Chains of War 11 - Air Sea Battle 24/7/18
Posted: Wed Aug 23, 2023 7:52 pm
As the conflict around Japan and Korea settled into stalemate, the US and Australia form TF77 with a brief to clear the South China Sea of enemy forces and escort an amphibious formation to the Southern Philippines. The intention is to neutralise Chinese bases on the artificial islands of the Spratly and Paracel chains. Though you have plenty of Tomahawks, you are told to use them sparingly, as they will be needed later. Weather is expected to be stormy and laser- and EO/IR-guided weapons are likely to be ineffective (you don’t have any of these loaded at the outset).
The scenario has a duration of SIX days, so I intend to play it a day at a time, with breaks for other games, posting up to six entries on this post.
All US/Australian task groups start at the corner of the Java Sea next to Sumatra, with outlying units elsewhere. Supporting the CVN Nimitz are two cruisers, three DDGs and two oilers, while the Eisenhower has a similar escort with one less cruiser. Both have substantial air groups, mostly consisting of F-18 Hornet variants along with some F-35s on Nimitz and support aircraft and choppers. The useful AMRAAM D is widely available, along with a range of strike munitions.
The US part of the amphibious group centres on the carrier America, which has choppers, Ospreys and a small force of F-35s with AMRAAM Ds. Her escort comprises a cruiser and three destroyers and the warships are accompanied by four transports.
Having entered the war, Australia furnishes the helicopter carrier Canberra, with a destroyer, four frigates and a landing ship. There are no relevant aircraft apart from ASW choppers on the escorts.
You have four spare Arleigh Burke DDGs, which can be assigned to the other groups as desired. Four US littoral combat ships are loitering off Singapore (for all the use they are) and there are three SSNs and two Aussie SSKs between the task force and the two exits from the Makassar Strait between Borneo/Kalimantan and Sulawesi/Celebes.
A number of F-18s and F-22s are based in Australia, but carry older versions of the AMRAAM and will, in any case, require a lot of tanker support to get near the action. Here and at Christmas Island, there are ample numbers of maritime patrol planes, but the distances involved in this scenario means that their endurance is going to be severely challenged. A healthy number of tankers is on-hand, which is just as well, since without them you are totally screwed. Some UAVs are also provided for recon and, if nothing else, they have long legs.
At Tinian in the Marianas, there are four B-1 bombers and another pair of tankers. The Lancers are restricted to one loadout each and only two of these four are genuine stand-off weapons, so they need to be used with care.
China has a variety of weapons with which to stop you. Most menacing are the ballistic missiles expressly designed to combat US carrier groups. The DF-21D has a range of 1,100nm (in theory) and, even optimally sited in Southern Hainan, can only reach halfway down the coast of Borneo, so you can avoid them by steering through the Makassar Straits. The superior DF-26 reaches 2,160nm, however and can only be escaped by sailing S of Christmas Island, which is a real stretch for conducting offensive operations against the Spratly and Paracel Islands. Besides, you probably wouldn’t get time to reach this haven. The missiles can’t be used unless the Chinese get a firm fix on your location, but they have plenty of satellites passing overhead and some have the radar to see through the weather. Especially as you have the risk of being found by submarines, UAVs and conventional aircraft, it is not really practical to escape detection over six days. The only weapons you have that can stop a DF-26 are the RIM-161s, of which the Nimitz and America groups have 30 each and the Eisenhower group 14. RIM-174s can theoretically stop DF-21s, but it would be unwise to count on it. Otherwise, you have decoys and electronic countermeasures.
Perhaps the next most serious threat is China’s force of H-6G Badger bombers, which can each carry four anti-shipping cruise missiles. Closer to the island chains, they can supplement these with Flounders and Flankers carrying Kryptons and the like. Batteries of YJ-62 cruise missiles are emplaced on the islands, while offshore, there is known to be an SAG of two DDGs, four FFGs and an oiler, as well as detached groups of Houbei missile corvettes. Finally, there are SSNs and SSKs in the theatre of operations.
