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I don't know why this thought came to me, but I decided to post it anyway.

Consider an alternate history where Yamamoto's idea of an attack on Pearl Harbor had not been accepted and the Japanese had not struck there first. Instead, they had concentrated on the move towards the Southern Resource area. Let us assume that 2by3 would allow for a first turn extra distance movement phase (as is in the game) to allow for strategic initiative.

My question: How many of us would then as the allies prepare for an attack on Pearl Harbor? Would we be caught as flat footed as the US forces were in real life should a IJN player decide to go after Pearl?


I know it is a silly little exercise in mental masturbation, but for some reason I had to post this question...

BRADFORDKAY It needs more definition. If Yamamoto's plan was rejected, why
would 2by3 need to include the extra "strategic movement"? There aren't any
ways for the Japanese to go SOUTH without being noticed, so the bonus "suprise
movement" makes no sense.

I think what you are asking is if there was a way for the Allies to start the game
convinced that the rules didn't allow a PH strike (but unknown to them, the Japs
were playing by a different set of rules), would surprise be possible. My guess
is not only suprise, but fistfights. Gamer's tent to be really serious about knowing
the "rules" (even if their real life counterparts didn't always). It's a fun thought,
but probably not practical.

In my thought, the extra strategic movement represents the fact that Japan's forces would have already been at sea no matter what target they would have originally chosen. This is the advantage given the aggressor in warfare of the time. Without satellite reconnaisance, the allies would only have known that the Japanese had many ships at sea (the actual situation).

Because the Japanese did attack Pearl, we as gamers look for ways to mitigate (or exploit) that attack. If they hadn't, how many of us would have done things differently than the commanders of the day, given that the Japanese player would have the same opportunity as they had in real life. This is why I called it "mental masturbation".

A fair question actually. Task forces were at sea for some pretty hefty invasions, PH was just a small part of the opening moves. PI got caught sleeping at the switch just like PH, so it is safe to presume that while the USA fully expected to enter a shooting war very soon, they expected a formal declaration so they could turn on the switch. Rather silly on their part really.

Anyone who wants to attack elsewhere instead of PH is free to do so, wanting to does not negate the bonus move nor should it. I would question sending KB to where it gets to swat the USA CV's that happened to be at sea as a gamey move (Japan expected them to be at PH), but if one wants to pop by PI instead, that seems fair enough.

The surprise is not negated by not hitting PH, it is caused by Japan attacking everywhere at dawn on the 7th.

You should look up some of the old AARs between Mogami and me. In several of the games he allowed me to move on the first turn and I was able to save all my ships a PH. They were very interesting games.

Hi, I think avoiding the PH strike really puts too many options in the hands of the USN for the Japanese to consider. Even if all you get is aircraft and BB there are no richer targets anywhere else and these items will be put to use in the Central Pacific if you do not damage them at the outset of the war.

For one: Yamamoto was ASSIGNED the task of devising a first strike. He figured that the only acceptable first strike was to catch the WHOLE fleet in Pearl. Yamamoto counselled against it but would not allow anyone else to command it once it was decided upon.

Two: The follow-up invasions were designed around the destruction, or incapacitation, of the WHOLE fleet. The fact that the carriers were at sea blew the follow-up plans out of the water.

Three: The japanese mentality would not allow changing of the plans even though the WHOLE fleet didn't get taken out.....the one factor needed to give the follow-up plans the probability of success. Yamamoto was a follower of Myamoto Musashi, who, like Sun Tzu, stated that initiation of combat is a mistake unless victory is perceived. The imperials calling the shots would have found this dishonorable and may have given the operations to someone else. Yamamoto knew himself to be the best man to get the job done, thus he continued with what would have been continued whether he was there or not.

So, the whole plan should have been scrapped when they failed to get the carriers in port. They should have fell back and reinforced their supply lines and gotten a good foothold where it could be maintained.

But, historically, the PH strike would have happened then the plans would have either been scrapped or kept. So, not puting the PH attack in the scenario, wouldn't make sense. The only sensible way to initiate combat with US would be a first strike. And PH would be the only sensible place to do it.

ORIGINAL: bradfordkay

I don't know why this thought came to me, but I decided to post it anyway.

Consider an alternate history where Yamamoto's idea of an attack on Pearl Harbor had not been accepted and the Japanese had not struck there first. Instead, they had concentrated on the move towards the Southern Resource area. Let us assume that 2by3 would allow for a first turn extra distance movement phase (as is in the game) to allow for strategic initiative.

My question: How many of us would then as the allies prepare for an attack on Pearl Harbor? Would we be caught as flat footed as the US forces were in real life should a IJN player decide to go after Pearl?


I know it is a silly little exercise in mental masturbation, but for some reason I had to post this question...

