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Holy cow, the amazing things one discovers from letters, diarys, reports, you know, those things that those people did back in those days, on paper, with pencil or pen. This stuff sure ain't your little Internet doo-doo.

This is from the usual sources in Morton, USGPO, 1953, along with letters and diary entries from J.Q.Johnson, P.Kerchum. F.D.Lowe, W.F.Radshaw, A.Abraham (C company), J.B.Fry (Service coy), A.C. Houghtby (C company). The sources are in print (microfiche) so one has to know how to read.

There is no Philippine Division, in the US OOB in 1939. There were units of regimental size deployed to various out-continent stations (PI, HI, CZ) and 31st IR was one. It sat in the Philippines for years, under the 1922 TOE, at half strength, till Oct 1939, when it was reorganized in accord with TO 7-16, with many and various decrements to support weaponry. Fortunately, the letters and diarys state just exactly what they got, and when. And they also say that they could have put on the carabao patch, but they wore the blue/white seahorse of the Phil Dept.

Ciao. John

Wow. Just plain WOW!

Hm. According to the Army Almanac of 1950, the division was activated in 1921.

Interesting, Stanton doesnt have an "activated" date for the Division but Madej shows 8 June 1921

Seeing I am smart enough to read and also use the internet I am able to work from more than Diaries

From http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipu ... attle1.pdf
US Army
Order of Battle
1919–1941
Volume 1
The Arms: Major Commands and
Infantry Organizations, 1919–41
by
Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Steven E. Clay

