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I know nothing about the Civil War but I found this: source, the Washington Post, Gene Thorp, a cartographer.

http://live.washingtonpost.com/civil-war-120305.html

My question is, if Lee did indeed say this, was he being sincere or satirical? And I am thinking about something like this: "of course he was great... had he continued they [the Union] would have never made it to Richmond! Please, stay in charge!"

Or another possibility: maybe to downplay heroes like Grant, etc.

So sincere or satirical?

Difficult to say. I think McClellan was bad general, but I also think if McClellan had not been in charge, Union AotP would never become such a fighting force. Much of the bad reputation he got was from the fact he was politically opposed to Lincoln. And since Lincoln is deified, someone has to be the scapegoat. He was a bad general, but not as bad as many Union Civil war generals. For example, I do not know why Butler, Banks and McDowell have better strategic rating while in fact were poorer generals than him.

McClellan was too ate up with the love his men showed him. It screwed with his head and made him so afraid of getting his force killed that he was afraid to use it. In short he let his feelings interfere with his generaling. He was too cautious and cautious generals don't win battles - at least not offensive battles/campaigns.

It would not be surprising if Lee thought McClellan was the best. On paper he probably was. In training and peace time exercises he shined. Didn't translate into a war time general though. If Mac had had the aggressiveness of Grant and the mental toughness to accept casualties it is very possible that the Union could have wrapped the south up and put it to bed in '62.

Lee understood McClellan. He said after the guy was dismissed something along the lines of "They keep doing this til they get one I don't understand."
 
While it can be claimed that he created the AotP, his two campaigns showed that he really didn't know how to use it.
 
He would always claim he was out numbered, (200,000 Rebels.....) He would keep large numbers of men out of battle, yet claim he had no fresh troops.
 
His messiah like complex, his contempt for the civilian leadership certainly did him no favors. (Just imagine what would of happened if Stanton actually read the line in one message that said he , Stanton, did his best to sacrifice the army.)

ORIGINAL: Aurelian

Lee understood McClellan. He said after the guy was dismissed something along the lines of "They keep doing this til they get one I don't understand."

While it can be claimed that he created the AotP, his two campaigns showed that he really didn't know how to use it.

He would always claim he was out numbered, (200,000 Rebels.....) He would keep large numbers of men out of battle, yet claim he had no fresh troops.

His messiah like complex, his contempt for the civilian leadership certainly did him no favors. (Just imagine what would of happened if Stanton actually read the line in one message that said he , Stanton, did his best to sacrifice the army.)

McClellan

I highly recommend a series of C-SPAN ACW discussions and lectures:

http://c-spanvideo.org/program/McClell (Images of Generals McClellan and Lee)
http://c-spanvideo.org/program/Clellan (General McClellan and Colonel Key)

They also had a good one about Braxton Bragg (http://c-spanvideo.org/program/Stones)

Klink, Oberst

ORIGINAL: Ace1

For example, I do not know why Butler, Banks and McDowell have better strategic rating while in fact were poorer generals than him.

Well, in the case of Butler, I think he deserves a better strategic rating simply because he DID something (North Carolina coast and New Orleans, for two) where Mac couldn't even be coaxed into battle (it took a presidential order to make him move). McDowell moved his army, too, although his coordination of that army left much to be desired.

We need to keep in mind that strategic rating has more to do with activation than anything, and Mac simply would not activate.

Mac was an excellent general in many ways and Lee recognized that. He was a top notched administrator and built the Army of the Potomac from the ground up. He was an excellent strategic planner and logistician as well. In many ways, he was also operationally gifted. His problem was that he was more afraid of losing than he was interested in winning. He was unwilling to take the risks that a general must at times for fear that he could lose.

He just wouldn't "put the pedal down". Everything had to be perfect so as to reduce risk. Mac certainly was not incompetent and did very well in the days/battles leading up to Antietam through the passes. There is a lot for Lee to admire in this very traditional general.
Don't forget though, Lee could be arrogant...as could any general, and it's easy to admire someone you have beaten while disdaining one that had beaten you. Grant had many of Macs abilities with the addition of being willing to force the fight.

