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Hello all.

I wrote Dan yesterday saying I was going to Post something that I thought some people might enjoy. About a month ago I spotted Cory Pfarr's work Longstreet at Gettysburg: A Critical Reassessment and ordered it.

The book takes a highly focused look at comparing the anti-Longstreet (Robert E. Lee Marble Man) group of historians who sought to raise Lee to a pedestal and make 'gloomy old Pete' the villain for Gettysburg with the actual facts of the campaign with small chapters devoted to each of the major moments of the battle. It is not even 200 pages in length but is pumped full of information.

It is a fascinating read that is not for those new to the subject. Pfarr takes on many of the titans of Civil War writers like Freeman, Wert, Coddington, Krick, Catton, Sears, etc...and crafts his work separating fact, from perception, to outright lies. It is controversial but I thought to throw it out for our American Civil War-minded forum members...

Interesting...

Unfortunately Gettysburg has long been a target of the crowd that wants to simplify history into an easily propagandable story.

I'll have to add this to my reading list for further ammunition against those persistent myths that hang around discussions of the Gettysburg campaign...

Ah, the old argument that the loss at Gettysburg was the fault of Longstreet. Well he was no 'Stonewall' Jackson, then again who was, but that as far as I'll go. As to who was the cause of the loss, I'll say the Union Army.[;)]

Question:

Is it reasonable to draw similarities with the historiography of the Battles of Midway and Gettysburg?

For example, the blame attributed to Nagumo and Longstreet/Stuart to shield senior officers.

More generally, the similar mythos surrounding the battles: the 'decks loaded with attack planes' aligns with the high water mark of Gettysburg for the Confederacy.

Thoughts?

The Japanese could and did do reasonable offensives after the Battle of Midway, the Rebels only did spoiling attacks.

People always seem to want shift the blame away except for President Truman overall, and General Eisenhower for D-Day.

J3,

Not very well read on this subject, but curios if those who are believe that the depiction of Longstreet in the movie Gettysburg (based on the historical novel Killer Angels, which I have read) is more accurate.

Great... you just made my Must Read list 1 book longer...

Is that the writer/book that equates, in achievement, Longstreet’s attack on July 2 to Jackson’s Chancellorsville flank assault?

I don't know about that... maybe.


I sure there is plenty of blame to go around... individually.

I tend toward that the main bane of the Confederates was dancing to the Federal's tune, while committing piecemeal and blind. Then there were the deaths of Jackson, Pelham and the toll taken on the psyches especially Lee's.


JEB Stuart said it was his fault. After the war Mosby defended JEB's actions.




Maybe it's dependent on ... perspective....
As demonstrated in this correspondence between Jackson and Early:



To Major-General Early.

General,
General Jackson desires to know why he saw so many of your stragglers in rear of your division today?

(Signed) A.S. Pendleton, A.A.G. Headquarters Left Wing





To Captain A.S. Pendleton, A.A.G.

Captain,
In answer to your note, I would state that I think it probable that the reason why General Jackson SAW so many of my stragglers on the march today is that he rode in rear of my division.

Respectfully,
J.A. Early Major-General Headquarters Early's Division



Jackson read the note, only smiled and made no further inquiries about the matter.

Wasn't it General Early who said, post war, "It took a great many mistakes to lose that battle, and I made many of them."?

Longstreet was a superb commanding general who had the full confidence and affection of Robert E. Lee. Enough said, from that standpoint.

History has picked at Longstreet, in part because post-war he heartily strove for re-unification and became a Republican. He took federal posts, was related by marriage to Ulysses Grant, and was involved in a tough matter involving freedmen in Louisiana. As a result of these and other things, he became a target, at times. But history largely looks favorably upon him...and it should. He was an outstanding field general.

If we consider the fact that Chancellorsville was nearly lost by the Confederacy on the second day...and only the decision to retreat made by a minority of the Regency for the incapacitated Union general saved Lee from a poor result...

There may be something to comparing both assaults...I'll have to think about it.

""Wasn't it General Early who said, post war, "It took a great many mistakes to lose that battle, and I made many of them."? ""

I believe it was Ewell.

Many similarities between the Civil War and the War against Japan. The outcome of both was a foregone conclusion. The only way either war could have been lost was if the U.S. gave up. Lee could have captured Washington and still would've lost eventually {just move the capital to New York}. I don't believe the Brits or French would've intervened with slavery still a fact in the Confederacy. The Japanese believed they could hit Pearl Harbor, take everything they wanted and then ask for peace.

