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Report on the organization of communications in the Spanish Republican Army dated June 6, 1937.

In the old Spanish army, there was the signal regiment consisting of three battalions: a telegraph battalion, a telephone-optical battalion, and a radio battalion. There were no signal units in the field troops, and only during maneuvers did the signal regiment form signal companies, one for each division. These companies were responsible for establishing communications with the corps headquarters and with the battalions.
From the reviewed materials on the maneuvers, it is evident that technical communications were generally absent, and only horse messengers were used. The organization of communications was managed by general-purpose officers appointed by the command, and their individual orders show their complete lack of expertise in this matter. The signal regiment was trained exclusively in specialized laboratories, with a focus on optics. There were no training sessions for the command staff.
During the fascist uprising, the entire signal regiment and its equipment defected to Franco, and only a few officers who were on leave at the time and about three telephone companies stationed at the communications center in Madrid remained loyal to the Republic. These companies were used to form two signal companies, which were deployed to the Madrid area and actually began working when the enemy was close to Madrid. During the retreat of the Republican units to Madrid, civilian telephone and telegraph communications and motorcycles were primarily used.
Since the formation of the regular army, the primary focus has been on training specialists and producing communications equipment.
Over the past six months, the following achievements have been made in this area.

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Personnel training.
The communications center in Albacete releases 500 soldier-telephonists every 15 days, 20-30 corporals every month, and 150 low-power radio operators every 3 months. In addition, schools of communication specialists have been established at the fronts, which can cover 100-150 soldiers with a training period 15-20 days. There is an officer's school for 150 men. with a training period of 3 months (60 men of this group were released early, and the rest are expected to be released in July).

Manufacture of communications equipment.
«Standard» factory in Madrid produces per week: telephones – 200, low-power radio stations – 25, switches – 20. The cable factory in Barcelona produces 100 km of cable daily. The rest of the communications equipment (light signal devices, cable coils, frames, tool bags, etc.) is manufactured at other factories.
To create a reserve of communications assets, an order has been placed for French factories: 20,000 km of cable, 5,000 telephones, 600 low–power radio stations, and 50 [units] of medium power, but
the General Staff is slowing down the execution of this order (no currency has been allocated).

The organization of the signal troops of the Republican Army.
The signal troops are headed by the Chief of the Communications Department of the General Staff, who is responsible for all communications in the army. Until January 1937, he personally commanded all the signal companies and established communications on behalf of the General Staff, mainly with the brigades. The absence of communications chiefs and signal units subordinate to the troops put brigade and division commanders in a difficult position, as the communications task given by the General Staff usually did not correspond to the task assigned to the infantry commander.
As a result of the partial reorganization that has been carried out, the organization of the signal troops is currently as follows: The apparatus of the chiefs of communications for fronts, corps, divisions, brigades, and battalions has been introduced. Each infantry unit, up to and including the division, has its own signal units, which are equipped with their own equipment and serve the unit and are subordinate to the chief of communications of that unit. The chief of communications of the Republican army and the chiefs of communications of the fronts have their own communications parks and training centers. The telegraph service, headed by the civilian «Union of Telegraphists», and the radio service, headed by the «Union of Radio Telegraphists», are organized separately. Despite all the arguments, it has not yet been possible to unite them under the general leadership of the chief of communications. As a result of this situation, there are no military telegraph stations, and the telegraphic connection is established, if necessary, by the «Union of Telegraphists», whose representative is attached to the headquarters. The radio networks are also used in the same way by «Union of Radio Telegraphists».
The staffing of the signal troops in the units is still imperfect. New staffing requirements have been developed and presented, but due to a lack of understanding of the importance of communications, the General Staff is delaying their approval, which is hindering the planning of personnel and equipment training.