Mikeck, some good points, for sure. But, some of the notes you make (IMHO) insist that Mac be identified as a poor general. Yes, good administrator; yes, built the AOP from a beaten rabble into a fighting force; yes, a fair (not sure good is right) logistician -- but these alone don't make a good general. Mac's unwillingness to take risk is exactly why he makes a good administrator, but not a general. As I said, IMHO.

McClellan did well in West Virginia against Lee. My understanding is that he had better subordinates though.
 
 

Lee had Floyd. McClellan had Rosy who did all of the real work.

Floyd did what he did best, run at the first sign of trouble. This got Lee called back to Richmond.

Rosy did the work and Mac got the credit. About all there is to tell.

Lee was being very sincere. McClellan was consistently successful in throttling Lee's strategic options and outgeneralling him. No other commander, including Grant, was.

Consider this:

"There was no Union general whom we so much dreaded as much as McClellan. We would always tell when he was in command by the way the Union troops were handled, and the number of our dead and wounded. We received the blows, and we knew who dealt the heaviest ones. We were sorry when we heard he had been restored to command, after we had defeated Pope, and were glad when we was retired.... [McClellan] had, as we thought, no equal."

- unattributed Republican Confederate General (almost certainly James Longstreet) to Hugh McCulloch, 1874

ORIGINAL: Aurelian
He would keep large numbers of men out of battle, yet claim he had no fresh troops.

Did he?

This claim is made about Antietam, but does not stand up. 6th Corps and much of 5th Corps were dispatched to reinforce Sumner. When the crisis erupts McClellan has a single brigade, Barnes' of Morell's division, in reserve.

ORIGINAL: 67th Tigers

ORIGINAL: Aurelian
He would keep large numbers of men out of battle, yet claim he had no fresh troops.

Did he?

This claim is made about Antietam, but does not stand up. 6th Corps and much of 5th Corps were dispatched to reinforce Sumner. When the crisis erupts McClellan has a single brigade, Barnes' of Morell's division, in reserve.

Yes it does hold up. And not just at Antietam.

ORIGINAL: Aurelian

ORIGINAL: 67th Tigers

ORIGINAL: Aurelian
He would keep large numbers of men out of battle, yet claim he had no fresh troops.

Did he?

This claim is made about Antietam, but does not stand up. 6th Corps and much of 5th Corps were dispatched to reinforce Sumner. When the crisis erupts McClellan has a single brigade, Barnes' of Morell's division, in reserve.

Yes it does hold up. And not just at Antietam.

That's an interesting supposition. I, in fact, stated the one formation McClellan kept in reserve (Barnes' Brigade). Now, can you show me another brigade kept back in reserve bearing in mind:

1st, 12th, 2nd and 6th Corps were all committed to battle by McClellan to the attack on the Dunker Church Plateau initially under Hooker, then Sumner.

After much prodding, 9th Corps, Sykes' division and much of the cavalry attacked over the southern and middle bridges.

The main body of Morell's division (except Barnes' brigade) was sent to reinforce Sumner, but recalled later.

Couch's division didn't arrive until the next morning, and Humphrey's division straggled in the whole of the afternoon.

Despite a great opportunity to crack Lee's defense at Bloody Lane, Sumner ordered Franklin's VI Corps not to advance. Franklin, who had a better grasp of the situation, appealed to McClellan, who upheld Sumner. So Franklin went nowhere.

Later, Sykes, of Porter's V Corps, wanted to attack. It intrigued McClellan, but after a brief conversation with Fitz John "Remember, General, I command the last reserve of the last Army of the Republic." Porter, he changed his mind.

And then we had the all the cavalry massed in the center doing nothing. Maybe the young Napoleon was hoping for a grand cavalry charge at the right time a la Old Napoleon.

About 22,000 infantry and 3,500 cavalry, doing little if anything.

In making his battle against great odds to save the Republic, General McClellan had committed barely 50,000 infantry and artillerymen to the contest. A third of his army did not fire a shot. Even at that, his men repeatedly drove the Army of Northern Virginia to the brink of disaster, feats of valor entirely lost on a commander thinking of little beyond staving off his own defeat.

— Stephen W. Sears, Landscape Turned Red

ORIGINAL: Aurelian

Despite a great opportunity to crack Lee's defense at Bloody Lane, Sumner ordered Franklin's VI Corps not to advance. Franklin, who had a better grasp of the situation, appealed to McClellan, who upheld Sumner. So Franklin went nowhere.

