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If anyone has interest the following link will take them to the corrected CD-ROM version of "Naval Aviation Combat Statistics--World War II. (OPNAV-P-23V No. A129 17 June 1946": http://tinyurl.com/op4w

From my point of view nothing new is revealed in this document; its contents might, however, provide insight for those who insist on quoting dubious air-combat statistics taken out of context (which seem to be readily found at various Internet sites) in support of UV's curious air-combat model when it comes to "Zeroes" versus Wildcats and all that.

This is great at pointing out that over 50% of all planes shot down were done so by F6F. It does NOT point out that by the time the F6F was in theater shooting down these planes, they were being flown by totally green Japanese pilots with probably less flight training then you have

The moral of the story:

Had the F4F pilots not shot down so many good Japanese pilots, perhaps the F6F would not have appeared to be such a hot little aircraft

Mr.Frag wrote:This is great at pointing out that over 50% of all planes shot down were done so by F6F. It does NOT point out that by the time the F6F was in theater shooting down these planes, they were being flown by totally green Japanese pilots with probably less flight training then you have

The moral of the story:

Had the F4F pilots not shot down so many good Japanese pilots, perhaps the F6F would not have appeared to be such a hot little aircraft

What the document illustrates statisically, among other things, is that the "Zero" had no advantage whatsoever over the Wildcat or in fact over any fighter flown by USN or Marine pilots based on kill ratios. The UV model begs to differ but produces not a whit of statistical evidence to support its argument.

The document also points out just how sketchy Japanese records tend to be, especially when it comes to combat losses, to include all of that country's military services--which is why a closer breakdown of the cause of all enemy air losses cannot be accounted for.

Again, Japanese statistical records cannot be relied upon as a sole source.

As for the F6F: it was all-around superior to anything the Japanese built, though not as good on balance as the P-51. Had Japan met these models with something other than a bankrupt pilot cadre and pool it is not clear the final kill ratio would have stood significantly different (i.e., more favorable to the Japanese) at the end.

I've got to tell you that this forum is just chock full of Axis apologists. And why I couldn't say. The Axis leadership was not made up of beautiful human beings but rather monsters, the Axis war aims were themselves, in a word, monstrous.

What is this fascination with all things Axis, from where does this need come to develop fantastic rationalizations in order to excuse anything resembling an Axis shortcoming?

Frankly, I don't get it.

Hi, Thanks for the PDF files. It will take me a while to study it. I can't speak for anyone else. I don't consider myself an axis fan or an allied fan. If USN planes shot down 100 to 1 then thats what I would expect the game to do.
If the cause of the ratio was in any way something I could control then I would do what I was allowed to do to increase it when Allied and decrease it when I was Japanese.

The only problem I have with using only 1 sides stats is they are using the same stats reported by the pilots.

To give a quick example. On Dec 23 over Rangoon Allied pilots claim up to 40 enemy aircraft shot down and admit only losing three. So If I stoped here and was designing the game "Air battles of Rangoon on 23 Dec 1941" I would make model that produced 13.3 to 1 kill ratios for Allied side. But if instead I only used the Japanese account that claims 40 allied aircraft and admits to losing only 5 I would have it 8-1 in favour of the Japanese. If I use both I'm inclined to say 5-3 in favour of Allies. And this result in normal game play could be 4-4 one day or even 3-5 without being called unrealistic. (well no there are those who anything but 5-3 everytime will squawk) But I hope you can see what I mean. The only stats I have used in this WITP forum concerning air loss have been taken from the web pages you provided. But I still would like to have Japanese reports as well just to compare.
The USN report for example. States 42 fighters in May 1942. (Carrier launched USN fighters shotdown 42 enemy fighters and lost I think report said 19. So 2-1 in favour of USN. But I have read the report from Coral Sea where this 42 number first appears. At least 2 of the enemy fighters are reported as ME-109's
This does not mean the USN pilots did not shoot down 2 Japanese planes. They may have even been fighters but I'm willing to bet they were not ME-109's. Which makes me wonder if they were shot down and if they were fighters (and if they were even Japanese) Pilots who can not even correctly ID enemy AC they have been in combat with cause me to worry over numbers they produce.
(The Japanese pilots do the same thing so it's not a favor Japan or USN. Hell I spent 4 years in the USMC and 10 years in the USN. I don't like losing anything when I am the allied player. ) What we need are as many calm reasonable people as possible to locate numbers by type and period from all sources and then extract what we think is the closest to actual we can.

