Matrix Games Forums

This game teaches you something they drilled into us at Squadron Officer's School:

Think in terms of enemy capability, not enemy intentions.

Not doing so is what led the IJN to Midway. Whenever you fall into the trap of needing to read minds for your "plan" to work, you've already lost.

I was playing the "Raven 21 is down" scenario, and all that crap they taught us really came into play. When setting up my Missions, I found myself preparing for what I thought the Enemy could do, rather than trying to guess what they would do.

The game (re-)taught me this lesson over the course of playing a few scenarios.

I love it when a wargame responds properly to good, real-world operational technique. It's...validating.

I'm seeing a possible learning opportunity here.

So I was wondering.... for those, like me, who have not attended squadron officers school [;)]

Could you give us specific examples of how you applied that concept in this scenario?

What traps you may have otherwise fallen into and how this helped you avoid them?

Insights appreciated...

JD

Yeah, sure, I'll give it a try.

Basically, I was initially almost entirely focused on the Air/Naval threat, based on the briefing. Then I got to thinking: But they do have ground assets, right?

This brought back to the admonition about assessing capability rather than intention. There's no mention or suggestion of a ground intervention, but they could do that.

This led me to creating what I thought, at the time, might be an entirely superfluous CAS mission (ASuW Ground) using my VTOL assets with the mud-moving equipment to protect my CSAR. But I did it anyway, mostly just out of principle. This isn't really a "game" - it's more like a sandbox. There's no point "playing" unless you try to do it right. And if I were in command, I'd definitely have my guys some CAS on-hand just in case the Somali's decided to get frisky and ruin our day with some of that Soviet armor they got for Christmas (Ramadan, whatever lol).

Suffice to say, this "in principle" move pretty much saved the whole deal. And that's what I like most about CMANO. If the scenario designer does it right, then you can apply whatever you know about this subject and generally get results. It will also teach you never to assume that you know where, how and when the enemy will strike. Pretty soon, you'll discover that trying to do this is like playing the stock market or betting in Vegas. It's just damn hard to guess right more often than not. Better to have a plan that retains enough flexibility to deal with what the enemy could do, rather than trying to guess what they will do.

So, I felt sorta validated and it was fun to use something I learned a long time ago. If you ever want a perfect example of how not to think this way, look at these 2 historical examples of "I believe the enemy will do this, because if they don't, my plan is crap":

1. 1944 AG North Ukraine. Hitler needed the Russians to strike in the South for his plan to work, so he just assumed they would. This is actually less about trying to guess intentions, and more about just plain wishful thinking. But it still applies. Die Russen didn't cooperate with Der Idiot.

2. 1942 Midway. At every step of the Japanese plan, they absolutely required the Americans to do exactly what was predicted (aka "guessed"). It's stunning that no one objected even after wargames showed the high possibility of a CV ambush if even one or 2 things went the wrong way.

Wasn't that the same for Normandy?
I just remember from the movie Longest Day the Germans had a wargame that was won by a guy who invaded Normandy. They said: "Well done but completely unrealistic, the enemy will land in Calais of course."

I had a similar situation in the scenario Green Tide, where the briefing said: "Emcon: let's have a ball, let them know we're here and here to stay!"
Why would you do that?

Sometimes I think I overplan for the scope of CMANO. For Operation Lighting Strike I usually have airborne and ground spares and even deceptive refuel tracks to keep OPSSEC on my route to targets. Maybe I make it too complex.

One way to find out: Try it without those measures and see if it makes a difference.

This is really in the hands of the scenario designer. I'm confident, based on what I've seen thus far, that a scenario can be designed which would reward this sort of thing appropriately. Then again, there are probably some situations where such complexity isn't required - even if it were the Real Deal.

The thing about Reality is, of course, that you never really know for sure what kind of situation you're in. The best scenarios will recreate that uncertainty. I love surprises - as long as it's just a simulation.

ORIGINAL: Russian Heel

Sometimes I think I overplan for the scope of CMANO. For Operation Lighting Strike I usually have airborne and ground spares and even deceptive refuel tracks to keep OPSSEC on my route to targets. Maybe I make it too complex.

That's pretty awesome. Being a former wing nut and naval enthusiast, I tend to see things from 30,000 feet and leagues distant. [;)]

Thanks guys.

And a hearty well done to the game's designers/builders as well... obviously.

JD

Hmm speaking of wargames, wasn´t there an exercise in the 30´s in the pacific where an USN carrier fleet made a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor? They wouldn't do that, would they?

