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A friend of mine and I have been discussing this, and have come to the conclusion that the Americans have been able to consistently produce high quality ground, air and naval forces faster and better than any other nation in the 20th century and beyond.

For wargamers, there has been an inordinate fascination with the military forces of the Germans, especially in WWII. A deeply-ingrained stereotype of German military superiority took root, and this extends to the earliest years of the 20th century. This even extends to the Handbook on German Military Forces, issued by the US Army in 1945. The stereotype of the typical German as being militaristic and prone to regimentation was perpetuated, even though it was a negative view. They were being portrayed as mindless automatons of a totalitarian regime, and this image survived into the designs of the earliest wargames, most notably Avalon Hill's boardgames. The Germans units in say, Battle of the Bulge, always had higher "combat factors" as compared to American or British units. This numerical combat value was given to recreate the initial surprise and repulse of the Allies in that offensive. The value of defensive positions was abstracted, as well as artillery and air support.

Now, go to the combat reports of American units in that battle--when the odds were even, the American soldiers invariably performed better and inflicted more casualties on the Germans than the Germans did on them. In the Pacific theater, this so-called "kill ratio" was even more pronounced in favor of the Americans, with one notable exception.

I will argue this, and as an example, I will compare the "elite" German SS Divisions to the US Marine Corps. The German SS began as an elite core, of maybe four or five divisions. As the war dragged on, the Germans continuously expanded their SS forces, creating new divisions and populating these divisions with raw recruits, and diluting the hardcore of experienced veterans. This was a policy that was flawed and bound to fail. By 1944-45 even the best units, such as the 1st & 12th SS Pz Divisions, performed poorly in combat.

In contrast, the US Marine Corps formed six divisions between 1941 and 1944. They were formed by splitting the older units and providing a cadre of veterans for the mass of recruits and draftees. This ensured that the quality of the new units would not be diluted, and the combat records of these divisions prove this.

The US Army did much the same thing, but they expanded much further, and still maintained high standards. The 106th Division, which had a very small percentage of veterans in its ranks, was virtually destroyed in the Battle of the Bulge. It was a terrible defeat, but an exception to the general rule.

Compare this to the defeat of the German Army Group Center in Russia during the summer of 1944--some 25 divisions were destroyed.

This may generate some heated controversy, but I will categorically state that man for man, the typical American/British and other Western Allied soldier was as well or better trained, equipped and led at the tactical level than his counterpart on the German side throughout the war.

So, one may ask , how were the Germans so successful from 1939 to 1941? Better tactics, better communications, better air support and at times better higher leadership. That's all there was to it.

This is where the tactical games fall short, but ONLY for the 1939-41 period. For my argument, though, this is immaterial. We are strictly talking about the
quality of the soldiers, and the research for and design of the SPWaW 8.3 OOBs bears this notion out.

Some interesting ideas in this. I would like to add some points.

Armor: The M-4 was a good tank and in a lot of ways very underrated. Yes it could not stand up in a head to head duel with a Panther or Tiger, but it didn't have to. It was a rugged and very reliable tank and brought a quality all in itself. Only bad decisions by higher authorities back in the states limited the upgrades to the Sherman that would have allowed it to go head to head with the German Tanks i.e. refusal to upgun it in 1943, except for the Jumbo refusal to up armor it, and the U.S. Army's decision to use gasoline powered instead of Diesel powered M-4's.

Artillery: Clear U.S. Superiority

Air Power: Clear U.S. Superiority

Infantry Weapons: The M-1 Garand was the best standard infantry rifle of the war, accurate, high rate of fire, easy to maintain, and very reliable. The U.S. Army and USMC were the only forces equipped with a semi-automatic rifle for the infantry. The MP-44, Tokorav, Gewehr-43, and others were not standard issue. Yes the MG-42 was the best MG of the war, the BAR, M-1919A2-4, BREN, DT, and others were fair to good MG's but couldn't match the MG-42 in rate of fire, ease of operation, reliability, and portability.

Logisitics: Especially for the people who believe that the Allies won the war by mass production, there should be no argument that the Allies especially the Americans had the best Logistics of the War.

Intelligence: Ultra gave a priceless advantage to the Allies. Stalin had his own Ultra in the Lucy spy ring. And American code breakers read a good part of all Japanese traffic throughout the War. Tactical Intelligence was hit or miss on both sides. The Battle of the Bulge was a prime example of the failure of specifically U.S. Intel in the war.

