Late War AAR as Japan - Advancing on the Home Islands
Posted: Sat Apr 11, 2020 6:26 pm
April 1945 Update at the bottom, fall of the Philippines, invasion of Iwo Jima and more CV combat.
March 1945 Update at the bottom, including a CV battle, Allied CV sweeps in the South China Sea, multiple invasions, surface combats, and Japanese PT boat operations.
February 1945 Update at the bottom, including Battle of Moulmein and interesting ASW combat.
January 1945 Update at the bottom, including detailed look at B-29 missions and effects.
I’ve been playing a WITP game as the Japanese against the inimitable David Herlocker for 10+ years. My strategy from the beginning was to fight the “long war”: get to 1945 in good economic shape, with an intact carrier fleet and reasonable defensive perimeter, where I could use the better late-war Japanese aircraft to mount a viable defense of the Home Islands. If I could get into 1946, I would be assured at least a Draw and maybe better if I could make 1945/46 expensive for the Allies. (Feel free to LOL at the “long war” strategy. I certainly have on occasion, but it seemed like a reasonable idea at the time!) Having arrived at 1 January 1945, I thought some might find an AAR on this situation of interest. My intent is to update it at the end of each game month going forward and, of course, questions are welcome.
Game: Scenario 1 with one day turns, all game options on except no PDU and no Reliable USN Torpedo (i.e., historical). Also, due to the database we started with, Okha devices will never appear.
Getting to 1945: the Japanese Empire expanded at about the historical rate to a little beyond the historical perimeter. The Allies fell back in good order and were cautious. The Japanese took Port Moresby and all of Burma and DEI. In China, the Japanese established and still hold a line from Yenan through Nanyang, Ichang, Changsha, Kweilin, Nanning and Hanoi. Some resources and fuel are moving through China to Korea, but not much oil. I was willing to seek early victory if an opportunity presented itself. In an effort to draw the Allies out and create that opportunity, the Empire invaded New Caledonia. After successfully landing in the north, the invasion forces marched south but ultimately stalled just outside the city of Noumea. This effectively ended the Japanese expansion.
The Allied road back was largely historical, but with very little island hopping – just grinding it out. (The Allies even invaded Truk, where the Japanese put up a long and stalwart defense.) In Burma, the Allies broke the Mandalay-Magwe defensive line due to poor Japanese leadership (i.e., me!), ultimately resulting in a significant encirclement around Toungoo to the south. “Fortress Rangoon” turned out to be a bust, falling at the end of November 1944. Port Blair was occupied by the Japanese, but retaken by the Allies in August 1944.
The Japanese “Midway event” took place on 2 October 1943 just northeast of Truk. Allied carriers moved forward behind a weather front and caught the Japanese off guard. We replayed the turn a number of times with slightly different parameters, but the result was largely the same. The Allies simply had greater numbers and the F6F-3 outclassed the A6M5 Zero in the air – as did the Allied DBs and TBs in key areas. Bottom line: the Japanese should not have loitered there.
Economically, I successfully implemented convoy operations, covered by growing ASW coverage along the convoy routes, between Singapore and Fukuoka. The first instance of a lack of oil in the Home Islands was mid-1943 (IIRC). Oil and resources are still making their way to the Home Islands, with intermittent lack of oil at times.
Summary: good execution on the Japanese economy consistent with the plan (more below), terrible execution at keeping an intact carrier fleet and reasonable defensive perimeter everywhere except Burma. I now realize the Allies have “helped” considerably due to their relatively rapid retreat in early 1942 and cautious road back.
1 January 1945 SITREP (Turn 1122):
In the central Pacific, the Allies control Marcus Island, the Marianas (the last holdout, Tinian, was declared secure on 12 Dec 44), and all of the islands south and the east, including Babeldaub, Peliliu and Talaud-eilanden.
In the Dutch East Indies, the Allies have made a slow but steady advance from the west, moving up New Guinea, taking Timor, Ceram Island, the Moluccas and almost all islands in the chain to the southeast of Java. (The closest Allied base to Soerabaja is Denpasar.) The Philippines are still entirely occupied by the Japanese.
In Burma, the Allies advanced from Rangoon and are now camped across the river just north of Moulmein. B-29s can and have hit Cam Ranh Bay, Saigon, Bangkok, and even Singapore, focusing primarily on airfields and ports in this theater.
In the Home Islands, the first B-29 raid took place on 24 Dec 44 and devastated Tokyo, destroying over 35% of heavy industry and damaging most other economic activities in an around Tokyo. Overall, the Japanese have had some success against the B-29s, albeit intermittently. Allied B-29 losses are ~330 with 130 attributed to air-to-air combat, and narrowly out-pacing B-29 Ops losses. Extensive pilot training activities continue.
