers.

My personal feeling is that the poor showing of VGD etc in attack is better represented by poor fatigue recovery, poor reconnaissance and spotting of stationary positions (and a consequent uncoordinated effort) and the ever-present discrepancy between Allied motorised/mechanised forces with many heavy weapons, and the German marching troops, with poor(ish) supply and during dreadful weather.

The most vital parameters were skill and fatigue.

Skill: In theory, those VGD units, that were equipped with StG44 assault rifles, should have received a vital boost in firepower, resulting in a higher combat effectiveness at close range and medium range, it should have made up for other deficiencies, e.g. the lack of personnel (when understrength) or seasoned grunts, at least.

Quite some authors seem to either forget or not even know about the difficulties when handling these rifles. It took quite some experience to use this weapon effectively, it was not just a matter of days or even a week or two to have its handling down, as this rifle was less forgiving than the MP40 or a grease gun, even though it was pretty accurate up to 400 meters (when firing single shots, if compared to the K98 rifle). While green soldiers had the tendency to grab the MP40 by the magazine and not by its magazine slot, right above the magazine - which often resulted in losing the mag when firing, for example, green soldiers had the tendency to use the StG 44's full auto at medium ranges. Also, the weight and the shaft/slot holding the magazine was anything than ergonomic (for 2nd hand), which was often the reason for less accurate shots.
Mortar fire without a direct/clear FOV, indirect Inf gun fire, these and many other tasks have to be executed by trained and skilled professionals.

The fairly thin scattering of veteran troops would suggest that heavy casualties might reduce combat effectiveness more variably than for a more uniform formation as well... if the casualties are predominantly the raw troops, then combat power may be marginally affected. OTOH, if the relatively scarce veterans are depleted further, then the remaining troops would be very poor indeed.

Well, combat effectiveness was already reduced. I outlined some reasons above.
There were 2 other major showstoppers for combat effectiveness of German units:

1) Leadership:
..... A good example would be the stubborn and unclever attacks with high casualty rates on the Bastogne perimeter, after the encirclement. During at least one major attack the German inf was attacking through the fog in the open, with the last bit (300-600 meters) between the US defenders and the attackers being fog-free (the layer of fog in the background with the silhouettes of the Germans in the foreground then turned this into some target practice for the US paras).
..... Desperate tank attacks carried out without inf support (the unit commander did not even grant time to clear some of the mines) on US held areas in the Hürtgen Forest, where then the German inf had to attack through open terrain after the armored attack failed.

2) War weariness (note: not fatigue):
...... Maybe the most vital factor. Some German veterans had been fighting since 1939, more than 5 years - in December 1944. Others had at least served since 1941 or 1942. This, coupled with physical fatigue, lowered morale and performance. US veterans stated that during the initial phase of the Ardennes offensive German soldiers seemed to be ultra aggressive, with a strange - if not "evil"- glare in their eyes, attacking and killing relentlessly. In fact, there are accounts that German company commanders handed out amphetamin pills, in an attempt to make up for the lack of aggressiveness/drive/morale. I've seen a TV report showing both US and German veteran accounts backing up that detail. They also showed papers handling the order of a huge amount of amphetamins, but it seems that most company commanders (who were approached with this secretely made offer) did either not trust those drugs or did not believe in that kind of "doping".

That said, if COs have to dope their soldiers, it says a lot about the condition of these grunts.

ORIGINAL: OlegHasky
But Lieste, didnt you have in mind Panzer Grenadiers instead of VolksGren, when writing about veterans core of late German units?
From what I recall.. The valuated veterans, as well as soldiers from other services (lutwaffe etc) was a core of PZGren not VG.

VG divisions were very varied, some were build from old and battle hardened but shattered Inf Divisions.
Those had a core of veteran officers and NCO's and mostly performed well in battle.
Some others were build from scratch with green officers and NCO's.
Soldiers from the Kriegsmarine and the Luftwaffe could be found in most of the VG divisions but they were mostly no "veterans" with higher combat value.
They often were not well motivated and had no fun at all doing a ordinary infantry job.