Needless to say, the islands have batteries of HQ-9, HQ-12 and HQ-17 SAMs, as well as MANPADs and AA guns. Strikes on Mainland China and Hainan are expressly forbidden at this time.
Day 1 (13:00Z 14/7/18 to 13:00Z 15/7/18)
I calculated that it would take the America and Canberra groups over 130 of the available 144 hours to reach the Mindanao Sea arrival zone via the Makassar Strait, moving at the cruise speed of the slowest horse. This seemed satisfactory, so I sent them E to begin with, assigning the DDGs Stockdale and Spruance as additional escorts and setting-up Poseidon and Orion patrols in the Java Sea. The SSN Texas and the SSK Sheehan would sweep the Makassar Strait in advance.
It seemed best to keep the Nimitz and Eisenhower groups S of DF-21 range off the W coast of Borneo. From here, they could mount strikes against the targets with tanker support. We could only pray that the DF-26s wouldn’t do too much damage when they arrived and that China only had a few of them. The DDGs Kidd and Lawrence were assigned as support. Needless to say, everything moved with radars and other emissions off. Patrol planes and the SSNs Pasadena and Hampton were told to scour the assembly area for enemy subs. It was only at the end of the first day of the scenario that I realised that the Nimitz and Eisenhower groups were meant to go to the Mindanao Sea as well. This means that everything has to go via the Makassar Strait and further extends the range for strikes against the island targets. As it is, I’m now probably too late to get the carriers there and must hope that this does not make a bad position even more unrecoverable.
As for the four LCS near Singapore, their only real use seemed to be to distract Chinese strikes away from the high-value assets. I dispersed them to prevent all four falling to the same sub and hoped for the best.
13:00Z: It was soon apparent that the Chinese were going to get far better support from their satellites than we were from ours. We only had the benefit of the occasional pass, whereas the enemy had the regular services of a much larger constellation. We did detect half a dozen Flankers and four Firebirds over the islands. On early evidence, there seemed little danger of our task forces running out of fuel over the six days and magazines seemed fairly well-stocked, at least.
14:00Z: Data began to accumulate about enemy defences on the islands and their SAG and missile boat squadrons were located. Our patrol planes were struggling with distance, though re-basing aircraft to Christmas Island helped alleviate this. Three Chinese Soar Dragon UAVs were forging steadily S and, although they could only detect our non-existent emissions, something had to be done about them.
18:00Z: After much nursing from a tanker, an Aussie F-18 from RAAF Tindal in Northern Territory destroyed two of the Soar Dragons. This saved wasting AMRAAM Ds on them, but necessitated more tanker support to get the plane home again. It was necessary to use an F-35 from America to shoot down the Westernmost UAV. It seemed that Chinese aircraft losses would score us no VPs.
19:00Z: The F-35 made the most of her loadout and tested enemy CAP, downing a Flanker and escaping.
21:00Z: Another F-35 managed to destroy a Flanker after much in-flight refuelling. USS America’s Lightnings have less endurance than the ones on Nimitz, partly because America is further away from the action. It illustrated how problems would worsen if everything went via the Makassar Strait.
Inevitably, the Chinese got a satellite or submarine fix for their DF-26s and attacked with what I suspect was their full complement of eight. They targeted the Canberra group, which was the least valuable but the most defenceless. The FFG Arunta was sunk for 250VP and the Canberra was struck and died of wounds later for 1,250 more. Losses of choppers at 100VP each added-up to a further 1,300VP penalty. I’d done everything I could think of to remain hidden. USS Stockdale was sent to link-up with Nimitz and the surviving amphib TF ships forged on.
23:00Z: USS Texas detected a sub at the N end of the Makassar Strait. It was too close for comfort at about 5nm away, so I loosed two torpedoes. The Chinese boat evaded at Flank and somehow managed to slip away. Texas lay low and waited for her to reappear.
