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This seems like a bug to me, as a Neutral Italy should have an easier time passing through and should not require it to be at War.

I think the issue is here, which requires a fully mobilized Italy.

{
#NAME= DE 706 - Italy: Continue through the Gibraltar Strait? (From East to West) (AI - 0% Yes)
#POPUP=
#MESSAGE= Ammiraglio di Squadra %N%N Say %B(YES) if you would you like our ships to continue sailing through the Gibraltar Strait to the Atlantic.%N%N If not, then say %B(NO) and they will remain in their current position.
#IMAGE=
#SOUND= teletype_1.ogg, teletype_2.ogg
#FLAG= 1
#TYPE= 2
#AI= 0
#LEVEL= 0
; Set global variable condition to always trigger (dummy value)
#GV= 1[1,100]
#LINK= 0[0]
#COUNTRY_ID= 59
#TRIGGER= 100
#DISPLAY_ORDER= 0
#DECISION= 706
#MPP_UPDOWN= 0
#MPP_TURNS= 0
#MPP_TEXT=
#NOTES= This event represents the ability the Axis had to slip small numbers of ships through the Gibraltar Strait.%N%N However, sending units through the Strait is not without risk as they may end their turn adjacent to Gibraltar, making them vulnerable to enemy attack.
#NOTES_POSITION= 136,114
; Set AI acceptance % (AI will accept 0% of the time)
#AI_RESPONSE= 0
#AI_RESPONSE_POPUP=
#DATE= 1939/09/01
#TEXT_RGB= 0,0,0
#SHADOW_RGB= 0,0,0
; Gibraltar is in Allied hands
#ALIGNMENT_POSITION= 136,114 [2]
;Set National Morale Trigger (dummy value)
#NATIONAL_MORALE_TRIGGER= 0 [0]
; 1st Line - Italy(59) aligned with Axis and not surrendered
#VARIABLE_CONDITION= 59 [1] [100] [0]
; An Italian Naval Unit is in place to travel through the Strait
#CONDITION_POSITION= 139,113 [0,0] [1,1] [1] [59]
#CONDITION_POSITION= 139,114 [0,0] [1,1] [1] [59]
}

From memory I think that was intentional, as only once she has entered the war should Italy be able to do it.

In WAW it is different as there Italy has some colonies elsewhere in the world that they may wish to defend, whereas here, they have nowhere reasonable to sail to until they have joined the Axis.

They can deploy subs.

IIRC, Gibraltar was open to neutral ships.

If it was intentional (which I do not argue), it is a fairly goofy, ahistorical implementation.

Making it more capable of allowing shipping to pass only after the ship's country are at war is making my brain hurt.

Yes, it's not so much about what was technically possible, so much as what was likely, coupled with what impact it might have in game.

In principle the Italian navy could have perhaps sailed out into the Atlantic in 1939 while the country was neutral, but what impact would this have had on its relations with other countries, on morale in Italy, and most importantly, what impact might this have in game if we allow it?

We can see this in WAW where we have already had to implement a mobilization script to prevent some gamey use of the Italian navy while Italy is still neutral. I don't really want to have to implement more here too, bearing in mind that there are always players who will try to use the system to gain an advantage that might not be historically realistic, and scripting in anti-exploitation events can be time consuming.

I know it can be done, as I have already made the modification, locally.

But consider:
- on Turn 1, Italy is still considered (by the world) to be neutral;
- on Turn 1, UK is neutral as well;
- UK does not have the grounds to prevent any ship from passing;
(that only came about as a result of a formal declaration of war against Germany, and even then, it only affords grounds to interdict German vessels.)
- Italy had overseas possessions;
- Unless Italy was massing their entire fleet, the world would not care if Italy dispatched some ships through the straits;

Freedom of the seas allows a ship to move freely on the ocean as long as it follows international law.

Very true, and I totally agree. However, such a move would have been seen as aggressive so it is possible it may have had consequences.