Victory Disease? I think Lee had some. The North certainly gave him cause. He launched an attack over open ground against an entrenched Union position. Stuart was not there when needed to tell Lee how many men the Union had, which is Stuarts fault but Lee still gave the order despite this. The Japanese certainly suffered from it.

All wars only end when one side (sometimes both sides) refuse to continue it and decide to end it.  There is no foregone conclusion to any war, not in the past, not in the present nor in the future.
 
1.  By all logical considerations Rome lost every year of the Second Punic War, except for the last year.  It simply refused to accept defeat.
 
2.  By all logical considerations the Greek city states lacked the GDP and manpower to stand up to Xerxes, yet they refused to accept the situation and ultimately prevailed.
 
3.  Alexander the Great lacked the GDP, and manpower plus the logistics to defeat the might Persian Empire.  Yet who was it that prevailed decisively.
 
4.  Frederick the Great's Prussia was at the mercy of its enemies in the Seven Years War but he refused to accept defeat and was only saved by the new Russian Tsar.
 
5.  Garribaldi's 1000 were hopelessly outclassed in absolutely every metric against the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies.  Yet who was it that prevailed.
 
6.  Russia still had huge resources available which dwarfed Japan in 1905 yet it decided to sue for peace.
 
7.  Little Finland stood up to the juggernaut of the USSR and yet fought it to a draw in the Winter War.
 
8.  North Vietnam was a minnow compared to France and the USA and yet managed to see both off the battle field.
 
 
These are just some of the most prominent instances where because one side refused to accept the metrics, it ultimately prevailed.  The decision to go to war is always a political decision.  As is the decision to end one.  Metrics by themselves mean nothing, especially if they are not exploited properly.
 
Alfred

ORIGINAL: Alfred


All wars only end when one side (sometimes both sides) refuse to continue it and decide to end it.  There is no foregone conclusion to any war, not in the past, not in the present nor in the future.

1.  By all logical considerations Rome lost every year of the Second Punic War, except for the last year.  It simply refused to accept defeat.

2.  By all logical considerations the Greek city states lacked the GDP and manpower to stand up to Xerxes, yet they refused to accept the situation and ultimately prevailed.

3.  Alexander the Great lacked the GDP, and manpower plus the logistics to defeat the might Persian Empire.  Yet who was it that prevailed decisively.

4.  Frederick the Great's Prussia was at the mercy of its enemies in the Seven Years War but he refused to accept defeat and was only saved by the new Russian Tsar.

5.  Garribaldi's 1000 were hopelessly outclassed in absolutely every metric against the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies.  Yet who was it that prevailed.

6.  Russia still had huge resources available which dwarfed Japan in 1905 yet it decided to sue for peace.

7.  Little Finland stood up to the juggernaut of the USSR and yet fought it to a draw in the Winter War.

8.  North Vietnam was a minnow compared to France and the USA and yet managed to see both off the battle field.


These are just some of the most prominent instances where because one side refused to accept the metrics, it ultimately prevailed.  The decision to go to war is always a political decision.  As is the decision to end one.  Metrics by themselves mean nothing, especially if they are not exploited properly.

Alfred

I agree that wars do not have 'foregone' conclusions. Human factors are as important as material. Nations and leaders often behave irrationally. Sometimes the irrationally is rewarded by Dame Fortune; more often it's punished. That is a big reason why the big battalions don't always win. And a country is not defeated until its people admit defeat.

"The race is not always to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, but that's the way to bet." - Damon Runyon


I respectfully disagree with most of your examples. Here goes:

1. Rome certainly won those years where Scipio conquered Spain, where Hasdrubal died at the Metaurus, and when Scipio defeated the Carthaginians to force Hannibal's recall. Hannibal controlled only the land his army occupied (for the most part).

2. Time and distance made it impossible for the Persians to bring more than a fraction of their Empire to Greece. The numbers in the actual campaigns were not THAT one sided (the Greeks exaggerated the numbers against them).

3. Alex won because the Persians strategy of seeking decisive battles was wrong. His army could have been worn down by campaigns against his flanks and rear. He was also 'liberating' people from the Persians, at least until he got to Persia. Again, time and distance worked against the Persians, as well as leadership.

