Matrix Games Forums

Posted: **Thu Jun 26, 2025 8:10 pm**

Friends,

I'm working on a new series of scenarios. It assumes World War III started in 1968 with the Soviets attempting to seize territory in both eastern and western Turkey--they want to control the Turkish straits and to create an open corridor of territory leading to Syria and Iraq. If they can take all of Turkey, they will; if not, they will settle for what they can get.

I'm trying to figure out the "world" parts of this World War. The Soviets are NOT trying to invade Europe...they've focused their efforts on Turkey and reinforced their other borders to protect against counterattacks. My question is what other operations they would be likely to use.

I'm assuming they would try to interrupt Atlantic trade to prevent resupply of Turkish and other NATO forces. This would involve going after merchants in the Mediterranean and attempting to reach the Straits of Gibraltar, with other Atlantic trade/convoys/warships being attacked as opportunities allow. They would also do this as diversions...if it looks like a large Soviet force will be operating near Iceland, for instance, it forces NATO to send at least some forces to Iceland to deal with them, as opposed to sending everything to the eastern Mediterranean. Even if it is obvious that their primary goal is Turkey, NATO can't just ignore other attacks.

Does this make sense? Does attacking shipping in the Atlantic sound like something the Soviets would do as part of a campaign to occupy much or all of Turkey?

What other things might to Soviets do with the intent to force NATO to effectively split its forces between Turkey (the real target in this war) and other secondary objectives? Would they attack NATO airbases in other parts of Europe, for example? Not because they're planning to invade, but simply to weaken NATO any way they can now that they are at war.

Thanks in advance.

Posted: **Thu Jun 26, 2025 9:34 pm**

The most important thing they would do outside of the offensive in Asia Minor/the Aegean would be massive reinforcement of East Germany and Czechia. Even if they don't intend to attack across the iron curtain, they would want to do everything they could to prevent a NATO offensive across it. The only offensive that MIGHT still happen in Central Europe would be a siege/assault on West Berlin, but that wouldn't be at the outset.

In this era of Cold War One, that would probably be to NATO's disadvantage, as they would be unlikely to use Nukes first, and they wouldn't have the pre-positioned strength for a real drive eastward, especially since their forces had been locked into preparing for a defense, at least at first. NATO Air forces might launch a campaign against their counterparts in the GDR and Czechia though.

At the minimum NATO would have to spend time mobilizing and getting reinforcements across the Atlantic. This would incentivize the limited Soviet fleet to attempt some form of SLOC interdiction in the Atlantic, but they wouldn't be as strong as they would become in this realm in the 70s & 80s. I think the main Soviet goal here would be to tie down NATO combat vessels rather than actually interdict the SLOC effectively.

I suspect that Moscow's best strategic play would be to do everything they can to tie down NATO forces along the Central front in Germany as well as Norway to prevent significant reinforcements being sent to the Aegean. This would be a combination of periphery attacks and posturing near the Iron Curtain. The Soviets would want their own "Phoney War".

There would be significant debate in the Kremlin and Stavka as NATO mobilizes, with some wanting to maintain the defensive posture, and others wanting to strike before NATO is ready to attack, being keen to remind their colleagues about June 1941.

This is convenient for Moscow as well, as the excuse of war breaking out would allow them to "peacefully" flood Czechoslovakia with troops as a sort of hidden crushing of the Prague Spring rather than the PR disaster that happened historically with Operation Danube on Aug. 20-21. Then again, could this also lead to a Czech revolt? "The Soviets are pouring in here, and NATO is mobilizing, maybe this is our chance?"

As for the rest of the world, Pyongyang might want to join in on the action by renewing the war on the 38th Parallel, but Moscow would probably be conflicted about this. A renewed Korean War would divert US resources, but could also be dangerously escalatory. Seoul would already be on alert though, due to the recent border clashes and the infamous Blue House Raid. 1968 was probably the most dangerous year for the DMZ after 1953.

I've long been intrigued by the idea of what scenarios could be made in Indochina where WW3 breaks out DURING the Vietnam War with the US already heavily committed in-country. In Aug. 1968, as your previous scenarios on this are set, the PAVN and VC have already sapped alot of their strength in the Tet Offensive and Khe Sanh. This war would cut off significant Soviet aid for the time being, since it had largely been coming in by sea.