PHILIPPINE DIVISION
HQ—
Fort McKinley, PI, 1922–41
The Philippine Division was constituted in the R.A. on 7 December 1921 and activated
at Fort McKinley, Philippine Islands, on 10 April 1922. The division was the primary
ground force of the Philippine Department and was given the mission of defending the
Philippine archipelago from potential invaders. The division began organizing around
the nucleus of the 23d Inf. Brig. (consisting of the 45th and the 57th Inf. Regts.), which
was activated on 15
December 1921. Additionally, the 31st Inf.; the 1st Bn., 24th F.A.;
the 1st Bn., 14th Engrs.; and several of the companies in the division special troops were
already organized and integrated into the division. The division continued to receive and
activate units throughout 1922, adding HHC, 24th Inf. Brig.; HHC, 12th F.A. Brig.; HQ,
Philippine Division Q.M. Tns., and several of the train’s elements; and the 12th Mtcyl
Co. by April. The 15th Inf. was assigned to the division in July 1922, however, only
the 1st Bn. was stationed in the Philippines. The remainder of the regiment was posted
to the American Barracks in Tientsin, China, and attached to HQ, American Forces in China. By the end of 1922,
the 12th Med. Regt. was activated and rounded out the division’s structure. The Philippine Division was forced to
inactivate several units over the interwar years due to budget decreases, starting with the 12th F.A. Brig. HQ in 1922,
followed by the 1st Bn., 15th Inf. in 1929, and the 24th Inf. Brig. HQ in 1930. With the relief of the 31st Inf. from the
division in 1931, the 24th Brig. was redesignated as a Philippine Scout (PS) organization and the 43d and 44th Inf.
Regts. (PS) were added to the brigade as inactive units. Additionally, the inactive 25th F.A. (PS) was relieved and the
23d F.A. (PS) replaced it as the division’s other indirect fire regiment, also in an inactive status. Like other overseas
divisions at the time, the Philippine Division was fortunate in that it was located on the terrain on which it would
fight if the archipelago was ever invaded. Therefore, the training in which it participated tended to be more realistic
and provided a more focused military environment. The environment helped to develop many of the Army officers
who would lead the United States to victory in World War II. Due to the archipelago’s seasonal weather patterns, the
division conducted individual training, marksmanship training, and schools for specialists during the rainy months
of June–August. The drier months of September–November were devoted to officer and noncommissioned officer
schools, garrison work details, inspections, and maneuver preparation. The late part of the year began with small unit
training, reconnaissance of the maneuver areas for the next major department exercise, and exercising transportation
and communications systems. These activities were followed by the repair and construction of roads leading to and
on the peninsula of Bataan. The preparations finally culminated in the large-scale division and department maneuvers
in January and February. The maneuvers occasionally included large surface squadrons from the Navy as well as
amphibious invasion forces provided by the US Marine Corps. In 1933, the Philippine Division began to train in earnest
to prepare for an invasion, which Army planners believed would come at the beaches of Lingayan. The January 1934
maneuver was actually little more than a thorough reconnaissance of Bataan with particular emphasis on the Miraveles
Mountains. This reconnaissance revealed the poor internal road net of the peninsula, and the 14th Engrs. and 23d F.A.
were put to work improving the trails and roads. The 1935 maneuver was again held on Bataan. This exercise focused
on determining the enemy avenues of approach and selecting defensive positions to block those approaches. The 1936
maneuver came uncannily close to rehearsing what would occur 6 years later when the Japanese invaded. The 26th
Cav., with the 23d F.A. in support, was sent to scout the Lingayan landing areas and report movements of the invasion
force, while the Philippine Division concentrated near Fort Stotsenberg. As the enemy forced the cavalry back, the
Philippine Division fought a delaying action, fell back onto Bataan to defend the Olongopo Road, and then centered
its defense on the Miraveles Mountains where the exercise ended. The next change to the division’s structure came in
1936 with the reorganization of the Q.M. Tn. into the 12th Q.M. Regt. Shortly before Pearl Harbor, the 31st Inf. was
reassigned to the Philippine Division, and the 1st Bns. of the 43d Inf. and the 23d F.A. were activated. Interestingly,
the 24th Inf. Brig. was still assigned as an inactive unit; therefore, the Philippine Division was the only R.A. infantry
division that retained the “square” structure (at least on paper) on entry into World War II. Location of the division HQ
on 7 December 1941 was Fort William McKinley, Philippine Islands.
Organization Day:
10 April. Commemorates the initial activation of the division on 10 April 1922.
Status:
Surrendered to the Japanese 14th Army in May 1942. Reactivated on 6 April 1946 at Angeles, Pampanga, PI,
and redesignated as the 12th Inf. Div. (PS). Inactivated 30 April 1947.
Division Commanders
Brig. Gen. Omar Bundy
10 April 1922–24 March 1924
Brig. Gen. Alfred
T. Smith
28 June 1935–8 January 1937
Maj. Gen. James H. McRae
24 March 1924–17 November 1924
Brig. Gen. Evan H. Humphrey
9 January 1937–20 January 1937
Maj. Gen. Douglas MacArthur
18 November 1924–30 January 1925
Maj. Gen. John L. DeWitt
20 January 1937–8 April 1937
Maj. Gen. William Weigel
26 January 1925–16 February 1927
Brig. Gen. George Grunert
8 April 1937–3 July 1937
Brig. Gen. Frank M. Caldwell
16 February 1927–25 April 1927
Maj. Gen. John H. Hughes
3 July 1937–25 February 1938
Maj. Gen. Johnson Hagood
25 April 1927–22 June 1929
Maj. Gen. Percy P. Bishop
26 February 1938–31 October 1938
Maj. Gen. Paul B. Malone
22 June 1929–24 June 1931
Maj. Gen. W
alter S. Grant
31 October 1938–24 July 1939
Brig. Gen. Caspar H. Conrad Jr.
24 June 1931–1 July 1933
Brig. Gen. Henry C. Pratt
25 July 1939–November 1939
Brig. Gen. Frank S. Cocheu
1 July 1933–8 May 1935
Maj. Gen. George Grunert
November 1939–May 1940
Brig. Gen. Stanley H. Ford
8 May 1935–27 May 1935
Brig. Gen. Henry C. Pratt
May 1940–November 1940
Col. Ralph H. Leavitt
28 May 1935–28 June 1935
Maj. Gen. Jonathan M. W
ainwright
November 1940–28 November 1941

So, in a nutshell, the Philippine Division did exist between the wars but the 31st Infantry was not part of it until late 1941.