25/7/18 00:00Z: A large Badger formation was detected by Hawkeye to the S of Vietnam, heading for the carriers. A nearby F-35 attacked, but all four of her AMRAAMs were spoofed or plain missed. Eight F-18s launched from the carriers and USS America sent two more F-35s to help. I assumed that we would be fending-off cruise missiles, but the Chinese were out-of-range, possibly didn’t have a firm location fix and kept coming. They had some ludicrous good fortune with spoof rolls, but still lost 15 of their number and the survivors withdrew. No VP scored, of course, whereas each of Canberra’s ‘no loadout’ choppers was worth 100...
03:00Z: Texas re-acquired the sub contact in the Makassar Strait. This time, the Kilo’s luck ran out, but the sinking scored no points. It was now clear that only hitting targets on the Spratly and Paracel Islands and, possibly, getting ships or task groups to the Mindanao Sea would score anything. With fighters and SAMs to subdue with long-ranged, heavily tanker-supported strikes before there was any realistic chance of attacking the island targets, we faced a long wait. Meanwhile, any losses of our own were going to hurt us badly. It was also very depressing...
04:00Z: An F-35 destroyed a pair of Flankers as we continued to harass the Chinese CAP.
05:00Z: The F-35s bagged another Flanker.
06:00Z: The surviving Badgers completed refuelling from a Midas tanker and returned suicidally for another go. Five more were downed by CAP and maybe one escaped.
We then endured a long spell where our F-35s simply couldn’t hit a Flanker. AMRAAMs fired at 70nm range were being outrun and petering out, while those fired at 60nm ran the risk of overshooting if the enemy planes kept coming. When this didn’t happen, they simply missed…
In the middle of this, I tried firing two Tomahawks at the SIGINT bunker on Cuateron Reef, which did not seem to be defended by more than AA guns. In keeping with the prevailing ill-fortune, the missiles coincided with the Mischief Reef airbase scrambling about eight Flankers to engage one of our Lightnings and were intercepted and destroyed.
09:00Z: Again, an F-35 engaged three Flankers at 70nm. Again, the Chinese turned and ran and the missiles petered-out. Our pilot tried again at 60nm with his last AMRAAM, but missed on a 52% shot.
Suddenly, USS Russel, an Arleigh Burke with the Nimitz group, was sunk by DF-21s, four having been fired. Another 250VP gone. I had calculated how close I could get to the Southern tip of Hainan, but had wanted to cut things fine to minimise the distance my strike planes would have to travel. Russel’s sinking happened 1,107nm from the closest place the DF-21s could have been UNLESS they were on the Spratlys or Paracels (and recon had detected lots of other stuff, but no ballistic missile TELs). It may only have been a matter of 7nm, but the DF-21s were out of range (and our ships had all stopped). It is possible that the problem stemmed from map changes since the scenario was written. Seriously doubting whether it was worth the bother, I pulled both carrier groups back about 75nm.
10:00Z: Another F-35 engaged the Flankers at 60nm and actually managed to down one after over 20 misses. All relevant aircraft were told to engage at 60nm, which on the evidence to-date was too far away from the Flankers for them to get a clear return shot.
11:00Z: Another pair of F-35s engaged. By now, with six of their number down, the Fiery Cross Reef squadron were not in evidence, though some must have been readying. The Mischief Reef squadron, instead of having two birds up at a time, had a policy of surging at anything within range and once again came at me en masse. My lead Lightning destroyed its opposite number, but was then obliged to flee, at which point the back-up plane decided to go to a tanker and refuel (and you don’t dare put the tankers too close).
