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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XWEEHOKcTnA

ORIGINAL: Joe D.


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XWEEHOKcTnA

warspite1

Why does he keep calling Australia USS Australia?

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Joe D.


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XWEEHOKcTnA

warspite1

Why does he keep calling Australia USS Australia?

It's clearly marked as HMAS Australia. I suspect that the narrator -- who probably knows English as a second language -- just made a mistake as U.S. Adm. Turner was in overall command.

But what about the rest of this very informative short video?

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Joe D.


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XWEEHOKcTnA

warspite1

Why does he keep calling Australia USS Australia?

It's clearly marked as HMAS Australia. I suspect that the narrator -- who probably knows English as a second language -- just made a mistake as U.S. Adm. Turner was in overall command.

But what about the rest of this very informative short video?

warspite1

I gave up watching the second time he referred to her as USS.

I thought the video was very informative, enjoyed it.

ORIGINAL: rtoolooze

I thought the video was very informative, enjoyed it.

Thanks. I was hoping someone would.

I never knew that the IJN had special night binoculars, or that its ship's scout planes would drop flares to illuminate targets.

On the Allied side, I was amazed at how disorganized the chain of command of the fleet covering the supply ships was. And had IJN pressed its attack against those transports, the 'Canal may have ended very differently.

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

ORIGINAL: rtoolooze

I thought the video was very informative, enjoyed it.

Thanks. I was hoping someone would.

I never knew that the IJN had special night binoculars, or that its ship's scout planes would drop flares to illuminate targets.

On the Allied side, I was amazed at how disorganized the chain of command of the fleet covering the supply ships was. And had IJN pressed its attack against those transports, the 'Canal may have ended very differently.

warspite1

If you want to know more about this battle I'd recommend the Shame of Savo

On the Allied side, I was amazed at how disorganized the chain of command of the fleet covering the supply ships was. And had IJN pressed its attack against those transports, the 'Canal may have ended very differently.

Admiral Mikawa displayed, at Savo Island, the same curious lack of aggression as Admiral Kurita did in the Battle Off Samar in 1944.

ORIGINAL: spence

On the Allied side, I was amazed at how disorganized the chain of command of the fleet covering the supply ships was. And had IJN pressed its attack against those transports, the 'Canal may have ended very differently.

Admiral Mikawa displayed, at Savo Island, the same curious lack of aggression as Admiral Kurita did in the Battle Off Samar in 1944.

Mikawa seemed to do a very aggressive job of sinking and or damaging most of the fleet guarding the Guadalcanal.

Mikawa was concerned that if he stayed longer to attack the Canal's transports he would have been vulnerable to Allied carrier planes.

ORIGINAL: spence

On the Allied side, I was amazed at how disorganized the chain of command of the fleet covering the supply ships was. And had IJN pressed its attack against those transports, the 'Canal may have ended very differently.

Admiral Mikawa displayed, at Savo Island, the same curious lack of aggression as Admiral Kurita did in the Battle Off Samar in 1944.

The US aircraft carriers were covering the Guadalcanal landings and had decimated the Betties flying torpedo attacks against the transports. Mikawa did not want to be in range of the carriers' aircraft come daylight lest he lose as many heavy cruisers as the allies just did.

What he did not know is that the US carriers had withdrawn that very night to replenish. Had he stayed the only aircraft likely to attack would be B-17s on long distance strikes. HMAS Australia and USS Chicago (with a damaged bow) could still fight and there were DDs and CLAAs to oppose them so ammo remaining would also be a factor in whether he should stay.

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

ORIGINAL: spence

On the Allied side, I was amazed at how disorganized the chain of command of the fleet covering the supply ships was. And had IJN pressed its attack against those transports, the 'Canal may have ended very differently.

Admiral Mikawa displayed, at Savo Island, the same curious lack of aggression as Admiral Kurita did in the Battle Off Samar in 1944.

Mikawa seemed to do a very aggressive job of sinking and or damaging most of the fleet guarding the Guadalcanal.

Mikawa was concerned that if he stayed longer to attack the Canal's transports he would have been vulnerable to Allied carrier planes.

warspite1

Well as with most things in life there are two or more ways of looking at it. Mikawa's initial action was suitably aggressive. But one would have thought he didn't intend to risk the destruction of his cruisers just in order to sink a few enemy cruisers. The whole point of that audacious - and risky - move south was to destroy the invasion fleet.

