Professor Kotkin's lecture on Stalin at War.

[Nikel]

The third part of his biography on the dictator, still not published even though the lecture is from 2019.

Quote in 26:40 "My NY apartment is in some ways under occupation by Glantz's work"

Enjoyed listening to it, even though I would have liked that he talked more about what the lecture was not about (9:45).


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1NV-hq2akCQ

[Light4bettor]

I like that he calls the soviet factory relocation effort in 41 a myth. In effect, Kotkin suggests that the factories were indeed, for the most part, evacuated from the Ukraine (which at least kept them out of German hands), but that the effort was such a mess-(tracking where the rail cars went when they are mixed in with all the thousands of other rail cars-from a hundred other different factories- in depots deep in the middle of "nowhere central Russia")- that the new factories being established were being put up from scratch/improvisation. I've seen this idea before somewhere.

By the way, I also like some of Adam Tooze's discussions on his book "Wages of Destruction." Here's a recent one-https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e_pZtzELV48

[Light4bettor]

Quote in 26:40 "My NY apartment is in some ways under occupation by Glantz's work"

and while he extols its utility, he doesn't refrain from pointing out, in Kotkin's view, Glantz's overstating some aspects of the Soviet effort.

[Light4bettor]

One other thing that struck me while listening to Kotkin's talk was his statement that in 1941 85 percent of Germany's able bodied men aged 20-30 were already in the Wehrmacht (armed forces as a whole). I don't know if this is an over-simplification or if there is unstated nuance to this statement. Because if it is true, it is cutting the margins paper thin in terms of replacement quality.

[Jango32]

One other thing that struck me while listening to Kotkin's talk was his statement that in 1941 85 percent of Germany's able bodied men aged 20-30 were already in the Wehrmacht (armed forces as a whole). I don't know if this is an over-simplification or if there is unstated nuance to this statement. Because if it is true, it is cutting the margins paper thin in terms of replacement quality.

Here's the allocation as of the 4th of August 1941:

2022-08-03_09-35-10.png (298.12 KiB) Viewed 1257 times

[Light4bettor]

Wow thanks, that is an interesting chart to look at.

Listening to one of Tooze's talks- he pointed out this interesting (to me at least) tid bit about world auto production-
There were not a lot of vehicles in Germany in the late 30s to the start of WW2. A lot of people walked to work. And not many young people had an opportunity to learn to drive. German annual car production reaches just over 250k in 37-38. That's a drop in the bucket for a 80 million pop country. Compare USA car production in 1936 at 3.6 million cars (not to mention the years preceding 1936 in terms of cumulative numbers).

In fact, if we go by this chart-- the total number of trucks in Germany (an approximation given the numbers below) seem woefully inadequate for Barbarossa-- Yes, I am aware they "acquired" other trucks and truck manufacturing facilities along the way- but still.

I was not aware of how far ahead the USA was surging economically versus the old world since the 20's (at least as far as this chart shows.)

2022-08-03 00_33_03-Tooze Wages of destruction NYMAS 2022 - e58cb7fc-522f-4540-a713-804315676e58.pdf.png (523.99 KiB) Viewed 1237 times

[Light4bettor]

Here's the allocation as of the 4th of August 1941:

May I ask what source is that from? Is it a book? Thanks.

[Jango32]

Germany and the Second World War, volume V/I.

[Light4bettor]

Oh thanks, nice. I have Vol 1 and Vol 4 of that series-- plus the Map book that comes with the hardbound edition of Vol 4.

[Nikel]

I like that he calls the soviet factory relocation effort in 41 a myth. In effect, Kotkin suggests that the factories were indeed, for the most part, evacuated from the Ukraine (which at least kept them out of German hands), but that the effort was such a mess-(tracking where the rail cars went when they are mixed in with all the thousands of other rail cars-from a hundred other different factories- in depots deep in the middle of "nowhere central Russia")- that the new factories being established were being put up from scratch/improvisation. I've seen this idea before somewhere.

An immense mess, but they managed to do it and according to Bellamy:

"On 24 June a ‘Soviet’ — a Council — for Evacuation was set up. In the wake of the Red Army’s withdrawal it would ‘decide the most important strategic and war-economic task — re-basing powerful human and
material resources from the threatened regions to the east, to the rear of the country’."

And:

"Nevertheless, confused and imperfect though it was, with fragments of factories and a small, exhausted proportion of the workforce arriving in the wrong order in the dead of night, the
achievement is still astonishing. Some 1.5 million railway wagons carried enough of Soviet industry eastwards to begin to rebuild a war industry and economy which would outproduce the Germans and
compensate for the stupendous losses suffered. After two days of war, Stalin had focused on that inner truth. The hard definition of intellect. Priorities."


