Territory matters!
Posted: Fri Feb 22, 2013 4:26 pm
I have raised the issue before, but nobody reacted (I'm not much of a "name" on this forum). But recently, I read the Pelton vs MT AAR and it seemed a blatant illustration of my concern, AND I read Pelton voiving the same concern (and as far as game experience goes he is a "name", so I decided to give it another shot.
My problem is: territory doesn't really matter.
The fact that a German full retreat, back to starting poistions, after a mere 6 months of campaign, could be considered, within the context of the game, as a winning strategy, illustrates this.
As for the Soviet, I think I remember reading Pelton quoting MT, who said that it didn't really matter if he had to abandon Moscow. And we all know there isn't much in-game incentive in trying to hold ground as the Soviet, in 1941.
The thing is, territory mattered. Capturing or failing to capture emblematic enemy locations, loosing or retaining control of friendly locations, was (and always has been) a potent indicator of how the war is going. No, the Wehrmacht (assuming someone in charge had survived the firing squad after suggesting the idea) could not have retreated that far AND, on top of that, retain a high morale! (one of the strong points of Pelton's strategy). No, Stalin and his red army, stright-jacketted into offensive doctrines, could not have conceded such a large part of the Motherland without fighting. It took a year of severe maulings before the Red army stared to adopt retreat as a deliberate tactic;
Yet, Pelton was right in trying that, if his objective was winning, that is, winning according to the game's victory conditions;
So this raises the question of the victory conditions: I guess there is unanimous agreement that victory conditions should not reflect who actually wins the war (since wars are often unbalanced - this one was) and games are supposed to be balanced. VCs should reflect performance, so vctory should equate better than historical performance;
Yet, contrarily to scenarios, the campaign game VC are formaulated, for the German, in negative terms (barring a K.O. victory which is unlikely): that is, defensive: lose as late as possible. That is paradoxical when we consder that the game portrays operation Barbarossa, which was an offensive undertaking if ever there was one.
So the problem is that once the German gives up the idea of a K.O victory (most likely winter 41) he must play with a completely defensive set of mind, that is delaying defeat.
This is not just ahistorical. this has a deep impact on the game as a fun experience. There is a lot less flamboyance, a lot less daring. Who would squeeze his meagre panzer remnants into the Russian lines to get in sight of the kremlin bulbs? why bother this last strenuous effort to capture kalinin? Who would dart towards Stalingrad, at the cost of dangerous overextension? the script often unfolds according to the same lines: Russian run until they reach last-ditch defense line, then Germans may well run too in the opposite direction.
I honestly believe that Barbarossa, a conquering undertaking, should have OFFENSIVE factors computed into its performance criteria. After all, that's how scenarios work! The Typhoon scenario, for example, allows for historical daring German moves BECAUSE the VC rewards holding key positions, and holding them sooner than later; In the same way, Soviets, will NOT give up key locations without a fight.
So yes I think it would make for a much funnier game, as well as more historical, if grabing territory was a factor in final victory determination. Earning points when capturing before historical time (or capturing uncaptured territory), when retaining control after historical time of capture, for example.
This would give a nice race-against time which was a essential factor ion Barbarossa, and that is kind of absent in WitE.
Now, I'm not saying territory is everything, and precisely, it would bring interesting dilemnas and opportunities for strategic mistakes, where holding ground just one more turn would bring encirclement and losses that do not compensate the VC gain. In WitE thereis no such urge.
Also, besides the rather abstract VC aspect, there could, and should be a way of linking territory gain or loss to the conduct of the game. As I said, territory possession is a key indicator of war performance as a whole. So the VC situation, territory speaking, should affect national morale, and therefore the morale of units in the game. This would be a direct incentive for territorial conquest.
Currently, unit morale increases as a function of its own performance. But would a German unit which has won a few fights be inclined to a higher morale if the wehrmacht was back to Poland in the winterafter conceding everything it fought for during the summer? What would abandoning Moscow do for the Red Army's confidence? And the other way round, how confident would Soviet recruits feel if the Red Army was back to its original borders in 1941? Or fighting with its bak to the Ural?
