Page 1 of 1

Assorted Questions

Posted: Mon Feb 16, 2026 6:20 pm
by Vanman
Greetings all,

A few questions I have been pondering over.

In the Presence of the Enemy
-Do you use this rule? I have never used it. Its seems to have the benefit of mitigating deep, and some might say somewhat unrealistic, excursions behind the nominal naval frontlines. Yet, wouldn't it have the also unrealistic drawback of restricting the EuroAxis sub range in the Atlantic?

Fortifications
-Do you use this rule? They are relatively cheap. The CW buying one early and having it secure the northern Gibraltar border largely nixes an Axis advance into Spain (though it can be a quagmire so maybe giving them an incentive may not be a bad thing). In many cases they can be circumvented relatively easily, but in others like just north of the Quattara Depression could be a wise move. Thoughts?

US Entry into the war
-In your experience, when is the average time the USA tends to enter the war? March/April 42? Of course there can be a bit of a spread between the Japanese and Euro Axis since the latter have no incentive to DOW the USA.

Pacific War
-As the Japanese, do you tend to wait until the USA DOW you? Dragging out their entry as long as possible? If you tend to DOW, do you DOW the CW a turn before you DOW the USA? How do you tend to handle this situation as Japan?

Thanks.

Re: Assorted Questions

Posted: Mon Feb 16, 2026 6:35 pm
by Orm
Vanman wrote: Mon Feb 16, 2026 6:20 pm Greetings all,

A few questions I have been pondering over.

In the Presence of the Enemy
-Do you use this rule? I have never used it. Its seems to have the benefit of mitigating deep, and some might say somewhat unrealistic, excursions behind the nominal naval frontlines. Yet, wouldn't it have the also unrealistic drawback of restricting the EuroAxis sub range in the Atlantic?
Greetings Steve,

SUBs are not affected by this rule. Only surface ships.

I've used it in about half the games that I've played, and it has both disadvantages and advantages, in my humble opinion. At the moment I lean towards playing without it.

I would say that the "unrealistic excursions behind naval frontlines" was what the Germans tried to do historically with their surface ships. And did. So I would claim that this option stops the realistic excursions behind naval frontlines.

The major disadvantage with this rule is that one can place a single, obsolete SCS, in a sea area and that would be enough slow down any enemy mission to the sea area or trying to sail through the sea area. Highly unhistorical if you ask me. :)

Re: Assorted Questions

Posted: Mon Feb 16, 2026 6:42 pm
by Orm
Vanman wrote: Mon Feb 16, 2026 6:20 pm
Fortifications
-Do you use this rule? They are relatively cheap. The CW buying one early and having it secure the northern Gibraltar border largely nixes an Axis advance into Spain (though it can be a quagmire so maybe giving them an incentive may not be a bad thing). In many cases they can be circumvented relatively easily, but in others like just north of the Quattara Depression could be a wise move. Thoughts?
I use most options that adds extra units, and I always vote to include fortifications. I think it adds flavour to the game, and I think it is fair that one is allowed ot build them after the game begun since preexisting fort-sides are included.

As CW I often build one, or more. Usually place them at Gibraltar or Singapore. Although placing them in Egypt has been considered I have yet to do so. Other units have been taking production priority and once Egypt been under serious threat there have not been time enough to build them.

Re: Assorted Questions

Posted: Mon Feb 16, 2026 8:19 pm
by Angeldust2
Vanman wrote: Mon Feb 16, 2026 6:20 pm In the Presence of the Enemy
-Do you use this rule? I have never used it. Its seems to have the benefit of mitigating deep, and some might say somewhat unrealistic, excursions behind the nominal naval frontlines. Yet, wouldn't it have the also unrealistic drawback of restricting the EuroAxis sub range in the Atlantic?
This optional is beneficial for an interesting game. It gives a meaning for command of the sea areas. Sometimes it leads to small naval battles, instead of both sides just sitting in ports as fleets-in-being. As Orm has already cleared up, sub operations are not hampered by ITPOTE. I agree with Orm's other views on this as well, but weigh his objections much lower, more tactical, thereas MWIF should focus more on the strategic level, which ITPOTE helps to enhance overall.
Fortifications
-Do you use this rule? They are relatively cheap. The CW buying one early and having it secure the northern Gibraltar border largely nixes an Axis advance into Spain (though it can be a quagmire so maybe giving them an incentive may not be a bad thing). In many cases they can be circumvented relatively easily, but in others like just north of the Quattara Depression could be a wise move. Thoughts?
This is one of the few Optionals, I am not keen on to play with.I agree, too cheap, too powerful. Especially the ability to place it anywhere depending on current situation, does not fit the characteristics of a permanent installation with long building time.
US Entry into the war
-In your experience, when is the average time the USA tends to enter the war? March/April 42? Of course there can be a bit of a spread between the Japanese and Euro Axis since the latter have no incentive to DOW the USA.
Usually, whenever the Japanese player decides to attack. This will be more often 41ND than 42MA, alone already because of weather considerations.
Pacific War
-As the Japanese, do you tend to wait until the USA DOW you? Dragging out their entry as long as possible? If you tend to DOW, do you DOW the CW a turn before you DOW the USA? How do you tend to handle this situation as Japan?
No, as Japan I would focus on an own surprise impulse as much as possible, most likely against all Western Allies at the same time.

Re: Assorted Questions

Posted: Tue Feb 17, 2026 1:23 pm
by rkr1958
To expand on Angledust2's key last point, the surprise impulse for a Japanese DOW on the the US, CW and Free France allows Japan to make a large number of amphibious invasions easily. This includes automatic landings at a large number of small islands or key points, like NEI oil, due to 1 notional - 1 for surprise = 0 notional.

Of course, this requires long term planning and prep to maximize this.