Victory Points: The VP ratio is currently a draw: 1.135 in favor of the Allies (the fall of Rangoon changed this dramatically). A Tracker screenshot is included so you can see the breakdown. As a result of Japanese air strategy, victory points related to Japanese air losses have been relatively low.
Air war: air units are generally at full strength with good pilots (target average of 70 Exp, 70 Air, 70 Defense in front line units). I accelerated the Ki-84a Frank to 43/12 and have built over 2,500, and the Ki-84b Frank to 44/11 producing about 160. I expect the Ki-84r Frank 45/2. My key Navy land-based Navy fighter is the George, having produced almost 1,400. Naturally, these aircraft account for most of Japanese fighter losses: almost 2,100 Franks and a little over 1,200 Georges. CVs are equipped with the A6M5c, as are front-line Navy fighter units that don’t operate the George, but I use them sparingly.
I have 70/70/70 fighter pools totaling ~300 for the Navy and ~200 for the Army.
Kamikazes have not been activated.
The current situation is the result of a defined and well-executed strategy: do not allow good pilots to be killed in marginal aircraft, or good aircraft to be lost due to marginal pilots. By definition, this will limit where you can contest Allied air superiority, especially mid-war and in conjunction with my aircraft building strategy (see below).
Naval war: The IJN has lost 8 CVs and 6 CVLs, 4 BBs and 14 CAs. The Allies have lost to 2 CVs, 7 CVEs, 5 BBs (all in 1941) and 3 CAs.
I’ve (re)assembled a very modest carrier fleet of 5 CVs (Kasagi, Katsuragi, Shinano, Taiho and Unryu). They can theoretically put up about 310 aircraft. I expect to get the Hiyo back from a long repair period, adding another 53 carrier-based aircraft.
Cargo and tanker shipping losses have been modest – so much so that I’ve actually halted production of large cargo ships and tankers because I don’t need them.
I’ve used 4-ship ASW TFs, and proactively given them good leadership. The IJA and IJN conduct extensive ASW operations, especially along the convoy routes. Results have been good: an estimated 110 Allied submarines sunk and many more damaged.
Ground war: not much to say. I’ve produced enough vehicles and armaments to likely last the duration of the war. Virtually every Japanese defensive position has fortifications, CD units are in good locations, and I’ve worked to set up good combat planning and command relationships. I’m not sure what went wrong at Rangoon; hoping for better results at Moulmein.
Economy: I’ve included a Tracker screenshot with a summary of key economic variables. I have a reserve of 3.6M heavy industry, 4.6M supply units and 4.6M fuel units. The most important factor getting here has been air strategy and aircraft building strategy. The Allies have not pressed as hard as they might so, despite a very “conservative” aircraft building program, I’ve rarely been in a situation without enough aircraft to fill front-line units.
There are many aircraft that will not be built for various reasons: marginal aircraft, engine requirements, not enough units flying the aircraft to make a difference (with PDU on), upgrade issues, withdrawal issues, etc. Examples:
1) Never built the A6M5b. I accelerated the A6M5c (which is the one I wanted anyway, with its armor) to 44/6 – the same arrival date as the A6M5b. There were some issues keeping air units filled out with aircraft, but manageable.
2) Won’t build the Karyu/Kikka aircraft with jet engines due to the ‘5’ service level. Once the Allies target an airfield, the Japanese have enough trouble repairing aircraft with service levels of 1-3.
2a) In the Home Islands and Java, it’s nice to be able to evacuate even damaged aircraft to another airfield via rail.
3) Built just enough Oscars and Sonias to keep units fully equipped for training with a small pool for operational losses.
4) Won’t build any of the many marginal Japanese kamikaze aircraft. Most come with enough aircraft to immediately use as training units. When the kamikazes fly, I want them to do serious damage! So, IJA Kamikazes will be the Ki-115 Tsurugi (already building the Ki-115a model in 44/12) with the first Ki-9 Spruce unit to which it upgrades arriving in mid-March 1945 and a total buildout of over 200 aircraft – admittedly in small, 10 aircraft units. (I’m hoping for great results with the Tsurugi. The a model has a max speed of 342 mph and a 1764 unit bomb load, versus 149 mph and 221 unit bomb load for the Ki-9.) For the IJN, trying to do the same thing with the Toka/K5Y1 Willow, although it’s more difficult because the Toka isn’t scheduled to arrive until 45/12.
