Bombing Poll results
Posted: Sat May 31, 2003 10:20 pm
Seems with the threads here and in WitP, folks are pretty equally matched in agreeing that things are not right, but vary in where they need to be fixed.
To condense the opinions into a simple list:
(a) Too accurate against naval targets.
(b) Too effective at inflicting ground casualties.
(c) Operate too easily at small bases.
(d) AA losses not on par with reality. (units being destroyed on the ground too quickly)
(e) Immunity to fighters too high still (non-B-17).
(f) Raid sizes too large.
(g) Overuse of low level attacks.
(h) Supply loss due to damage is too high.
These issues all relate to each other to some degree or another as far as cause and effect. For example, a smaller raid size would reduce naval hits obviously.
Possible solutions:
(a) limit raid sizes to finite numbers of planes OR dynamically adjust range and weapon load based on number of planes.
(b) limit basing of Medium/Heavy bombers to larger bases OR increase the operational loss rate penalty to a higher base size to increase the cost of operation.
(c) Double the intercept rates on large raids (ie: raid is so large that fighters get 2 chances to intercept and do damage).
(d) Increase the supply use of bombers to realistically cause forward basing to be a drain on other assets.
(e) Disallow basing at *overbuilt* bases. Use SPS value as limiting factor.
(f) Introduce a finite number of squadrons to a base rule or change the # planes = size x 50 rule to # engines = size x 50.
(g) Increase the chance of a raid not finding it's target. This should be a combination of range/weather/interception/fatigue.
(h) Increase runway repair rate but counter this with service repair rate decrease (you can fly what's working, but repairs take longer at damaged base).
(i) Decrease damage taken to ground units. Disruption should be a factor still (small harrassment raids to prevent folks from being able to sleep was used historically).
(j) Decrease damage taken to naval targets by forcing larger raids to break up into sections per target (ie: it took 9 B-17's to drop a pattern large enough to ensure a ship could not move out of the spread. For each group of 9, you have a sure hit, but the game doesn't work the math that way.)
(k) Increase AA effectiveness against slow flying level bombers (forcing them up higher for safety). Damaged planes should abort and not continue on to target.
As you can see, a lot of these possible solutions intermix with each other as to overall effects. For example, (k) would result in (j) & (i) not being required.
No one person is going to agree exactly what show or could be done, and not all folks will agree that something actually needs to be done based on the poll results of only 80% wanting something done. I think we can safely agree to disagree on this topic.
One of the toughest things to manage is the fact that we have history to look back on and not make the same mistakes so we already start with a huge advantage.
Being honest about this, I have a vested interest in shifting the game towards a naval focus as thats where my interests happen to be. Air Force domination in the latter part of WW II is well documented, but so is it's ineffectiveness during the early years as it's needs outgrew it's availability as technology continued to show what it could do.
A perfect example of this is the B-17 in 1942, where it was tasked with naval search, not because it was a naval search aircraft, but simply because it could shoot down intercepting fighters and still continue the search. PBY's (the search plane of the time) used in that roll were a one way trip, get spotted and pray there is a cloud to hide in or die. Air Force records document that 80% of all B-17 missions flown were search and early on, they did not even carry bombs much to the frustration of the aircrew who would spot something and be able to do nothing.
When used in a naval attack capacity, due to many factors that actually had nothing to do with the aircraft itself, results were in the 1% - 2.5% range at putting bombs on target. I need to stress that these results were not at all due to the plane itself, but a cronic shortage of fuel and bombs for training, extreme fatigue on the aircrews due to the long missions flown as all missions were always at long range, lack of spare parts to keep aircraft flight worthy, poor airfield control resulting in wasting hours of fuel forming raids up (which reduced the range and increase fatigue), etc.
To condense the opinions into a simple list:
(a) Too accurate against naval targets.
(b) Too effective at inflicting ground casualties.
(c) Operate too easily at small bases.
(d) AA losses not on par with reality. (units being destroyed on the ground too quickly)
(e) Immunity to fighters too high still (non-B-17).
(f) Raid sizes too large.
(g) Overuse of low level attacks.
(h) Supply loss due to damage is too high.
These issues all relate to each other to some degree or another as far as cause and effect. For example, a smaller raid size would reduce naval hits obviously.
Possible solutions:
(a) limit raid sizes to finite numbers of planes OR dynamically adjust range and weapon load based on number of planes.
(b) limit basing of Medium/Heavy bombers to larger bases OR increase the operational loss rate penalty to a higher base size to increase the cost of operation.
(c) Double the intercept rates on large raids (ie: raid is so large that fighters get 2 chances to intercept and do damage).
(d) Increase the supply use of bombers to realistically cause forward basing to be a drain on other assets.
(e) Disallow basing at *overbuilt* bases. Use SPS value as limiting factor.
(f) Introduce a finite number of squadrons to a base rule or change the # planes = size x 50 rule to # engines = size x 50.
(g) Increase the chance of a raid not finding it's target. This should be a combination of range/weather/interception/fatigue.
(h) Increase runway repair rate but counter this with service repair rate decrease (you can fly what's working, but repairs take longer at damaged base).
(i) Decrease damage taken to ground units. Disruption should be a factor still (small harrassment raids to prevent folks from being able to sleep was used historically).
(j) Decrease damage taken to naval targets by forcing larger raids to break up into sections per target (ie: it took 9 B-17's to drop a pattern large enough to ensure a ship could not move out of the spread. For each group of 9, you have a sure hit, but the game doesn't work the math that way.)
(k) Increase AA effectiveness against slow flying level bombers (forcing them up higher for safety). Damaged planes should abort and not continue on to target.
As you can see, a lot of these possible solutions intermix with each other as to overall effects. For example, (k) would result in (j) & (i) not being required.
No one person is going to agree exactly what show or could be done, and not all folks will agree that something actually needs to be done based on the poll results of only 80% wanting something done. I think we can safely agree to disagree on this topic.
One of the toughest things to manage is the fact that we have history to look back on and not make the same mistakes so we already start with a huge advantage.
Being honest about this, I have a vested interest in shifting the game towards a naval focus as thats where my interests happen to be. Air Force domination in the latter part of WW II is well documented, but so is it's ineffectiveness during the early years as it's needs outgrew it's availability as technology continued to show what it could do.
A perfect example of this is the B-17 in 1942, where it was tasked with naval search, not because it was a naval search aircraft, but simply because it could shoot down intercepting fighters and still continue the search. PBY's (the search plane of the time) used in that roll were a one way trip, get spotted and pray there is a cloud to hide in or die. Air Force records document that 80% of all B-17 missions flown were search and early on, they did not even carry bombs much to the frustration of the aircrew who would spot something and be able to do nothing.
When used in a naval attack capacity, due to many factors that actually had nothing to do with the aircraft itself, results were in the 1% - 2.5% range at putting bombs on target. I need to stress that these results were not at all due to the plane itself, but a cronic shortage of fuel and bombs for training, extreme fatigue on the aircrews due to the long missions flown as all missions were always at long range, lack of spare parts to keep aircraft flight worthy, poor airfield control resulting in wasting hours of fuel forming raids up (which reduced the range and increase fatigue), etc.