You are taking the exact opposite extremes that others take.

Both sides made lots of glaring errors. Both sides had their streaks of luck.

The only truth in war is that anything can happen and statistics really mean nothing. Just ask the survivors of the HMS Hood what the statistical odds of a shell striking them at exactly the right spot to cause both magazines to explode and rip the ship apart. You will find that it is statistically impossible yet the HMS Hood lies at the bottom of the Ocean.

Reality: The Attacker as a distinct advantage over the Defender in air combat. It matters not what aircraft you happen to be flying as altitude can be traded for position and speed against a Defender who is trying to climb trading off the very speed required to live for altitude.

Japan happens to be on the attack for the first part of UV, and this advantage is coded into the aircraft as there is probably no other way of simulating it. You seem to neglect the fact that the F4F's were busy trying to shoot down Vals and Kates so they had a deck to land on which tended to distract them from being able to defend themselves from the Zeros. It is not that the Zero is better then the F4F, but you have to ask yourself as the F4F pilot, "Do I shoot down the Kate before it puts a torpedo in my carrier or do I shoot down the Zero that can't hurt my carrier?".

The biggest aspect that would be interesting to fix in UV (and perhaps WitP) would be aircraft ammo. It was a VERY finite resource. While your little statistics would tend to indicate that a F6F flew up and shot down 19 Zeros, it needs to be clearly pointed out that after the first two or three, he would be out of ammo and not be shooting down any more.

Hi, I think it due to the fog of time. But back in 1941 there were many western military leader who did not believe Japan had a Naval Air Arm (in fact a story in the Honolulu Star on DEC 5 stated "Japan has no Naval air arm") For quite a while USN and US Army leader thought German aircraft and pilots were doing the fighting (to explain the Japanese success-I encountered the same feeling when I talked to Arabs about the 1973 war. They maintained it was US pilots and aircraft rather then admit it was Israeli's) After Coral Sea the USN thought it had sunk 3 IJN CV (including one that did not even exist) This partly accounts for the surprise during the Solomon's Campaign when IJN CV that the USN did not know existed showed up.

The USN official After Action reports for both Coral Sea and Midway state that USN pilots were better then Japanese. But then C. Nimitz inquires if P-40's can be used as carrier fighters. (because of the reported success of P-40's) The USN and USAAF even after encountering the Zero did not know what it was and often reported it as ME-109
and claimed it was being flown by German pilots because Japanese pilots could not be that good.
Now I suppose this is normal confusion during wartime but it makes me curious.
I also assume the Japanese were likewise trying to explain the enemy being better then believed. I've seen many posters ask why USN torpedo planes are so good. But they ignore that as time passed the TBF became the most numerous bomber onboard USN CV (not just CVE) The people using it in combat must have persuaded someone to use it.

What I think happens in games is given the debate and confusion over actual numbers designers err in the direction that produces the more balanced outcomes.
I agree totally with people who want the actual results no matter what. But the designers are going to have to be able to back up without dispute any one-sided weapon system.

What really upsets players is the thought that no matter what they do the forces they commanded are doomed to defeat. If this was the case then so be it I think the game should reflect that. Many players are upset because the Japanese are given the early victories but then are somehow spared later on. (allied player gets denied easy victories) I think Japanese players want to keep the Japanese advantage too long and many allied players want to gain the allied advantage too early.
In my mind the debate is really finding the line where the first ended and the second began. (The Japanese did not go from overwhelming to overwhelmed without a period of equaliberium inbetween. (This is where Japanese players pin their hopes and where allied players get disgusted)
I think the Japanese did not do as well as popular myth but still I think the middle period did exist in some fashion. Even after Midway the Japanese were not push overs but clearly by 1944 the Allies had the means in impose their will where ever and when ever they chose.

Then also we need to decide what exactly produces ratios. The early Japanese ratios are produced by destroying enemy on ground and then outnumbering him in the air. I think a case for late war Allied success being due to the same factors could be made. So the thing that most interests me is when the forces were even what results were produced. And this is also where it is important to have as much data from both sides as possible.