All this is very interesting. I think it's time to read up on "between the wars".

ORIGINAL: Terminus
Hm. According to the Army Almanac of 1950, the division was activated in 1921.

ORIGINAL: Don Bowen
So, in a nutshell, the Philippine Division did exist between the wars but the 31st Infantry was not part of it until late 1941.

All this is very interesting. I think it's time to read up on "between the wars".

Yep. I guess saying it didn't exist was a bit hyperbolic. It did exist as the administrative HQ for Philippine Scout units from 1930 on. Although it existed on paper, I tend to think it was more like the Philippine division (or Philippino portion) of the Philippine Department as distinct from the US portion which administratively reported directly to Department. There wasn't much for it to administer.

On September 1, 1941, the 31st Infantry Regiment was reassigned from the Philippine Department to the Philippine
Division which had since 1931 consisted of only Philippine Scout units. The transfer order was not posted and
therefore went unnoticed to men of the regiment who continued to wear the blue and white seahorse patch of the
Philippine Department, rather than the red and gold Carabao (water buffalo) patch of the Philippine Division.
"Recollection Letters", W.H.Garleb, Pvt, H Coy, 31st Inf Rgt. (Meixsel Collection, James Madison University, Harrisonburg, VA.)

Other fun stuff is a good description of the troops weapons. Again from the Meixsel Collection,
The Antitank Company received its guns in April 1941. They included four 37mm wheeled guns
and four older British “one-pounders.” Starting with a cadre of one captain, two lieutenants, and 25
enlisted men, the company was reinforced by 60 additional enlisted men in June. Organized in two
platoons of four gun squads each, the company had an authorized strength of 180 officers and men, a
strength it never reached. Eight Dodge weapons carriers towed the guns and carried the crews. A
command car, a supply truck, and a kitchen truck rounded out the company’s transportation.

The photos show the M1916 IG, not the QF 1-Pdr MkII, although it may have used the Brit MkII common shell (a base fused SAP projectile) as ammo.
Great stuff !!

Items like this are why I love reading the forums . The knowledge that some of you have is amazing. I thank you guy's for sharing.

More cool stuff. Matt sent me a copy of a paper written for The Combined Arms Regular Course at the Army Staff College, in 1946, by a Philippine Army Major who participated in the events, on the organization and operational deployment of the Constabulary immediately pre-war and during the Bataan campaign. Woof !!

Ok, till 1936 they were under Dept of Interior. Then they were transferred to Dept of Defense, where they were known as the Constabulary Division (of the PA). Again the term is misleading, because context clearly suggests division in the sense of “portion”, not an operational entity. This didn’t work out since the newly created replacement National Police couldn’t do the job, so back to Interior they went. So on Dec.8, 1941 (PI Item Time), the Constabulary was an adjunct of the Army for personnel and administration but under the operational control of the Secretary of the Interior.

They were organized as ‘companys’ and assigned to ‘stations’ (law enforcement districts) and given the ‘station’ name. Some stations had one company, others had several, including air components. More than one company at a station was termed a battalion (whether two or six). Company organization depended on the needs of the ‘station’ and so was varied, but generally 3 officers and 94 enlisted. According to the Major, a table of authorized strengths and equipment was published annually, for each territorial District, by HQ Philippine Constabulary. These must still exist in a musty basement somewhere. Up to us and our Filipino friends to get at them.

Constabulary was light infantry in the strict sense of the term, but the provincial stations often had MGs, mortars, even aircraft on the books. The Constabularyman was a military jack-of-all-trades. Their marching song says “infantry, cavalry, artillery, engineer”. When they weren’t fighting insurgents, they were building roads, bridges, hospitals, and the like. But first and foremost the operational function of the Constabulary was as a law enforcement agency. Just think of SWAT units, with carbines, in khaki shirts and jeans, and you get the idea (oh, and cocoanut fiber helmets, can’t forget those).

Well, that’s the background. From Jose, Hurley, Waldrup, Dioquito, and Ramas. Next up is their operational organization and deployment.

Ciao. John

If you want to know a little bit about the Scouts.........