Personnel: How go you measure the effectiveness of personnel in war? I maintain that the only way to measure it is who won the war? I have read various books and studies on the effectiveness of the individual infantryman in World War II. For every battle where the Germans outfought the Allies there is another battle where the Allies outfought the Germans. In one study Dupuy used a scientific calculation to measure effectiveness. I have seen other studies using similiar methods with both similiar and different results. Without going into the studies, I think we can say that a green division didn't generally perform as well as a veteran division who didn't perform as well as an elite division. The One Major Advantage the American Infantry had in the war I believe was that they learned faster than their opponents. The U.S. Army's performance in the early battles in North Africa was a disappointment to say the least. Yet these same divisions learned their lessons and were very effective formations later on in the war. The 45th and 36th Divisions in the Vosges Mountains are an excellent case in point. Due to weather and terrain, the divisions could not effectively use their advantages in supporting arms in the campaign to clear these mountains. They did not have a clear numerical superiority in infantry and in some cases the defenders outnumbered the attacker. Yet these two divisions were extremely effective against the Germans.

Other Factors relating to Combat Effectiveness: I believe the Germans had the best staff organization at the operational levels. The Germans were past masters at redeploying troops to shore up weak points in their lines. The Battles around Aachen and Metz are cases in point. Staff work was what enabled the Germans to do this. Motivation of the Troops I believe was a wash, with no clear advantage on either side. The Germans had a priceless advantage in the early parts of the war over everyone else. They had a solid cadre of combat experienced Officers and Senior NCO's that most of the other armies lacked. Yes the other armies also had combat experienced leaders but not in the numbers that the Germans had. Stalin's purges of the Red Army's officer corps prior to 1941 hamstrung the Red Army through 1943. The U.S. Army did not have the numbers of experienced troops to rapidly expand the army effectively. The Western Allies had suffered through a depression in the 1930's and only started to expand their armies at the last minute. It takes time to create an effective army and the performance of western troops in the early part of the war reflects the years of neglect heaped upon them. The USMC was probably the only example in the war where a Green Division performed as well as a Veteran Formation in all cases. But the USMC used a different method to form its divisions, it transferred a core of combat experienced Officers and NCO's to the new divisions when formed. The USMC also had another priceless advantage in the numbers of combat experience Marines still serving from the Banana Wars of the 1920-30's. The British Army was hamstrung with an outdated organization at the start of the war and later in the war was operating with a severe shortage of manpower. Also in some ways Churchhill was as bad as Hitler in some of the decisions made about senior commanders, Richie in North Africa for example. Both the French and British Armies were also at a disadvantage because of the First World War. Both armies remembered the losses from the first war and were haunted by it. Where the Germans took the lessons of the WW I and applied them correctly in my judgement to WW II, the French and British did not early in the War.

I believe that most people lose sight of World War II by looking through rose colored lens. It was probably the last war fought that everyone believed in, no matter which side you were on. Yes the German Army accomplished some amazing things in the war. But so did the U.S. Military.

Don't forget that some of the very first reverses suffered by the Germans were inflicted by Commonwealth troops; at the tactical level, the Germans failed in almost every attack they conducted in Greece (although sheer numerical superiority meant they could constantly turn the extended flank and force a withdrawal). They suffered another very bloody nose at Tobruk, where the Australian and British garrison turned back the very best Rommel had to throw at them. The first real reverse suffered by the Imperial Japanese Army was at Milne Bay, at the hands of Australians and American engineers; followed by a strong rearguard action down the Kokoda Track (despite MacArthur's and Blamey's best efforts to sabotage the Australian force by replacing all its best commanders) and ultimately inflicting a strong defeat on the Japanese by fighting back along the Track.

Australian efforts were however often undermined by poor command at the most senior level (especially Blamey, a thoroughly bad egg if ever there was one) and the usual Commonwealth inability to take things seriously and prepare adequately for operations.

My personal favourite is a quote from an Australian Lieutenant, after leading a platoon counterattack to regain some of the Tobruk posts that had been captured by the Germans:

"We have been into them, and they are running like f*****g bunnies!"

So much for the vaunted elite of the Afrika Korps!

Regards
33

One comment on the supposed "elite" character of the early German SS formations...

You can roughly divide German Waffen SS development on 3 periods.

In first period units like LAH mot regiment/division and various SS battalions and regiments were more considered as elites due to the political support then for anything else. Their combat record was not really impressive (LAH regiment was routed in Poland and Totenkopf was more known from massacre of UK prisioners then from other traits) compared to Wehrmacht units. In general, SS units were taking more casualties then Heer to achieve the same results.

In this period Waffen SS was mainly experimental formation.