Mr.Frag wrote:You are taking the exact opposite extremes that others take.

Both sides made lots of glaring errors. Both sides had their streaks of luck.

The only truth in war is that anything can happen and statistics really mean nothing. Just ask the survivors of the HMS Hood what the statistical odds of a shell striking them at exactly the right spot to cause both magazines to explode and rip the ship apart. You will find that it is statistically impossible yet the HMS Hood lies at the bottom of the Ocean.

Reality: The Attacker as a distinct advantage over the Defender in air combat. It matters not what aircraft you happen to be flying as altitude can be traded for position and speed against a Defender who is trying to climb trading off the very speed required to live for altitude.

Japan happens to be on the attack for the first part of UV, and this advantage is coded into the aircraft as there is probably no other way of simulating it. You seem to neglect the fact that the F4F's were busy trying to shoot down Vals and Kates so they had a deck to land on which tended to distract them from being able to defend themselves from the Zeros. It is not that the Zero is better then the F4F, but you have to ask yourself as the F4F pilot, "Do I shoot down the Kate before it puts a torpedo in my carrier or do I shoot down the Zero that can't hurt my carrier?".

The biggest aspect that would be interesting to fix in UV (and perhaps WitP) would be aircraft ammo. It was a VERY finite resource. While your little statistics would tend to indicate that a F6F flew up and shot down 19 Zeros, it needs to be clearly pointed out that after the first two or three, he would be out of ammo and not be shooting down any more.

Bravo. Exactly what I was thinking. As someone with flight experience reading about WWII, it seems obvious that the first two years of the war meant that IJN planes and pilots were superior to their USN counterparts.

Besides, although it isn't statistical evidence, you read the memoirs of any WWII pacific pilot, be they USN or IJN, and they'll tell you how superior the IJN a/c and pilots were. Why the hell did the USN copy ideas from the crashed zero in the aleutians for the f6f if it was inferior?? All those stories of wowed USN pilots amazed at how the zero could outturn and outspeed them in low turning dogfights - and then climb straight up, do a slow roll and come back at them?

As for your document TJ, I'm fascinated by it and will be studying the numbers within in extreme detail, and doing some comparison with other sources/then some testing.

History is written by the victors, so I won't be surprised when many of these numbers don't add up.

Mogami wrote:Hi, I think it due to the fog of time. But back in 1941 there were many western military leader who did not believe Japan had a Naval Air Arm (in fact a story in the Honolulu Star on DEC 5 stated "Japan has no Naval air arm") For quite a while USN and US Army leader thought German aircraft and pilots were doing the fighting (to explain the Japanese success-I encountered the same feeling when I talked to Arabs about the 1973 war. They maintained it was US pilots and aircraft rather then admit it was Israeli's) After Coral Sea the USN thought it had sunk 3 IJN CV (including one that did not even exist) This partly accounts for the surprise during the Solomon's Campaign when IJN CV that the USN did not know existed showed up.

The USN official After Action reports for both Coral Sea and Midway state that USN pilots were better then Japanese. But then C. Nimitz inquires if P-40's can be used as carrier fighters. (because of the reported success of P-40's) The USN and USAAF even after encountering the Zero did not know what it was and often reported it as ME-109
and claimed it was being flown by German pilots because Japanese pilots could not be that good.
Now I suppose this is normal confusion during wartime but it makes me curious.
I also assume the Japanese were likewise trying to explain the enemy being better then believed. I've seen many posters ask why USN torpedo planes are so good. But they ignore that as time passed the TBF became the most numerous bomber onboard USN CV (not just CVE) The people using it in combat must have persuaded someone to use it.

What I think happens in games is given the debate and confusion over actual numbers designers err in the direction that produces the more balanced outcomes.
I agree totally with people who want the actual results no matter what. But the designers are going to have to be able to back up without dispute any one-sided weapon system.

What really upsets players is the thought that no matter what they do the forces they commanded are doomed to defeat. If this was the case then so be it I think the game should reflect that. Many players are upset because the Japanese are given the early victories but then are somehow spared later on. (allied player gets denied easy victories) I think Japanese players want to keep the Japanese advantage too long and many allied players want to gain the allied advantage too early.
In my mind the debate is really finding the line where the first ended and the second began. (The Japanese did not go from overwhelming to overwhelmed without a period of equaliberium inbetween. (This is where Japanese players pin their hopes and where allied players get disgusted)
I think the Japanese did not do as well as popular myth but still I think the middle period did exist in some fashion. Even after Midway the Japanese were not push overs but clearly by 1944 the Allies had the means in impose their will where ever and when ever they chose.