The American Army’s initial involvement with training indigenous troops in the Philippines turned out to be one of its longest running and most unique. From 1899 to 1902, a state of war existed in the Philippine Islands as a revolutionary army under Emilio Aguinaldo battled for independence against American troops who vanquished the Spanish garrison of the Archipelago. This was the war of the Philippine Insurrection, which began after the Battle of Manila on 4 February 1899. Following the example of U.S. Army commanders in making use of the services of friendly Native Americans during the Indian wars, Filipinos from various tribes were employed in a wide variety of capacities, to include guides, interpreters, boatmen, teamsters, and trackers.

A letter from 1st Lt. Matthew A. Batson of the 4th Cavalry dated 16 July 1899 provides the earliest official record of any proposal to employ Filipinos as armed scouts. American soldiers, particularly mounted troops like Batson’s unit, often encountered significant delays when moving cross country due to a lack of suitable bridges. Lieutenant Batson wanted to hire expert native boatmen capable of building a hasty bridge using native canoes to provide U.S. units with the capability to cross the innumerable streams encountered when patrolling. In his proposal, Lieutenant Batson recommended arming the native boatmen so they could protect themselves against unexpected insurgent attack.

Maj. Gen. Henry W. Lawton, the 1st Division commanding general, accepted Batson’s proposal. General Lawton then requested War Department permission to form a company of 100 armed Macabebe scouts. Their earlier willingness to fight for Spain, which marked them for retaliation by other Filipinos, attested to their remaining loyal to the Americans. Convinced of the concept’s worth, Lawton directed Batson to begin forming several units of indigenous troops even before an initial response arrived from Washington. On 10 September 1899, Lieutenant Batson organized the first company of Macabebe Scouts, followed eleven days later by a second company. Three more company-sized units were created in October after permission arrived from the War Department to create several units. The men were considered as civilian employees of the Quartermaster Department, paid from civil funds, and officered by personnel temporarily detached from the U.S. Regular Army.

Most of the initial group of native scouts had served with the Spanish colonial army, which meant they were fairly well trained and disciplined. Their utility as boatmen proven in combat, the U.S. Army decided to create a native cavalry unit to augment American mounted patrols. On 3 April 1900, President William McKinley authorized the creation of a Filipino cavalry squadron under Lieutenant Batson. In a move to encourage other regular officers to serve with the native scouts, Batson received a temporary boost in grade to Major, U.S. Volunteers. On 24 May 1900, Maj. Gen. Arthur MacArthur, the Philippine Division’s commanding general, issued General Order No. 25 authorizing the formation of a cavalry battalion of four troops, each with a maximum of 120 men, engaged to serve until 30 June 1901 unless sooner discharged. Between May and December 1900, a company of Ilocano native scouts was also formed in northern Luzon, spurring MacArthur to modify General Order No. 25 in order to establish a fixed uniform rate of pay and allowances, declaring the scouts subject to military discipline, guaranteeing them regular rations, and stipulating that pay and allowances would come from public civil funds.

The utility of the scout concept was soon proven under fire, thus setting the stage for the formation of additional units. In late January 1901, authority was given for an additional battalion of Macabebe Native Scouts, a battalion of Cagayan Native Scouts, and a second company of Ilocano Native Scouts. MacArthur also approved using Native Scouts against insurgents operating in the Department of Southern Luzon. The Native Scout initiative received legislative recognition on 2 February 1901 when Congress retroactively authorized President McKinley to enlist Filipinos into the service of the U.S. Army as scouts. The bill permitted scouts to be organized into companies, squadrons, and battalions led by non-commissioned and commissioned officers selected from the ranks of the Regular Army. Duty with indigenous troops offered a powerful career incentive for non-commissioned officers, who were authorized to be promoted to lieutenant rank while serving with the scouts. In addition, regular officers were formally authorized to be promoted one rank while commanding scout units. The total number of “enlisted men in said native organizations shall not exceed twelve thousand,” which also counted toward the enlisted strength of the U.S. Army.

