ORIGINAL: KNac007
But anyway, how usually was this used? How much time took to prepare units for this kind of concentration? Target registration was neccessay, possitioning of artillery units important?
The requirements to fire accurate concentrations from multiple units are:
1. All firing units on a common survey grid, preferably theatre (precise location and orientation on the earth's surface to within, IIRC, 1 metre , and 1 mil).
2. Corrections of the moment (COM) for all firing units. COM are either current valid met data OR registration of the guns (this is real "registration", a different term from the "registration" you might sometimes see in the FireSpt tab in HTTR).
3. Calibration for muzzle velocity of all guns.
Survey was readily available by 1944 as entire Survey Regiments were established for the specific purpose of carrying survey to points located convenient to likely gun positions. When deploying, a regiment would send out a survey team to the nearest "BP" (a precisely located point on the ground, often concreted in by a survey regiment team) and carry back theatre survey to the guns. This could sometimes be complete by the time the guns were ready to fire, if there was a BP close enough.
Met also seems to have been pretty readily available from reading contemporary accounts but I haven't got hard data for that. Registration, in the technical artillery sense, is a procedure for a single gun to fire on a known (surveyed) target and from that deduce the COM to allow future missions from all calibrated guns within registration limits to strike the required grid location without adjustment. Registration limits are basically that the guns sharing registration must be located within a limited distance (IIRC about 10-20 km), on a common survey grid, and calibrated.
Calibration of guns provided a problem area in the early war years, but by 1943 had largely been resolved. A pool of guns was calibrated and then distributed to the firing units, which could then make comparative adjustments to produce calibration data for their other guns. By 1944 this procedure was routine and I believe that at least all British guns could be regarded as calibrated.
Essentially the requirements for coordinated fire from distributed units were routinely present at divisional artillery level and below, and were pretty easy to establish for corps level and below as well. They would be satisified as part of the normal process of deployment of the guns. Bear in mind that the
movement of guns in HTTR is far less coordinated than occurred in practice, where the movement, deployment and survey of guns was not dealt with by manoeuvre arm HQs but planned and ordered by the artillery command at the highest level.
In late 1942 this sort of artillery activity was already becoming a regular occurrence. 8th Army artillery was centralised to a high degree, with the divisional artilleries being used as a massive 72-gun battery, and communications were established to enable Corps fire plans. "Registration was restricted to one gun per regiment, but all guns were calibrated, in the case of medium guns every third day; frequent meteorological corrections were issued; and all guns were on a common communications grid. Timings were synchronized by using the BBC radio time signal, and specification of time on target (TOT) became standard when calling for fire." FOOs now had the power to call on the firepower of the whole brigade and this was later extended to not only the whole division but also the whole corps. Survey was in this theatre the limiting factor; "lengthy survey was not possible in the mobile operations that followed El Alamein. A battery would usually advance with reconnaissance. The regimental survey officer would fix the position of one gun and fire two groups of airburst 40 degrees apart at 6,000m. The other troops would lay their directors on these bursts and deduce their own positions relative to the "pistol gun". A whole divisional artillery could be brought onto a common grid in one hour, using a survey beacon subsequently erected at a prominent position. The seventy-two-gun battery fire mission could thus become the standard method of support, which could be applied to a map reference by template in what was known as a "stonk", or even as a quick smoke screen." This is talking about late 1942, in the desert, in very mobile warfare. We are looking at late 1944, in the well-developed and mapped areas of northwest Europe, in much less mobile operations. In early 1943 the system was further expanded by the addition of air OPs (AOP), whose FOs had authorisation for regimental and divisional concentrations. Further officers were also added to the normal complement of observers, authorised to fire quick, observed divisional concentrations. (quotes are from J.B.A. Bailey,
Field Artillery and Firepower, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2004.)
FO linking with each combat line unit took time? etc. That effects flexibility too.
Yes, this is a good point and one that could be handled in greater detail for future games. British field artillery regiments deployed (in NW Europe) six FOO parties, three BCs parties, and of course the Regt Tac HQ. This means that every brigade got a Regt Tac HQ that established itself at Bde HQ and an artillery commander who travelled with the Bde commander. Every Bn got a battery commander who travelled in general with the bn commander, and every bn had two FO parties that were transferred between companies to ensure that the lead company had the support when required. FO parties could also be deployed away from the infantry, usually in static OPs to provide overwatch for an attack or when their supported bn was in reserve and therefore required no observer support. But the general effect is that any combat unit would have three observer parties attached to it while in contact, and could therefore place a call for fire within moments of contact. Those observers were connected by radio to an artillery net that reached all the way up to Corps artillery via the Regimental and Divisional artillery command posts. Those command posts could relay calls for fire and provide authorisation and allocation within a few minutes if it was required. I am not currently sure how medium and heavy artillery organised their observation parties, however.