In second period, 1941-1943, Waffen SS recieved much more attention. Main reason for that was change in priorities - Totenkopf performance in Demiansk pocket in 1942 was used by Himmler as a proof, that stubborn and hard to break soldiers are the ones that are now needed. This way Waffen SS recieved much more political support, which allowed to develop core of their units from motorized infantry to either tank or tank/mech formations. Since attrition on the Eastern Front was very high, Waffen SS due to the better support units quickly became elites simply because they were recieveing replacements on time, while Wehrmacht was not. And Waffen SS was not single example of political factor in creating elites (Herman Goering Panzer Division).

In third period, 1944-1945, supposed superiority of the Waffen SS (created by the "core" of 5 panzer divisions - 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th and 10th) and rise of political influence on the army resulted in mass creation of Waffen SS units. That included foreign volunteers units, youth movement draft and various ad-hoc units, like penal battalions (used to fight 1944 Warsaw Rising). In this last period Waffen SS became too big and too hard to control to be called elite - and it was developing more and more to replace Wehrmacht, not support it.

You touch on an issue here that in someways has not been thoroughly explored. Without a doubt, the Commonwealth supplied the best troops the British had. The ANZAC forces supplied superb infantry, although supplied with some what dated weapons (SMLE, Vickers HMG, etc.). There is an author (John Mosier) who has written two books ("The Myth of the Great War" and "The Blitzkreig Myth") who maintains that the poor use of Commonwealth troops in both world wars led to the demise of the British Empire. This is not the central theme in the books but is one of a few small conclusions he draws in support of his main theory. I don't know if I buy into that theory or not. But it would make some excellent food for thought.

The Canadians supplied some excellent troops also. But whatever accomplishments Commonwealth Troops provided the British there is still one major problem with them; there were never enough of them. I don't know the exact population figures for the Commonwealth for the interwar period, but I would be willing to bet there was a much smaller pool of military age manpower available due to the heavy losses suffered in World War I. If the young men are not there in the early 1920's to help make babies, there are not a whole lot of young adult males around in the late 30's and early 40's. If Hitler had not declared war on the United States on 10 Dec 1941, I believe that the best the British could have hoped for was a draw and an outright victory was out of the question.

Even with the Russians factored into the equation, I believe the Germans would have won the war if the United States did not become involved in Europe. Yes the Russians produced the vast majority of its own armored vehicles during the war. But with out the massive aid provided by Lend Lease (over 600.000 trucks in particular) I can't see the Russians winning either. The United States fed the Red Army, clothed it, provided it with its communications, transportation, and medical supplies, and most importantly provided an Ally that drew off almost half of the German Army to other fronts. The Battle of Kursk did not end because the Germans were stopped by the Russians. It ended because Hitler ordered it to stop due to the need to transfer troops to the Med to react to the invasion of Sicily.

ORIGINAL: Golf33

Don't forget that some of the very first reverses suffered by the Germans were inflicted by Commonwealth troops; at the tactical level, the Germans failed in almost every attack they conducted in Greece (although sheer numerical superiority meant they could constantly turn the extended flank and force a withdrawal). They suffered another very bloody nose at Tobruk, where the Australian and British garrison turned back the very best Rommel had to throw at them. The first real reverse suffered by the Imperial Japanese Army was at Milne Bay, at the hands of Australians and American engineers; followed by a strong rearguard action down the Kokoda Track (despite MacArthur's and Blamey's best efforts to sabotage the Australian force by replacing all its best commanders) and ultimately inflicting a strong defeat on the Japanese by fighting back along the Track.

Australian efforts were however often undermined by poor command at the most senior level (especially Blamey, a thoroughly bad egg if ever there was one) and the usual Commonwealth inability to take things seriously and prepare adequately for operations.

My personal favourite is a quote from an Australian Lieutenant, after leading a platoon counterattack to regain some of the Tobruk posts that had been captured by the Germans:

"We have been into them, and they are running like f*****g bunnies!"

So much for the vaunted elite of the Afrika Korps!

Regards
33

The Germans may have had the best staff early in the war but by late 1944 Hitler was completely out of touch with reality and undermined the German army's ability to control its own destiny. The policy of Fortress's that had to defended to the last man, the refusal to evacuate the Baltic Balcony to bolster the defence of the Oder, placing Himmler in charge of Army Group Vistula etc. had devestating effects on the Germans ability to fight on the Eastern Front. It could also be argued that as the allies closed in from both sides many German soldiers felt that it would be better if the western allies captured Berlin. How many front line german units were anywhere near strength? How many of the troops in them were boys or straight out of training?

The destruction of the Luftwaffe must be taken into account as much for its psychological effect as its material effect.

Having said that the speed of Pattons advance once the breakout from Normandy had been achieved and the drive into Germany over all, and the planning and logistics that underpinned it are remarkable when you consider that four years previously the US had no idea about joint warfare.