At the same time, US Troop strength in the area would have been around it's peak, and it's likely that Washington would want to transfer some formations to Europe or Japan rapidly. Maybe the Johnson Admin would "take the gloves off" of MACV and allow operations across the 17th Parallel.

It's impossible to say how the unrest in the US would affect all this. The DNC in Chicago wouldn't have happened yet and it's a particularly contentious election year. Maybe this was part of Moscow's calculus in attacking Turkey.

I think the Soviet Pacific Fleet would probably want to do what it could to try to stem the flow of troops & equipment from Vietnam back to Hawaii-US West Coast.

China is a big question mark. This was during both the Cultural Revolution as well as the tense periods of the Sino Soviet Split, with the historical border clashes in Manchuria occurring in 1969. Moscow was terrified of hordes of Chinese storming northward into Siberia, and it's conceivable that the attack on Turkey would give the Mao regime the excuse it wants.

The bottom line is that Moscow wants to isolate the war as much as possible to Turkey and the Aegean, but in their mind, they can't do that without actively keeping NATO forces away, which requires building up at the Iron Curtain at minimum, and attacks in other locations to keep them all from piling into the Eastern Med. They want a "Limited" war, but they can't really do that because the NATO threat is too big.

And all of this would have to include some kind of pretext that Moscow would use to (try) to isolate Turkey politically and attempt to make it look like it's an "Between us and Ankara only" war.

1968 is a very interesting year to speculate about Cold War One going hot. It offers significant theoretical advantages to Moscow in terms of the NATO threat, but also was at a time of heightened threats from China and potential internal threats (i.e. the Prague Spring). At the same time, I'd argue it was possibly the weakest point for the Western Alliance during Cold War One (maybe tied with 1973), with the US waist-deep in Vietnam and major domestic divides and crises, which were also happening in Western Europe.

(Sorry about the long wall of text, stuff like this really gets my brain going!

)

Posted: **Sun Jun 29, 2025 1:01 am**

These are interesting ideas. Thank you.

Yes, a big build-up in Czechoslovakia would allow the Soviets the suppress the Prague Spring while making the West believe a second front will open up in that part of Europe. There would be conflicting intelligence on this point, but enough people would be worried about the expected attack in Europe to divert forces to West Germany. Meanwhile, isolated raids on air fields or other assets would allow the Soviets to distract the West, weaken the West's ability to counterattack, etc. while probably not risking too many assets. [And this can be the basis of one or more future scenarios in the 1968 "campaign"--I'm using that word rather loosely, although I'm trying to create a coherent common back story for all these scenarios.]

I'm not entirely sure how to use the Vietnam War in this situation, but I knew from the first it would be significant. With so many American carrier groups tied up in the South China Sea, it's going to take a while to move some of them to the Atlantic. Normally, it would be about three weeks, but since Egypt is siding with the Soviets, they have probably closed the Suez Canal, which means ships have to spend an extra week going around Africa. Going across the Pacific and through the Panama Canal (which might come under attack from forces based in Cuba...again, not an invasion, but a combination of diversion/destruction of assets attack) takes about the same amount of time. Suffice that it will be about a month before American carriers in the South China Sea could reach the Mediterranean. A couple would be in the Atlantic to begin with, but those forces will be limited compared to what America could do if it was not busy in Vietnam. And any carrier trying to reach the Mediterranean would have to go through Gibraltar, a perfect choke point for ambush by Soviet submarines, Algerian missile boats, etc.

But this does give a mission to the Soviet Pacific Fleet. They would have sortied and are waiting to ambush any carrier groups headed to Pearl Harbor, Panama, etc. Perhaps the Soviets will have a couple of experimental carriers with some hypothetical aircraft like Yak-25s ready to strike. They're no match for an American carrier group in a stand-up fight, but if they can surprise American ships in the Pacific, they can do some damage and then sneak away. Or finish off any stragglers damaged by submarines.

China...I think China would take a wait and see approach. If the West takes enough damage fighting the Soviets, the Chinese might attack Taiwan, but they won't do it while so many carriers are still in the region. But an attack on Taiwan might be something that takes place a month or so into the war. I'll have to see how I feel after I write the other scenarios.

India...India might use this opportunity to attack Pakistan and/or might let the Soviets use their ports. I suspect rather than attack Indian ports directly, except perhaps for a few isolated strike missions, NATO would try to ambush any Soviet forces trying to make their way across the Indian Ocean or out of the Persian Gulf (there wouldn't be many...the Soviets usually didn't have too many forces forward-deployed to the Indian Ocean, but they might have one SAG that needs to be dispatched) but I could probably get one or two good scenarios out of this.