There was every chance his fleet would be spotted on the way back too so why not press on and try and find the transports? Perhaps the folly of his premature withdrawal was shown by the fact that Mikawa lost (Kako iirc) on the way back to a submarine.

Set against that of course was the knowledge that, having won a 'great' naval victory, why would Mikawa want to risk his irreplaceable cruisers and so nullify that victory?

I can't recall how aware he was of the transports - I believe he would have had to get his fleet back into line before attack and then go searching for them - with no guarantee of success.

With hindsight Mikawa's decision was poor, but then.....

ORIGINAL: BBfanboy

ORIGINAL: spence

On the Allied side, I was amazed at how disorganized the chain of command of the fleet covering the supply ships was. And had IJN pressed its attack against those transports, the 'Canal may have ended very differently.

Admiral Mikawa displayed, at Savo Island, the same curious lack of aggression as Admiral Kurita did in the Battle Off Samar in 1944.

What he did not know is that the US carriers had withdrawn that very night to replenish.

warspite1

It's a while since I read the detail, but I didn't think the decision to withdraw the carriers was about replenishment alone. There was a big argument because it was felt Fletcher was withdrawing them too early and so leaving the transports to the potential threat of Japanese air and naval units.

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

ORIGINAL: spence



Admiral Mikawa displayed, at Savo Island, the same curious lack of aggression as Admiral Kurita did in the Battle Off Samar in 1944.

Mikawa seemed to do a very aggressive job of sinking and or damaging most of the fleet guarding the Guadalcanal.

Mikawa was concerned that if he stayed longer to attack the Canal's transports he would have been vulnerable to Allied carrier planes.

warspite1

Well as with most things in life there are two or more ways of looking at it. Mikawa's initial action was suitably aggressive. But one would have thought he didn't intend to risk the destruction of his cruisers just in order to sink a few enemy cruisers. The whole point of that audacious - and risky - move south was to destroy the invasion fleet.

There was every chance his fleet would be spotted on the way back too so why not press on and try and find the transports? Perhaps the folly of his premature withdrawal was shown by the fact that Mikawa lost (Kako iirc) on the way back to a submarine.

Set against that of course was the knowledge that, having won a 'great' naval victory, why would Mikawa want to risk his irreplaceable cruisers and so nullify that victory?

I can't recall how aware he was of the transports - I believe he would have had to get his fleet back into line before attack and then go searching for them - with no guarantee of success.

With hindsight Mikawa's decision was poor, but then.....

Although Mikawa's pre-battle plan didn't involve going after the transports, his charts were destroyed by one hit from the Quincy, making navigation more risky and dawn was soon approaching.

Had Mikawa successfully sank those supply ships, he could have had both a tactical and a strategic victory. But, like Nagumo at Pearl Harbor, the longer he stuck around, the greater the odds against him became.

After all, these attacks were hit and run raids, not amphibious operations.

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Joe D.




Mikawa seemed to do a very aggressive job of sinking and or damaging most of the fleet guarding the Guadalcanal.

Mikawa was concerned that if he stayed longer to attack the Canal's transports he would have been vulnerable to Allied carrier planes.

warspite1

Well as with most things in life there are two or more ways of looking at it. Mikawa's initial action was suitably aggressive. But one would have thought he didn't intend to risk the destruction of his cruisers just in order to sink a few enemy cruisers. The whole point of that audacious - and risky - move south was to destroy the invasion fleet.

There was every chance his fleet would be spotted on the way back too so why not press on and try and find the transports? Perhaps the folly of his premature withdrawal was shown by the fact that Mikawa lost (Kako iirc) on the way back to a submarine.

Set against that of course was the knowledge that, having won a 'great' naval victory, why would Mikawa want to risk his irreplaceable cruisers and so nullify that victory?

I can't recall how aware he was of the transports - I believe he would have had to get his fleet back into line before attack and then go searching for them - with no guarantee of success.

With hindsight Mikawa's decision was poor, but then.....