On the subject of the pace of the allied advance many US fanboys are extremely dissmissive of the British armies less agressive stance on assualting the enemy but it bears repeating that many British staff officers had served in WW1 and were none too keen to repeat that kind of meatgrinder approach. On the first day of the battle of the Somme the british army sustained 60,000 casualties, a similar figure to the number of dead the Americans suffered during the entire Vietnam war. (those figures are accurate as best I can remember, if not please correct me). The American (very reasonable) response post Vietnam has been to go high tech and to avoid wherever possible the loss of American servicemen and women.

British/Commonwealth forces also had, as pointed out above, a smaller manpower pool to work with and could much less afford heavy losses of infantry. By late 1944 they had to disband an entire infantry division in order to bring the others up to an effective strength.

Commonwealth forces used the same equipment as the British - by the time they reached combat the AIF units at least were using SMLE, TSMG, Bren and Vickers - just like their British counterparts. The level of training of Australian replacements was often very poor though, and they needed thorough training by the theatre depots before they were ready to be committed to battle. Fortunately the theatre depot in the Middle East was superbly run and produced very high-quality reinforcements.

Regards
33

"The Germans may have had the best staff early in the war but by late 1944 Hitler was completely out of touch with reality and undermined the German army's ability to control its own destiny." quoted from KGV.

Hitler was an asset for the allies undoubtedly. He refused to bow to military necessity many times and payed the price, Stalingrad, the destruction of Army Group Center, etc. By late 44 you had two staff systems in the German Army: OKH and OKW on one side and the staff organizations at Army level on down on the other. OKW and OKH were out of touch with the realities of what was happening at the fronts mainly due to Hitler's influence. The staffs at army level and below were fighting a losing war and in most cases still accomplishing minor miracles. Hitler committed many blunders throughout the war, relieving excellent commanders such as Manstein, insisting on holding hopeless positions, and most importantly never actually putting the German economy on a war-time footing. Hitler's many mistakes are legendary and it would take a book to document them all.

The German soldier has many excellent qualities, among them the willingness to take heavy losses if necessary, initiative, tactical acumen, and others. German Units fought with fanatical courage on the Eastern Front to the end of the war. But was the German soldier a supersoldier, no. German Armor was excellent when it worked. The Mk IV was a workhorse that was reliable and able to be upgraded as the war progressed. But both the Panther and both series of the Tiger were very unreliable. Operational Readiness rates for the Tigers were normally less than 50% and the Panthers were not much better. The German heavy tanks were plagued with engine and transmission problems throughout their service life along with inadequate suspension. The Panther was prone to catching fire at inopertune times throughout its service life also.

Also mentioned in previous posts are examples from the First World War. Normally accounts from that war emphasis the horror of serving in the trenches and little is actually mentioned about troop quality. I believe everyone in this forum will agree that the Allies wasted troops' lives at a tremendous rate. But I would argue that American troops in World War I stood head and shoulders above any other troops committed by the Allies. For instance at the Battle of the Argonne in particular the Battle of Belleau Wood, U.S. Forces (both Marine and Army) breached the German trench system completely, the first time this had happened in the war. Throughout the War the Germans had developed tactics that prevented the French or British from making any major gains in the trench fighting. Indeed part of the French Army mutineed because of the blunders of its high command. The British Army was quite adept at portraying limited gains as a great victory as were the French. The only actual success for the British in the entire war was at Cambrai and it was squandered by poor planning. If you check KIA figures for the entire war you will find that the British and French lost over twice as many men as the Germans lost on all fronts.




.

You guys have raised some excellent points, and I'm glad that the stereotypes, at least in this particular community, are realized to be, if not completely unfounded, then highly exaggerated.

This is a welcome change from some of the attitudes I see on forums relating to the German forces. Some of the more serious researchers are doing their best to dash the long-held notions of the Germans as being inherently superior soldiers.

There are other stereotypes, too, one of which is related to my favorites, the US Marines. Their leadership has been characterized as unimaginative and stubbornly insistent on the "hey diddle diddle, straight up in the middle" approach. This is patently false. However, it isn't my intent to focus on leadership issues, but instead, on the troops themselves.

I once started a thread called "Is it the Man or the Weapon?", and while you wouldn't expect even the best-trained soldier to fight well with pea-shooters, conversely, the best equipment in the hands of poorly-trained men is just as bad.

As for the alleged German combat superiority, this image was greatly influenced by the studies of the late Col. Trevor N. Dupuy, most notably in his book "A Genius for War". The statistical studies he based his opinions on were flawed, and he picked the examples that best supported his viewpoint. Unfortunately, many subsequent historians (and wargame designers) took this as gospel, and it has taken years to re-evaluate and refute these assumptions.

