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How important was Malta to the defeat of Axis forces in North Africa? What would have been the effect of a successful Axis invasion in say early 1941?

Simple improving the supply situation of the DAK is benefit enough.

The allies still would have won the war, but it would have slowed things down in the med.

Just off the top of my head I would suggest…


Significant Axis land, sea, and air forces would become available.

Submarine, E-boat, and MAS units based at Malta would effectively seal the Mediterranean.

Spain would probably be thinking about demanding Gibraltar, joining the Axis, or both.

Sort of a two part question in my mind.

The first part dealing with the defeat of the Axis forces in North Africa would be it played a significant role after Germany committed troops to Africa. With Malta sitting on the Axis supply lines, Rommel could never be sure of his supplies and the Axis also had to tie down sizeable air assets to try to neutralize Malta. In addition, I don't think the British try to "run the gauntlet" with some of their tank convoys without Malta.

The second part is when does Malta get invaded? My opinion is the Axis should have been more aggressive and knocked it out in the fall of 1940 after it was clear the Battle of Britain and Sealion would not take place. There were minimal defenses there and the Germans could have easily led a combined operation with paratroopers and air assets with support from the Italian navy before Taranto took place.

ORIGINAL: warspite1

How important was Malta to the defeat of Axis forces in North Africa? What would have been the effect of a successful Axis invasion in say early 1941?

I would suggest that Malta was useful, but not critical.

Unless we assume that the fall of Malta would have allowed the DAK to take Alexandria, then nothing of consequence would have changed.

The allies would still have significant advantages in quantity of troops and equipment, airpower, and supplies. The DAK would still have had logistical difficulties the further they pushed into Egypt.
The UK was already routing shipping around the tip of Africa and not through the Med, with rare (and risky) exceptions.
The Allies would still have a huge intelligence advantage - Ultra combined with the abysmal Italian security arrangements (sometimes the Germans refused to tell the Italians what they were doing specifically because they just couldn't keep a secret).
The entry of the US and the Torch invasions would still have forced the DAK to withdraw back to Tunisia.

Bottom line, North Africa was always seen by Hitler as a secondary theater (until Torch, at which time he flooded the area with reinforcements, too late to matter). Even if Malta had fallen in early 1941, the German army and air force were committed to Barbarossa. The fall of Malta would have eased the DAK's logistics somewhat, but without significant reinforcements, taking Alexandria and really changing the war would have remained unlikely.

it is much more critical then Crete.

the Germans should have sacrificed it´s elite paratroopers on Malta instead    

Timeline up to Crete
10/28/40 – 06/01/41 The Balkans Campaign
10/28/40 Italy launches an unsuccessful campaign against Greece from Albania.
04/06/41 – 04/17/41 Operation 25 The German Invasion of Yugoslavia.
04/17/41 – 04/19/41 The German Invasion of Greece 04/19/41 05:30 Allied resistance on mainland Greece ends.

06/22/41 Operation Barbarossa
06/22/41 – 07/29/41 Battle of Brest-Litovsk
06/24/41 – 06/28/41 Battle of Minsk
06/25/41 – 06/29/41 Battle of Lutsk


On the plus side for the British they would have more Aircraft Carriers for Operation Torch or Operation Sledgehammer.

I think Malta was more important than some people think. Convoy routes from Italy to Libya were difficult to protect for the Axis, simply because of British Reconnaissance from Malta, combined with the small attack vessels and planes based there. Rommel got about 50% of the goods send from Italy. On several occasions, Rommel couldn't press on, simply because he ran out of fuel or tanks...
I don't think the British were able to sink or damage that much Italian merchant vessels without Malta as a reconnaissance base. The sail time from Italy to Libya would have been much shorter, if Malta had been conquered somewhere in 1940 (when there wasn't much defence there...).

ORIGINAL: Centuur

I think Malta was more important than some people think. Convoy routes from Italy to Libya were difficult to protect for the Axis, simply because of British Reconnaissance from Malta, combined with the small attack vessels and planes based there. Rommel got about 50% of the goods send from Italy. On several occasions, Rommel couldn't press on, simply because he ran out of fuel or tanks...
I don't think the British were able to sink or damage that much Italian merchant vessels without Malta as a reconnaissance base. The sail time from Italy to Libya would have been much shorter, if Malta had been conquered somewhere in 1940 (when there wasn't much defence there...).

Warspite1

O'Hara has always been a supporter of the Regia Marina's efforts in WWII and cites the following figures for the men and supplies that were loaded in Italy:

90% of the material reached Rommel*
98% of the troops reached Rommel*

* Source: On Seas Contested. O'Hara, Dickson and Worth

I read a book a while ago about Malta and the war in the Mediterranean 1940 to 1942. The author made an analysis in the book on how big impact Malta had an on the supply situation Rommel had. He found out that Malta did not affect the situatian at all or was minimal at most. The main trouble for Rommel was harbour capacity, lack of trucks and distance. Put in another way. The Axis got enough supply to Tripoli but could not get enough to Tobruk and even less into Egypt. A railroad would have made all the difference.