Then also we need to decide what exactly produces ratios. The early Japanese ratios are produced by destroying enemy on ground and then outnumbering him in the air. I think a case for late war Allied success being due to the same factors could be made. So the thing that most interests me is when the forces were even what results were produced. And this is also where it is important to have as much data from both sides as possible.

There's some truth in what you say but mainly you're still bending over backward to excuse the errant game system.

As for when the Allies began to impose their will: that occurred in 1942 with the Battles of the Coral Sea and Midway, the invasion of the lower Solomons, and the buildup by SWPAC in New Guinea. By the summer of 1943 the "roll up" had certainly begun, and by the end of 1943 it was in full swing with the push into the Gilberts. By the turn of the year the Marshalls were next, and afterward Japan's entire house of cards inexorably collapsed.

If one studies the war in the Pacific with an eye to an overview of not only what was actually happening but how this came about it becomes clear that America's success followed directly in the footsteps of its unparalleled war industry and mobilization of manpower into the military. More and more of everything was being built faster and faster, and not just more "Zeroes" but better infantry equipment and better planes and better ships and so on, always in those larger and larger yet numbers.

My point is that Japan's point of "equilibrium" rested precisely at the juncture of where it first met America in combat after Pearl Harbor. At that instant in time Japan's movement forward abruptly ceased; its fortunes teetered for a few fleeting months in precarious and impossible balance; then began to recede, with ever-increasing reverse momentum, as America built up like some gigantic engine of steam irresistable force; finally what was left just toppled over and out of view from all Imperial dreams of Hakko Ichiu.

In overview it's that simple. And always keep in mind that Japan at no time was asked to fight against more than about 20% of America's war potentiality.

That in a nutshell is the reality of World War II in the Pacific.

As for the numbers in the Office of Naval Intelligence report: they're as accurate as we're going to get and if I had to guess I'd say the Navy's bean counters probably got it to within a few dozen planes either way when all was said and done. For sure they knew to within a pilot or two and a plane or three what happened to our assets, and almost immediately after hostilities were concluded these same actuary-types were hard at it in Tokyo poring over what war records existed along with aircraft industry production statistics, all cross-checked with interviews of surviving principles, this further proofed by an absolutely accurate inventory of remaining Japanese weaponry taken within months of surrender, so please don't tell me there are some "other numbers" out there "somewhere" or that America "fudged" the numbers we do have just to make it look better in the press. There was no need for that as the victory was utterly overwhelming and complete.

As for the rest of it: go talk to Mdiehl and he'll give you some therapy.

Hi all,

The PDF document "Tristanjohn" gave URL for (US Naval Aviation Combat
Statistics WWII) is very very interesting one indeed (thanks for that
"Tristanjohn")!


But some basic mathematics in it struck me as interesting/worth discussing...


Let's just concentrate on one singe aircraft type mentioned in that document -
the Grumman F6F Hellcat.


On page 15 of that PDF there is list of all losses for that type:

A/A: 553
A/C: 270
Operational: 340
Other: 885
On ship/ground: 413

TOTAL: 2416


Now, I have number for whole Hellcat production (including all subtypes) which
is 12275 (from 30 September of 1942 till 16 November 1945).

Note that in this 25 and half months it means that average monthly production
was 481 units.

This number is given in book "The Great Book of World War II Airplanes" ISBN
0-517-459930 (this is _HUGE_ book of almost 5 kg / 10 lb with 700+ pages dealing
with 12 remarkable aircraft of WWII illustrated by great fold outs by Ryuko
Watanabe). The F6F Hellcat part of the book was written by David A. Anderton.

Also, in my book the very same (exact) number of aircraft looses for enemy A/C
is given (270) and the total number of enemy aircraft shoot down differs by just
60 or from PDF Tristanjohn gave URL for (US Naval Aviation Combat Statistics
WWII). Therefore we can safely assume that same data was used and that numbers
were accurate.