I think the comparisons between the US forces to other countries' armies are a bit unfair. The Americans have often met exhausted forces on the opposing side. The Germans in 1917 or 1944 were not the same as those that poured into France in 1940. If the US army of 1940 had fought the Germans in France instead of the Allied forces at the time I doubt they'd do much better than the French or the British. The US performance in Torch wasn't good, neither was the US air doctrine nor the anti-submarine doctrine initially. The US campaign against the Japanese is perhaps an exception.
The Germans weren't supermen, the Soviet soldiers were certainly just as good as them when the German advantages were nullified, e.g. outside Moscow or in Stalingrad. As for the Japanese vs the Americans I don't know of any battles where a comparison can be made, either the Japanese had an overwhelming superiority or the Japanese were cut off and starving when the US forces attacked.

IMO once the US gets rolling then it does things well and it has consistently shown its ability to to fix what's wrong (e.g. after Torch or Pearl Harbour) which is probably its greatest strength outside its excellent economic infrastructure.

The big question that remains to be answered if what the US would have done if it had been in the same situation as the French in 1940 or the USSR in 1941, would it have beaten the Axis or would it suffer the same losses?

ORIGINAL: KG Erwin

You guys have raised some excellent points, and I'm glad that the stereotypes, at least in this particular community, are realized to be, if not completely unfounded, then highly exaggerated.

This is a welcome change from some of the attitudes I see on forums relating to the German forces. Some of the more serious researchers are doing their best to dash the long-held notions of the Germans as being inherently superior soldiers.

There are other stereotypes, too, one of which is related to my favorites, the US Marines. Their leadership has been characterized as unimaginative and stubbornly insistent on the "hey diddle diddle, straight up in the middle" approach. This is patently false. However, it isn't my intent to focus on leadership issues, but instead, on the troops themselves.

I once started a thread called "Is it the Man or the Weapon?", and while you wouldn't expect even the best-trained soldier to fight well with pea-shooters, conversely, the best equipment in the hands of poorly-trained men is just as bad.

As for the alleged German combat superiority, this image was greatly influenced by the studies of the late Col. Trevor N. Dupuy, most notably in his book "A Genius for War". The statistical studies he based his opinions on were flawed, and he picked the examples that best supported his viewpoint. Unfortunately, many subsequent historians (and wargame designers) took this as gospel, and it has taken years to re-evaluate and refute these assumptions.

Col. Dupuy was one of the earliest people trying to quantify the performance of troops in war. To me all efforts to quantify performance in war are a waste of time. There are too many intangibles to consider to make a cold mathmatical equation work. Being good at war is an art not a science. The former Soviet Union tried to quantify things to a high degree using such things as Norms. They tried to take the human factor totally out of the equation and in my estimation did very badly at it. I know of no calculation that will determine if a unit stands to the death or bugs out at the first hint of hostile fire. How do you factor in the morale level of a company which is holding the key position in your entire area? Did they just get mail from home or did they just lose their very popular Company Commander? The U.S. Army tries hard to quantify training. They publish volumes of manuals with common tasks and MOS specific tasks yearly. They index and cross reference this tasks to rank and MOS. Common Task testing is a yearly ordeal every unit goes through. All of these efforts are geared towards having a common training level by rank and MOS throughout the Army. In most cases its works fairly well. But what the U.S. Army has never been able to Quantify is the intrinsic values held by the soldier himself; loyality to comrades, desire to perform so as to not let the team down (peer pressure), fear of personal failure, patriotism, and others. All of these factor affect performance in combat to one degree or another.

In a lot of ways, the one thing that a wargame has never been able to do is to factor in these human qualities in combat. The best ones average out the combat performance of a nation's soldiers and use a probability equation to determine if they will break or hold. But these equations do not address the motivation of the troops in a situational manner, but rather in an historical manner as to what they did at the time. No game can actually address the effects of the battlefield on morale adequately. Some games get it closer than others but without that unique human factor it is all probablity. One man in the right place at the right time can have totally unanticipated results in a combat action, that is what awards for valor are for. Conversely the wrong man at the wrong place at the wrong time can cause the best plans to go south. In both instances the rank and duty position can be anything.

The U.S. Military is now developing a new concept called "Fourth Generational Warfare" and a lot of smart people are developing the facts and assumptions behind the concept. Fourth Generational Warfare the way I understand it is based on fighting a force without a national border to defend (terrorism) that fights in mostly urban terrain to blend into the population. I am sure I do not have the full concept down but so-far I see nothing that is new to me. It is just a restatement of warfare as it is conducted today. Why did I bring this up? I brought this topic up for the excellent reason that once again the human factors (motivation, morale, training, etc.) have come to the forefront in trying to understand an enemy who does not conform to previous enemies. Any endeavor that involves humans must be dependent on the human factor for its success or failure.

