The Deutsches Afrikakorps in Heroes and Leaders mod

[asl3d]

Deutsches Afrikakorps is coming

[Monkie]

Looking forward to your further work for HOS, thank you so much for your efforts.

[asl3d]

ORIGINAL: Monkie

Looking forward to your further work for HOS, thank you so much for your efforts.

Hello Monkie. I appreciate your kind words. Hope you enjoy the new Heroes and Leaders mod Expansion: Desert Warriors.

By the way, as I usually say to new friends who participate in this forum, "welcome to the ruins of Stalingrad."

[Monkie]

Thanks for that, I have been messing with the scenario editor myself and figuring things out that are different than the LNL Digital edition. I've really been enjoying the Eastern Front scenarios, especially the Stalingrad maps, thanks again for the efforts in bringing to to the community.

[asl3d]

North Africa

As Generaloberst Franz Halder states: “The impossibility of securing a supply line across a body of water dominated by the enemy, the numerical and material inadequacies held by the Germans-and even more their allies-and the increasing lack of Luftwaffe fighting and transport units, these are all negative aspects of the campaign. On the positive side belongs the tempo and performance of field forces under the leadership of Rommel, forces which were without a doubt far above the average in initiative, spontaneity, and soldierly zeal.
The German experiences in African desert warfare are made unique by the fact that the command and the troops were faced with a mission in no way either planned or prepared, and they entered into it completely without prior prejudices. The experience gained, therefore, is free from outside theories and opinions and was only achieved by their struggling with an entirely new military situation; it thus has the value of originality.”
Not unlike many of the U.S. units engaged in the war with Iraq, the Germans in North Africa learned about combat operations in the desert only after they arrived on the scene and confronted the desert on its own terms.

[asl3d]

Desert Terrain and Climate

When the first German units were shipped to Africa in February 1941, the officers responsible for the operational planning had no data of any kind on the nature of the terrain and circumstances in the desert. The intelligence data furnished by the Italians was extremely meager, and the Italian maps were so inaccurate and so incomplete that they were used only for lack of something better. For this reason, the German command had to obtain all necessary information itself through reconnaissance.
The British Long Range Desert Group, apart from its intelligence and sabotage missions, carried out reconnaissance far behind the Italo-German fronts in Libya. The English maps captured by the German troops proved an excellent help. The results obtained in this reconnaissance work formed the basis for the British maps on the Italian colony of Libya, which were incomparably better, so far as quality, accuracy, and detail were concerned, than the Italian maps. The British maps were considered a particularly valuable prize when captured. The results of the methodical reconnaissance were consolidated in what might be called a traversability map and in reports, and these were made available to the command. These maps contained the following details:
• Terrain that could be traversed by any type of vehicle in all parts and in all directions.
• Terrain outside the tracks that was moderately or poorly suited for vehicular traffic.
• Terrain with many steep cliffs.
• Salty swamps and depressions that were impassable after rain.
• Sand dunes that were difficult for vehicular traffic.
• Information on plant growth.
• Broken terrain.
• Impassable cliffs.
• Cliffs that were less steep and that could be traversed in numerous places.
• Passes over the cliffs, with information as to whether they could be used by wheeled or only track laying vehicles.
• Trails, with information as to their usability for wheeled or track laying vehicles.

[asl3d]