So, after a day, the score is -3,050. Not as bad in actuality as this sounds, as the Chinese are probably out of DF-26s, have lost most of their Badgers and also a submarine, whereas the units we’ve lost were not essential and our combat readiness is largely unimpaired. However, the CAP at the islands is only down about 20% and it will take quite a while to finish the job at the rate we are going, after which we’ll still have to reduce the SAMs and carry-out the strikes. Five more days might be enough but, on the other hand, only the America is going to reach Mindanao in time, even if all is well with her. We also have no idea whether the VP we’d get for the targets on the islands will suffice to pull back the huge deficit.
The scenario has a duration of SIX days, so I intend to play it a day at a time, with breaks for other games, posting up to six entries on this post.
All US/Australian task groups start at the corner of the Java Sea next to Sumatra, with outlying units elsewhere. Supporting the CVN Nimitz are two cruisers, three DDGs and two oilers, while the Eisenhower has a similar escort with one less cruiser. Both have substantial air groups, mostly consisting of F-18 Hornet variants along with some F-35s on Nimitz and support aircraft and choppers. The useful AMRAAM D is widely available, along with a range of strike munitions.
The US part of the amphibious group centres on the carrier America, which has choppers, Ospreys and a small force of F-35s with AMRAAM Ds. Her escort comprises a cruiser and three destroyers and the warships are accompanied by four transports.
Having entered the war, Australia furnishes the helicopter carrier Canberra, with a destroyer, four frigates and a landing ship. There are no relevant aircraft apart from ASW choppers on the escorts.
You have four spare Arleigh Burke DDGs, which can be assigned to the other groups as desired. Four US littoral combat ships are loitering off Singapore (for all the use they are) and there are three SSNs and two Aussie SSKs between the task force and the two exits from the Makassar Strait between Borneo/Kalimantan and Sulawesi/Celebes.
A number of F-18s and F-22s are based in Australia, but carry older versions of the AMRAAM and will, in any case, require a lot of tanker support to get near the action. Here and at Christmas Island, there are ample numbers of maritime patrol planes, but the distances involved in this scenario means that their endurance is going to be severely challenged. A healthy number of tankers is on-hand, which is just as well, since without them you are totally screwed. Some UAVs are also provided for recon and, if nothing else, they have long legs.
At Tinian in the Marianas, there are four B-1 bombers and another pair of tankers. The Lancers are restricted to one loadout each and only two of these four are genuine stand-off weapons, so they need to be used with care.
China has a variety of weapons with which to stop you. Most menacing are the ballistic missiles expressly designed to combat US carrier groups. The DF-21D has a range of 1,100nm (in theory) and, even optimally sited in Southern Hainan, can only reach halfway down the coast of Borneo, so you can avoid them by steering through the Makassar Straits. The superior DF-26 reaches 2,160nm, however and can only be escaped by sailing S of Christmas Island, which is a real stretch for conducting offensive operations against the Spratly and Paracel Islands. Besides, you probably wouldn’t get time to reach this haven. The missiles can’t be used unless the Chinese get a firm fix on your location, but they have plenty of satellites passing overhead and some have the radar to see through the weather. Especially as you have the risk of being found by submarines, UAVs and conventional aircraft, it is not really practical to escape detection over six days. The only weapons you have that can stop a DF-26 are the RIM-161s, of which the Nimitz and America groups have 30 each and the Eisenhower group 14. RIM-174s can theoretically stop DF-21s, but it would be unwise to count on it. Otherwise, you have decoys and electronic countermeasures.
Perhaps the next most serious threat is China’s force of H-6G Badger bombers, which can each carry four anti-shipping cruise missiles. Closer to the island chains, they can supplement these with Flounders and Flankers carrying Kryptons and the like. Batteries of YJ-62 cruise missiles are emplaced on the islands, while offshore, there is known to be an SAG of two DDGs, four FFGs and an oiler, as well as detached groups of Houbei missile corvettes. Finally, there are SSNs and SSKs in the theatre of operations.
Needless to say, the islands have batteries of HQ-9, HQ-12 and HQ-17 SAMs, as well as MANPADs and AA guns. Strikes on Mainland China and Hainan are expressly forbidden at this time.
