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http://www.mossekongen.no/downloads/200 ... iefing.pdf

Certainly is, but don't forget this part after reading it.

http://web.archive.org/web/20090915183215/http://www.rand.org/news/press/2008/09/25/index.html

OFFICE OF MEDIA RELATIONS
703-413-1100 x5117
and 310-451-6913
media@rand.org


Statement Regarding Media Coverage of F-35 Joint Strike Fighter

Andrew Hoehn, Director of RAND Project Air Force, made the following statement today:

“Recently, articles have appeared in the Australian press with assertions regarding a war game in which analysts from the RAND Corporation were involved. Those reports are not accurate. RAND did not present any analysis at the war game relating to the performance of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, nor did the game attempt detailed adjudication of air-to-air combat. Neither the game nor the assessments by RAND in support of the game undertook any comparison of the fighting qualities of particular fighter aircraft.”

There was a long debate here about AA Missiles a while back. I noted this comment in the presentation:

"Since the advent of BVR missiles, 588
air-to-air kills have been recorded by
BVR-equipped forces
–
24 have been BVR*"

I think this shows that the original Command low pk for BVR is not far off.

To me, the whole point of that article is that we will be fighting someone else's turf. And we will not have every available asset. One thing that seemed to get very little mention was Taiwan's air force. I know it doesn't have the capabilities of the USAF/USN, but it is no slouch. I also noted they assume no navy coverage for the SAM and fighter forces. Not sure why.

Well, you have to take the report in the context it was meant for. It is primarily about basing and supply, with worst case scenarios, not accurately simulating the battle part for the USAF, so it's not factoring in the Navy much.

The BVR figures have been found to be skewd, they aren't factoring in the initial purpose of firing a BVR missile in many real world cases was to put the target on the defensive, even if the missile was fired outside of the optimum Pk zone.

It is also important to look at the authors background. RAND does a lot of studies, many of which do not have anything to do with military matters or tactics.

Regarding what's missing in the 2020 scenario: one commenter mentioned some of the following:

* Leaving out US Navy submarine support is a mistake.
* Leaving out theater-ABM support is a big mistake.
* Leaving out offensive lasers is a probable mistake.
* Taking out our air-to-air refueling is a mistake.
* Leaving out help from Japan might be a mistake.
* Using so few F22′s is a likely mistake.
* Having no ballistic missile support from the US is a likely mistake.
* Leaving out the B3 is a likely mistake. At least a few will be available.
* Clubbing baby seals is always a mistake as eventually momma seal will get you. - See more at: http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/the-d ... MWAQb.dpuf

Essentially, if you plugged in everything, including Taiwan's assets, and the U.S. Chinese Satellite networks in CMANO, you'll probably have a better idea of the capabilities and challenges and be able to write up a better report on you own. You don't need to rely on a RAND study, the tool is probably in your desktop right now for analysis. [;)]

ORIGINAL: thewood1

There was a long debate here about AA Missiles a while back. I noted this comment in the presentation:

"Since the advent of BVR missiles, 588
air-to-air kills have been recorded by
BVR-equipped forces
–
24 have been BVR*"

I think this shows that the original Command low pk for BVR is not far off.

To me, the whole point of that article is that we will be fighting someone else's turf. And we will not have every available asset. One thing that seemed to get very little mention was Taiwan's air force. I know it doesn't have the capabilities of the USAF/USN, but it is no slouch. I also noted they assume no navy coverage for the SAM and fighter forces. Not sure why.

I've seen this before. And again I have to wonder whether this is more about ROE than actual performance or capability. Would these numbers hold during an actual all out knock down drag out...?

JD

have to wonder whether this is more about ROE than actual performance or capability. Would these numbers hold during an actual all out knock down drag out...?

ROE is part of the equation, particularly during Vietnam, where the air target had to be visually ID'd plus the older and less reliable BVR capabilites of that timeframe.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1995/DM.htm

The ROEs in place for the air campaign over North Vietnam included restrictions on

where aircraft could fly, what conditions aircraft could attack enemy forces (when they

were considered hostile), and what degree of force could be used both in self-defense and

attack.3 Another part of the ROEs restricted pilots from attacking certain types of targets

that were off limits; some of these were: enemy airfields, SAM sites, power plants, naval

craft in some areas, a 30 mile area around Hanoi, and a 10 mile area around Haiphong.4

The inability to attack certain targets made it difficult to stop the flow of men and material

into South Vietnam, and the requirements to spare North Vietnamese civilians limited the

use of certain types of munitions, such as B-52s and napalm. Until early 1967, in many

instances U.S. pilots were not allowed to engage enemy fighters unless they themselves

had been attacked first.

The recent trend to see, and identify the threat at longer standoff, while also being able to employ BVR weapons at their intended longer ranges changes the equation when factoring in today's capabilities.

Also keep in mind that the majority of BVR klls appear to be non maneuvering aircraft with limited ECM and RWR. Not sure how that translates into head on engagements against modern fighters.

the majority of BVR klls appear to be non maneuvering aircraft with limited ECM and RWR.

Appears to be, and from what I've seen, it's going to continue to be the case. Looking closer at the various engagements in the past, you can't always blame the receiving aircraft's ECM or RWR. Sometimes the firing aircraft simply had systems that make it harder to detect you were even fired on.

Today with IRST, Passive Imaging IR missiles, Aim-120D's with datalinks that don't necessarily need illumination by the parent aircraft, LPI radars, etc. It all points to even modern aircraft being just as surprised with little chance to maneuver or escape with more modern missiles.

Just my opinion though.