My problem is: territory doesn't really matter.
The fact that a German full retreat, back to starting poistions, after a mere 6 months of campaign, could be considered, within the context of the game, as a winning strategy, illustrates this.
As for the Soviet, I think I remember reading Pelton quoting MT, who said that it didn't really matter if he had to abandon Moscow. And we all know there isn't much in-game incentive in trying to hold ground as the Soviet, in 1941.
The thing is, territory mattered. Capturing or failing to capture emblematic enemy locations, loosing or retaining control of friendly locations, was (and always has been) a potent indicator of how the war is going. No, the Wehrmacht (assuming someone in charge had survived the firing squad after suggesting the idea) could not have retreated that far AND, on top of that, retain a high morale! (one of the strong points of Pelton's strategy). No, Stalin and his red army, stright-jacketted into offensive doctrines, could not have conceded such a large part of the Motherland without fighting. It took a year of severe maulings before the Red army stared to adopt retreat as a deliberate tactic;
Yet, Pelton was right in trying that, if his objective was winning, that is, winning according to the game's victory conditions;
So this raises the question of the victory conditions: I guess there is unanimous agreement that victory conditions should not reflect who actually wins the war (since wars are often unbalanced - this one was) and games are supposed to be balanced. VCs should reflect performance, so vctory should equate better than historical performance;
Yet, contrarily to scenarios, the campaign game VC are formaulated, for the German, in negative terms (barring a K.O. victory which is unlikely): that is, defensive: lose as late as possible. That is paradoxical when we consder that the game portrays operation Barbarossa, which was an offensive undertaking if ever there was one.
So the problem is that once the German gives up the idea of a K.O victory (most likely winter 41) he must play with a completely defensive set of mind, that is delaying defeat.
This is not just ahistorical. this has a deep impact on the game as a fun experience. There is a lot less flamboyance, a lot less daring. Who would squeeze his meagre panzer remnants into the Russian lines to get in sight of the kremlin bulbs? why bother this last strenuous effort to capture kalinin? Who would dart towards Stalingrad, at the cost of dangerous overextension? the script often unfolds according to the same lines: Russian run until they reach last-ditch defense line, then Germans may well run too in the opposite direction.
I honestly believe that Barbarossa, a conquering undertaking, should have OFFENSIVE factors computed into its performance criteria. After all, that's how scenarios work! The Typhoon scenario, for example, allows for historical daring German moves BECAUSE the VC rewards holding key positions, and holding them sooner than later; In the same way, Soviets, will NOT give up key locations without a fight.
So yes I think it would make for a much funnier game, as well as more historical, if grabing territory was a factor in final victory determination. Earning points when capturing before historical time (or capturing uncaptured territory), when retaining control after historical time of capture, for example.
This would give a nice race-against time which was a essential factor ion Barbarossa, and that is kind of absent in WitE.
Now, I'm not saying territory is everything, and precisely, it would bring interesting dilemnas and opportunities for strategic mistakes, where holding ground just one more turn would bring encirclement and losses that do not compensate the VC gain. In WitE thereis no such urge.
Also, besides the rather abstract VC aspect, there could, and should be a way of linking territory gain or loss to the conduct of the game. As I said, territory possession is a key indicator of war performance as a whole. So the VC situation, territory speaking, should affect national morale, and therefore the morale of units in the game. This would be a direct incentive for territorial conquest.
Currently, unit morale increases as a function of its own performance. But would a German unit which has won a few fights be inclined to a higher morale if the wehrmacht was back to Poland in the winterafter conceding everything it fought for during the summer? What would abandoning Moscow do for the Red Army's confidence? And the other way round, how confident would Soviet recruits feel if the Red Army was back to its original borders in 1941? Or fighting with its bak to the Ural?
