Thoughts/Discussion RE: PO/Elmer Sr.
Posted: Mon Jul 04, 2011 5:14 am
On the verge of getting heavily into working with the PO, thought I'd share a few things and try to pick up some additional tips from others.
The PO has improved considerably but still has some inherent weaknesses. The primary weakness, imo, is inability to see the global strategic picture. Instead, with each formation having its own orders, and such, it develops lots of "tactical snapshots". Developing it to respond with the right amount of force to massive breakthroughs (and even small breakthroughs)... or even to respond at all, is our nightmare as designers.
What I've found to offset the tendency to "overstack" - can be resolved in how formations are defined. Obviously, this can vary a lot, suffice that for TOAW it is better to define formations with regards to how the PO handles them, then how they were defined historically. The "system" advocates for a variety of different formation types, in terms of size and function. I'll use some stereotypical WW2 Russian formations as examples.
1. Triggers - independent brigades/divisions - just something to hold specific landmarks. Very small formations.
2. Objective Takers - Shock Armies, Guards Armies and other large formations that concentrate in force.
3. Main Lines - medium-sized formations expected to hold "x" amount of frontage.
4. Gap Holders - small-size formations expected to hold "x" amount of frontage between Main Line formations and/or provide defensive coverage when the Main Line engages offensively.
5. Trigger Response - biggest variable - depends upon what is available to be called upon, akin to a second line Objective Taker Formation.
6. Waves - For situations where there is an abundance of units/formations - can serve as Trigger Response and/or replacements for Main Line formations (and alternate function) managed through objective tracks.
Considering what any given formation can be reasonably expected to accomplish on its own will go a long way to help in "PO stability". A lot of Russian Armies are pretty small - 3-5 divisions; and some can be pretty big, 10-12 divisions. The objectives of each formation have to be considered with what it can be reasonably expected to handle - such as covering 3 hexes of frontage on the offensive, or 3 hexes of frontage with defense in depth. That's decent for a small army, but will lead to bunching up for a large army.
One method that may help is standardizing the size of some of these larger armies to that of the smaller armies - and then branching off its excess units into Operational Groups. Say 64th Army historically had 10 divisions - in TOAW that 64th Army could be represented as an Army with 6 divisions plus 2 operational groups of 2 divisions each (left/right flanks). Of course, that means four divisions will not have a normal HQ - but the only functional drawback to that appears to be they will not be subject to the proficiency loss in the event that the 64th Army HQ is destroyed. They'll still gain a bonus in supply if a friendly, cooperating HQ is adjacent to them.
In my own and with other's in regular play, when conducting an offensive - we all like to have at least something dug in on the front line when we go on the offensive. Having more formations should lend to the PO being able to do the same. Haven't tested this in a while - suffice that in my lasts tests - the PO did more or less what I told it, and if it got it wrong, it was owing more to my issuing the wrong orders or messing up the objective sequence.
Covering the big what-ifs - major breakthroughs and potential encirclements - I think is the biggest problem though. In theory, this comes down to setting up the means to 1) Prevent (or attempt to), 2) If it does happen, enable the PO to (attempt to) determine that it has happened... and then... .... ha... 3) try to respond to it. Not asking for miracles or anything... hahaha...
I think the above mechanisms can "help" do a lot more, in some scenarios, with respect to prevention. The Trigger Points, provided there are enough of them, should be able to help in defining for the PO what has happened. Might require 2 or maybe even 3 layers of Trigger Points, though that can get expensive in unit count.
With just three objective tracks... I think being able to engineer an appropriate response would be pretty difficult. Now that there are five objective tracks - it could be do-able. Leastwise, I can see it being do-able in situations like late-WWII Soviet side situations - where there are endless hordes of reinforcements.
These are my thoughts and observations up to this point, suffice that I welcome other's ideas and observations, too - techniques for simplifying PO components, etc.
I'm looking forward to lots of fun in figuring out how to define the Axis response to the Balkans...
The PO has improved considerably but still has some inherent weaknesses. The primary weakness, imo, is inability to see the global strategic picture. Instead, with each formation having its own orders, and such, it develops lots of "tactical snapshots". Developing it to respond with the right amount of force to massive breakthroughs (and even small breakthroughs)... or even to respond at all, is our nightmare as designers.
What I've found to offset the tendency to "overstack" - can be resolved in how formations are defined. Obviously, this can vary a lot, suffice that for TOAW it is better to define formations with regards to how the PO handles them, then how they were defined historically. The "system" advocates for a variety of different formation types, in terms of size and function. I'll use some stereotypical WW2 Russian formations as examples.
1. Triggers - independent brigades/divisions - just something to hold specific landmarks. Very small formations.
2. Objective Takers - Shock Armies, Guards Armies and other large formations that concentrate in force.
3. Main Lines - medium-sized formations expected to hold "x" amount of frontage.
4. Gap Holders - small-size formations expected to hold "x" amount of frontage between Main Line formations and/or provide defensive coverage when the Main Line engages offensively.
5. Trigger Response - biggest variable - depends upon what is available to be called upon, akin to a second line Objective Taker Formation.
6. Waves - For situations where there is an abundance of units/formations - can serve as Trigger Response and/or replacements for Main Line formations (and alternate function) managed through objective tracks.
Considering what any given formation can be reasonably expected to accomplish on its own will go a long way to help in "PO stability". A lot of Russian Armies are pretty small - 3-5 divisions; and some can be pretty big, 10-12 divisions. The objectives of each formation have to be considered with what it can be reasonably expected to handle - such as covering 3 hexes of frontage on the offensive, or 3 hexes of frontage with defense in depth. That's decent for a small army, but will lead to bunching up for a large army.
One method that may help is standardizing the size of some of these larger armies to that of the smaller armies - and then branching off its excess units into Operational Groups. Say 64th Army historically had 10 divisions - in TOAW that 64th Army could be represented as an Army with 6 divisions plus 2 operational groups of 2 divisions each (left/right flanks). Of course, that means four divisions will not have a normal HQ - but the only functional drawback to that appears to be they will not be subject to the proficiency loss in the event that the 64th Army HQ is destroyed. They'll still gain a bonus in supply if a friendly, cooperating HQ is adjacent to them.
In my own and with other's in regular play, when conducting an offensive - we all like to have at least something dug in on the front line when we go on the offensive. Having more formations should lend to the PO being able to do the same. Haven't tested this in a while - suffice that in my lasts tests - the PO did more or less what I told it, and if it got it wrong, it was owing more to my issuing the wrong orders or messing up the objective sequence.
Covering the big what-ifs - major breakthroughs and potential encirclements - I think is the biggest problem though. In theory, this comes down to setting up the means to 1) Prevent (or attempt to), 2) If it does happen, enable the PO to (attempt to) determine that it has happened... and then... .... ha... 3) try to respond to it. Not asking for miracles or anything... hahaha...
I think the above mechanisms can "help" do a lot more, in some scenarios, with respect to prevention. The Trigger Points, provided there are enough of them, should be able to help in defining for the PO what has happened. Might require 2 or maybe even 3 layers of Trigger Points, though that can get expensive in unit count.
With just three objective tracks... I think being able to engineer an appropriate response would be pretty difficult. Now that there are five objective tracks - it could be do-able. Leastwise, I can see it being do-able in situations like late-WWII Soviet side situations - where there are endless hordes of reinforcements.
These are my thoughts and observations up to this point, suffice that I welcome other's ideas and observations, too - techniques for simplifying PO components, etc.
I'm looking forward to lots of fun in figuring out how to define the Axis response to the Balkans...