Volunteer units in the Philippines were mustered out on 3 July 1901, a development which led to Volunteer officers with the Native Scouts being replaced with Regular officers. The changeover sparked yet another reorganization of scout units by the Commanding General, Department of Northern Luzon. The new directive authorized a mounted scout battalion of four companies, the Lepanto Native scouts with ten numbered companies, the Cagayan Native scouts with four companies, the Macabebe Native Scouts with seven companies, and the Ilocano Native Scouts with seven companies. The companies were capped at 50 men apiece for the Lepanto Scouts and 100 men for the other units. Each company was authorized two U.S. lieutenants. All of the Filipinos were expected to sign a collective contract stating, “We the undersigned do severally agree that we will well and faithfully serve the United States of America as scouts in the Philippine Native Scouts for the period of six months unless sooner discharged.” Beginning on 1 October 1901, Native Scouts entering the service of the United States did so for a formal three year enlistment. Rather than paying them using insular department funds, their pay would now come from Regular Army appropriations.

In early 1904, the U.S. Army created the 1st Provisional Battalion of Native Scouts, consisting of a company each of Ilocanos, Visayans, Tagalogs, and Macabebes, for special duty at the Louisiana Purchase Exposition at St. Louis, Missouri. Under the command of Maj. Frank de L. Carrington, the 434-man unit sailed from Manila on 15 February, arriving at St. Louis on 17 April after a train trip across the Rocky Mountains. Maj. William H. Johnston, who assumed command from Carrington soon afterward, supervised the scouts during the summer and fall as they entertained crowds with drill exhibitions at the 47-acre Philippine exhibit. Although the scouts received the same wages as American soldiers while in the United States, 137 of them declined to reenlist when their terms expired that fall. These personnel were sent back to the Philippines in late September. Major Johnston’s battalion then took part in President Theodore Roosevelt’s inauguration in January 1905 before departing for the Philippines.

Upon its return to Manila, the 1st Provisional Battalion discovered that several major changes were occurring. The first involved redesignating Native Scout units as Philippine Scouts. In addition to the new title, all separate companies were being assembled into battalions. Rather than operating as auxiliaries assisting U.S. units during counterinsurgency operations, the Scout units were transitioning into a conventional military force. As a result, the Scouts were assembling on regular military cantonments rather than remaining dispersed in smaller garrisons throughout the islands. This process took time because it also involved the movement of families and recruiting of new personnel from regions near the cantonments. The 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, and 7th Battalions, Philippine Scouts, were organized in February 1905, followed by the 8th Battalion later that year, the 9th, 10th and 11th Battalions in 1908, the 12th Battalion in 1909 and the 13th Battalion in 1914.

With the suppression of most insurgent bands, U.S. Army planners also reoriented the Scout mission to one of defending the Archipelago against external threats. As early as 1906, American planners assumed that Japan posed the most dangerous threat to the Philippines. Manila Bay, a splendid thirty-by-thirty mile harbor on the shores of which sat the capital city and a seaport with excellent commercial infrastructure, represented the most valuable prize for any potential invader of the Philippines. In 1916 an Army-Navy committee proposed that the city and bay should be held as long as possible by local units. The scouts were envisioned to play a major role in this defensive effort as the Philippine garrison awaited reinforcements arrived from the Continental United States.

A select few of the Scouts were also being groomed for leadership roles during this period. While Filipino non-commissioned officers had long been the norm, almost a decade passed before Filipino officers were allowed to serve in Scout units. The first Filipino, Vicente P. Lim, entered West Point in 1910. Two years later, 24-year-old Lt. Estaban B. Dalao became the first Filipino to be commissioned into the Philippine Scouts. Over the next eight years, Dalao was joined by fourteen more Filipinos, two of which graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy and six, to include Lim, from the U.S. Military Academy. Although this initiative provided an upward career path within the Philippine Scouts, Filipinos were rarely provided with meaningful command opportunities.