Although Mikawa's pre-battle plan didn't involve going after the transports, his charts were destroyed by one hit from the Quincy, making navigation more risky and dawn was soon approaching.

Had Mikawa successfully sank those supply ships, he could have had both a tactical and a strategic victory. But, like Nagumo at Pearl Harbor, the longer he stuck around, the greater the odds against him became.

After all, these attacks were hit and run raids, not amphibious operations.

warspite1

I'm curious to know why Mikawa would have risked his cruiser fleet for a very long-range and highly risky 'hit and run' mission that was not designed to deal with the invasion and supply shipping? Seems strange.....

I'm curious to know why Mikawa would have risked his cruiser fleet for a very long-range and highly risky 'hit and run' mission that was not designed to deal with the invasion and supply shipping? Seems strange.....

+1

By the same token, the whole point of Kurita's mission in the Battle of Leyte Gulf was to attack Kinkaid's transports yet after he had all but defeated the ships of Taffy 3 and had practically nothing between him and the transports he turned his fleet around and headed home (the claim he needed to spend some time reorganizing sounds a lot like a post-war excuse for not doing what was a planned desperate effort in the first place).

"Just hold on a little longer, boys; we're sucking them into 40-mm range."

Well, Kurita actually saw planes being thrown at him, and could reasonably believe himself within range of the main US carrier force. After all, the whole gamble relied on an elaborated diversion. Problem being that you can't make sure your feint worked at all if you have no means of monitoring it...
But certainly, I guess generations of analysts have good reasons to find his lack of faith disturbing [;)]

In that regard, the motivations of Mikawa at Savo might warrant further analysis, and will still do so many years from now. Still, my understanding of the Iron bottom sound area is that it wasn't a place you'd like to travel without a chart, considering the limited amount of hydrographic knowledge available back then. Charts of both sides were based on German early century surveys, and if Mikawa took a good look at them before losing them due to battle damage, he indeed had reasons to doubt his ability to navigate the place blindly.

I am quite convinced though that it isn't enough to explain his withdrawal - the latter has to be the sum of many factors (fear of US air coverage, disorganization, doctrine, overconfidence regarding other theatre assets...). Considering he obviously wasn't a coward, he probably had good enough reasons to give up the Press Closely ~ Strike Home business altogether. Perhaps the mere multitude of factors did much to confuse him at the time. Not to mention the fact that we sure know there wasn't anything left between him and the transport force - but Mikawa had no way to be 100% sure about that either..

It's been a while since I have read up on Savo, but I think a couple of things come to mind. IIRC the Japanese thought the Americans were only making a raid and not planning on sticking around. Later in the campaign they routinely underestimated how many Marines (and later Army) troops were on the Canal - which led them to consistently send in small forces to evict the Americans. And there was also the predisposition to attack warships. Their subs gave merchants near free reign for the entire war, and they did a horrible job of protecting their own merchies (defensive - not part of the culture), until it was too late. Always amazes me that the S-44 managed to take out the Kako on her way back to Rabaul.

The complete mis-handling of the Allied fleet that night bears no defense. Unclear orders, taking a CA to bring a commander to a conference and then not getting back to her group for the night. No comms about one group being attacked before the second was.

Perhaps if the whole Allied fleet was replaced by the Boise things would have gone differently :>)

Another factor is that the Allies relied too much on their pickets because they had radar. What they did not realize is that the installation had a blind spot aft because of things in the way of the radar beam. The gods of war love chinks in the armour and arranged for the Japanese to come in behind Blue at just the right time to be in the blind spot.

Hey BB,

Interesting comment. It really seemed like it mattered who was in charge. A lot of admirals did not trust the new fangled things and would routinely place the ships with the best sets in the worst possible places in the line. Fletcher and Honolulu come to mind.....

I think Callaghan understood radar very well and was able to profit from that. Some of the other guys, not so much.....

Regards,
Frank

You had a British naval officer in charge of a fleet of mixed Australian and American ships which had crews tired from supporting the invasion plus the air attack by the Japanese. Fletcher left because he claimed that he lost too many fighters. If I recall correctly, the alert for the big air raid was the only time when "Condition Very Red" was ever called out by the US Navy.

Frank Jack Fletcher did not last much longer as a carrier TF commander.