But (there is always but)... can we now do simple arithmetic...


12275 (total production) - 2416 (total looses) = 9859

Therefore can we assume that by the end of the war there were almost 10000
fully operation F6F aircraft in squadrons.


On pages 20 and 21 of PDF there is list of F6F squadrons in action. In 1945 the
largest number of carrier based squadrons was in May (22) and in July for land
based squadrons (6).

Can 28 (22+6) squadrons in peak of action in 1945 account for 10000
aircraft?

IMHO Nope...


And then further down in PDF document on pages 46 and 47.

It says that in July of 1945 there were 412 F6Fs on 10 CVs and 144 F6Fs
on 6 CVLs and that there were 84 F6F on CVEs in April of 1945.

This gives total of just 640 (412+144+84) F6F in service for late 1945.

Above numbers correspond OK with number of squadrons I mention above and
everything is much clearer... the number of squadrons and aircraft add up
just fine - something else must be wrong here...


Also on page 59 in PDF document there is summary for 1944/1945 regarding
F6F availability (I think this table must be some kind of average on-hand
availability since it covers 1944/1945).

It lists that Navy had 511 and Marines had 362 on hand. The calculated total
is then 873 (511+362).

This also roughly corresponds with above data and, again, something else
must be wrong here...



So... even if we generously round up numbers of F6F available in late 1945
to 1000 units this leaves us with 9000 F6F unaccounted for.


Why is there such _HUGE_ discrepancy in numbers?


To me this seems awfully big number (way too big)...

If this calculated number is inaccurate - then what happened to difference in
numbers and who made mistake in counting?


Any ideas gentleman?



Leo "Apollo11"

Hi, Since it has been suggested that Coral Sea is an example of the USA imposing their will on the Japanese, In game terms what would be the result of the Japanese sending all 6 CV 3 CVL 6-8 BB 10-12 CA 50-80 DD 2 Infantry Div
4 Fighter Sentai 4 Bomber Daitai 2-4 IJN Fighter Daitai to the Coral Sea operation?

Personally I don't think all aspects of the war changed at the same time. I think the Allied air evened up long before the Allied Naval power. Even after Midway the Japanese had roughly equal carrier forces. It is the Essex class arrivals in mid-late 43 that give the USN the final advantage.
In game terms we have to assume the allied player will at least do as well if we are going to state they will have a noticeable advantage after mid 1943.
I don't think it was written in stone that Japan would lose 4 CV in 1942.
As a result I don't think the August 1942 USN/USMC operation is automaticly going to occur (or succeed if it is attempted).

There is no reason to presume the Japanese will attempt Midway.
In the carrier versus carrier battles Midway balances out the loses. (remove Midway and the Japanese do not look so bad.) Something as small as 1 more IJN sub getting lucky adds months to Japans survival. (Of course if Japanese subs do not match their historical record the carrier battles are altered in favour of the USN. (+2 CV before mid 1943)

The ignorance factor in this thread is pretty high so I'm gonna weigh in.

On statistics. Anyone who dismisses statistical analyses of data ("statistics... mean nothing") or, for that matter, accepts them, without knowing what was measured, how, how tested, and whether the proper stats were applied, is a fool. In these threads I have spoken of central tendencies in results. These measures of central tendency are probably an appropriate target for modeling.

This does not mean that one ignores statistical outliers. Outliers may be very informative because, at least in warfare as far as I can tell, they usually occur when circumstances were quite abnormal. These can tell you about adding infrequent and unlikely tweaks to a model (excessive fatigue, the "bounce," or as was the case at Midway, mission creep) that provide entertaining (h#ll it's just a game) events that add flavor to something that in the end amounts fo mostly grinding attrition.

Bravo. Exactly what I was thinking. As someone with flight experience reading about WWII, it seems obvious that the first two years of the war meant that IJN planes and pilots were superior to their USN counterparts.

There is no evidence for that claim in anything that I have read. As usual, it comes down to the claimant having no clear idea of what makes a plane or a pilot superior. This has been rehashed here so many times and the notion so thoroughly debunked that, frankly, it warrants little further response except to recommend that you to duplicate the effort at factfinding and make an enlightened determination on your own. As a basic queston to drive your research I suggest that you ask yourself the following question. "If Japanese pilots were superior and their aircraft were superior for the first two years of the war, how come they lost more aircraft and pilots in air to air combat than they shot down, despite the fact that they often had numerical superiority?"

