My Problem with WiTE
Posted: Sat Nov 12, 2011 4:53 pm
I love this game, but I'm beginning to have a bit of a philosophical dilemma with it. You see my personal philosophy is that I want a game that gives me as historically accurate a simulation as possible, but then gives me complete control and flexibilty in the decision making. In other words, I want to be Stalin and STAVKA or Hitler and OKH (without the megolomania) and see if I can do better than they did historically. I therefore don't generally have a lot of empathy for players who make comments like "the Soviets/Germans shouldn't be able to do this or that because Stalin/Hitler would never have allowed it." Since I want to be totally in command (maybe I am a megolomaniac) I don't want to be restricted by what Stalin or Hitler may or may not have allowed.
The problem with applying this philosophy to WiTE is that historically, IMHO, the Soviet High Command in the first year of the War (and especially in the first few months) stumbled from one big blunder to another. The most obvious (but certainly not only) example of which was to allow 600,000 men plus their equipment to be captured in the Kiev pocket. IMHO had the Soviet forces been properly handled they would have been able to avoid the big pockets and thus preserve a much larger army for the Winter offensive than they did historically. This would have caused a chain reaction allowing them to inflict more casualties on the Axis forces. Come spring/summer 42 a good Russian player would probably realize that his forces are still not a match for the Germans and, instead of launching a Kharkov type offensive would sit tight in his fortifications. Accordingly,the Axis would not have made anywhere close to the advance in the summer of 42 that they did historically and the tide of war would turn much earlier than it did historically.
So if I am correct in my opinions, than in most cases an historically accurate simulation of the War in Russia fought between two capable opponents who have freedom of movement (that is to say they are not restricted by what their historical counterparts did) will probably result in the Axis having at best only a limited offensive in the summer of 42, followed by a Soviet offensive beginning earlier than historical. Of course, the Axis player will proably not make the mistake of having an entire army surrounded (as historically happened at Stalingrad) and will not be handcuffed by Hitler's "No Retreat" Order, However, the end result will probably be a quicker end to the War.
Because of my philosophy I am not moved by the cries of the German Players who complain that the Russian Players are running away and they are not inflicting the 3 million+ casualties on the Russians that were achieved historically. I mean did you really think that your opponent was going to (or should be forced to) make the same stupid mistakes as his historical counterpart? If this is what you want than play the less capable Russian Players (which perhaps even include me) who are more likely to make these mistakes. On the other hand, if the Soviet RR capacity is still larger than historical than this should be fixed. Also if historically the evacuation of HI was important and if in the game it is not, than this should also be fixed.
Having said this, I want the game to be challenging for both sides and accordingly I want the Axis to have as equal a chance to win as the Soviets. This is my dilemma, how can this be accomplished without offending my philosophy. The options as I see them are:
1. Change the Victory Conditions so that the Axis only have to hold Berlin until January 45 (or such other date as playtesting determines is fair).
2. Change the Victory Conditons as is being proposed by Michael T (see his post).
3. Change the Victory Conditions so that VPs are awarded for holding certain cities for certain periods of time (I understand this may be difficult or impossible to implement).
4. To hell with my philosophy and give the Axis some ahistoric advantage to "balance" things out. Such as not nerfing HQ Chaining (yes I know the Soviets can do it too but it is not the same) or not fixing the railhead repair bug, or perhaps a nuclear warhead or two.
The problem with applying this philosophy to WiTE is that historically, IMHO, the Soviet High Command in the first year of the War (and especially in the first few months) stumbled from one big blunder to another. The most obvious (but certainly not only) example of which was to allow 600,000 men plus their equipment to be captured in the Kiev pocket. IMHO had the Soviet forces been properly handled they would have been able to avoid the big pockets and thus preserve a much larger army for the Winter offensive than they did historically. This would have caused a chain reaction allowing them to inflict more casualties on the Axis forces. Come spring/summer 42 a good Russian player would probably realize that his forces are still not a match for the Germans and, instead of launching a Kharkov type offensive would sit tight in his fortifications. Accordingly,the Axis would not have made anywhere close to the advance in the summer of 42 that they did historically and the tide of war would turn much earlier than it did historically.
So if I am correct in my opinions, than in most cases an historically accurate simulation of the War in Russia fought between two capable opponents who have freedom of movement (that is to say they are not restricted by what their historical counterparts did) will probably result in the Axis having at best only a limited offensive in the summer of 42, followed by a Soviet offensive beginning earlier than historical. Of course, the Axis player will proably not make the mistake of having an entire army surrounded (as historically happened at Stalingrad) and will not be handcuffed by Hitler's "No Retreat" Order, However, the end result will probably be a quicker end to the War.
Because of my philosophy I am not moved by the cries of the German Players who complain that the Russian Players are running away and they are not inflicting the 3 million+ casualties on the Russians that were achieved historically. I mean did you really think that your opponent was going to (or should be forced to) make the same stupid mistakes as his historical counterpart? If this is what you want than play the less capable Russian Players (which perhaps even include me) who are more likely to make these mistakes. On the other hand, if the Soviet RR capacity is still larger than historical than this should be fixed. Also if historically the evacuation of HI was important and if in the game it is not, than this should also be fixed.
Having said this, I want the game to be challenging for both sides and accordingly I want the Axis to have as equal a chance to win as the Soviets. This is my dilemma, how can this be accomplished without offending my philosophy. The options as I see them are:
1. Change the Victory Conditions so that the Axis only have to hold Berlin until January 45 (or such other date as playtesting determines is fair).
2. Change the Victory Conditons as is being proposed by Michael T (see his post).
3. Change the Victory Conditions so that VPs are awarded for holding certain cities for certain periods of time (I understand this may be difficult or impossible to implement).
4. To hell with my philosophy and give the Axis some ahistoric advantage to "balance" things out. Such as not nerfing HQ Chaining (yes I know the Soviets can do it too but it is not the same) or not fixing the railhead repair bug, or perhaps a nuclear warhead or two.