Matrix Games Forums

ORIGINAL: loki100

which is why I regularly, and indeed all the time, argue that AS should be seen as a highly specialised mission done for a very particular purpose.

In WiTW it had 2:

a)put your fighters over enemy airspace to look for a fight (escorts stick to their job of protecting bombers); or,
b)keep your defensive fighters in a very defined box

I don't think that (b) makes any sense in WiTE2, (a) has a potential value but given the relatively short range fighters of both sides its a bit hard to pull off

I'd suggest what you are seeing is WAD, hence the value of auto-intercept (when set up so it can work - which it does)

ORIGINAL: AlbertN

I believe the discussion about OPs losses being too high is already about by a few mouths since a while, not just for AS but in general.

It just seems some airplanes are made of thin paper or that pilots and crews are incompetent, when OPs losses tally 20 to 50% of an air recon team and to shrink recon mission time means you may as well not fly at all.

Then AS has the issue of potentially do little to nothing as discussed.

ORIGINAL: Great_Ajax

"Supply is for us the greatest difficulty in this war." - Richthofen.

"The air losses suffered by Fliegerkorps VIII in twelve days (August 10 to 21) while supporting I Army Corps in its effort to cut the main Moscow-Leningrad railroad dramatizes the impact of attrition on Luftwaffe strength. In this period supporting the advance of one army corps, Fliegerkorps VIII lost 10.3% of its aircraft (destroyed or written off as a result of operations), with 54.5% of its aircraft damaged but repairable. During this action, the air corps had 3.9% of its flying personnel killed, 5.7% wounded, and 2.9% listed as missing for a 12.5% total casualty rate.
"Aiding the Luftwaffe in its support of the army's advance was the flexible supply and maintenance system already discussed in relation to the French campaign. Units moved forward rapidly behind advancing spearheads; and as the campaign's emphasis shifted from one front to another, bomber and fighter units moved swiftly to to new bases and areas of operation. Such flexibility allowed the Luftwaffe to give maximum support to the armored drives and helped the army push ever deeper into Russian territory. Nevertheless, the continual movement of units across the Russian landscape was not without cost. These shifts strained the maintenance and supply system to the breaking point so that by late fall 1941, operational aircraft ready rates were way down, thereby having a negative impact on the whole force."

"Milch in a visit to the eastern front discovered that hundreds of inoperable aircraft were lying about on forward airfields. They had either broken down or been damaged in combat, and spare parts were not flowing forward to repair these aircraft."

Table XVII German Losses, All Cases - 1941 (Not including November) - Aircraft Written Off

Close Recce - 263 (total) - 165 (Due to Enemy Action ie combat losses) - 98 (Not Due to Enemy Action ie Operational Losses) - 37% operational loss rate

Long Range Recce - 290 (total) - 195 combat/95 Operational - 32% operational loss rate

Single-Engine Fighters - 1,327 (total) - 622 combat/705 Operational - 53% operational loss rate

Twin-Engine Fighters - 463 (total) - 246 combat/217 operational - 46% operational loss rate

Bombers - 1,798 (total) - 1,154 combat/644 operational - 35% operational loss rate

Stukas - 366 (total) - 225 combat/141 operational - 38% operational loss rate

Strategy for Defeat, The Luftwaffe 1933-1945 by Williamson Murray.

ORIGINAL: Great_Ajax

"Supply is for us the greatest difficulty in this war." - Richthofen.

"The air losses suffered by Fliegerkorps VIII in twelve days (August 10 to 21) while supporting I Army Corps in its effort to cut the main Moscow-Leningrad railroad dramatizes the impact of attrition on Luftwaffe strength. In this period supporting the advance of one army corps, Fliegerkorps VIII lost 10.3% of its aircraft (destroyed or written off as a result of operations), with 54.5% of its aircraft damaged but repairable. During this action, the air corps had 3.9% of its flying personnel killed, 5.7% wounded, and 2.9% listed as missing for a 12.5% total casualty rate.
"Aiding the Luftwaffe in its support of the army's advance was the flexible supply and maintenance system already discussed in relation to the French campaign. Units moved forward rapidly behind advancing spearheads; and as the campaign's emphasis shifted from one front to another, bomber and fighter units moved swiftly to to new bases and areas of operation. Such flexibility allowed the Luftwaffe to give maximum support to the armored drives and helped the army push ever deeper into Russian territory. Nevertheless, the continual movement of units across the Russian landscape was not without cost. These shifts strained the maintenance and supply system to the breaking point so that by late fall 1941, operational aircraft ready rates were way down, thereby having a negative impact on the whole force."