3. Motorization

Prior to World War II, not a soul in the German armed forces imagined the possibility of it becoming necessary in any future war to conduct land warfare outside of Europe. This is why no particular attention was paid in the army to the military experiences of this type gained during World War I, particularly in the former German colony, German East Africa. It was only in 1935 that a subsection for colonial affairs was created in the Foreign Affairs Branch of the Reich Ministry of War. This subsection was staffed with only one officer who had fought in German Southwest Africa.
Prior to the outbreak of war in 1939, no preparations of any sort had been made in the German Army for any desert warfare that might possibly become necessary in the future. All preparatory work in the operational, organizational, and training fields had been restricted exclusively to preparations for the conduct of war on the continent of Europe. This was why a suggestion submitted by the Mapping and Survey Branch of the German Army General Staff in 1938 that the maps to be issued in the eventuality of mobilization should include maps of Denmark, Norway, and North Africa was disapproved as entirely unnecessary by the appropriate representative of the Operational Branch under instructions from the chief of that branch.
With the exception of the experience gained by General Graziani's army during its advance on Egypt in the winter of 1940, no information taken from military history was used in planning the campaign. It is an actual fact that early in 1941, the German troops reached the African theater of operations almost entirely unprepared for their new missions. One lesson that this experience pointed out is that troops that are not motorized are valueless in desert warfare and can do nothing whatever against a motorized enemy. General Graziani's army consisted almost exclusively of infantry units, and it was tied down, enveloped, and destroyed by the well-motorized British forces because it was unable to conduct mobile operations.
The African campaign took on such entirely new forms owing to the almost exclusive use of mobile troops by both sides in the desert. It was not possible in planning to make use of any examples taken from military history. Indeed, the methods of modern desert warfare were created by Field Marshal Rommel.

[asl3d]

4. Deutsches Afrikakorps

Up to the summer of 1940, the information available to the German Army General Staff on North Africa was restricted to the reports furnished by the German military attached in Rome and reports from agents of the German counterintelligence service. At the meeting between Hitler and Mussolini in October 1940, the dispatch of a German panzer corps to Libya was discussed, but no decision was reached. The 3d Panzer Division, which in peacetime was garrisoned in the Berlin area, had been reorganized in all haste for employment in the tropics as a precautionary measure; it was now available for other employment. So far as ground forces were concerned, the original plan was to send only a defense unit of brigade strength that was to be specially organized for the purpose, but it soon became evident that such a weak unit would not be able to give Germany's ally any really effective support. In January 1941, Hitler therefore decided to make a special corps of two divisions available, the German Africa Corps.
The march of events was too fast so that the first units of the German Africa Corps landed in Africa when the staff had just commenced its work in Libya. The German Army High Command was taken almost completely by surprise when the necessity arose to dispatch troops for warfare in the desert. Initially only one military-geographical bulletin was available. It had been prepared in a hurry and was not accurate in all points. A manual of instructions for the tropics was being drafted in the summer of 1942. It was not possible within Germany to accustom the troops to the intense heat to which they would be exposed, particularly at that time of the year, the winter of 1940. To a certain extent, the troops that had to wait any length of time in Italy for transportation to North Africa adapted themselves automatically to the heat.

[asl3d]

5. Organization

The composition of the units employed in Africa was the same as those in Europe. The pressure of time alone made any reorganization impossible in 1941, and later experience showed that no specialized organization is necessary for divisions and other units that are to be employed in desert warfare. However, it is necessary to have a far higher ratio of tanks and antitank weapons, since these are the two decisive weapons in the desert. It goes without saying that all units employed in desert warfare must be motorized.
It was necessary to implement a set of changes necessary so far as equipment was concerned: long-range artillery, long-range antitank guns, and tank guns decisively influenced the course of battle in desert warfare, and it was therefore necessary to employ more long-range weapons. No alterations of the weapons themselves were necessary.
In their 87.6-mm guns, the British had a light artillery piece with a longer range than the Germans' guns, but the German forces in Africa soon received 100-mm and 170-mm guns that had a longer range than any of the British guns. In 1941, the guns of the German Type III tanks had a longer range than the guns of the British tanks, and this was the reason for the success of the German tanks in that year, but from May 1942 on, the British employed American tanks of the Grant, Lee, and Sherman types that mounted guns with a considerably superior range of fire. In the Battle of Gazala, these guns came as a disconcerting surprise for the German tank units, and in the first phase of the battle, the British were able to gain considerable successes.