There are some numbers in the link below regarding German manpower.

https://www.feldgrau.com/ww2-germany-st ... d-numbers/

[Light4bettor]

Further from Walter S. Dunn's "The Soviet Economy and the Red Army, 1930-1945 (1995)"--

"The operation was not always orderly. Other indications that planning was not complete and that turnaround time was longer than average were anecdotes of equipment having been dumped beside the tracks to empty the cars for a return journey. Of the 700 plants evacuated in the first months, only 270 arrived at planned destinations fully equipped, and 110 arrived with only part of their equipment….At times, inadequate planning resulted in trains having been loaded with materials and dispatched with no destination to prevent capture by the Germans. These orphan trains moved around the country for long periods because there were no plans to use the equipment and no one knew what to do with them….."

[malyhin1517]

It can also be added here that the machines were unloaded in the steppes and during the construction of the workshop, when only the floor was ready and there was no roof, the machines were already starting to produce weapons, and often teenagers and women worked on the machines, because the men went to fight. A lot of equipment fell into misuse and was placed at other plants, many plants were attached to existing ones and after the war remained beyond the Urals, giving rise to industry in these remote regions of Russia.

[FortTell]

remained beyond the Urals, giving rise to industry in these remote regions of Russia.

Hey, that is a little unfair, the Urals already had significant factories before the war started: Uralmash (produced machine parts), Chelyabinsk tractor plant, Uralvagonzavod (railcars), Pyshma copper plant (now part of UMMC). Platinum, copper and gold were also mined. And if we stretch the "Urals" a little, we find Magnitogorsk, the largest steelmaking city of the USSR.

[malyhin1517]

remained beyond the Urals, giving rise to industry in these remote regions of Russia.

Hey, that is a little unfair, the Urals already had significant factories before the war started: Uralmash (produced machine parts), Chelyabinsk tractor plant, Uralvagonzavod (railcars), Pyshma copper plant (now part of UMMC). Platinum, copper and gold were also mined. And if we stretch the "Urals" a little, we find Magnitogorsk, the largest steelmaking city of the USSR.

I do not argue with this, but nevertheless, many factories appeared there as a result of evacuation from the European part of the USSR and were not returned after the end of the war.

[SigUp]

One other thing that struck me while listening to Kotkin's talk was his statement that in 1941 85 percent of Germany's able bodied men aged 20-30 were already in the Wehrmacht (armed forces as a whole). I don't know if this is an over-simplification or if there is unstated nuance to this statement. Because if it is true, it is cutting the margins paper thin in terms of replacement quality.

It is roughly correct. Fritz Fromm and the German Ersatzheer essentially mobilised everything they could for Barbarossa. In fact, the mobilisation level exceeded what was realistically sustainable. While replacements are one thing, the other thing is that this mobilisation level was a significant burden to Germany's war economy by removing able workforce from the economy. Fromm actually banked on being able to demobilise a significant chunk of the army still in 1941 after a quick victory over the Soviet Union (that never came). This significant workforce shortage was only solved by a combination of a massive use of forced labour and increasing usage of women.

Also, looking at the chart Jango32 posted you can also see another significant manpower problem Germany was dealing with: The complete lack of depth in the pool of fully trained personnel. Due to the restrictions of the Versailles Treaty, the strong birth years of 1901-1913 only received limited amount of short-term training after Germany reintroduced conscription in 1935. Meanwhile, the best trained birth years of 1914-1917 are limited in numbers due to the impact of the Great War on birth rates during that time (especially from 1916 onward as Germany started to really feel the effect of the British naval blockade). This means that the biggest burden of the German war effort up to and including Barbarossa was carried by a limited number of the numerically weakest birth years who consequently suffered the heaviest losses.

The Ostheer on 22 June 1941 was for all intents and purposes a single use weapon. It had to defeat the Soviet Union in one single stroke in the Summer of 1941. Otherwise the army's rapid degradation would leave it incapable of forcing a settlement in the East - which is what happened in the end (and, hence, also a key factor in Stahel's argument that the Battle of Smolensk essentially marked the failure of Barbarossa and Germany's defeat in the East).

[Light4bettor]

It is roughly correct.

Absolutely agree. This is also my current thinking. They continued kicking the can down the road after the Bialystok/Minsk pockets failed to deliver (or at least precipitate) a Soviet military/political collapse (a la French campaign)- and the conflict then began to coalesce into a semi-positional / attrition combat situation- which is long-term nightmare time.

Stahel's "Retreat from Moscow" (2019) was really eye-opening for me. I had grown up with all the tropes about the winter of 41 in Russia. But I think Stahel demonstrated Hitler's lack of influence on what was really going on that winter (in fact one might argue he stuck his head in the ground)- and how the leadership on the ground (Von Kluge, for one) managed the Heer's way out of the crisis- namely by only selectively following/ creatively interpreting directives from OKH.

Not to mention that one cannot overestimate the politics of command and their influence of decision making at the Army Gruppe- Armee- Korps- level (see the Guderian - Bock - Kluge dynamic in the first 4 weeks of operation Barborossa-- and futher- Guderian's relative autonomous actions- during and after Typhoon- before his sacking).