The American declaration of war against the Central Powers resulted in the Filipino people offering to raise troops to fight for the United States and also pay for the construction of a destroyer and submarine. The Philippine legislature passed a Militia Act on 12 April 1917 authorizing the mustering of a National Guard division. The proposed organization would consist of three infantry regiments, a cavalry troop, two field artillery batteries, and two coast artillery companies. With a few weeks, construction of training camps began as over 25,000 Filipinos volunteered for military service. Yet when the Governor General sought formal authority for his actions, the Chief of the Militia Bureau protested any reference to the unit as a National Guard organization because it really represented “a volunteer organization for war purposes.”

Although the Chief of the Militia Bureau’s reaction might be construed as an exercise in semantics, few within the U.S. Army envisioned a pressing reason to create another Philippine military force given the existence of the Constabulary and Scouts. The fact that a Filipino division had to travel almost ten thousand miles by ship to reach Europe, also influenced the views of a War Department hobbled by shipping shortages as it struggled to transport men and material to France. Despite lack of official sanction, a number of U.S. officers of the Philippine garrison assisted the Governor General’s efforts to organize the new unit. In addition to filling critical staff functions, American troops trained 200 Filipino officer candidates and 100 prospective Filipino non-commissioned officers from late July through mid-September at a camp near Manila.

A lack of legislative approval, rather than War Department misgivings, prevented the U.S. Army from providing more support to the Filipino volunteers. Approval did not come until the U.S. House of Representatives introduced legislation allowing the Philippine volunteer division to be federalized in late 1917. On 26 January 1918, President Wilson proclaimed that the Filipino volunteers could be “organized and called into United States service in the same manner as the National Guard of the States…” However, statutory recognition of the Philippine volunteer division did not make it a part of the National Guard system of the United States. The administration of the troops, which remained solely with the Philippine government, did not involve the Militia Bureau.

A week after hostilities ended in Europe, President Woodrow Wilson signed a proclamation calling the Infantry Division, Philippine National Guard, into Federal service for one month’s training beginning on 20 November. Nine days later the State Department notified the War Department of the President’s proclamation. On 29 November, the War Department formally notified the Governor General that the division would be called into service at reduced strength. Meanwhile, in accordance with the President’s proclamation, the Philippine National Guard division had already begun assembling. Although the division mustered out on 19 December, it’s members continued training for two more months before the unit formally disbanded.

Although the Filipino volunteer unit had encountered many obstacles, World War One resulted in significant changes within the Philippine Scouts. Roughly 14,400 U.S. troops, of which 5,733 were Scouts, were stationed in the Philippines when America joined the Allied powers. Within a few weeks, many American soldiers were transferred from the Philippines to join units destined for service in France. By April 1918, the strength of the U.S. garrison fell to 9,300 officers and men. To offset the reduced number of U.S. troops, President Woodrow Wilson authorized an additional four battalions and eighteen separate companies of Philippines scouts. The increased force structure resulted in Scout authorizations increasing to 314 officers and 8,129 enlisted personnel.

In addition to creating new Scout units, the existing formations were reorganized into four provisional infantry regiments, an artillery regiment, a field signal battalion, and an engineer battalion. Twelve of the new separate companies were used to form the headquarters, supply, and machinegun companies of the provisional infantry regiments. The remaining six companies provided the artillery regiment with a headquarters and supply component and the manpower for field signal and engineer units. The reorganization marked a major milestone in the evolution of the Scouts as they were transformed from a light infantry force to an all-arms organization with organic artillery, machinegun, engineer, and signal units.

Although the cessation of hostilities on 11 November 1918 led to the dissolution of the 3d Philippine Regiment and signal unit, another eighteen months passed before additional force reductions were mandated. The delay in part reflected the post-war debate over the size and organization of the United States Army. The War Department wanted the ability to rapidly expand in the event of a future conflict by creating a robust standing army and mandating Universal Military Training for all male citizens. That proposal, however, gained little support in Congress because no one believed that a major land war would occur for several decades. As a result, Congress capped the U.S. Army at 17,726 officers and 280,000 enlisted men when it passed the National Defense Act of 4 June 1920. The act also created the Army of the United States consisting of the Regular Army, National Guard, and Organized Reserves.