[asl3d]

6. Clothing and uniforms

The German army uniform was made from a watertight linen, cut in a style approximating the traditional uniforms of the former German colonial defense forces. These uniforms proved unsuitable both in style and material. The material was too stiff and did not give adequate protection against heat or cold. In the early mornings, the material absorbed moisture from the dew so that it became intolerable to wear the uniforms. The British tropical uniforms, in contrast, were made of pure wool and were excellent. Large quantities of the British uniforms were captured and worn by the troops of the German Africa Corps. The Germans especially liked the British trousers.
High boots were unsuitable in every respect, since in hot climates, everything must be done to prevent soldiers wearing any apparel on the legs that restricts the circulation of the blood. In this matter, the troops helped themselves by wearing only slacks, most of which came from captured British depots and which the troops wore over their boots. The German shoe with laces and a cloth tongue proved suitable. The shorts issued to the troops could not be worn during combat, since they left bare legs exposed to injury by thorns and stones.
The olive-drab caps with wide visors were excellent; the visor, in particular, was indispensable for the infantryman and for the gunner as protection against the intense glare of the sun. The German troops wore no steel helmets, in contrast to the British troops, whose steel helmets were more appropriate both in shape and weight, being lighter than the German helmets. The tropical coats issued, which were made from a thick woolen material, were good, but the English ones, which were fur-lined and reached only to the knees, were better. Owing to the stiff material from which it was made, the German tropical shirts were inferior to the British ones, which were made of so-called "Tropic" material.

[asl3d]

7 Logistical

Between February and May 1941, German transportation of troops and supplies across the Mediterranean functioned without interruption. The convoys reached Tripoli regularly and almost without losses. Immediately after its capture, Benghasi was used as a port of debarkation. At the request of the German command, Italian submarines were used as early as April 1941 to transport fuel for the most advanced elements of the Africa Corps. They discharged their cargo at Derna.
Between June and December 1941, British surface and submarine craft interfered with the transportation of German troops and supplies. The losses in shipping space and in materiel were considerable. To relieve the situation, air transportation groups were employed to move troops and materiel, while naval barges transported tanks and important spare parts. The use of Bardia as a port of debarkation close to the front was prevented by the British Air Force.
Between January and June 1942, transportation was favored by German superiority in the air, which was gained by the German Second Air Force and also by the fact that Malta was suppressed. The transportation of troops and supplies functioned smoothly and with few losses. Enough supplies were moved forward to enable the German-Italian Army to launch an offensive with limited objectives that advanced as far as the borders of Egypt in May-June. In addition, adequate supplies were stockpiled for a period of six to eight weeks against the eventuality of the air forces and naval vessels being employed in an operation to capture Malta.
Between July 1942 and May 1943, and as a result of Rommel's advance into Egyptian territory after the capture of Tobruk, the supplies deposited in the Benghasi and Tripoli areas for the front were practically useless, since the distances were too great for transportation of supplies on land and coastal shipping was prevented by the British. The British forces on Malta regained their strength and employed new types of bombers that were equipped with radar and had a wider radius of action. The British succeeded in bringing German convoy traffic to an almost complete standstill. Losses in materiel and fuel were so heavy that it was barely possible to obtain adequate supplies from Germany. The sea routes to Tripoli and Benghasi were completely severed.

[asl3d]

8 Zone of Operations

The zone of operations in the North African campaign in Libya and Egypt consisted of a strip of land, sometimes as much as sixty kilometres wide, bounded on one side by the coast and on the other by the desert interior.
The ground surface was either firm gravel, sand-covered gravel, or mixed sand and gravel. Within this entire zone, large parts of which were level plain, the desert could be traversed by all types of vehicles. The only exceptions were patches of deep sand, steep wadis and salty swamps, such as those at Marada. Natural sinuous defiles were formed at Derna and the Halfaya Pass at the border between Libya and Egypt.
Undulating, steppe-like terrain predominated, which consisted of low mounds and long ridges, whose average height above the surrounding terrain was from four to twenty meters. At times, these ridges had gentle slopes, and at other times, they rose steeply from broad, level valleys in which there were no watercourses. The summits were naked rock covered with loose rocks of varying size, which made motor traffic difficult but not impossible. In the valleys, the rocky bottom was covered by a layer of dust or clay of varying thickness. In dry weather, this ground could be traversed without difficulty by vehicles with four-wheel drive that were capable of cross-country travel. The terrain had patches of camel's thorn shrubs, around which the dust had blown to form small dunes. Traffic followed the broad paths, called Trighs or Pistes, which connected the few settlements and water holes. The coast itself was fringed by a belt of dunes behind which was a zone of salt swamps, called Sebchen, which were usually dry. The only parts of the coast where there were no dunes were the cliff sections at Tobruk, Bardia, and Sollum. There, the coastal sector was often inter• sected by deep wadis and was difficult to penetrate.
Toward the interior, the steppe-like zone gradually merged with the desert proper, which is practically devoid of any type of vegetation. On the whole, motoring was easier in the desert proper than in the steppe-like zone, although movement was rendered difficult in rugged areas.