Anyone else have any thoughts on all this?

HalfLifeExpert wrote: Thu Jun 26, 2025 9:34 pm The most important thing they would do outside of the offensive in Asia Minor/the Aegean would be massive reinforcement of East Germany and Czechia. Even if they don't intend to attack across the iron curtain, they would want to do everything they could to prevent a NATO offensive across it. The only offensive that MIGHT still happen in Central Europe would be a siege/assault on West Berlin, but that wouldn't be at the outset.

In this era of Cold War One, that would probably be to NATO's disadvantage, as they would be unlikely to use Nukes first, and they wouldn't have the pre-positioned strength for a real drive eastward, especially since their forces had been locked into preparing for a defense, at least at first. NATO Air forces might launch a campaign against their counterparts in the GDR and Czechia though.

At the minimum NATO would have to spend time mobilizing and getting reinforcements across the Atlantic. This would incentivize the limited Soviet fleet to attempt some form of SLOC interdiction in the Atlantic, but they wouldn't be as strong as they would become in this realm in the 70s & 80s. I think the main Soviet goal here would be to tie down NATO combat vessels rather than actually interdict the SLOC effectively.

I suspect that Moscow's best strategic play would be to do everything they can to tie down NATO forces along the Central front in Germany as well as Norway to prevent significant reinforcements being sent to the Aegean. This would be a combination of periphery attacks and posturing near the Iron Curtain. The Soviets would want their own "Phoney War".

There would be significant debate in the Kremlin and Stavka as NATO mobilizes, with some wanting to maintain the defensive posture, and others wanting to strike before NATO is ready to attack, being keen to remind their colleagues about June 1941.

This is convenient for Moscow as well, as the excuse of war breaking out would allow them to "peacefully" flood Czechoslovakia with troops as a sort of hidden crushing of the Prague Spring rather than the PR disaster that happened historically with Operation Danube on Aug. 20-21. Then again, could this also lead to a Czech revolt? "The Soviets are pouring in here, and NATO is mobilizing, maybe this is our chance?"

As for the rest of the world, Pyongyang might want to join in on the action by renewing the war on the 38th Parallel, but Moscow would probably be conflicted about this. A renewed Korean War would divert US resources, but could also be dangerously escalatory. Seoul would already be on alert though, due to the recent border clashes and the infamous Blue House Raid. 1968 was probably the most dangerous year for the DMZ after 1953.

I've long been intrigued by the idea of what scenarios could be made in Indochina where WW3 breaks out DURING the Vietnam War with the US already heavily committed in-country. In Aug. 1968, as your previous scenarios on this are set, the PAVN and VC have already sapped alot of their strength in the Tet Offensive and Khe Sanh. This war would cut off significant Soviet aid for the time being, since it had largely been coming in by sea.

At the same time, US Troop strength in the area would have been around it's peak, and it's likely that Washington would want to transfer some formations to Europe or Japan rapidly. Maybe the Johnson Admin would "take the gloves off" of MACV and allow operations across the 17th Parallel.

It's impossible to say how the unrest in the US would affect all this. The DNC in Chicago wouldn't have happened yet and it's a particularly contentious election year. Maybe this was part of Moscow's calculus in attacking Turkey.

I think the Soviet Pacific Fleet would probably want to do what it could to try to stem the flow of troops & equipment from Vietnam back to Hawaii-US West Coast.

China is a big question mark. This was during both the Cultural Revolution as well as the tense periods of the Sino Soviet Split, with the historical border clashes in Manchuria occurring in 1969. Moscow was terrified of hordes of Chinese storming northward into Siberia, and it's conceivable that the attack on Turkey would give the Mao regime the excuse it wants.

The bottom line is that Moscow wants to isolate the war as much as possible to Turkey and the Aegean, but in their mind, they can't do that without actively keeping NATO forces away, which requires building up at the Iron Curtain at minimum, and attacks in other locations to keep them all from piling into the Eastern Med. They want a "Limited" war, but they can't really do that because the NATO threat is too big.

And all of this would have to include some kind of pretext that Moscow would use to (try) to isolate Turkey politically and attempt to make it look like it's an "Between us and Ankara only" war.

