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The IJA's main focus for two or three generations was to expand at the expense
of the Russians. Indeed, Korea and Manchukuo were taken from Russian control,
the latter by an offensive military campaign. IJA vehicles and aircraft were
optimized for operations in the North - in cold weather - and where great
ranges were not required (permitting greater numbers of short range aircraft
be acquired). A small spat in 1938 along the Korean border didn't turn out
so bad - the border TODAY is where Japan said it was THEN - and an unsupported
IJA regiment held for many days against superior forces. Not wanting a war,
it was finally allowed to withdraw, which it did in good order. But it got ugly
at Kholkan Gol (Nomanhan to the Japanese): it was Zhukov's first significant
victory, and it revealed not only good logistics and planning, but superior
weapons. The IJA 47 mm anti-tank gun is a Russian 45 mm using bores for which
Japan already had tooling. The Ki-48 is a Japanese imitation of an SB-2 (and a
not an impressive imitation, and anyway too late for its performance to be
very useful). Japan's 'armored corps' was supposed to entirely face the Russians.
Delayed by politics, it only stood up in summer, 1942 (three divisions) - but
these STILL deployed according to the previous plan. One division was supposed
to cross Inner Mongolia to capture Ulan Bator Kot. Imagine, an armored drive
across the desert without a primary road or rail LOC! Facing Russian tanks (by
then T-34s) with Japanese Type 1s (using that same 47 mm gun as was made for the
anti-tank gun). Nomanhan all over again. The main offensive was by the direct
route, to capture Chita, with a major force defending the populated SE front,
in rough country, with very heavy artillery (including even a 16 inch gun)
and fortifications. It was believed a force of about 12-14 divisions was enough
to beat the Red Army!

So - anyone want to try it? Probably not. What about anyone want to deal with
it (like an exercise) - sort of the Coalition vs the Iraqi Army c 1991.

Yes, I know the group of players in Novosibersk is interested in any game permitting
the Russians to actually fight in AE. But anyone else?

I propose to make it a game designed for AI as Japan. The current engine might be
up to it - if units have assigned objectives in Russia. [Surely the Japanese won't need
follow on assignments - they are going to be on the defensive within a month.] A game
for AI means simplified - too bad because RR units were only numerous on this front.

The game would be set in Monsoon, 1942 - the river system cannot be used before the
spring "break-up" season is over. Had Yamashita's plan been adopted when presented,
the armored divisions (entirely made from existing units, simply combined) would have
been ready (although not experienced). I see no reason to restrict the Allies either:
they are ALREADY allies of the USSR. So Japan can attack the SRA at the same time - or not -
their call. Either way, they have to deal with all the Allies can throw at them.
So it can be a short scenario. Maybe we end it at the onset of Winter, 1942? [That is,
six months.]

It might be a good scenario for new AE players to use to learn how to work with AE.

But is there any interest? It could be released within a few days.

I am not personally interested (I am a hardcore historical freak). The Japanese (a light army, let's not forget it) and their "crapettes" (or so-called tanks aka tankettes) had little to do against the Red Army. Suffice to say that an army mutilated by Stalin's purges managed to utterly trash them (Battles of Khalkhin Gol, which you mention). The Finns and initial German operations clearly showed the poor state of these military forces. Although some writers said somehow the murderous arm of Uncle Joe might have spared the Far East Districts. Not sure about that [;)]

Anyway, to each his own. The more [scenarios] the merrier [:)]

I have several times been able to study this subject since 1968,
when I was able to go to the Mitsubishi Tank Museum and to the
National Diet Library. I also have written an essay on the subject,
because I believe it is quite misunderstood in the West. Much of
widely held opinion is based on published materials which are remarkably
unaware of the history - so I appreciate why people think as they do.
As well, much of the real story is a story of poor choices and missed
opportunities, resulting in things like the dismal battle on Luzon
between a Japanese 'tank division' and a US tank force in which the
Japanese apparently never got off a shot (due to the short range
of the short 57 mm on the by then obsolete Chi Ha).

But Japanese tank development in the 1930s and 1940s was VERY competitive
and in some ways led the world. In particular, it was JAPANESE tanks
that introduced diesel engines for armor (and military vehicles more widely)
and in forms which worked in very cold weather. As well, although we never
faced them, the Japanese developed and fielded very Sherman like tank products,
with high velocity 75 mm AA guns modified as tank guns. These were held to
face the invasion which never happened. Most writers are unaware of these
tanks, or that some of them were fielded. As well, Japanese armor probably
led the world in amphibious vehicles, including the only one ever designed
]for submarine delivery. [That is, the tank could be delivered on the deck
of a submarine and could swim off to its target beach.]