[asl3d]

9 Mountain Ranges

The Cyrenaica Mountains, at points, reach a height of 875 meters above sea level. The mountains rise in two, high, steep terraces that can be traversed at only a few points and are intersected by numerous deep valleys, which make it impossible to conduct sizable operations except along roads. South of the topmost ridges, the mountains slope down gradually to the desert terrain, which is good for vehicular traffic. The Cyrenaica region was vulnerable to attack from the south-a fact that Rommel recognized at once during his attack in the spring of 1941. He delivered his main attack against Mechili, a desert fort designed to protect the southern approaches to the Cyrenaica. During every retreat, every effort was made to pass through this region as rapidly as possible to avoid being intercepted.
The Gebel Nefusa Mountains protruded like a barrier between the coastal plains of Tripoli and those of Misurata. South of Tripoli, they rose to a height of 700 meters above sea level. In the southeast, they descended in a gradual slope. At Homs, in the northeast toward the sea, their height was less than 200 meters above sea level. In the central part, this mountain range was extremely rugged, and motorized troops could only pass along the roads. From the north, this mountain range formed an impregnable fortress. From the southeast, however, it was vulnerable to attack in spite of the mountainous and intersected nature of its approaches. Possibilities for bypassing the area existed and were taken advantage of by the British in the attack in January 1943.
The Matmata Mountains, a range in south Tunisia, had a steep drop of 100 to 200 meters in the east. In the west, they sloped down gradually to a high plateau, which was sandy in parts, while in other areas, the ground was good for motor traffic so that it could be crossed by motorized columns. The steep, clifflike wall in the east and north was interrupted by numerous wadis, through some of which an ascent to the high plateau was possible. The Matmata Mountains narrowed down the size of the coastal plains of southern Tunisia considerably so that it was possible to organize a defense line at the narrowest point, at Mareth. However, the steep mountainside was only a weak protection against flanking attacks, since it could be bypassed with little difficulty.

[asl3d]

10 Steep Terraces

Most of the steep terraces in the steppe-like terrain were not high and followed a course parallel with the coast. Thus, they hardly interfered with troop movements. In the numerous caves, overhanging cliffs, and gorges, good opportunities could be found for troop shelters.
The Northern Rim of the Qattara Depression, on Which the Southern Flank of the El Alamein Line Was Based rim towered about 300 meters above the floor of the depression, which was 80 meters below sea level. Within the sectors held by the German-Italian forces, there were only three points at which motor traffic was possible, and even there, difficulties were encountered because of the deep sand. Throughout the entire campaign, no better protection for a flank was ever found than in the El Alamein line.
At the Steep Terrace at Sollum Between the BardiaCapuzzo High Plateau and the Sollum Coastal Plain there were two roads with numerous serpentine curves across the terrace, one from the Via Balbia-the tarred coastal road-the other from the Halfaya Pass road.
The large-size Wadis were found in the Cyrenaica region and in the eastern approaches to the Tripolitanian Mountain and extended as far as the Bay of Sirte. Usually the bed of a wadi consisted of a layer of soft sand; less frequently. On the whole, wadis could be considered as terrain obstacles-but as obstacles that could be overcome without difficulty unless obstinately defended. During the German-Italian retreat from El Alamein to Tunis, only one defense position was based on a wadi, namely the Buerat line, which extended along the Zem-Zem wadi south of the Via Balbia.