Dear t. Uritsky!
Believe me, there is no time to write and it is very difficult to write. We live all the time worrying about how to hold the front, how not to surrender Madrid, how to put together at least some reserves for the front and for hitting the enemy. With a few exceptions, local people do almost nothing, you have to chase them, catch them, and convince them of the need for certain activities.
Our centers are scattered within a radius of 300-400 km; communication is only possible by personal contact or by telephone. It is difficult to make telephone calls, because long-distance communication is only possible through Madrid. If you want to talk to Albacete from Valencia, which is only 120 km away, you must connect through Madrid, as there is no direct communication. Even Toledo, Seville, and other cities can only be reached through Madrid. The Madrid telephone exchange is owned by an American company, and the owners do not sympathize with us. Therefore, telephone conversations must be conducted in a coded language and with great caution. The Madrid central exchange often fails to provide communication for hours, leaving us with no choice but to do as we please. It is important to note that all communication with the front lines is only possible through the Madrid central exchange, and it is often the case that we are unable to obtain information about the situation on a particular front line by telephone. We must send people, but we have very few of them, and it takes 5-6 hours to receive information.
This is the reason for our late information. The Center probably thinks that we have decent headquarters here, with duplicate communication with all units, and that this communication goes from top to bottom and along the front, so that we can know what is happening at any given time. However, this is not the case. In addition to the above-mentioned telephone station and personal travel (by motorcycle or car), there is no other form of communication. There is no communication between the units on the front, except for delegations. The brigade commander communicates with his battalions only through messengers or personal travel. There are no field telephones or radios in the units. During the organization of the last offensive, some field telephones and cables were found in the Madrid warehouses, but they could not be used because there were no specialists available. The same applies to field radios. In this situation, even in Madrid, communication with individual units is primarily maintained by people. As a result, information is often delayed, and telephone calls often need to be verified.

Dreamslayer wrote: Sun Mar 08, 2026 7:41 pm (part of the letter)
No. 2.1. Letter from Ya.K. Berzin (alias Donizetti), Chief Military Advisor of Spanish Republican Army, to S.P. Uritskiy, Chief of the Red Army's Intelligence Department, about the situation in the Republican Army and the work of Soviet military advisers

(Not earlier than November 16, 1936)

Dear t. Uritsky!
Believe me, there is no time to write and it is very difficult to write. We live all the time worrying about how to hold the front, how not to surrender Madrid, how to put together at least some reserves for the front and for hitting the enemy. With a few exceptions, local people do almost nothing, you have to chase them, catch them, and convince them of the need for certain activities.
Our centers are scattered within a radius of 300-400 km; communication is only possible by personal contact or by telephone. It is difficult to make telephone calls, because long-distance communication is only possible through Madrid. If you want to talk to Albacete from Valencia, which is only 120 km away, you must connect through Madrid, as there is no direct communication. Even Toledo, Seville, and other cities can only be reached through Madrid. The Madrid telephone exchange is owned by an American company, and the owners do not sympathize with us. Therefore, telephone conversations must be conducted in a coded language and with great caution. The Madrid central exchange often fails to provide communication for hours, leaving us with no choice but to do as we please. It is important to note that all communication with the front lines is only possible through the Madrid central exchange, and it is often the case that we are unable to obtain information about the situation on a particular front line by telephone. We must send people, but we have very few of them, and it takes 5-6 hours to receive information.
This is the reason for our late information. The Center probably thinks that we have decent headquarters here, with duplicate communication with all units, and that this communication goes from top to bottom and along the front, so that we can know what is happening at any given time. However, this is not the case. In addition to the above-mentioned telephone station and personal travel (by motorcycle or car), there is no other form of communication. There is no communication between the units on the front, except for delegations. The brigade commander communicates with his battalions only through messengers or personal travel. There are no field telephones or radios in the units. During the organization of the last offensive, some field telephones and cables were found in the Madrid warehouses, but they could not be used because there were no specialists available. The same applies to field radios. In this situation, even in Madrid, communication with individual units is primarily maintained by people. As a result, information is often delayed, and telephone calls often need to be verified.