In the game you can get 10 arty bn as reinforcements and in matter of minutes able to fire tireless at any place all at the same time. If your artillery are perfoming such missions suddenly should be able to change their target and shot at a totally different place?
First, a minor point, but the guns do not fire tirelessly. Conducting fire missions is exhausting and artillery units in HTTR will fatigue as they fire. On the larger issue, if your guns are already coordinated to deal with a single target, then haven't they clearly already satisfied the conditions to coordinate their fires for other targets? If anything, a delay would affect the first target far more than subsequent targets.
In Tunisia, any US FO could fire all the guns of the division in less than five minutes. Corps assets were not as well handled (this was 1943) and were usually parceled out to the divisions which reduced their effectiveness. This improved by the time of Anzio where VI Corps artillery was on common grid and could concentrate fire on prearranged targets anywhere with a single code word. Engagement of targets of opportunity could be done almost as easily - massing of fires of up to seven battalions after the adjustment of observed fire by one battalion or by one forward observer was made possible by the introduction of the FDC or Fire Direction Centre. If massing could be done after adjustment, it could also be done (albeit with reduced effectiveness and accuracy) without adjustment. In a good example of this, german infantry were spotted by an air OP and were engaged within twelve minutes by every gun in VI Corps. The guns engaged another four corps targets in the next 50 minutes.
For example if I have 3 brit fld regt under XXX Corps in the middle of the island should they be able to support an attack of by the Guard Armoured div heading towards Arnhem and suddenly change their support in a matter of 5 minutes and shot at units spotted by the 82nd Airborne Div at Nijmegen, which, at all, probably don't have any contact with these artillery units. Or shoting at units spotted by the 1st Airborne Div which doubtfully can have contact and any direct link with these Flf Regt, links that could take hours, if not days to be in effect. And that if we do not account that these units are cut off, and if we do not account for physical barriers like a forest, abrut mountains or a river like the Rhine!
Physical barriers are no problem for artillery. By late 1944, in mobile warfare, radio was the standard means of communication for artillery at the tactical level. In fact XXX Corps' artillery did fire for 1st Airborne Division's observers, and very effectively, breaking up a number of German attacks on Oosterbeek. The only real limit on this in Market Garden was the lack of artillery ammunition, and the inability of 1st Airborne Division to observe targets in depth since their positions were so compressed and on low ground.
Artillery for the Allies in WWII devoted great attention to establishing and maintaining communications. At Arnhem, the only radio nets which worked flawlessly and throughout were the 'gunner nets' which were from time to time used even by the infantry commanders to communicate since their own communications were frequently not working. Placing an observer in contact with another regiment is simple provided the observer either has the frequencies as part of orders (certainly common today, not sure about then) or has some kind of radio contact with the organisation controlling the guns. For instance, as long as there is a command radio link from XXX Corps to 1st Airborne Division, then the correct frequency for XXX Corps artillery can be passed over that link.
There are many issues with the question of artillery. As you said there are many "command states" in which artillery could be, supporting what units and with what priority, etc. But because artillery procuded 80% of casualties in war, I think we can agree that it must be as much realistic as possible. And probably a deep revision and addition in the attachment/detachment of artillery units department, priority target etc. must be done, as well.
Yes, quite correct. Handling of extra-divisional artillery could be customised more since it's an important issue. Artillery doesn't currently behave the way I'd like to see, where the movement of guns is controlled separately from their fires and observation assets, which can be allocated to pretty much any unit. Artillery in the game currently engages targets of opportunity and defensive fires on a timed basis, whereas artillery in war normally (then as now) engages on the basis of a number of rounds and/or a rate of fire per gun per minute. Corps artillery does concentrate a little too easily, and on targets of insufficient importance. It is not possible to specifically allocate Corps artillery fire to a manoeuvre unit without actually giving the manoeuvre unit command over the artillery - you can't simply have them provide communications and liaison and thus fires, as it was actually done. Mortars are currently also too flexible since as a general rule they would only fire for their parent battalion (although control of even mortars could be and sometimes was concentrated, especially for set-piece deliberate fireplans in support of significant attacks). There is no Time-On-Target facility in the game, this was by late 1944 a very common means of fire control for both British and US artillery. There is also no means of developing a deliberate fireplan to support an attack, indeed no fire at all except on observed targets, and no barrage lines. The DF process is abstracted and this loses the power of its implementation, where a single officer could concentrate the fire of every gun within range within moments as guns were laid on the highest-priority DF when not actually engaged on other missions. These were all common and effective, and I would love to see them in future games - though of course the wishlist is long enough already [:)].