Besides, although it isn't statistical evidence, you read the memoirs of any WWII pacific pilot, be they USN or IJN, and they'll tell you how superior the IJN a/c and pilots were.

Only if you read your memoirs very selectively. I recommend that you read Thach's report to CinCPac from August/September 1942. One of the interesting comments there is that the kill ratio (they thought they had a kill ratio of 3:1 favoring the USN) would have been lower if Japanese air-to-air combat tactics had not been so manifestly inferior.

Why the hell did the USN copy ideas from the crashed zero in the aleutians for the f6f if it was inferior??

The USN did not copy a single idea from the Zero. Also the F6F design was finalized before that particular A6M was captured. You are citing as fact an incorrect hypothesis. When you look at the characteristics of the F6F and the Zero, no person with any detailed knowledge of the planes could claim that ANY idea on the F6F was borrowed from the Zeke.

All those stories of wowed USN pilots amazed at how the zero could outturn and outspeed them in low turning dogfights - and then climb straight up, do a slow roll and come back at them?

I think you have mistaken respect for shock and awe. But if you want to keep a talley of amazement, why don't you read some English-text versions of Japanese amazement at the durability of the Ironworks planes? If you contrast your wowed Allied pilots with your wowed Japanese pilots you can easily see the relative design goals of the aircraft manufacturers played out.

The only truth in war is that anything can happen and statistics really mean nothing. Just ask the survivors of the HMS Hood what the statistical odds of a shell striking them at exactly the right spot to cause both magazines to explode and rip the ship apart. You will find that it is statistically impossible yet the HMS Hood lies at the bottom of the Ocean.

Again, your understanding of the example is flawed. The statistical odds were apparently thought pretty good since it happened repeatedly at Jutland. As a consequence, the late WW1 RN CB designs were substantially up-armored in the interbellum. Hood, however, being part of the tour de force pool, was never given the rest time to have the armor added. This was known to her skipper and was given extreme priority in her tactics vis a vis the Bismarck. Hood made a direct approach to close the range (and limit her exposure to plunging fire, to which she was known to be quite vulnerable), and was roughly thirty seconds from completing a port turn that would have almost eliminated that vulnerability. One could probably with enough information calculate a rather precise statistical risk that such would happen to Hood. I doubt that anyone did so, and as a consequence her skipper had to go with his best judgement of the risk.

mdiehl wrote:The ignorance factor in this thread is pretty high so I'm gonna weigh in.

On statistics. Anyone who dismisses statistical analyses of data ("statistics... mean nothing") or, for that matter, accepts them, without knowing what was measured, how, how tested, and whether the proper stats were applied, is a fool.

Amen.

Any statistic has meaning and all statistics have meaning; it is the work of a statistician to extrapolate sense (either good or bad) from these things.

it is the work of a statistician to extrapolate sense (either good or bad) from these things.

Not quite, it is their job to interpret the results to favour those that are paying the bill for the report.

This is the old classic: Is the glass half empty or half full?

History is written by the winner. Anyone who reads the history must accept the fact that it will generally portray the winner as the good guy at his best and the looser as the evil one who made every mistake in the book.

mdiehl wrote:Again, your understanding of the example is flawed. The statistical odds were apparently thought pretty good since it happened repeatedly at Jutland. As a consequence, the late WW1 RN CB designs were substantially up-armored in the interbellum. Hood, however, being part of the tour de force pool, was never given the rest time to have the armor added. This was known to her skipper and was given extreme priority in her tactics vis a vis the Bismarck. Hood made a direct approach to close the range (and limit her exposure to plunging fire, to which she was known to be quite vulnerable), and was roughly thirty seconds from completing a port turn that would have almost eliminated that vulnerability. One could probably with enough information calculate a rather precise statistical risk that such would happen to Hood. I doubt that anyone did so, and as a consequence her skipper had to go with his best judgement of the risk.

Essentially correct though a detail or two are in order.