If you mean attacking the colony possesions of European powers (SRA) and not attacking Pearl Harbor (or the Phillipines), then isn't it likely that FDR would not be able to get a war declaration from congress? The Pacific Theatre would be very different indeed. Without US interference, the Japanese would have achieved all of their resource goals.

If, if, if. And if the dog hadn't stopped to take a sh1t, he would have caught the rabbit, too.

I'm tired of speculating. I'm ready to play.

It was actually Yamato's idea to attack Pearl Harbour, and he was a known gambler. He was against the war in general, especially against the US, but it was his idea.

ORIGINAL: rogueusmc

For one: Yamamoto was ASSIGNED the task of devising a first strike. He figured that the only acceptable first strike was to catch the WHOLE fleet in Pearl. Yamamoto counselled against it but would not allow anyone else to command it once it was decided upon.

Two: The follow-up invasions were designed around the destruction, or incapacitation, of the WHOLE fleet. The fact that the carriers were at sea blew the follow-up plans out of the water.

Three: The japanese mentality would not allow changing of the plans even though the WHOLE fleet didn't get taken out.....the one factor needed to give the follow-up plans the probability of success. Yamamoto was a follower of Myamoto Musashi, who, like Sun Tzu, stated that initiation of combat is a mistake unless victory is perceived. The imperials calling the shots would have found this dishonorable and may have given the operations to someone else. Yamamoto knew himself to be the best man to get the job done, thus he continued with what would have been continued whether he was there or not.

So, the whole plan should have been scrapped when they failed to get the carriers in port. They should have fell back and reinforced their supply lines and gotten a good foothold where it could be maintained.

But, historically, the PH strike would have happened then the plans would have either been scrapped or kept. So, not puting the PH attack in the scenario, wouldn't make sense. The only sensible way to initiate combat with US would be a first strike. And PH would be the only sensible place to do it.

I agree with rogueusmc's analysis, not just because it holds water when viewed in the light of what occurred historically, but also because it underscores the nature of the WitP game design assumptions.

The game is a simulation of WWII in the Pacific Theater, beginning at the time of the historical Pearl Harbor attack. That, or a similar act of Japanese aggression, is what triggers the start of the game. You are then in the situation, either as the Japanese or as the Allied commander, faced by your historical counterpart.

Now, you alternative history fans can skrew around with the editor all you want, and devise all kinds of fantasy worlds to live and glory in. Start the game in 1937. Give the Japanese huge amounts of materiel that were not available to them in the real world. Fiddle with aircraft characteristics until you have the Japanese flying the equivalent of Su-29s. I don't care.

What I absolutely will not tolerate as a gamer and a consumer with seventy bucks in hand to spend is the basic game design pandering to this nonsense. UV evolved away, to a degree, from its initial design position regarding aircraft performance in fighter vs. fighter engagements (and in some other respects, as well) to the detriment of the game's ability to present a historical simulation that, again, presents the players with the situation their historical counterparts faced.

This is why I have played wargames for going on 45 years now. This is what I will buy. I would love to see a game that simulates all the "what ifs," and would buy that, as well.

But this is not that game.

One thing you keep forgetting.. Would the US allow the Japanese to invade Dutch Indonesia and secure all of those resources ? Or fight their allies England and Australia and invade their holdings as well ? I don't think so..
The US didn't care much about Japan fighting China, as they knew Japan could never defeat China - China is just to damn big. Japan had the 3rd largest navy at that time and a booming economy - all they needed were natural resources and they could dominate SE asia and the pacific.. The US couldn't allow the Japanese to invade and hold Indonesia.
Japan knew that the US would react to their invasion of Indonesia and decided since they would be fighting the US soon anyways, may as well get the first strike in and make it a crippling strike (IE Pearl).

I just don't see Japan invading Indonesia without the US declaring war on them. It may be a month or even 6 months later, but they would have and they would have the entire pacific fleet to back up their counter attacks - and even more important... they would have the initiative and force Japan to react to them.
Invading the SRA ends in the same result - War with the US.. With PH, the Japanese thought it would buy them supremacy of the pacific and the ability to convince the US that fighting them wasn't worth it for foreign lands... They were wrong.

Xargun

I am not forgetting anything of the kind. Please note that I am not arguing about what might have happened, I am talking about how the game has been designed.

ou should look up some of the old AARs between Mogami and me. In several of the games he allowed me to move on the first turn and I was able to save all my ships a PH. They were very interesting games.

This is why I posted the question. You removed your forces from PH because the Japanese had attacked PH first. Would you have done the same, given the same opportunity, if they had struck instead solely in the direction of the SRA (say at the Philippines and Malaya, but not at PH)? Without the historical fact of the PH attack, would you think that it would be likely?