Day 1 (13:00Z 14/7/18 to 13:00Z 15/7/18)
I calculated that it would take the America and Canberra groups over 130 of the available 144 hours to reach the Mindanao Sea arrival zone via the Makassar Strait, moving at the cruise speed of the slowest horse. This seemed satisfactory, so I sent them E to begin with, assigning the DDGs Stockdale and Spruance as additional escorts and setting-up Poseidon and Orion patrols in the Java Sea. The SSN Texas and the SSK Sheehan would sweep the Makassar Strait in advance.
It seemed best to keep the Nimitz and Eisenhower groups S of DF-21 range off the W coast of Borneo. From here, they could mount strikes against the targets with tanker support. We could only pray that the DF-26s wouldn’t do too much damage when they arrived and that China only had a few of them. The DDGs Kidd and Lawrence were assigned as support. Needless to say, everything moved with radars and other emissions off. Patrol planes and the SSNs Pasadena and Hampton were told to scour the assembly area for enemy subs. It was only at the end of the first day of the scenario that I realised that the Nimitz and Eisenhower groups were meant to go to the Mindanao Sea as well. This means that everything has to go via the Makassar Strait and further extends the range for strikes against the island targets. As it is, I’m now probably too late to get the carriers there and must hope that this does not make a bad position even more unrecoverable.
As for the four LCS near Singapore, their only real use seemed to be to distract Chinese strikes away from the high-value assets. I dispersed them to prevent all four falling to the same sub and hoped for the best.
13:00Z: It was soon apparent that the Chinese were going to get far better support from their satellites than we were from ours. We only had the benefit of the occasional pass, whereas the enemy had the regular services of a much larger constellation. We did detect half a dozen Flankers and four Firebirds over the islands. On early evidence, there seemed little danger of our task forces running out of fuel over the six days and magazines seemed fairly well-stocked, at least.
14:00Z: Data began to accumulate about enemy defences on the islands and their SAG and missile boat squadrons were located. Our patrol planes were struggling with distance, though re-basing aircraft to Christmas Island helped alleviate this. Three Chinese Soar Dragon UAVs were forging steadily S and, although they could only detect our non-existent emissions, something had to be done about them.
18:00Z: After much nursing from a tanker, an Aussie F-18 from RAAF Tindal in Northern Territory destroyed two of the Soar Dragons. This saved wasting AMRAAM Ds on them, but necessitated more tanker support to get the plane home again. It was necessary to use an F-35 from America to shoot down the Westernmost UAV. It seemed that Chinese aircraft losses would score us no VPs.
19:00Z: The F-35 made the most of her loadout and tested enemy CAP, downing a Flanker and escaping.
21:00Z: Another F-35 managed to destroy a Flanker after much in-flight refuelling. USS America’s Lightnings have less endurance than the ones on Nimitz, partly because America is further away from the action. It illustrated how problems would worsen if everything went via the Makassar Strait.
Inevitably, the Chinese got a satellite or submarine fix for their DF-26s and attacked with what I suspect was their full complement of eight. They targeted the Canberra group, which was the least valuable but the most defenceless. The FFG Arunta was sunk for 250VP and the Canberra was struck and died of wounds later for 1,250 more. Losses of choppers at 100VP each added-up to a further 1,300VP penalty. I’d done everything I could think of to remain hidden. USS Stockdale was sent to link-up with Nimitz and the surviving amphib TF ships forged on.
23:00Z: USS Texas detected a sub at the N end of the Makassar Strait. It was too close for comfort at about 5nm away, so I loosed two torpedoes. The Chinese boat evaded at Flank and somehow managed to slip away. Texas lay low and waited for her to reappear.