When I grew up in Detroit, spending much time at the Henry Ford Museum (the
greatest collection of vehicles and engines in the world) and in the archives
of the Ford International Headquarters (nearby), where my father's work often
took him, I was told (wrongly) that Japan failed to convert its auto industry
to make aircraft, as we did at Willow Run (to build huge numbers of B-24s).
This is actually the OPPOSITE of the truth: Japan did that TOO MUCH, and
ended up producing more planes than they could train pilots to fly. The real
mistake IJA made was to NOT regard tanks as war winning weapons EARLY enough:
by the time they did it was too late.

The greatest lost opportunity lost was when General Yamashita returned from
the Eastern Front, in 1941, and wrote a report recommending the immediate
formation of a 'tank corps' from EXISTING units. Not just armor, but also
infantry, artillery, engineer and even Flak units - to form combined arms
teams. This was tabled until AFTER the invasion of Malaya, when he was finally
allowed to form them - in the summer of 1942. What these organizations look
like can be seen already in Scenario 105, which assumes his recommendation
was adopted. [In fact, they are virtually identical to the formations of 1942,
except in some cases earlier vehicles are used - the Type 1 tank isn't yet
in production for example.] As players of Scenario 105 (or 125 in Level I)
know well, these formations are demi-gods in the Far East of 1941 and 1942.
ONLY Soviet armor would be a problem for them. They are remarkably similar to
the Australian First Armored Division of the same period - not true tank
divisions in the European sense - but very large super brigades with proper
combined arms elements (often missing from other nation's tank divisions of
that period).

A Japanese tank division as Yamashita conceived it typically had four tank 'regiments'
(battalions) and four motorized or mechanized infantry battalions (3 motorized,
1 mechanized). It also had an engineer unit, a flak unit, a communications unit,
and a logistics train without peer in IJA. Because the IJA writ large was NOT able
to support motorized forces, ALL Japanese motor units had ORGANIC support, including
reserve vehicles and drivers. First, second and third echelon support, in US terms,
were ORGANIC at the regiment. The division added fourth echelon support to that.
The problem with these formations was a lack of experience. But since Japanese
armor was always used for infantry support, at least a tank force with motorized
infantry to support would be much more mobile between fights (which would always
be dismounted).

The other thing writers get very wrong is the quality of the vehicles. Tankettes
are NOT a Japanese invention. Their vehicles are BASED on IMPORTED vehicles. At the
time the Pacific War begins, the Allies are fielding similar vehicles in great numbers:
consider the Bren Carrier for example. As well, the Allies are fielding improvised
vehicles, with "wood" behind boiler plate 'armor' - armed with a mere machine gun!
[See the Beaverette Armored Car, present in large numbers in the game.]
In fact, very light armor was useful - and remains so: the British army today fields
fine very light armor (see Scorpion and Scimitar).

Japan had a problem similar to the PLA since the war: Asia's roads lack bridges which
can support heavy tanks. Having traveled extensively in the area, I can tell you from
direct knowledge that a bridge on a primary road in 1941 had '10 t" marked in the concrete -
meaning it is a 10 ton bridge. Such a bridge can pass a tank several tons heavier than
that - one at a time - slowly - without damaging the bridge. But it cannot long support
30-40 ton tanks. Japanese vehicle designs were actually well suited to the infrastructure
of their area. Just as we found that the Stuart was a fine tank in the same area.

This proposed scenario would give players a chance to experiment with both the plans of
the IJA and Yamashita's proposed armor organizations. That experimentation likely will
reveal IJA was over-optimistic in its view about what might be accomplished? While
these units clearly are superior to NON RUSSIAN 1941 forces in the area, both the Russian
armor and the Russian fortifications will pose formidable problems for the IJA to overcome.
But Russia has its hands full with the Germans, and likely has few if any T-34s immediately
available for Far Eastern operations. It will have to fight with older tanks, and mainly
with the troops already in the area - risking the loss of Moscow or Leningrad committing
reserves to the Far East is probably not an option.

ORIGINAL: el cid again

This proposed scenario would give players a chance to experiment with both the plans of the IJA and Yamashita's proposed armor organizations. That experimentation likely will reveal IJA was over-optimistic in its view about what might be accomplished? While these units clearly are superior to NON RUSSIAN 1941 forces in the area, both the Russian armor and the Russian fortifications will pose formidable problems for the IJA to overcome.
But Russia has its hands full with the Germans, and likely has few if any T-34s immediately available for Far Eastern operations. It will have to fight with older tanks, and mainly with the troops already in the area - risking the loss of Moscow or Leningrad committing reserves to the Far East is probably not an option.

That is 100% sound.