ORIGINAL: SemperAugustus

I think the comparisons between the US forces to other countries' armies are a bit unfair. The Americans have often met exhausted forces on the opposing side. The Germans in 1917 or 1944 were not the same as those that poured into France in 1940. If the US army of 1940 had fought the Germans in France instead of the Allied forces at the time I doubt they'd do much better than the French or the British. The US performance in Torch wasn't good, neither was the US air doctrine nor the anti-submarine doctrine initially. The US campaign against the Japanese is perhaps an exception.
The Germans weren't supermen, the Soviet soldiers were certainly just as good as them when the German advantages were nullified, e.g. outside Moscow or in Stalingrad. As for the Japanese vs the Americans I don't know of any battles where a comparison can be made, either the Japanese had an overwhelming superiority or the Japanese were cut off and starving when the US forces attacked.

IMO once the US gets rolling then it does things well and it has consistently shown its ability to to fix what's wrong (e.g. after Torch or Pearl Harbour) which is probably its greatest strength outside its excellent economic infrastructure.

The big question that remains to be answered if what the US would have done if it had been in the same situation as the French in 1940 or the USSR in 1941, would it have beaten the Axis or would it suffer the same losses?

The German Forces in France in June 1944 where far from exhausted. They probably had the best combat readiness of any of the German Forces at the time. You might also look at the Italian Campaign in 1943/44 before the Dragoon Landings also. My personnel favorite U.S. Infantry Division the 45th fought from Sicily into Italy into Southern France then on into Germany. Mistakes were made in the Italian Campaign (Rapido River come immediately to mind) but the U.S. Infantry performed well against the Germans in this campaign.

In regards to 1917/18 the U.S. Forces were definitely not facing exhausted German Forces. The vast majority of the forces faced were fresh from their victories over the Imperial Russians, Romanians, and the Italians who had Allied help. Historically the Germans in World War I took far less causalitie than did the Allies. The Germans substituted firepower for manpower. Much was made by the Allies in 1916 when the Germans took the fourth infantry regiment away from the infantry division. They were sure that this indicated a lack of manpower on the part of the Germans which indicated that the Allies were being successful in killing vast amounts of Germans. In actuality this was far from the case. A three regiment division is far easier to control, it takes less logistical effort to support, and with the vast increases in firepower that came along with this reorganization could hold a larger section of front. The Germans never really committed the type of mass attacks across no man's land that the Allies did. General Von Mudra early in the war showed the Germans how to conduct attacks with limited objectives using limited forces and be successful. This was the forebearers of the famous StormTroopers. The "Miracle of the Marne" was not a French victory per se. The Germans knew they were over extended before the Marne and voluntarily withdrew to defensible positions not because of French actions.

In regards to your question about what would have the position of the U.S. been like if they had been in the position of France in 1940 or Russia in 1941. In all actually they were in that position from Dec 41 to May 42. The American Forces had suffered one defeat after another. Yes they had not been physically invaded, but geography prevented that.

There is a military axiom attributed to I believe Napoleon that states there are no bad troops just bad leaders. I tend to agree with that having served 30 years in the military. The key German advantage through most of the war was leadership with all the things that apply. The German soldier was no better or worse than any other soldier in WW II. I would also point out the U.S. Army that invaded France in June 1944 was mostly green troops fighting against veteran troops. Through out the war the Germans maintained a core of veteran officers and NCO's almost all of their units. One of Hitler's many mistakes of the war was his refusal to reconstitute units in a lot of cases. He would leave a unit in the line until it was destroyed and then create a new unit to take its place. This contributed to the loss of a lot of combat experience soldiers throughout the war.

Fabulous thread, KG, and a great post to start us off. I think I'm going to attract a little criticism as we go along, though [;)].

ORIGINAL: KG Erwin

A friend of mine and I have been discussing this, and have come to the conclusion that the Americans have been able to consistently produce high quality ground, air and naval forces faster and better than any other nation in the 20th century and beyond.

I think this is difficult to show for several reasons. We can move on to the subject of Combat performance in WWII, but as others have pointed out, there are too many intangibles to be able to make a statement like this. For example, I can't think of too many occasions since 1917 when the Americans have fought without serious firepower advantages. They operated with air superiority over the mediterranean, complete air supremacy over NW Europe, and about the worst period they "endured" was for a few days at the beginning of the Bulge, when very little from either side flew.