That said, in game terms there have been calls in WAW for Italians ships to not be allowed to sail via Gibraltar while Italy is neutral, therefore introducing it in this game, when people have asked for it to be removed from the other game, risks introducing issues (of the gamey exploit variety) that aren't currently present.

You can also strongly argue that Italy did not have the capacity to operate her navy at long distances and sailing the out into the Atlantic to potentially raid UK convoys (even if the Axis seized Gibraltar) was never much a serious possibility.

From a game aspect, we can already see that the DD that the neutral US gets is a great way to scout the sea lanes with impunity. 6 or so invulnerable (until Italy mobilizes) RM ships would make the Uboat campaign that much more lethal. The Axis player would just need to get his ships to safety as Italy increases its mobilization but the extra 'eyes' would be invaluable to the Germans.

It might also encourage a ploy that seems gamey to me of the RN ships entering the zone that increases Italy's mobilization and 'forcing' them to mobilize early.

Personally, when I was implimenting a fix to the following scripts, and discovered I could not send the Italians to test until *after* they were at war.

The Italians are extremely fragile, in-game, and there is not too much gamey-ness they can really afford.

Historically, they were sending vessels to/from East Africa via the Suez Canal, which is even more restrictive than the straits of Gibraltar.

As far as sending naval units to the Atlantic, historically they did operate out of the Atlantic and certainly had the capability to reach it.

https://www.wikiwand.com/en/BETASOM


{
#NAME= US East Coast Shipping Disrupted By Axis Raiders (Continuous)
#POPUP= The Presence Of Axis Vessels Disrupts US Coastal Shipping
#IMAGE=
#SOUND= sub_movement.ogg
#FLAG= 1
#TYPE= 2
#AI= 0
#LEVEL= 0
#GV= 1[1,100]
#LINK= 0[0]
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
; fixed here:
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
#COUNTRY_ID= 0
#ALIGNMENT_ID= 1
#FLAG_ID= 115
#TRIGGER= 100
#SEASON_FLAG= 0
#DATE= 1939/09/01
#SOURCE_POSITION= 7,112 [-1.6]
#SOURCE_POSITION= 7,111 [-1.6]
#SOURCE_POSITION= 11,105 [-1.6]
#SOURCE_POSITION= 11,106 [-1.6]
#SOURCE_POSITION= 12,106 [-1.6]
#SOURCE_POSITION= 16,104 [-1.6]
#SOURCE_POSITION= 16,103 [-1.6]
#SOURCE_POSITION= 18,100 [-1.6]
#SOURCE_POSITION= 18,99 [-1.6]
#DESTINATION_RESOURCE= 0,103 [1,2]
#DESTINATION_RESOURCE= 0,104 [1,2]
; Germany(45) Axis and not surrendered
; USA(115) Allied and not surrendered
#VARIABLE_CONDITION= 45 [1] [100] [0]
#VARIABLE_CONDITION= 115 [2] [100] [0]
}

Recently came across the following fairly comprehensive U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
thesis -
THE ITALIAN SUBMARINE FORCE IN THE BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC

Some very interesting data tables listed, to include "APPENDIX A -
ITALIAN SUBMARINE SUCCESSES IN THE ATLANTIC", which gives a breakdown of GRT sunk by date for each Italian submarine.

For the record, I was refering to the RM surface fleet when talking about theirlo.ited range.

Far enough.

So, was the RM considered a blue water navy ?

While they lacked Aircraft Carriers (or even integrated air assets), the Regia Marina was deployed in the Mediterrean (obviously), the Red Sea, the Black Sea, the Atlantic and even the Pacific during World War II.

The Regia Marina had a naval base in the concession territory of Tientsin in China. The primary Italian vessels based in China were the mine-layer Lepanto and the gunboat Carlotto. During World War II, Italian supply ships, auxiliary cruisers and submarines operated throughout the waters of the Far East, often in disguise.

There was even consideration given toward using parts of the recently acquired Italian fleet (after 1943), in the war against Japan.

