Matrix Games Forums

I know it's late in the day and WarPlan is more ore less complete, but I thought I'd mention this.

I cannot find a source right now, but the reason Norway did not mobilize was because
a) they wanted to stay neutral,
b) not antagonize either side
and
c) they also though the war would stay down in Europe like World War 1.

Germany also recongnized this in their planning for Weserübung, and synchronized their attacks on the two countries.

Personally I am conviced any attack on Denmark would have led to full Norwegian mobilization. Specualtion I know, but not unreasonable.

Therefore, I'd like to suggest (much like Netherlands/Belgium), that an attack on Denmark is also an attack on Norway, for the purposes of the game.

Hmmm....

That would render the German airborne useless in the attack as they have to drop from Denmark.
Germany would be required to use Landing Craft...and probably 20...so they would have less Shipyards for subs...though it may not matter.

The bigger issue is the longer the delay for the attack on Norway the easier it is for the UK to drop a unit in Narvik and then transfer a corps in...which means it will be lost...
Germany would need to move armor to dislodge them...with the navy which is unlikely.


Perhaps in the next version you may be able to cut supply of the unit via air which then would be reasonable.
But if you can cut supply you must be able to "keep" supply by maybe stationing a fighter there?

Honestly I think the UK should not be able to build LC until April 40....OR make Narvik a 0 port so it does not supply the Allies if the rest of the country is Axis...

Doing an april attack simultaneously on Denmark and Norway is tricky. Landing troops from destroyers and other auxiliary ships is not simulated and Germany building LCs in 1940 would never have happened. Dropping the airborne at Oslo in April is usually foiled by the bad weather. And a UK Fortress Narvik in an Axis Norway should not be able to be supplied. Simulating Weserubung in Warplan is hardly possible.