At their peak, the Germans didn't employ anything like the Tactical air support the Western Allies did at their peak, and never did anything like the aerial bombardments that preceded the breakout and Goodwood when hundreds of heavies were employed in a tactical role.

You could certainly make a case for air and naval forces, but again this is partially a feature of expenditure. The US has never lacked the resources or money. The British Navy performed equally admirably during World War II but never had the Aircraft Carriers the Americans had. However, I don't think I know enough to offer too much of an opinion on this aspect.

For wargamers, there has been an inordinate fascination with the military forces of the Germans, especially in WWII. A deeply-ingrained stereotype of German military superiority took root, and this extends to the earliest years of the 20th century. This even extends to the Handbook on German Military Forces, issued by the US Army in 1945. The stereotype of the typical German as being militaristic and prone to regimentation was perpetuated, even though it was a negative view. They were being portrayed as mindless automatons of a totalitarian regime, and this image survived into the designs of the earliest wargames, most notably Avalon Hill's boardgames. The Germans units in say, Battle of the Bulge, always had higher "combat factors" as compared to American or British units. This numerical combat value was given to recreate the initial surprise and repulse of the Allies in that offensive. The value of defensive positions was abstracted, as well as artillery and air support.

There has been a fascination. I've always put it down to the nonsense about Blitzkrieg, the early stunning victories, the more exitingly named Armoured Vehicles (Tiger and Panther over the Sherman) and some of the post war mythology which absolved the Wehrmacht of complicity in war crimes, and painted the Waffen SS as misguided soldiers. This mythology helped make it acceptable to be fascinated by the wehrmacht, without having to confront some of the unpleasantness that it all entailed.

As for higher combat factors in games, I think that is sometimes necessary to explain how the germans did as well as they did in the face of the odds against them. You could argue that the Germans weren't better fighters but you still need some mechanism to represent and explain why they held on against the odds they did for so long. Games chose higher combat factors.

Now, go to the combat reports of American units in that battle--when the odds were even, the American soldiers invariably performed better and inflicted more casualties on the Germans than the Germans did on them. In the Pacific theater, this so-called "kill ratio" was even more pronounced in favor of the Americans, with one notable exception.

I think the pacific is a different balll game altogether. I think few people would suggest the Japanese were better tactically that the American troops. The Pacific kill ratios are largely (IMHO) a reflection of the relevant tactics and the firepower differential. When you look at the treatment places like Iwo Jima received before and during the battle, it was always going to result in more dead Japanese than Americans.

I will argue this, and as an example, I will compare the "elite" German SS Divisions to the US Marine Corps. The German SS began as an elite core, of maybe four or five divisions. As the war dragged on, the Germans continuously expanded their SS forces, creating new divisions and populating these divisions with raw recruits, and diluting the hardcore of experienced veterans. This was a policy that was flawed and bound to fail. By 1944-45 even the best units, such as the 1st & 12th SS Pz Divisions, performed poorly in combat.

I don't know this is a fair comparison, because they faced different conditions and different enemies and with different advantages. However, you're right to make these sorts of comparisions as you can't explore the themes you are interested in without doing something like this.

You're correct to suggest the constant expansion diluted the hardcore of veterans, but I think when you look at the casualties incurred in these formations, that dilution happened everytime they pulled the exhausted survivors out of the line and rebuilt the division. There wasn't much they could do about it, it was a fact of life. Also, taking the 12th SS, they were a hardcore of veterans surrounded by thousands of Kids and they performed exceptionally well on their first deployment, so it wasn't always an issue.

I also don't see too much difference between what the germans did and this...

In contrast, the US Marine Corps formed six divisions between 1941 and 1944. They were formed by splitting the older units and providing a cadre of veterans for the mass of recruits and draftees. This ensured that the quality of the new units would not be diluted, and the combat records of these divisions prove this.

Ultimately, every time the Germans expanded they split older units and added a leavening of veterans to the new recruits in the Officer and NCO roles. These units might in turn have had a cadre taken to another unit, but only after the unit had been deployed and fought, hence making the cadre "Veteran" in turn when it was assigned to a new formation.

The US Army did much the same thing, but they expanded much further, and still maintained high standards. The 106th Division, which had a very small percentage of veterans in its ranks, was virtually destroyed in the Battle of the Bulge. It was a terrible defeat, but an exception to the general rule.