No-one ever ordered the attack on the Sunken Road. Sumner had lost control of two of his divisions and they ran head on into DH Hill and Anderson.

Franklin was dispatched to Sumner and his lead unit (Hancock's Brigade) came into line just in time to stem a Confederate counterattack who saw Sumner's gunline with no infantry support, but turned back when seeing an infantry line in place.

After filling in the line, Franklin had two brigades of Slocum's division spare. He proposed a rather idiotic frontal attack at the strongest part of the Confederate line, probably in response to rumours of his cowardice in the Pleasant Valley a few days earlier. It was a dumb proposition, and he wasn't allowed to throw them away. That said, Irwin's Brigade did charge the Dunker Church later in the day and were broken up by artillery alone.

Later, Sykes, of Porter's V Corps, wanted to attack. It intrigued McClellan, but after a brief conversation with Fitz John "Remember, General, I command the last reserve of the last Army of the Republic." Porter, he changed his mind.

The person that gave this story to the Century magazine wasn't there to witness it, Porter said it never happened and both Sykes and McClellan never mentioned it, and the records of McClellan's movements suggest at that time he was still riding back from Sumner's HQ before the Dunker Church. Thus I question this happened.

And then we had the all the cavalry massed in the center doing nothing. Maybe the young Napoleon was hoping for a grand cavalry charge at the right time a la Old Napoleon.

and?

About 22,000 infantry and 3,500 cavalry, doing little if anything.

Delete. Misread something. My bad.

Let's look at numbers and compare two prominent Union generals.

One is vilified, and one is defied. One was cautious, the other one was bold and reckless. Here are their numbers when faced against Lee.

McClellan:
Seven days battles and Maryland Campaign (including Antietam battle)

Forces present Seven days US:
104.000
Forces present Seven days CSA:
92.000
Casualties Seven days US:
16.000
Casualties Seven days CSA:
20.000

Forces present 1st Marlyand invasion:
84.000
Forces present 1st Marlyand invasion CSA:
45.000
Casualties 1st Marlyand invasion US:
15.000
Casualties 1st Marlyand invasion CSA:
14.000

So in total, under Mac US had 31.000 to 34.000 casualties ratio.

Grant:
Forces present Overland Campaign US:
120.000
Forces present Overland Campaign CSA:
64.000
Casualties Overland Campaign US:
55.000
Casualties Overland Campaign CSA:
34.000

So in total, under Grant US had 55.000 to 34.000 casualties ratio. He lost 24.000 more men to inflict same CSA casualties, with bigger force disparity. So, I am firm in my belief Mac was vilified from political reasons, and was not as bad general as republicans portrayed afterwards. He had his flaws, but he was not the worst general of the war his political opponents wanted everyone to believe.

If I could compare it to chess, I would compare him to Karpov, a dull chess player, but one which does not make errors. Not brilliant, but somewhat competent.

In game terms, I personally think Grant is overrated. I think a "6" strategic rating is valid, because he didn't sit on his hands, but his tactical handling during the Overland Campaign in particular left alot to be desired.

McClellan, on the other hand, I think is underrated in the game. A "2" would make more sense, and I would boost his defensive ratings.

Don't get me wrong, Grant is better, but I think there is an unbalance overall

ORIGINAL: Q-Ball

In game terms, I personally think Grant is overrated. I think a "6" strategic rating is valid, because he didn't sit on his hands, but his tactical handling during the Overland Campaign in particular left alot to be desired.

McClellan, on the other hand, I think is underrated in the game. A "2" would make more sense, and I would boost his defensive ratings.

Don't get me wrong, Grant is better, but I think there is an unbalance overall

McClellan is, of course, actually one of the most successful generals of the war. He's derided for less than absolute success in a very short period of time.

Oddly, Grant did sit on his hands a lot. We just skip over it in the narrative of the war. Sometimes Grant moved quickly and decisively, and sometimes he was inert and immovable. Same can be said of McClellan, Meade, Rosecrans and especially Thomas.

In a game, I'm tempted to suggest the player when rolling for Grant was lucky and rolled a string of sixes....