"Milch in a visit to the eastern front discovered that hundreds of inoperable aircraft were lying about on forward airfields. They had either broken down or been damaged in combat, and spare parts were not flowing forward to repair these aircraft."

Table XVII German Losses, All Cases - 1941 (Not including November) - Aircraft Written Off

Close Recce - 263 (total) - 165 (Due to Enemy Action ie combat losses) - 98 (Not Due to Enemy Action ie Operational Losses) - 37% operational loss rate

Long Range Recce - 290 (total) - 195 combat/95 Operational - 32% operational loss rate

Single-Engine Fighters - 1,327 (total) - 622 combat/705 Operational - 53% operational loss rate

Twin-Engine Fighters - 463 (total) - 246 combat/217 operational - 46% operational loss rate

Bombers - 1,798 (total) - 1,154 combat/644 operational - 35% operational loss rate

Stukas - 366 (total) - 225 combat/141 operational - 38% operational loss rate

Strategy for Defeat, The Luftwaffe 1933-1945 by Williamson Murray.

ORIGINAL: AlbertN

Number crunching again.

You have an In-Game function that is perceived as non functioning.

OPs losses generally perceived as high - which means the player feel they're wasting their resources.

That leads to pretty much 'passing' on the air war. Especially when results are ... debatable.

In my AARs I saw that for Ground Support the ... air significance was nihil. Maybe you wish to try to open up a Poll to see how many players actually use the Air War model there (Besides the dreaded Soviet Ground Attacks) and how they use it.

ORIGINAL: loki100

ORIGINAL: AlbertN

Number crunching again.

You have an In-Game function that is perceived as non functioning.

OPs losses generally perceived as high - which means the player feel they're wasting their resources.

That leads to pretty much 'passing' on the air war. Especially when results are ... debatable.

In my AARs I saw that for Ground Support the ... air significance was nihil. Maybe you wish to try to open up a Poll to see how many players actually use the Air War model there (Besides the dreaded Soviet Ground Attacks) and how they use it.

when you don't understand how something should work its not really a surprise that it doesn't work as you want it to. None of AS, GS or auto-interecept are broken when you understand how to use them

ORIGINAL: HardLuckYetAgain

ORIGINAL: loki100

ORIGINAL: AlbertN

Number crunching again.

You have an In-Game function that is perceived as non functioning.

OPs losses generally perceived as high - which means the player feel they're wasting their resources.

That leads to pretty much 'passing' on the air war. Especially when results are ... debatable.

In my AARs I saw that for Ground Support the ... air significance was nihil. Maybe you wish to try to open up a Poll to see how many players actually use the Air War model there (Besides the dreaded Soviet Ground Attacks) and how they use it.

when you don't understand how something should work its not really a surprise that it doesn't work as you want it to. None of AS, GS or auto-interecept are broken when you understand how to use them

That wasnt very nice Now directing this back to my subject.

I don't have a problem at all with GS and auto-intercept. Now Air Superiroty I do when the AS does NOT engage a single plane. So, if everyone would step back and look at this this way. I have 10 aircraft that take off on AS. They fly around don't meet anything and I take 20-30% loses on those aircraft just for flying. I will lose 2-3 aircraft. I fly AS again the next turn to protect this vital point with my 7-8 aircraft that survived and I will lose another 20-30% of that not meeting a thing in the air. Pretty much after some turns I can't fly at all because I will be out of aircraft from just trying to protect something and NO air combat. What it boils down to is this, "there has to be a different operational loss for AS that does NOT have any combat compared to AS directives that do have air combat". That is what I am saying and would make a whole bunch more practical sense then taking crazy operational losses not meeting a thing in the air. If I had an AS that was in combat, then sure hit me up with those Ops losses.