HMS Hood was still in design during WWI and after the Royal Navy's battlecruisers had their "bad day" at Jutland it was decided to rearrange her armor-protection schemes. This change, though, proved insufficient in theory as proof against plunging fire from the larger rifled projectiles which came into service even before WWII so yet another redesign was contemplated for her in the late 1930's, though this was pushed back to the spring of 1942, partly due to budgetary concerns, partly to the more pressing demands on limited ship-repair facilities.

The new scheme considered for our lady included an increase to her deck armor over certain critical areas; changes to her side-armor configuation (bulge to be moved up to the line of her 7" belt); various changes to her superstructure, to include new masts fore and aft, new funnels, removal of spotting top and the armor there; addition of a catapult and hangars for Walrus seaplanes; resdesign of the torpedo tubes; upgraded AA; upgraded fire directors, radar and the like; new engines; plus a possible extension of her forecastle deck--Hood was world renown for being the "wettest ship" around--her quarterdeck lay awash at cruising speed!

Taken together these plans amounted to little more than a facelift of somewhat sketchy character. Not only was this new configuration deficient in terms of the extent of the armor-protection overhaul but no alteration was contemplated for the extremely hazardous situation of her powder magazines directly over the shell rooms.

Let's all say together, "Boooom!"

The project was "funny" on its face; no actual naval engineering computations had been undertaken, the entire repair project was something rather off the cuff. Indeed, without an "inclining experiment" dockside afterward it could not be absolutely known if planned changes might not cause Hood to become an even less inherently-stable platform with regard to her GM (metacentric height) value. In point of fact it was doubtful this beautifully-lined though otherwise structurally-flawed vessel could have ever been modernized along WWII standards and she never could have been transformed into anything resembling a match for Bismarck.

The concept of greater speed providing proof against larger ordnance was cockeyed, and in any event the British battlecruiser designs of WWI were inherently less stable gun platforms than their German counterparts, and at that with less protection against plunging fire where it counted. On balance not one of these designs of any nation's navy ever justified the investment in either war and England's BCs were the worst of all, though the Royal Navy smugly imagined an accruance of international "prestige" between the conflicts as Hood sailed ever so majestically hither and yon around the globe.

Re odds of her survival against any modern battleship of the era: it would not be much of an exaggeration to typify Hood as your classical "deathtrap." She simply couldn't take it in a straight fight.

Mr.Frag wrote:Not quite, it is their job to interpret the results to favour those that are paying the bill for the report.

This is the old classic: Is the glass half empty or half full?

History is written by the winner. Anyone who reads the history must accept the fact that it will generally portray the winner as the good guy at his best and the looser as the evil one who made every mistake in the book.

I'm sorry to say it but what you write is not just completely mistaken in its implications with regard to WWII history but borders on arrogance motivated by interest to further some unspoken agenda with regard to Japan's actual position vis-a-vis WWII reality. At base it argues insensibly counter to known facts with regard to the war and seems spurred by either ignorance and/or selfish motive.

History is written by the winner.

Inncorrect again. There are plenty of Axis histories. The problem with WW2 history is that some of these are given uncritical evaluation.

Anyone who reads the history must accept the fact that it will generally portray the winner as the good guy at his best and the looser as the evil one who made every mistake in the book.

Spoken like a guy whose never had to slog through mounds of post-bellum American War of the Rebellion lost-cause muck.

Tristanjohn wrote:I'm sorry to say it but what you write is not just completely mistaken in its implications with regard to WWII history but borders on arrogance motivated by interest to further some unspoken agenda with regard to Japan's actual position vis-a-vis WWII reality. At base it argues insensibly counter to known facts with regard to the war and seems spurred by either ignorance and/or selfish motive.

Agenda? Are you one of these conspiracy types?

The very reason that gun cameras were installed in aircraft was to bring some truth to the accounts of pilots after combat. This is simple fact. You can accept it or not as it makes no difference to me.

As someone from neither side of the battle, I tend to remove the rose coloured glasses before reading historical reports. I don't really care which side wrote them as they are always biased in one direction or the other. Only with data from both sides for the same event can you start drawing accurate conclusions and there happens to be very little of that available. The few areas where this happened shows clearly that each side reported vastly different accounts of the very same air battle.

The Allies won because they had more of everything. This is about the ONLY fact of record that can not be debated at great length.

mdiehl wrote:The ignorance factor in this thread is pretty high so I'm gonna weigh in.