Whatever the line troops should be, the fundamental problem is that staffs, technical troops etc, were seldom wiped out, and cadres including these elements should ensure that artillery, HQs, armour, and other 'heavy'/technical branches should operate at high effectiveness, even in a raw division. Using the saved 326 VGD as an example, the idea that the organic/attached artillery should have 25% experience and 45% training, isn't IMO likely - even if 90% of the troops in this formation are raw, the survey, technical and logistics troops are quite likely to be experienced, and these are the troops who dictate the combat effectiveness of the artillery branch from the 'gun side'. The observers and junior officers in the supported troops will make-or-break the useful-ness of the artillery support, but once fired, an artillery shell doesn't care how skilled the wagon driver or even most of the gun-crew was.

Lieste...I think those studies with regards to soldiers not shooting come in for alot of criticsum....and don't hold up well to scrutiny...I'd take it with a pinch of salt if I where you...Think it was someone called Marshall...there is a discusion about it over on Wargamer...turns out alot of people brought found articles to bring that study into disripute.

VG divisions were very varied, some were build from old and battle hardened but shattered Inf Divisions.
Those had a core of veteran officers and NCO's and mostly performed well in battle.
Some others were build from scratch with green officers and NCO's.
Soldiers from the Kriegsmarine and the Luftwaffe could be found in most of the VG divisions but they were mostly no "veterans" with higher combat value.
They often were not well motivated and had no fun at all doing a ordinary infantry job.

VG was the was the bottom of German structures at the time (excluding Volkssturm in Reich). Whenever you could find some veterans in there - not really in the mood as you say. Most of volountier veterans "in-mood" , as well as serious recruits from FJ/KM can be found rather in PZGren.

GoodGuy,
"training" values appears to be low enough. Also doch, Lieste seem to be correct, maybe a drop of fitness could be taken out to adjust to the situation.
And also not quite neccesairly while youre mentioning aphetamines. This drug have its short path.. Though long enough to pull out enough "extras" for "short" perroid of time-frame. Fitting the BerlinHQ actual need from the soldiers to just "Do - And die"

Of course they need taking with a pinch of salt, and try some pepper as well... but still, a general trend occurs that whether fighting takes place in the air, or on land, and whether it is tanks or infantry, the casualty figures are almost universally much less than the numbers of troops causing them.

Most fighters will not shoot down a bomber on a given interception. Most tanks will not destroy an enemy armoured vehicle, most soldiers will not have killed or wounded an enemy soldier... and yet some make multiple kills, and those same ones will repeat that 'rare feat' again and again.

So it appears there may be some kernel of truth there. Whether the reasons for this observation are that some people are placed where they maximise their exposure to these 'opportunities' thus reducing the chances for their fellows, or these latter are just not functioning as well as their training suggests they should (or any other reason you can think of) is not as important as the basic truth of the kill/loss rates.

A small formation is sometimes capable of very violent action lasting a few seconds/minutes. As battles get larger they take longer to fight, and casualty rates per 1000 drop rapidly (even where you focus only on bayonet strengths). Maybe it isn't that only one man does all the fighting while the rest applaud politely. Perhaps, 'the man' is one of those who *never* fires his weapon, but instead coordinates, guides and encourages his fellows, inspiring them to feats of arms they never knew they could attain.

ORIGINAL: Wiggum

VG divisions were very varied, some were build from old and battle hardened but shattered Inf Divisions.
Those had a core of veteran officers and NCO's and mostly performed well in battle.
Some others were build from scratch with green officers and NCO's ...

I seem to recall that the VG units involved in the Bulge had veteran NCOs leading very green troops, and the German paras south of Bastogne were hardly elite: apparently the FJ cadre never recovered from Crete!

That said, the Allies found there was still a remarkable espirt du corps among German soldiers in spite of their deteriorating strategic situation; this stood in stark contrast to the demoralized German Army after its disasterous offensive at the end of WW I.