[asl3d]

11 Dune Terrain

Large sandy areas were found close to the coast, near larger wadis, and in the desert proper, where the Ergs (large areas of shifting sand dunes) present barriers that were impenetrable for traffic.
The dunes along the coast that interfered with traffic were found around Agedabia, on the shores of the Bay of Sirte south of Misurata, and in the neighborhood of Tripoli, in western Libya. These dunes impeded traffic off the roads, and even the roads were affected, since the dunes shifted constantly. After severe storms, the roads became so deeply covered with sand that they had to be cleared.
A large area of dunes was also found north of the EI Fareh wadi, between El Agheila and Marada along the shores of the Bay of Sirte. These dunes protected the German Marsa el Brega position against flanking attacks and forced the British to make a wide detour through the region south of the El Fareh wadi, where vehicular traffic was possible.
The big dunes of the desert proper were all south of the zone of operations, and only a section of them along the border between Libya and Egypt played a role of some tactical importance, since they afforded protection for the south flank of the German Alamein positions. The dunes in the desert proper were formed continuous ridges between four and fifty meters high that usually extended from north to south. A number of these ridges, driven by the wind, formed a labyrinthian confusion of dune ridges with completely encircled hollows in which the firm ground could be seen. To cross them, it was necessary to have the best cross-country vehicles available and to drive at top speed at the first dune, breaking through its crest, and on driving down the opposite slope, to gather speed for the next dune. In this way, one to two kilometers might be covered per day. Serious losses in personnel and materiel were unavoidable.
The Great Eastern Erg, a large dune area, extended from south Tunisia to south Algeria, close to the western border of Libya.

[asl3d]

12 Salt Swamps

These swamps developed at those points where the water in the subsoil of the desert rose to the surface. Owing to the constant evaporation that takes place in the desert, the salts carried by the water were deposited, and the resultant brine formed either a lake or, when mixed with sand and clay, a patch of thick, tough mud on which salt-marsh vegetation could take root. Once a person was caught in a salt swamp, it was impossible for him to escape without help. Vehicles sunk in salt marshes could be recovered but only on terrain that was not too swampy. In really soft, swampy ground, the vehicle had to be pulled out by another vehicle, which was often extremely difficult and could only be done if the latter was on firm ground and had a strong engine.
The biggest salt marsh in the Libyan and Egyptian deserts was the Qattara Depression, the surface of which was eighty meters below sea level. This depression and its northern rim protected the flank of the El Alamein line. The swamp itself was skirted by a zone of soft sand varying between one and two kilometers in width, on which a few vehicles could travel with some difficulty. The salt marsh that was within the German zone of operations in the Marsa el Brega line was considerably smaller. Nevertheless, in conjunction with the sandy patches and dune areas, it provided good protection against a frontal attack, in spite of the fact that it had numerous fords. The salt marshes of southern Tunisia, called Schotts, were of more importance. The Schott el Djerid was the terrain feature that led to the decision to construct the Gabes line, which served as a rear line for the Mareth line. In most parts, the Schott el Djerid was considered an impassable obstacle, but its eastern part, the so-called El Fedjad Schott, had numerous good fords that could be crossed without difficulty by vehicles.

[asl3d]

13 Communications system

Both Benghasi and Tripoli had good ports with ample capacities for shipping and landing, for which reason the former the German Army used as the main supply base. The capacities in the ports of Derna and Bardia, as well as the naval port of Tobruk, were much smaller.
There was no continuous railroad in Libya. The two railroads, each about thirty kilometers in length, in Tripolitania and in the Cyrenaica were of no military importance.
The only permanent signal communications system consisted of an open-wire telephone line, on poles, from Tripoli to Bardia. The distances spanned were extremely great, and the line made only limited communication traffic possible.
The water-supply facilities along the Via Balbia were adequate. The water holes in the desert, usually with a small supply of brackish water, were generally known only to the natives and were not indicated on maps.
Rain fell only in winter but was then sometimes very heavy, starting suddenly and swamping extensive areas, sometimes stopping all traffic, even on roads, for protracted periods. The only other moisture was the heavy dew at daybreak and in the evenings.
The outstanding weather feature was the sandstorms, which are called ghiblis. These sandstorms recurred pretty regularly every four weeks in all seasons of the year. They usually lasted three days, and since they reduced visibility to nothing, they brought all operations by ground and air forces to a standstill. During these sandstorms, the range of vision was often reduced to less than three meters so that orientation was impossible.
Owing to the wind from the sea, the climate in the coastal regions was almost always healthy.