That’s it for now. Dave is willing to provide Allied commentary if someone can recommend a best practice to do that (separate thread?). Again, questions welcome.
Kurt
March 1945 Update at the bottom, including a CV battle, Allied CV sweeps in the South China Sea, multiple invasions, surface combats, and Japanese PT boat operations.
February 1945 Update at the bottom, including Battle of Moulmein and interesting ASW combat.
January 1945 Update at the bottom, including detailed look at B-29 missions and effects.
I’ve been playing a WITP game as the Japanese against the inimitable David Herlocker for 10+ years. My strategy from the beginning was to fight the “long war”: get to 1945 in good economic shape, with an intact carrier fleet and reasonable defensive perimeter, where I could use the better late-war Japanese aircraft to mount a viable defense of the Home Islands. If I could get into 1946, I would be assured at least a Draw and maybe better if I could make 1945/46 expensive for the Allies. (Feel free to LOL at the “long war” strategy. I certainly have on occasion, but it seemed like a reasonable idea at the time!) Having arrived at 1 January 1945, I thought some might find an AAR on this situation of interest. My intent is to update it at the end of each game month going forward and, of course, questions are welcome.
Game: Scenario 1 with one day turns, all game options on except no PDU and no Reliable USN Torpedo (i.e., historical). Also, due to the database we started with, Okha devices will never appear.
Getting to 1945: the Japanese Empire expanded at about the historical rate to a little beyond the historical perimeter. The Allies fell back in good order and were cautious. The Japanese took Port Moresby and all of Burma and DEI. In China, the Japanese established and still hold a line from Yenan through Nanyang, Ichang, Changsha, Kweilin, Nanning and Hanoi. Some resources and fuel are moving through China to Korea, but not much oil. I was willing to seek early victory if an opportunity presented itself. In an effort to draw the Allies out and create that opportunity, the Empire invaded New Caledonia. After successfully landing in the north, the invasion forces marched south but ultimately stalled just outside the city of Noumea. This effectively ended the Japanese expansion.
The Allied road back was largely historical, but with very little island hopping – just grinding it out. (The Allies even invaded Truk, where the Japanese put up a long and stalwart defense.) In Burma, the Allies broke the Mandalay-Magwe defensive line due to poor Japanese leadership (i.e., me!), ultimately resulting in a significant encirclement around Toungoo to the south. “Fortress Rangoon” turned out to be a bust, falling at the end of November 1944. Port Blair was occupied by the Japanese, but retaken by the Allies in August 1944.
The Japanese “Midway event” took place on 2 October 1943 just northeast of Truk. Allied carriers moved forward behind a weather front and caught the Japanese off guard. We replayed the turn a number of times with slightly different parameters, but the result was largely the same. The Allies simply had greater numbers and the F6F-3 outclassed the A6M5 Zero in the air – as did the Allied DBs and TBs in key areas. Bottom line: the Japanese should not have loitered there.
Economically, I successfully implemented convoy operations, covered by growing ASW coverage along the convoy routes, between Singapore and Fukuoka. The first instance of a lack of oil in the Home Islands was mid-1943 (IIRC). Oil and resources are still making their way to the Home Islands, with intermittent lack of oil at times.
Summary: good execution on the Japanese economy consistent with the plan (more below), terrible execution at keeping an intact carrier fleet and reasonable defensive perimeter everywhere except Burma. I now realize the Allies have “helped” considerably due to their relatively rapid retreat in early 1942 and cautious road back.
1 January 1945 SITREP (Turn 1122):
In the central Pacific, the Allies control Marcus Island, the Marianas (the last holdout, Tinian, was declared secure on 12 Dec 44), and all of the islands south and the east, including Babeldaub, Peliliu and Talaud-eilanden.
In the Dutch East Indies, the Allies have made a slow but steady advance from the west, moving up New Guinea, taking Timor, Ceram Island, the Moluccas and almost all islands in the chain to the southeast of Java. (The closest Allied base to Soerabaja is Denpasar.) The Philippines are still entirely occupied by the Japanese.
In Burma, the Allies advanced from Rangoon and are now camped across the river just north of Moulmein. B-29s can and have hit Cam Ranh Bay, Saigon, Bangkok, and even Singapore, focusing primarily on airfields and ports in this theater.
In the Home Islands, the first B-29 raid took place on 24 Dec 44 and devastated Tokyo, destroying over 35% of heavy industry and damaging most other economic activities in an around Tokyo. Overall, the Japanese have had some success against the B-29s, albeit intermittently. Allied B-29 losses are ~330 with 130 attributed to air-to-air combat, and narrowly out-pacing B-29 Ops losses. Extensive pilot training activities continue.