ORIGINAL: Skyhigh

Wasn't that the same for Normandy?
I just remember from the movie Longest Day the Germans had a wargame that was won by a guy who invaded Normandy. They said: "Well done but completely unrealistic, the enemy will land in Calais of course."

I had a similar situation in the scenario Green Tide, where the briefing said: "Emcon: let's have a ball, let them know we're here and here to stay!"
Why would you do that?

By the same token, US Navy Carriers in many FLEETEXs have been sunk or heavily damaged, yet the US has designed most of its strategy around the idea that they are invincible, and on several occasions has even changed the rules of wargames to prevent their sinking. Word to the wise in this game is do not make that assumption... reminded of a line from the movie Titanic... in reply to "But this ship can't sink.."--- " Aye, she's made of iron..., she can sink, and she will....."

Probably the FIRST military technothriller...written in 1925

The Great Pacific War: A History of the American-Japanese Campaign of 1931-1933

I read this a long time ago...if i remember right, the author correctly predicted a Japanese sneak attack, but it was not at Pearl Harbor. Also in the book, the Japanese make a move on the Panama Canal.

Hmm interesting stuff, will put this book on my list, but my list is long....pray i live up to retirement age[:D]

There are too many such stories where ambition of some top-brass overrules common sense, they are interesting though, especially for those (few if any) who are willing to learn from errors of the past.

There is an Admiralty Trilogy module based on that book if you play miniatures.

http://www.clashofarms.com/files/Bywate ... _2012).pdf

Guys, I can tell you from my exposure to the Military that certain parts are just like your local DMV: Lot's of people who just want a stable paycheck, benefits, and no way to get fired. This is not true of the guys at the sharp end, so let's get that real damn clear.

But the real issue is exemplified by a meeting we had once re: a rather brilliant MSgt who was in trouble for complaining about poor maintenance techniques (think I'm remembering that right). During the meeting, I said "Well, this is the organization that court-martialed Billy Mitchell".

No one present had the slightest idea what I was talking about, including a couple of full-birds. The organization didn't know its own history. I think the problem with a lot of militaries that haven't been in a real stand-up fight for a long time is that people with no real passion for fighting/winning/blowing shi* up tend to rise to the top. And nothing, not even reality, is gonna get in their way. If they have to cheat on some "stupid wargame", so be it.

I saw so many examples of just rampant careerism, where your ability (or willingness - Jesus!) to organize the Squadron Bake Sale was considered far more important than your knowledge or expertise at ripping the shi* out of the enemy. I hope to Hell we never have to fight someone who's even close to our level of expertise and technology.

You know, it reminds me of the Roman Army: They created a legionary system that was so good that any idiot could win with it. They did it via relentless training, which is exactly what we do. This is very smart - I just wish I had seen more people who were really into the history/art/science of warfighting during my time. Unfortunately, what I mainly saw were guys worried about BS like their squadrons avg fitness score and how much was raised in a damn raffle. Meanwhile, they had nearly zero interest in the actual job - which boils down to killing people efficiently by the way.

Another historical example: Read some of the reports from Japanese Army air force commanders who were stationed around Lae in New Guinea. Were these guys worried about what was going on around them, that they were losing and were about to starve to death in the jungle? Nope, they're talking about things like "Well, we didn't get this or that spare part" or "Not enough gas arrived this week" - that sort of thing. I'm not saying that these things aren't important. In fact, they're vital for day-to-day Ops. But the problem occurs when everyone - even those in command - starts thinking like this. Suddenly, you've got a body with no head.

Like we always used to say: A fish rots from the head down, just like a Command structure. Man, I saw plenty of that. Thank God our pilots are so incredible...

ORIGINAL: kondor999
Guys, I can tell you from my exposure to the Military that certain parts are just like your local DMV: Lot's of people who just want a stable paycheck, benefits, and no way to get fired. This is not true of the guys at the sharp end, so let's get that real damn clear.

I was a senior NCO at the sharp end, in fact I was the sharp end. It doesn't get much sharper than tankin'. Sadly I must admit there were NCOs and officers in my career field that were just as you described, but after Iraq kicked off a lot of them left service, but you had those who could weasel their way into some staff slot for a deployment and do their line time strictly stateside. You have those guys everywhere in every career field military or civilian. I was never anywhere other than on the line so I don't know how prevalent it is elsewhere in comparison, however.

ORIGINAL: kondor999

....