[snip]

Again, your understanding of the example is flawed. The statistical odds were apparently thought pretty good since it happened repeatedly at Jutland. As a consequence, the late WW1 RN CB designs were substantially up-armored in the interbellum. Hood, however, being part of the tour de force pool, was never given the rest time to have the armor added. This was known to her skipper and was given extreme priority in her tactics vis a vis the Bismarck. Hood made a direct approach to close the range (and limit her exposure to plunging fire, to which she was known to be quite vulnerable), and was roughly thirty seconds from completing a port turn that would have almost eliminated that vulnerability. One could probably with enough information calculate a rather precise statistical risk that such would happen to Hood. I doubt that anyone did so, and as a consequence her skipper had to go with his best judgement of the risk.

TJ has already commented on this to some extent, but the above is a perfect example of how apparently incontravertable 'facts' can be used to support a discussion of history, or a game. What was the chance of Hood blowing up due to a hit from Bismark's 3rd salvo? Given Jutland - quite good apparently. However, the 3 battlecruisers lost at Jutland (Invincible, Inflexible, and Queen Mary) probably tell us nothing about the Hood's loss.
The cause of the 3 BC explosions is not known (other than they were due to hits, presumably from large calibre shells - 12" German main armament or similar, at medium range. I do not have my books to hand, but IIRC it is in the early-mid teens thousand yards). The hit on Q turret of Lion, however, gives a good clue as to what happened. Lion was within an ace of going the same way following a turret hit. The enquiry later blamed inadequate flash protection in the turret trunks and hoists, too many cordite charges in the ammo train. The turret hit started a fire, that a few seconds or tens of seconds later flashed down the trunk, and ignited the magazines (probably actually the cordite room, the shells then going up in sympathy). Lion was saved by the very rapid (and selfless) flooding of the magazine by the crew, and the fact that the turret fire developed more slowly.
Following Jutland, all ships had their flash protection significantly improved, and this was read across, and further improved on the new designs. Hood, then planned had her protection scheme revised, prior to being built. Inevitably, the change could not even make her equivalent to a 'modern' 1920 BB, let alone a WW2 one. There were plans to give her a major refit all through the 30's, (along the lines of the QE/Warspite refit). However, the time was never right...

Back to the Denmark Straits: Hood was lost to long range plunging fire, and again, no one can be sure exactly how. One of the more plausable (IMHO) theories is that a plunging, oblique impact managed to avoid her belt, hit somewhere in the region of her After boiler rooms, penetrated the boiler room bulkhead in to the X turret cordite room, and set that off. Not proven, but also definately not a flash across from a turret hit (The witnesses disagree on many things, but most concur that the last hit was amidships, or at least clear of the turrets).

There obviously was a chance for a single hit destruction of the Hood (given that it happened! ). However, what is the likelihood? 10%? 1%? 0.1%?

Final thought: what is the probabilty that PoW (in the same engagement) would recieve a 15" hit from Bismark, that (probably) fell short, tumbled on hitting the water, travelled under the water for several feet (or tens of feet), penetrated below the belt, and hit the ship near the port (IIRC) shaft tunnel, where it would have easily crippled the ship in one hit. Not good I hear you cry. Except it happened...the only difference being the shell did not expload, and the hit was not even found until the ship was docked after the battle.

The Denmark Straits battle could have resulted in Bismark (an obsolescent BB, that in her only other surface action did remarkably badly, not landing a single hit) destroying one BC and crippling another in less than 15 minutes.... I wonder how we would be modelling Bismark if that happened!

I wonder how we would be modelling Bismark if that happened!

Based on what happened there, if used for a model, it and it's sister would have singlehandedly won the war for Germany

Thankfully, no game designers have been foolish enough to use that type of *historical* data to this day.

I also think you would have to factor in our poor little Swordfish as the most effective plane of WW II though, between what it did to Germany and Italy :p

2-3 CV's of them for the Brits, and the Americans would not have had to leave the farm to fight. Hmm, anyone got some cloth, I need to make one

Fortunately, WITP will ship with an editor - so people can design their own campaigns - even if they are titled "How the US really won the entire war in 6-12 months against inferior Japanese everything.".

Good luck finding a PBEM opponent to play the IJ side though!