Victory Points: The VP ratio is currently a draw: 1.135 in favor of the Allies (the fall of Rangoon changed this dramatically). A Tracker screenshot is included so you can see the breakdown. As a result of Japanese air strategy, victory points related to Japanese air losses have been relatively low.
Air war: air units are generally at full strength with good pilots (target average of 70 Exp, 70 Air, 70 Defense in front line units). I accelerated the Ki-84a Frank to 43/12 and have built over 2,500, and the Ki-84b Frank to 44/11 producing about 160. I expect the Ki-84r Frank 45/2. My key Navy land-based Navy fighter is the George, having produced almost 1,400. Naturally, these aircraft account for most of Japanese fighter losses: almost 2,100 Franks and a little over 1,200 Georges. CVs are equipped with the A6M5c, as are front-line Navy fighter units that don’t operate the George, but I use them sparingly.
I have 70/70/70 fighter pools totaling ~300 for the Navy and ~200 for the Army.
Kamikazes have not been activated.
The current situation is the result of a defined and well-executed strategy: do not allow good pilots to be killed in marginal aircraft, or good aircraft to be lost due to marginal pilots. By definition, this will limit where you can contest Allied air superiority, especially mid-war and in conjunction with my aircraft building strategy (see below).
Naval war: The IJN has lost 8 CVs and 6 CVLs, 4 BBs and 14 CAs. The Allies have lost to 2 CVs, 7 CVEs, 5 BBs (all in 1941) and 3 CAs.
I’ve (re)assembled a very modest carrier fleet of 5 CVs (Kasagi, Katsuragi, Shinano, Taiho and Unryu). They can theoretically put up about 310 aircraft. I expect to get the Hiyo back from a long repair period, adding another 53 carrier-based aircraft.
Cargo and tanker shipping losses have been modest – so much so that I’ve actually halted production of large cargo ships and tankers because I don’t need them.
I’ve used 4-ship ASW TFs, and proactively given them good leadership. The IJA and IJN conduct extensive ASW operations, especially along the convoy routes. Results have been good: an estimated 110 Allied submarines sunk and many more damaged.
Ground war: not much to say. I’ve produced enough vehicles and armaments to likely last the duration of the war. Virtually every Japanese defensive position has fortifications, CD units are in good locations, and I’ve worked to set up good combat planning and command relationships. I’m not sure what went wrong at Rangoon; hoping for better results at Moulmein.
Economy: I’ve included a Tracker screenshot with a summary of key economic variables. I have a reserve of 3.6M heavy industry, 4.6M supply units and 4.6M fuel units. The most important factor getting here has been air strategy and aircraft building strategy. The Allies have not pressed as hard as they might so, despite a very “conservative” aircraft building program, I’ve rarely been in a situation without enough aircraft to fill front-line units.
There are many aircraft that will not be built for various reasons: marginal aircraft, engine requirements, not enough units flying the aircraft to make a difference (with PDU on), upgrade issues, withdrawal issues, etc. Examples:
1) Never built the A6M5b. I accelerated the A6M5c (which is the one I wanted anyway, with its armor) to 44/6 – the same arrival date as the A6M5b. There were some issues keeping air units filled out with aircraft, but manageable.
2) Won’t build the Karyu/Kikka aircraft with jet engines due to the ‘5’ service level. Once the Allies target an airfield, the Japanese have enough trouble repairing aircraft with service levels of 1-3.
2a) In the Home Islands and Java, it’s nice to be able to evacuate even damaged aircraft to another airfield via rail.
3) Built just enough Oscars and Sonias to keep units fully equipped for training with a small pool for operational losses.
4) Won’t build any of the many marginal Japanese kamikaze aircraft. Most come with enough aircraft to immediately use as training units. When the kamikazes fly, I want them to do serious damage! So, IJA Kamikazes will be the Ki-115 Tsurugi (already building the Ki-115a model in 44/12) with the first Ki-9 Spruce unit to which it upgrades arriving in mid-March 1945 and a total buildout of over 200 aircraft – admittedly in small, 10 aircraft units. (I’m hoping for great results with the Tsurugi. The a model has a max speed of 342 mph and a 1764 unit bomb load, versus 149 mph and 221 unit bomb load for the Ki-9.) For the IJN, trying to do the same thing with the Toka/K5Y1 Willow, although it’s more difficult because the Toka isn’t scheduled to arrive until 45/12.
That’s it for now. Dave is willing to provide Allied commentary if someone can recommend a best practice to do that (separate thread?). Again, questions welcome.
Kurt