As I see it, it is quite simple or evident. The Japanese -a big power in the east but the poorest of the world powers- had not the resources to have both a powerful navy and army.

Since the beginninig they had made their strategic choice: they would be following the British ie a powerful navy.

That light army might have very well defeated the troops of the Tsar's rotten regime (as they did in 1904-1905), and I suspect the Japanese stategists toyed with this idea in the 20s and 30s: maybe the Soviet Union army is as weak as the Tsar's army. Now put on the equation the massive industrialization in the USSR on the 30s. In this context the Khalkin Gol battles are in fact a rude awakening "oops, this is not the 1905 army [and yet it was a mutilated army] looks like they are too much for our light army"... And from that very moment the IJA understood that enemy was truly dangerous.

This of course definitely doomed the western powers (strike south) [8D]

Yes, the Japanese equipment was excellent (navy, infantry, air), but there's no way the Japanese industry could have massively equipped dozens and dozens of armored, mechanised units (as Germany and the USSR did). Plus the artillery, flak etc etc. Needless to say that industry also failed to follow the US massive production (and I am thinking about the Japanese naval priority).

Actually, the IJA ground forces were the trump card of the Imperial forces, the one
force which could (and perhaps should) have been committed to win battles - but in
fact rarely was. One US general regarded the Japanese soldier as the 'best in the
world' and the Chinese said the same thing. Officers were different: IJA, once
very professional, had very poor officer training by the end of the 1930s.

Japanese divisions were larger than Russian or even Western divisions. It was against
Japanese law to surrender, so (except for Korean or other labor troops), this was only
rarely an option. IJA also adopted a fairly classical policy re artillery, and was
tied with the US Army in organizing its specialist units (including artillery) in a way
that they could be attached where most required. [Gen George C Marshall, no less,
was the leading US advocate of this].

The IJA was larger than the US Army - or any other army it faced - including China's.
The Pacific War (excluding China and troops facing the USSR) only involved about 15%
of the IJA. Early in the war, the IJA was undefeated, almost like the Royal Navy
in much of modern history: no matter the situation, a commander was expected to win.
According to Touched with Fire, the IJA won every battle up to the time the South Seas
Regiment pushed an Aussie brigade off the high ground on the outskirts of Port Moresby.
That after a horrible and debilitating march across the Owen Stanley Range. It was
then ordered to retreat - due to events on Guadalcanal - so heartbreaking its commander
essentially died of a broken spirit. [He drowned wading a stream, officially].

IJA suffered two fatal flaws, guaranteeing its failure. The first of these was a lack
of focus on logistics (except where Yamashita was in charge; he set records for that;
he turned down 40% of the troops offered for the invasion of Malaya on logistic grounds,
preferring a smaller force properly supported; even so he was within a day of suspending
operations on logistical grounds when the British surrendered). A division rated only
a junior officer in charge of logistics! Line of communications jobs were not considered
important either, and did not attract talent. Behind that lay the generally weak industrial
capability of the Empire. That might not have mattered had the IJA not had its other
fatal flaw: Asia writ large had ample manpower and resource industries, and sufficient
secondary industry to feed Japan fairly well - if it had been organized properly. But even
though many regarded the Japanese as liberators, only rarely was this exploited instead of
quashed.

The other major problem was leadership. IJA leadership was remarkably ignorant of the world
writ large, or the nature of their primary enemy (the USA). Exceptions were very rare. It
misjudged the scale of the problem, or indeed the resolve of the enemy. The US Army was
seen as small and weak, with some justice: the strongest unit was the Hawaii Division (until
November, 1941, when it split into two parts, absorbing two regiments of the Hawaii National
Guard in the process; those were eventually combined and a Washington National Guard was also
folded in during 1942). The so called Philippine Division had only one regiment of regular
white troops, although it did have a regiment of Philippine Scouts, colonial troops were not
highly regarded. [Generally correct, that was a mistake when used to assess the Scouts].
And, in 1941, the future commander of the post war German Navy had captured a report on (British)
Imperial defenses which he knew mattered: he took it to Japan and got permission to show it
to them. Japan had unusually sound intelligence about the weakness of its enemies in the SRA.
Underestimating how easy it would be to win a strategic victory over the smaller, and generally
poorly organized colonial formations it faced in theater, IJA - which ran the government - made
a strategic blunder in its decision for war.

In that context, at least, the proposed scenario fits the pattern: why could not an institution
which inflated its view of itself not make other grave strategic blunders? Were the plans of
Kwangtung Army in the 1930s EVER realistic and feasible? Probably not. Was IJA aware of that,
generally not. [General Togo, serving as Foreign Minister late in 1941, did say "Every night
I go to sleep worried about the Russians. Every morning I wake up without an answer." Possibly
he had a clue.