It is possible (probable?) that without the historical first turn, we will all remove out forces from PH, even though they are supposedly reasonably safe there (large amount of CAP, good amount of long range recon units). Now, in UV, I rarely remove my surface forces from well defended bases for fear of enemy air attack. Admittedly, surface forces leaving PH do not have to worry so much about air strikes from Bettys, but I am always loathe to send my BBs to sea without air cover. Yet the BBs in PH were the older, slower, BBs that could not keep up with the CV TFs, and therefore are not often used in conjunction with those TFs.


Pasternakski, I am not attempting to talk 2by3 into including an alternate history scenario. I am merely indulging a little mental calisthenics. My idea was to get us to think about how we play the game based upon what occurred in history, as opposed to what we would do given the same information that the leaders of the time had. I do believe that there is a difference.

ORIGINAL: pasternakski
I would love to see a game that simulates all the "what ifs," and would buy that, as well.

But this is not that game.

It can be. [:)]
If alternatives scenarios are included in addition to the historical start, what's the problem?
Even if those scenarios are not included (because of a development time constraint, for example). I would think everyone would want the editor to be capable of making them.

Upon reflection, I would probably do what the U.S. did and was about to do. No reason not keep your fleet at PH if hostilities do not seem imminent. Once hostilities start, I would figure the fleet is pretty safe at PH because of the substantial air forces - not to mention that carriers that would often be there as well - that would be on a full war footing. After all, it is only the surprise rule that makes PH possible; take that out, and attacking PH is a beetch.

Japan just happened to hit PH as the U.S. was transitioning from the "no hostilities imminent" mindset to the hostilities imminent/war footing mindset.

Regardless, I think I would remain at PH. Once hostilities looked imminent, I would place everyone on a war footing, which would eliminate the surprise rule and make an attack on PH very expensive. Catch me before I'm aware hostilities are imminent, and you catch me with the surprise rule on, just as actually happened.

The only reason to move the fleet is if you think hostilities are imminent. Cheaper to just be on a war footing and let the air force perform their function than to move the fleet. And, of course, I would spot them coming and be able to sortie to have the decisive surface engagement my plans call for.

I'm exhausted. That mental masturbation really took a lot out of me. [:D]

since we are talking about "what ifs" anyhow (yeah, I know, pasternakski), why not go up the ladder.
lets assume
a)The Japanese did not attack Pearl
Then what? Day of infamy would never have happened, resulting in making it much more difficult for FDR to get the USA into war. The support wouldn't have been as strong either.
Probably, the attack on Clark would have taken the place of the Pearl attack (The Japanese wouldn't have bypassed the PI. They are really right in the way).
b) the US counterstroke
I wonder why nobody mentioned Plan Orange yet. This was the actual battle plan of the US in 1941. An Attack on the Phillipines would result in a counterstroke by the US Battlefleet into the Marshalls to reopen the LOC to the PI. Probably would have led to similar results as the Pearl Attack did.
The exact course of things if Japan wouldn't have attacked the US at all cannot be foreseen. This really is pure speculation (anybody ever thought what might have happened if some lucky french bastard would have shot Hitler in 1917?? so much to what ifs).
Fact is
1) The japanese battleplan called for an attack on the US right from the start
2) The game therefore lets the US play along right from the start.
3) Considering 1 and esspecially 2, what else do you want to attack???? There is nothing else in the pacific posing a serious threat to you. So you might as well take out the battleships.
By the way, what kind of mission type do the planes attacking pearl have set?
You could stay around a little longer trying to catch the US-CV's or smashing the supply and any left over ships in Pearl, although the US-CV's will probably be underway to the westcoast by Dec. 8.

ORIGINAL: Damien Thorn

ORIGINAL: pasternakski
I would love to see a game that simulates all the "what ifs," and would buy that, as well.

But this is not that game.

It can be.

No, it can't. The editor is far too limited a tool to give you a simulation of, say, the 1937 situation using a game engine designed to present weapons, personnel, logistics, production, doctrine, leadership, and all the other necessary factors based on the historical reality of late 1941.

What about you, Bradfordkay? Would YOU plan against or expect an attack on Pearl if it hadn't actually happened?

My opinion. Most if not all the American commanders expected a strike from Japan. In their wildest dreams they didn't expect it at PH. In another thread Halsey was quoted as saying on about 5 6 Dec 1941 to his pilots if you see any Japanese planes that look even a little threating shoot first and ask permision later (sorry didn't look for the exact quote). Kimmel thought the fleet was perfectly safe at PH. If you want history the fleet has to stay at PH. If your pre 7 Dec intel was better than real life would the old slow BB's be better off at sea?