5. Asymmetrical wars are usually not decided on the battlefield, but by political and human factors.

6. Time and distance were Japanese allies, as well as the Czar's incompetence.

7. The Winter War was not fought to a draw. The Finns were overwhelmed by numbers of tanks and artillery. All it took was competent leadership and trained soldiers to realize the material advantage. The existence of Germany saved Finland from a worse defeat.

8. It was never just North Vietnam vs France or the US. China and Russia gave substantial aid.

The French lost militarily because they had limited resources at their disposal (the war was unpopular in France). And China offered a safe haven for the Vietnamese.

The US did not lose Vietnam on the battlefield; political factors led to our disengagement. After we left, the South Vietnamese were defeated militarily.

You make a point {or eight} Alfred. You could probably add the American Revolutionary War to your list.

But I just don't see either the Civil War or the War with Japan ending in victories for the South or Japan. Both would've required American politicians to basically give up. While this would've been easier in the Civil War {and I still have to strain my brain to come up with scenarios in which this would happen}, I don't think it could have ever happened during the War with Japan.

Slightly OT - today is Longstreet's 199th birthday.

Great post Alfred!

I think the greatest example I can think about is the last Chinese civil war. The Generalissimo had everything in his favor, vast armies, some of them US trained, the best lend-lease equipment, a "liberator" aura, this while the communists were a ragtag, if well organized army, with leftover Kwantung/ Manchukuo equipment, yet after a a few years Mao was on Beijing while Chiang left to Taiwan

In the case of the US Civil war, even the political factors favored the Union...

ORIGINAL: Jorge_Stanbury

Great post Alfred!

I think the greatest example I can think about is the last Chinese civil war. The Generalissimo had everything in his favor, vast armies, some of them US trained, the best lend-lease equipment, a "liberator" aura, this while the communists were a ragtag, if well organized army, with leftover Kwantung/ Manchukuo equipment, yet after a a few years Mao was on Beijing while Chiang left to Taiwan

I was totally thrown off by Alfred's post.

It left me scratching my head trying to figure out how it related to how Longstreet has been historically depicted.

Guess the thread took a turn down a side road that I missed.

And no one has answered my question.

The Japanese could and did do reasonable offensives after the Battle of Midway, the Rebels only did spoiling attacks.

I must respectfully disagree. The Battle of Chickamauga was much more than a mere spoiling attack: Bragg had every intention of destroying the Union army, and he came close to doing so. Also, Sterling Price's Missouri expedition (in late 1864!) hoped to capture St. Louis, not just to throw the Union forces in the state off balance.

Back to the subject of Longstreet, it's important to realize that his memoirs were of course written to boost his image, as almost everyone else's were. (It is a great pity that Lee did not live long enough to write his version of events.) That being said, I believe that Longstreet's view of the third day of Gettysburg was substantially correct. There was very little chance for the Pickett-Pettigrew-Trimble assault to succeed against prepared defenses and the more numerous Union army. Nonetheless, I find no serious fault with Longstreet's preparations. If Edward Porter Alexander, the best artillerist in the Army of Northern Virginia, said that was the time to launch the assault, Longstreet had to give the go-ahead or be in disobedience to Lee's orders. He could not have known that Union counter-fire had slackened only to conserve ammunition.

ORIGINAL: Capt. Harlock

The Japanese could and did do reasonable offensives after the Battle of Midway, the Rebels only did spoiling attacks.

I must respectfully disagree. The Battle of Chickamauga was much more than a mere spoiling attack: Bragg had every intention of destroying the Union army, and he came close to doing so. Also, Sterling Price's Missouri expedition (in late 1864!) hoped to capture St. Louis, not just to throw the Union forces in the state off balance.

Back to the subject of Longstreet, it's important to realize that his memoirs were of course written to boost his image, as almost everyone else's were. (It is a great pity that Lee did not live long enough to write his version of events.) That being said, I believe that Longstreet's view of the third day of Gettysburg was substantially correct. There was very little chance for the Pickett-Pettigrew-Trimble assault to succeed against prepared defenses and the more numerous Union army. Nonetheless, I find no serious fault with Longstreet's preparations. If Edward Porter Alexander, the best artillerist in the Army of Northern Virginia, said that was the time to launch the assault, Longstreet had to give the go-ahead or be in disobedience to Lee's orders. He could not have known that Union counter-fire had slackened only to conserve ammunition.

Wasn't Gettysburg also the first time that Union units were nearly all equipped with rifles that didn't require muzzle loading, increasing their firepower massively? That would have upset Lee's calculations of how many men could reach the Union lines.