Unfortuantely I have the book in storage at the moment so I can't get his figures. I suspect his figures match the ones O'Hara had. But when O'Hara say it reached Rommel I suspect he ment it reached Libya and mainly Tripoli. That is not the same thing.

Michael Tamelander's book "MALTA - Kriget i Medelhavet 1940-42" is ,as far as I know, not translated into english.

Also, just because the RM got the vast majority of supplies, vehicles, troops, &c through does not mean it was an adequate amount to begin with.

ORIGINAL: Orm

Unfortuantely I have the book in storage at the moment so I can't get his figures. I suspect his figures match the ones O'Hara had. But when O'Hara say it reached Rommel I suspect he ment it reached Libya and mainly Tripoli. That is not the same thing.

Warspite1

Undoubtedly that is the case - O'Hara is making the case for the Regia Marina - not the supply system employed by the Axis forces in Libya.

ORIGINAL: composer99

Also, just because the RM got the vast majority of supplies, vehicles, troops, &c through does not mean it was an adequate amount to begin with.

Warspite1

Indeed, and that missing 10% may have proven vital in a theatre where supplies were limited in any case.

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Orm

Unfortuantely I have the book in storage at the moment so I can't get his figures. I suspect his figures match the ones O'Hara had. But when O'Hara say it reached Rommel I suspect he ment it reached Libya and mainly Tripoli. That is not the same thing.

Warspite1

Undoubtedly that is the case - O'Hara is making the case for the Regia Marina - not the supply system employed by the Axis forces in Libya.

The book I read made a point of that the Axis had adequate amounts of supply in Tripoli but could not get it to the front.

ORIGINAL: Orm

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Orm

Unfortuantely I have the book in storage at the moment so I can't get his figures. I suspect his figures match the ones O'Hara had. But when O'Hara say it reached Rommel I suspect he ment it reached Libya and mainly Tripoli. That is not the same thing.

Warspite1

Undoubtedly that is the case - O'Hara is making the case for the Regia Marina - not the supply system employed by the Axis forces in Libya.

The book I read made a point of that the Axis had adequate amounts of supply in Tripoli but could not get it to the front.

Warspite1

Yes, and I think this is one of the points that O'Hara misses; namely that the Regia Marina could not always get supplies safely to Tobruk or even Benghazi when they were Axis owned and thus they had to be brought up from Tripoli.

ORIGINAL: Extraneous

Just off the top of my head I would suggest…


Significant Axis land, sea, and air forces would become available.

Fall Barbarossa my friend!!!

Submarine, E-boat, and MAS units based at Malta would effectively seal the Mediterranean.

Spain would probably be thinking about demanding Gibraltar, joining the Axis, or both.

Operation Torch hmmm Franco once again does his tortoise impression and sucks head back into shell

Don't forget the British subs based at Malta took a heavy toll as well (U-class mostly).

Harbor capacity was an issue for sure and not having Tobruk available for much of the African campaign hurt the Axis cause a lot.

Air transport of supplies was never really secure either when the Axis tried to go that way as well.

ORIGINAL: cantona2

ORIGINAL: Extraneous

Just off the top of my head I would suggest…


Significant Axis land, sea, and air forces would become available.

Fall Barbarossa my friend!!!

Submarine, E-boat, and MAS units based at Malta would effectively seal the Mediterranean.

Spain would probably be thinking about demanding Gibraltar, joining the Axis, or both.

Operation Torch hmmm Franco once again does his tortoise impression and sucks head back into shell

Operation Torch? I doubt if the Allies would attempt Torch. What would be to gain? In 1942 Monty was rolling west from El Alamein already.


Churchill would push for "Operation Jupiter - suggested invasion of Norway". I doubt if he would push for Yugoslavia "The soft underbelly of Europe" by way of Egypt.

Ike would push for "Operation Sledgehammer - establishment of beachhead in Cherbourg or Brest".

F.D.R. would side with "Operation Jupiter - suggested invasion of Norway". In the name of good Anglo-American relations.

Rommel himself stated that he only got about 50% of goods needed at the front lines. Also, he stated that he wanted to increase the number of trucks in Lybia to get better supply trains running, but wasn't able to do so because of the fact that there wasn't enough shipping available to transfer the trucks and the corresponding fuel to Libya. He was concerned with the Italian losses on shipping and contributed this completely to the fact that Malta was British...

I can't remember where I read this, but I recall seeing somewhere an analysis that Rommel, despite his operational brilliance, was regarded by the German General Staff as weak on managing his logistics. Granted, he was probably in a situation where he knew he had to roll the dice. But the point was that Rommel just didn't give logistical concerns the weight he could (or should) have. A comparison would be Robert E. Lee's invasions (or large scale raids, if you prefer) of the North in 1862 and 1863. Lee's purpose was to seek decisive battle while relieving the Confederate supply situation by foraging in points north. Once he was thwarted (at Antietam and Gettysburg) he wasted no time moving back to his supply lines in Virginia. Rommel, on the other hand, seemed prone to repeated overoptimism as to what his forces could accomplish at the end of a very very long truck route. Rommel's prolonged stay at the El Alamein position is akin to what Hood did in 1864, when he parked the Confederate Army of Tennessee outside Nashville until Thomas crushed it with a sledgehammer blow.