Churchill meanwhile told the his foreign secretary, Anthony Eden, who was in London: “Assuming we get the Italian Fleet, we gain not only that fleet but the British fleet which has hitherto contained it. This very heavy addition to our Naval power should be used at the earliest possible moment to intensify the war against Japan.” He instructed acting First Sea Lord, Admiral Syfret (who had relieved the ailing Dudley Pound) to confer with the Chief of the U.S. Naval Staff, Admiral Ernest King, about the way the Italian Fleet, once reconditioned, might be employed in the Pacific against Japan. In particular Churchill hoped that no fewer than ten aircraft carriers, suitably supplemented by the Italian Littorio class battleships and smaller craft, might be able to take part in a favoured operation of his against Northern Sumatra, one which the British Chiefs of Staff profoundly opposed.

Even Uncle Joe felt he was entitled to 1/3 of the Italian fleet - which caused great concern about making them unavailable to be used against Japan.

By 7 October 1943, however, the Russians had indicated an interest in taking over about one-third of the Italian Fleet, a desire they communicated to Eden when he visited Moscow later that month. As Eden warned the War Cabinet on 27 October, the Soviet commissar for foreign affairs, V.I. Molotov, had requested “1 Battleship, 1 Cruiser, 8 Destroyers, 4 Submarines and 40,000 tons of shipping,” which Eden thought reasonable and worth granting quickly, not least because “an early favourable decision would be very helpful at the Moscow Conference.” Eden named a third of the Italian navy on the basis that Italy had surrendered to all three Allied powers.

Although the British Chiefs of Staff weren’t opposed to this in principle, they did feel that “handing over of the ships would, however, give rise to a great many difficulties which would need very careful examination.” War Cabinet member Field Marshal Smuts of South Africa, whose views carried great weight in London, thought that it ought to be discussed by Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin at their next meeting, at Teheran.

The War Cabinet were concerned that if Molotov’s demands were met, the ships would not be used against Japan; that the ships were not conditioned for Arctic weather; that the Free French, Greeks and Yugoslavs might also make demands for Italian vessels as part of what was already being called the “United Nations” that had defeated Italy; and above all that it might “discourage Italian co-operation” if the Italian Navy and Government discovered that they were about to be handed over to Bolshevik Russia.

Italy did not have the oil or logistics to go far.
Ships were designed for short range unlike US and UK ships, not to mention lack of support vessels.

Italy had enough oil reserve stocks (assuming it was not replenished) for 12-18 months of war, certainly enough to venture into the Atlantic, had they chosen to do so in 1940.

It was not until 1942 that Italy's big ships became mostly inactive due to lack of fuel.

It was thought that the war would not have last long and that the little fuel reserve would be sufficient. As a matter of fact, until January 1941, there were no limitations on the use of oil fuel.

In the early months, the situation deteriorated further because of a drop in Romanian and German supplies. In April, the navy stockpile reached its minimum of 14.000 tons available. If we consider that a single class battleship needed 4000 tons to have its tanks replenished, we can get a clear picture of how the situation was dire. However, from the end of April, the fuel flow from Romania was re-established and the navy could receive 50.000 tons a month. To spare more naphtha, the Regia Marina suspended the mine-laying operations carried out by cruisers. These measures allowed the Italians to deploy the majority of their surface fleet against the allied operations in June 1942.

There were discussions in 1940 that if Gibraltar could be liberated that the RM would sail to the Atlantic and assist in a hypothetical operation Sealion (1941).

Additionally, the Regia Marina actually had more oil reserves than reported -

After several studies, some well-known historians pointed out several discrepancies between the fuel status reports the Regia Marina was sending to the Germans and the quantity reported by the historical bureau of the Italian Navy. The most evident of these discrepancies was noted in the meeting of Merano, in February 1941, where the head of the Navy, Admiral Riccardi, stated that the Navy had only 610,000 tons left when in fact, reserves amounted to over 1 million tons. One can easily assume that the Navy had created a sort of black fund of oil fuel to be used as a last resource with the double scope of obtaining more of the now available German fuel and, in relative security, to coordinate naval operations.