Anyway, there would be a misperception of how much usefull and in what situations was artillery. For that one has to check out the mechanics of war and how it all went. During movile actions the importance of artillery decreased, directly connected to the tempo of the actions theirself (when more rapid, less was the importance of artillery). It is prior to the attack and during stalemates that it is more important. We have to remember that most of the time frontlines were stable and just broke when offensives took place. In the western front these were the stands at Normandy and posterior, in the West Wall. During slow advancing or smaller offensive actions artillery serves for attrition of forces, prior to a major offensive it serves for destruction of enemy defensive line and total attrition of enemy so they cannot put any resitence. After the breakthrought, when pockets have been formed, artillery is important to reduce them. So it is prior to breakthrought/offensive, and before pockets formed when more usefull artillery is, and when that many casualties are produced, softening enemy resistence in the first case, and anhilating it in the second. But during offensive/movile phase artillery is (while it stills very important) limited in use to singular (but important) actions (breaking spotted FUPs), due to the FOW, changing situation and cosntant repositioning. This all linked to the tempo off course, that's why maybe the Bulge wouldn't be the best example because it's slow tempo and restricted movement. Gentlemen, I'm getting way offtopic here [:D] but I just want to make the point that this all are issues that have to taken into account when taking examples and applying things to the game. It's true that arty could take be flexible, but it took a more or less static situation and time to be that flexible (not the case of MG), and a lot of preparations had to eb done (unlike nowadays artillery which can setup, register and fire then move and repit process sveral kilometers away or to a compelktly different unit but that all thanks to current technology, not available in WWII era, even the usage of radios was limited, most of comunication went by a line connection that ahd to eb set up, etc).
Just some points
I disagree with most of this. To take the last point first, how can you claim that communications were limited when every British FO travelled in a Bren Carrier with at least two radios, as well as line, or in a tank with a similar and if anything more powerful radio net? When US Army Divisional Artillery came with 10 spotter aircraft on its TO&E from 1942?
Artillery is of vital importance in all phases of war. It enables mobility of friendly forces, by suppressing ('neutralising') enemy direct and indirect firepower that will prevent mobility. It destroys the mobility of the enemy by engaging him when he seeks to manoeuvre. In fast-moving operations artillery must ideally be mechanised (pretty frequent, see for example the British armoured division where half the artillery was mechanised, or the US Army Armored Division where it was
all mechanised) and FOs must be as mobile as their supported arms - Bren Carriers with infantry, FO tanks with armour - and this was routinely done by late 1944. Indeed by that time FOs were also very frequently employed in light aircraft (the "Air OP" or "AOP") although this is not modelled in HTTR as it did not occur during Market Garden. Note also that with few exceptions, the war in Northwest Europe in 1944-45 was not at all a war of movement, it was characterised far more often by set-piece offensives, massive artillery support, and movement at infantry rates. When this was not the case, artillery could still be used - when British 2nd Army covered 400 km in six days after crossing the Seine, artillery was used against targets selected from air photos and fired on when FOs called on the radio. Timed fireplans were only used when communications failed. It certainly wasn't this effective at the start of the war, but by late 1944 it had been through a process of continuous and rapid improvement (though even then there were still frequent and often disastrous regressions).
Artillery in HTTR isn't perfectly modelled, but it does provide at least a glimpse of the raw power of this decisive arm. For every aspect of the game which provides greater than historical freedom for artillery, there is another which takes away from its historical effectiveness; I think we have a pretty good balance for the moment. I would certainly hate to see the flexibility and effectiveness of artillery hobbled by pretending that no lessons were learned from 1939 to 1944, especially for British/Commonwealth and US formations.
Regards & sorry for the overly long post [:)]
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) and you will try to obtain as much realism as possible, etc. but I'm just trying to incentive you to give it higher priority [:D] other user would like to see other thing implemented or better done, and I'm pushing for my own priorites.