No one present had the slightest idea what I was talking about, including a couple of full-birds. The organization didn't know its own history. I think the problem with a lot of militaries that haven't been in a real stand-up fight for a long time is that people with no real passion for fighting/winning/blowing shi* up tend to rise to the top. And nothing, not even reality, is gonna get in their way. If they have to cheat on some "stupid wargame", so be it.

...

A long time ago, I was an umpire in a couple of professional wargames for DoD and saw what I considered to be the rigging of results. While my contempt for such activity knows no bounds, I would add this caveat: sometimes professionals mess with the results because what they are trying to test with a wargame is something other than strategy and tactics. A wargame may be used to test operational concepts, communications procedures, interoperatibilty, etc. If a tactical result interferes with what you are trying to test with the game, there is nothing wrong in those cases with going back and doing it over again (although I would certainly make a note of the result and at least footnote it in the final report). Additionally, some DoD games are incredibly expensive. To completely ruin a game one day into play because a side has done something bone-headed makes no sense. Better to reset and do it again (although with a note in the final report that this was necessary and why).

I have learned that no field of work or profession has an overabundance of talent available and every organisation has its share of Idiots,
Buckpassers, Yesmen, Suckholes, Careerists and Doghumpers. The problem is the skill set to succeed in a peacetime armed forces and rise to
positions of authority are not the same set of skills required of a fighting leader. This is amplified when a part of the organisation at
the sharp end is fighting a real war when the armed force itself is at "peace". For every Patton there is a Fredendall for every Slim a Percival.
Things are kinda screwy when you don't know if the war is fought on Capitol Hill, the Pentagon or in Afghanistan. We can all agree it is the fault
of the left/right or the right/left. Finger pointing and blaming are a fine art.
Millenium Challenge

Those are excellent points well worth considering.

As a footnote, I was in the rear with the gear. My profound thanks go out to everyone who wasn't, and I wish we'd done a better job supporting you. A lot of us tried and paid for it. After I nearly got an Article 15 for telling a fellow officer to "Get off your ass and do something" in an email (stupid, right?), I knew it was time to move on.

I'll say this. Everyone with a star was, to man/woman, an amazing officer. They actually weren't the problem. It was all the middle-management "yes men" that screwed things up.

Just my little opinion, and I'll be quiet now

ORIGINAL: CV60

ORIGINAL: kondor999

....

No one present had the slightest idea what I was talking about, including a couple of full-birds. The organization didn't know its own history. I think the problem with a lot of militaries that haven't been in a real stand-up fight for a long time is that people with no real passion for fighting/winning/blowing shi* up tend to rise to the top. And nothing, not even reality, is gonna get in their way. If they have to cheat on some "stupid wargame", so be it.

...

A long time ago, I was an umpire in a couple of professional wargames for DoD and saw what I considered to be the rigging of results. While my contempt for such activity knows no bounds, I would add this caveat: sometimes professionals mess with the results because what they are trying to test with a wargame is something other than strategy and tactics. A wargame may be used to test operational concepts, communications procedures, interoperatibilty, etc. If a tactical result interferes with what you are trying to test with the game, there is nothing wrong in those cases with going back and doing it over again (although I would certainly make a note of the result and at least footnote it in the final report). Additionally, some DoD games are incredibly expensive. To completely ruin a game one day into play because a side has done something bone-headed makes no sense. Better to reset and do it again (although with a note in the final report that this was necessary and why).

'Lions led by Donkeys' I haven't served in the forces but in law enforcement we have same here it makes me sick some times. Fiddle stats, implement idiotic plans to get promoted, it goes on and on.....[8|]

Just for the record, I agree with every single word you wrote. Well said.

I need to learn how to do the whole multi-quote reply thing. Looks like I'm spamming my own thread

ORIGINAL: danlongman

I have learned that no field of work or profession has an overabundance of talent available and every organisation has its share of Idiots,
Buckpassers, Yesmen, Suckholes, Careerists and Doghumpers. The problem is the skill set to succeed in a peacetime armed forces and rise to
positions of authority are not the same set of skills required of a fighting leader. This is amplified when a part of the organisation at
the sharp end is fighting a real war when the armed force itself is at "peace". For every Patton there is a Fredendall for every Slim a Percival.
Things are kinda screwy when you don't know if the war is fought on Capitol Hill, the Pentagon or in Afghanistan. We can all agree it is the fault
of the left/right or the right/left. Finger pointing and blaming are a fine art.
Millenium Challenge