25/7/18 00:00Z: A large Badger formation was detected by Hawkeye to the S of Vietnam, heading for the carriers. A nearby F-35 attacked, but all four of her AMRAAMs were spoofed or plain missed. Eight F-18s launched from the carriers and USS America sent two more F-35s to help. I assumed that we would be fending-off cruise missiles, but the Chinese were out-of-range, possibly didn’t have a firm location fix and kept coming. They had some ludicrous good fortune with spoof rolls, but still lost 15 of their number and the survivors withdrew. No VP scored, of course, whereas each of Canberra’s ‘no loadout’ choppers was worth 100...
03:00Z: Texas re-acquired the sub contact in the Makassar Strait. This time, the Kilo’s luck ran out, but the sinking scored no points. It was now clear that only hitting targets on the Spratly and Paracel Islands and, possibly, getting ships or task groups to the Mindanao Sea would score anything. With fighters and SAMs to subdue with long-ranged, heavily tanker-supported strikes before there was any realistic chance of attacking the island targets, we faced a long wait. Meanwhile, any losses of our own were going to hurt us badly. It was also very depressing...
04:00Z: An F-35 destroyed a pair of Flankers as we continued to harass the Chinese CAP.
05:00Z: The F-35s bagged another Flanker.
06:00Z: The surviving Badgers completed refuelling from a Midas tanker and returned suicidally for another go. Five more were downed by CAP and maybe one escaped.
We then endured a long spell where our F-35s simply couldn’t hit a Flanker. AMRAAMs fired at 70nm range were being outrun and petering out, while those fired at 60nm ran the risk of overshooting if the enemy planes kept coming. When this didn’t happen, they simply missed…
In the middle of this, I tried firing two Tomahawks at the SIGINT bunker on Cuateron Reef, which did not seem to be defended by more than AA guns. In keeping with the prevailing ill-fortune, the missiles coincided with the Mischief Reef airbase scrambling about eight Flankers to engage one of our Lightnings and were intercepted and destroyed.
09:00Z: Again, an F-35 engaged three Flankers at 70nm. Again, the Chinese turned and ran and the missiles petered-out. Our pilot tried again at 60nm with his last AMRAAM, but missed on a 52% shot.
Suddenly, USS Russel, an Arleigh Burke with the Nimitz group, was sunk by DF-21s, four having been fired. Another 250VP gone. I had calculated how close I could get to the Southern tip of Hainan, but had wanted to cut things fine to minimise the distance my strike planes would have to travel. Russel’s sinking happened 1,107nm from the closest place the DF-21s could have been UNLESS they were on the Spratlys or Paracels (and recon had detected lots of other stuff, but no ballistic missile TELs). It may only have been a matter of 7nm, but the DF-21s were out of range (and our ships had all stopped). It is possible that the problem stemmed from map changes since the scenario was written. Seriously doubting whether it was worth the bother, I pulled both carrier groups back about 75nm.
10:00Z: Another F-35 engaged the Flankers at 60nm and actually managed to down one after over 20 misses. All relevant aircraft were told to engage at 60nm, which on the evidence to-date was too far away from the Flankers for them to get a clear return shot.
11:00Z: Another pair of F-35s engaged. By now, with six of their number down, the Fiery Cross Reef squadron were not in evidence, though some must have been readying. The Mischief Reef squadron, instead of having two birds up at a time, had a policy of surging at anything within range and once again came at me en masse. My lead Lightning destroyed its opposite number, but was then obliged to flee, at which point the back-up plane decided to go to a tanker and refuel (and you don’t dare put the tankers too close).
So, after a day, the score is -3,050. Not as bad in actuality as this sounds, as the Chinese are probably out of DF-26s, have lost most of their Badgers and also a submarine, whereas the units we’ve lost were not essential and our combat readiness is largely unimpaired. However, the CAP at the islands is only down about 20% and it will take quite a while to finish the job at the rate we are going, after which we’ll still have to reduce the SAMs and carry-out the strikes. Five more days might be enough but, on the other hand, only the America is going to reach Mindanao in time, even if all is well with her. We also have no idea whether the VP we’d get for the targets on the islands will suffice to pull back the huge deficit.