The new legislation posed a challenge because the Scouts were not Regulars, National Guard, or Reservists. As a result, the War Department decided to integrate them within the Regular Army by transferring the colors of four regiments slated for inactivation to the Scouts. The 43d, 45th, 57th, and 62d Infantry were thus chosen to be sent to the Philippines. All four had been formed in 1917, but had not seen combat duty in France. A number of the officers from each regiment would accompany their colors and records to the Philippines. The influx of new officers proved necessary because the National Defense Act also had a significant impact within the commissioned ranks of the Philippine Scouts. It stipulated that all officers in the Scouts holding U.S. citizenship had to be reintegrated into the Regular Army. Of the 188 officers who applied, only 62 were eligible for an equivalent Regular Army commission. The applications of 95 officers were rejected while 31 others withdrew their paperwork or retired from active duty. Most of the officers failing to meet the eligibility requirements were retained while the Adjutant General sought alternative methods to reintegrate them.

The officers and colors of the incoming U.S. regiments began disembarking at Manila on 3 December 1920. With the stroke of a pen, the 1st Philippine Infantry (Provisional) became the 45th Infantry (Philippine Scouts) soon afterward while the 2d Philippine Regiment (Provisional) became the 57th Infantry (Philippine Scouts). In January 1921, the Philippine Department formed the 62d Infantry (Philippine Scouts) using personnel from the 4th Philippine Regiment (Provisional). Two months later, the separate 2d, 8th, and 13th Battalions were combined to form the 43d Infantry (Philippine Scouts). In May 1921, the War Department redesignated the 1st Philippine Field Artillery (Mountain) as the 25th Field Artillery (Philippine Scouts). That same month, the provisional Philippine engineer units were formed into the 1st Battalion, 14th Engineers (Philippine Scouts). The Philippine Division, consisting of a mix of U.S. and Scout units, was then activated at Fort William McKinley on 8 June 1921.

ORIGINAL: Symon
Next up is their operational organization and deployment.

And here it is.

The 1st and 2nd regiments were formed as provisional regiments from the 4000 new recruits authorized by the July expansion. Looks like Trota Jose and Mandeep Singh were pretty much right on about the regiments being 102 officers and 1800 enlisted at full establishment, but that would also mean absorbing about 2000 existing Constabularymen as cadre and filling up the TO with the recruits. Makes a lot of sense, if they really were at full establishment but, even so, them’s some mighty small battalions.

The 4th (the 3rd was sent to Mindanao) was an ad-hoc, spur of the moment, move. During the retreat into Bataan, the Constabulary CG decided to rally all the withdrawing troopers he could get in contact with and have them assemble at San Fernando, Pampaugh, on Dec. 31. The troops he collected came from North and Central Luzon, and the area around Manila. A tentative combat organization was set up and a provisional regiment created within about five hours, from 0100 to 0600, 31 Dec. (this is expressly stated as the Major’s recollection, so he was obviously there and a part of it as a junior officer).

In the meantime, the CG “proceeded to Bataan, explained the situation to the Luzon Force Commander, and was directed to form a Division and report to CG II Corps for his mission. In the afternoon of the 31st, the Constabulary troops at San Fernando proceeded by infiltration to Bataan, with orders to assemble at Balanja. By 0500, 1 Jan all troops were in their respective assembly areas. The C.G, formed his staff, assumed command of the 1st and 2nd Philippine Constabulary Regiments, and with the 4th Rgt (which was formed at San Fernando the day previous) and a provisional regiment combat team composed of ROTC cadets (mainly a Heavy Weapons Reinforcements Bn) made operational the 2nd Regular Division. One Bn of FA.(75 men) was attached to the 2nd Division to give it the necessary supporting long range fire. ” [75 men could be a typo. He could have meant 75mm. A Bn is 8 guns. 75 men could barely operate 2. Although, at that time, 2 guns just might be what constituted a Bn. Who knows.]

Kind of interesting that they moved into Bataan by infiltration. It was 31 Dec after all. Suggests not much in the way of support weapons, transport, or even medical or communications assets.

Ciao. JWE