[asl3d]

14 Order of Battle

The first units to be transferred to Africa between February and May 1941 were the corps headquarters of the Africa Corps and headquarters units together with the 5th Light Division, which was later reorganized to form the 21st and 15th Panzer Divisions.
During the summer months, a number of so-called oasis companies, a few battalions, and some coastal batteries were moved in, with an Africa Division Headquarters to control them. In the autumn of 1941, these units were consolidated to form a division, later designated the 90th Light Africa Division.
The German combat troops in Africa at the end of 1941 consisted of two armored and one light division. The two armored divisions remained under the command of the German Africa Corps. In the summer of 1941, this corps and the other army units in Africa were placed under the command of the newly created Panzergruppe Afrika. On 21 January 1942, this headquarters was redesignated Headquarters, Panzer Army of Africa, which designation was changed again in the autumn of 1942 to Headquarters, German-Italian Panzer Army.
In the summer of 1942, the 164th Light Africa Division and the Parachute Instruction Brigade were transferred to Africa. In 1942, about eighteen batteries were consolidated as Army Headquarters Artillery. This artillery was organized in two regiments and was placed under the command of the commander of artillery in Africa. In addition, the reconnaissance battalions of the 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions and the 580th Reconnaissance Battalion were consolidated to form a reconnaissance brigade under the immediate control of the Army Headquarters. The army also had the 900th Engineer Battalion, formerly a GHQ unit, available as a headquarters unit.

[asl3d]

15 Organization and Equipment

Initially, the German units were transferred to Africa with their normal tables of organization and equipment. The main changes that were effected immediately were that all vehicles were immediately fitted with new special dust filters; special units (water supply companies, water transportation columns, and geological teams), were organized immediately to take care of water supply and transportation problems; all vehicles were camouflaged by a coat of desert-colored paint and the troops were issued tropical clothes.
In 1941 additional changes became necessary. The antitank battalions arrived in Africa with 37-mm antitank guns. In the summer of 1941, these were exchanged for 50-mm guns, which were exchanged again in early 1942 for captured Russian 76.2-mm antitank guns. This was necessary because of the increased effectiveness of weapons used on both sides.
From early 1942 on, all infantry units were also assigned antitank guns, since tank warfare is the deciding factor in desert warfare, where the antitank gun becomes of even greater importance to the infantry than the machine gun. The aim of furnishing each battalion with eighteen 76.2-mm antitank guns was never achieved.
Types I and II tanks, some of which were armed with machine guns and some with 20-mm guns, were withdrawn after the summer of 1941 and replaced by Type III tanks, which had 50-mm guns. These, again, were replaced after the winter of 1941-42 by Type IV tanks, which had 75-mm guns.
All motorcycles were replaced by Volkswagens. Even the half-track motorcycles that were used for a while proved unsatisfactory.

[asl3d]

16. Dust

Men in the desert are constantly exposed to the effects of dust. This bothers the fighting man all the more because he has to endure it in conjunction with heat and the lack of water. There is no universal remedy against dust in the desert. Dust is a betrayer that enables observers, both from the ground and the air, to perceive every movement for great distances, even by individual vehicles. Every footstep on the surface of the desert throws up dust and sand. Moreover, the almost perpetual winds carry along dust with them, generally in the form of dust columns as high as a house, which form themselves into whirlwinds and dust devils.
The effects of dust on weapons and equipment, including motor vehicles, was considerable in the desert. Dust had the greatest effect on motor vehicles, because the dusty air that was sucked into the cylinders attacked the cylinders and pistons and caused these parts to wear out quickly. In tanks, the air was sucked out of the battle compartment. The average lifetime of engine in the desert was only 12,000-14,000 kilometers in comparison with 50,000-70,000 kilometers in other theaters of war. In the desert, it was necessary to change tank engines after about 3,500 kilometers, while they would last for 7,000-8,000 kilometers in Europe.
The barrels of guns, as well as all unprotected moving parts, were especially affected by dust. Machine guns, submachine guns, and other small arms were the weapons most endangered, because inasmuch as they were used on the surface of the ground, they were especially exposed to the effects of dust. It was necessary to protect all the movable parts of guns and equipment. The barrels of artillery pieces and rifles had to be provided with muzzle protectors whenever they were not being fired.