ORIGINAL: Arjuna
Short answer is "No we haven't". Both of these conflicts really require us to model helo ops. Once I bed down the COTA Ex Pack I will be modelling realistic mounted ops to support mech and mot inf. But I will be designing this aspect with helo ops in mind. So that could be done after. But there is more to helo ops than just mounted infantry being transported by helo. It also involves attack helo missions, nap of the earth route finding, helo resupply, helo basing and resup, SEAD missions aganst anti aircraft assets, not to mention radar modelling. So it's a pretty BIG undertaking.
This is true regarding NATO cold war scenarios.
But the Yom Kippur War featured few helo ops, only, if i am not mistaken. One was operation Gown, where the
recon platoon of the IDF paratroopers brigade flew deep inside Syria, where they destroyed a bridge in the tri-border area (Iraq, Syria and Jordan), 300 miles into Syrian territory).
A similar mission, the planned destruction of another bridge, was operation "Kotont", with a misdrop (helidrop 20 miles, instead of 12 miles, away from the target, with the platoon making it to sighting distance, just to figure it was well defended and that the defenders' absolutely outnumbered the platoon and to cancel the mission), subsequent surrounding by Syrian forces and successfull exfiltration. This mission was a failure, because the Syrians had now shifted to protect their bridges, after the first bridge was destroyed. These missions started one day after 11th of October, the day where Israeli forces started pushing towards Damascus, but subsequent missions were not carried out, afaik, since the Syrians had amassed units around vital bridges.
Hebrew -> English translation:
http://translate.google.com/translate?h ... 2F213.html
The actions to take Mount Hermon involved the Heli-borne Syrian 82nd Paratroop Bn (~300 troops), with 200 troops being dropped half a mile from the Israeli structures and attacking that Israeli outpost, and one Coy (100 troops) providing covering fire.
Recapturing Mount Hermon, operation "Dessert", involved the Israeli Golani Brigade, its 51st mech. Inf Bn, its Recon Coy and "a motorized Bn" (spearheaded by bulldozers and tanks) and paratroopers. The Golani Brigade's mission involved 9 hours of "climbing" on the only narrow access road towards the previously lost outpost, led by bulldozers and tanks, where artillery spilled out a rolling barrage (200 yards ahead). Nadel's 606 Israeli paras (Nadel ordered a drop at the crest, ignoring his superior's orders) were dropped on the crest, worked their way halfway down (neir the outposts), before they were ordered back up. Most of the Syrians had fled, Syrian reinforcements (on trucks) were taken out or captured by the paras. 30 years later, critics argued that the deployment of the paras was not necessary, as the Golani advance had been quite successful. Two Syrian helicopters carrying reinforcements were shot down by IDF aircraft.
Afaik, in the Northeast, there was no other remarkable helo mission during Yom Kippur, also, for the operation at Mt. Hermon, no exfiltration (by helo) would have to be rendered ... so para drops can be depicted the old fashioned way.
When the Egyptian Army started the war/attack, they attempted to land heli-borne commandos to take Israeli outposts at vital chokepoints or at vital routes Israeli reinforcements could use, but some 20 helicopters were shot down by the Israelis, so that the remaining commandos proved to be way less effective than expected, except for those near Beluza and Fort Budapest, they created some confusion on the Israeli side, though. Other advance parties, using the element of surprise, captured a couple of small Israeli outposts, while other Israeli outposts managed to fend off Egyptian attacks for several days, before they surrendered. 1700 commandos were dropped, 740 killed, and 330 became POW. The commandos were either dropped near the chokepoints or off these points so that they had to march to get there and set up ambushes. There are accounts stating that at some points, where the commandos met Israeli reinforcements on their way to the front, both side suffered heavy casualties, resulting in some reinforcements being delayed. Most outposts were overrun by ground units, though.
On the Egyptian theater/side, when the Israeli forces started to advance across the Suez channel, IDF paras helped to establish a bridgehead on the left bank of the Suez channel, so they crossed the channel using boats or rafts afaik, though, means they were employed like regular ground units, no helicopters involved, before Adan's tanks swung south towards the Red Sea.
Since, in the main, the campaign in the Sinai and the campaign in the East and Northeast (against Syrian, Jordan and Iraqi troops and tanks) was pretty much about Infantry/tank and tank/tank combat, and most notably, involving plenty of ground-to-ground rockets (wire guided-AT rockets) operated by Egyptian AT infantry or regular INF which reduced Israel's tank pool tremendously, I don't see the need to render helicopter transports or helicopters providing covering fire, as Yom Kippur was mainly about anything but such mobile heli operations, imho.
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