1968 is a very interesting year to speculate about Cold War One going hot. It offers significant theoretical advantages to Moscow in terms of the NATO threat, but also was at a time of heightened threats from China and potential internal threats (i.e. the Prague Spring). At the same time, I'd argue it was possibly the weakest point for the Western Alliance during Cold War One (maybe tied with 1973), with the US waist-deep in Vietnam and major domestic divides and crises, which were also happening in Western Europe.

(Sorry about the long wall of text, stuff like this really gets my brain going! )

Posted: **Mon Jun 30, 2025 3:01 am**

Political factors are probably a much bigger influence than the Soviets' material capacity to do stuff.

Historically during this period, the Soviets were much more concerned about a war with China than with NATO. Brezhnev regarded Mao as a total madman. So the events that lead up to this land grab in Turkey are an important factor.

If this alt-history does not include tensions with China easing, it is unlikely the Soviets will do anything in the Pacific. They regarded China as a serious threat, to the point that they raised a number of new ground force and air force formations during beginning in 1969 (and the last UR-100 ICBM divisions to be deployed had their missiles wired entirely for targets in China). It was very much a three-way Cold War at this point, and the Soviets would regard the Chinese with just as much fear as they did NATO.

Likewise China was probably unlikely to partake in any war, as it feared a Soviet invasion (Mao called Soviet foreign policy "social imperialism") and was embroiled in the Cultural Revolution. The Cultural Revolution was so intense that just a year prior to your alternate WWIII, PLA troops, siding with one faction of Red Guards, utilized tanks and artillery to massacre another faction of Red Guards in Chongqing. China was in no state to go to war with either the USSR or Taiwan.

Soviet actions in Europe would probably mirror their real life strategy towards Asia. The GSFG, Northern Group of Forces, and other commands on the rest of NATO's periphery (including the Northern Fleet) would probably be strictly defensively oriented. The Soviets would also having a greater willingness to use tactical nuclear weapons in these theaters, given their abandonment of any offensive action there. This strict defensive posture would be necessitated by forces facing Turkey suddenly taking priority for ammunition and fuel consumption (among other supplies). Forces in Europe would essentially need to do what forces in the Far East were expected to do if war broke out in Central Europe; make do with supplies on hand and hold out until the war is won in the primary theater.

Because of logistical limitations, the Soviets were also unlikely to encourage North Korea to attack South Korea. North Korea was already content to engage South Korea using asymmetrical warfare in the ongoing DMZ conflict, and if North Korea was to go to war, it would create a logistical headache for the Soviets. The initiation of a conflict in the Middle East might even result in a divergence in the course of the Vietnam War, as supplies meant for North Vietnam are redirected to Soviet forces.

Overall, contrary to taking action anywhere else in the world, the Soviets would probably try to signal the intention not to attack and their willingness to de-escalate everywhere else. The Soviets would urge other allies outside of the immediate Middle Eastern theater to not go to war with any long-standing rivals, as they would want to avoid a multi-front war. They would also avoid attacking NATO forces outside of those directly involved in defending Turkey. The goal would be to sow division in NATO and force the organization to abandon one member in favor of preserving the rest, while also creating a favorable logistical situation for Soviet forces fighting Turkey.

Any escalation on other fronts would have to be initiated on the American/NATO end, making attacks on different frontiers of the Soviet bloc to force them to tie up forces there. This would also invite the Soviets to respond with their own escalation—the kind of action mentioned in the OP, bombing air bases in Central and Northern Europe, and so forth. The Soviet General Staff and then-Minister of Defense Andrei Grechko in particular would probably press the CPSU to widen the war. It had only been four years since the end of Khrushchev’s rule, which was regarded as having significantly weakened the Soviet military.

Given this inferiority complex and the traditional Soviet paranoia about foreign invasion, in the event of NATO raids in Europe, the military would press hard to expand the war and strike first, against the CPSU’s wishes to limit the war. Soviet doctrine favored a well-planned first strike, influenced by their experience with the invasion of Manchuria during WWII. The alternative was sitting back and waiting for another Operation Barbarossa, with similar disastrous results. The details of Soviet action outside of the Middle East in response to NATO’s diversion attempts would depend on the situation in the primary theater.

China will definitely remain a non-factor no matter what, unless this is a significant alternate history in how the preceding two decades of the Cold War transpired—including Mao's domestic political strategy.

Matrix Games Forums

Question about Soviet tactics

Question about Soviet tactics

Re: Question about Soviet tactics

Re: Question about Soviet tactics

Re: Question about Soviet tactics