It depends who you are comparing the US Army to. They expanded much further than the SS, but the US Army only fielded 89 divisions during WWII, their expansion was not as large as the Wehrmacht expansion. They fielded around 150 divisions for Barbarossa alone when they invaded Russia. I'd also argue the US didn't maintain the quality. You can find all sorts of evidence outside of combat for this. General Patton had some interesting remarks to make on the subject, once quoting a French General who had said that poor infantry required lots of artillery. Patton remarked that the US infantry needed all the artillery it could get. Likewise, studies (IIRC) initiated in the autumn/winter of 1944 found the average GI shorter and with a lower IQ than the average American serviceman. The issue was that the cream of the crop were being persistently siphoned off by the Air force and Navy before the Army got their turn.

The expansion of the US Army was a very painful experience and I don't think they did it as well as the Germans did. They also were not under the pressure the Germans were. The German Army was existing and expanding after 1941 on the back of millions of casualties. I think the 106th was not alone in having a difficult time. Some American Divisions fought exceptionally well, but the general standard was not as uniform (IMHO) as you suggest.

Compare this to the defeat of the German Army Group Center in Russia during the summer of 1944--some 25 divisions were destroyed.

I don't think this is a fair comparison. The US Army never faced the logistical constraints, the length of front, and the numerical superiority the Germans faced on the Eastern Front. Remember, that in June when the Russians launched Bagration, a million Germans were hemming the Allied Expeditionary Force into their Normandy bridgehead and did so for the best part of three months. I think this is significant when explaining the collapse of Army Group Centre. That the German Army was not what it was is also plain to see. But remember, that when the Allies waded ashore in 1944, the Germans had already sustained millions of casualties. They were no longer fighting with the best they had to offer. Most of the best were dead or wounded.

This may generate some heated controversy, but I will categorically state that man for man, the typical American/British and other Western Allied soldier was as well or better trained, equipped and led at the tactical level than his counterpart on the German side throughout the war.

I don't agree. I think German training was better. They lost far more men in training accidents with use of live fire etc, but produced soldiers who were readier as a result. Upon his return from Italy, for example, Montgomery was forced to overhaul the entire training system for the British divisions preparing for NW Europe because he found it wanting. Allied equipment was sometimes better, but often worse amongst the infantry. The Garand was a better rifle, but the MG42 the better machine gun. The German stick grenade could be thrown further, and German armour was tougher and more destructive. As for leadership at the tactical level, I also disagree. I think it is in the requirement for inititative drummed into German Small unit leaders and NCOs that much of the German advantages come.

So, one may ask , how were the Germans so successful from 1939 to 1941? Better tactics, better communications, better air support and at times better higher leadership. That's all there was to it.

This is an awful lot, though, so all though this may be all there is to it, it encompasses just about the full range of military activity. I think there are a number of other reasons as well, though, but this period doesn't really impact the wider argument, because America didn't get involved until after 41.

This is where the tactical games fall short, but ONLY for the 1939-41 period. For my argument, though, this is immaterial. We are strictly talking about the
quality of the soldiers, and the research for and design of the SPWaW 8.3 OOBs bears this notion out.

I think you will get problems if you try and simulate the 41-43/early 44 period without some form of German advantage. Games will be too one sided.

Regards,
IronDuke

ORIGINAL: Dragoon 45

German Units fought with fanatical courage on the Eastern Front to the end of the war.
.

It is more than likely that the fanatasism shown by the veteran members of the Wermacht had more to do with a degree of understanding of the kind of revenge the soviet army had in mind for them rather than their level of training. Many were under no illusions that the red army would, and did in Prussia and Silesia, repay in kind the attrocities dealt out by SS AND Wermacht units in the Ukraine etc.

Or of course they could desert and be strung up by the Feldgendarnerie

ORIGINAL: Dragoon 45

Some interesting ideas in this. I would like to add some points.

Armor: The M-4 was a good tank and in a lot of ways very underrated. Yes it could not stand up in a head to head duel with a Panther or Tiger, but it didn't have to. It was a rugged and very reliable tank and brought a quality all in itself. Only bad decisions by higher authorities back in the states limited the upgrades to the Sherman that would have allowed it to go head to head with the German Tanks i.e. refusal to upgun it in 1943, except for the Jumbo refusal to up armor it, and the U.S. Army's decision to use gasoline powered instead of Diesel powered M-4's.

I don't agree. If memory serves, they used an aircraft engine to power the Sherman. It resulted in the high profile and familiar shape. This sort of profile would always have seen it bested on the battlefield. The quality it had was quantity. The upgunned versions could compete to a better degree, but were still upgunned shermans when compared to the purpose built heavy battle tanks of the Panther and Tiger. I don't think there is much they could have done to upgrade the sherman further. With extra armour and a 76MM/17 PDR, it had reached its limit, I feel. As for going head to head, I don't see why it didn't have to go head to head with the Tiger and Panther. There was no other Allied Tank capable or present in the sort of numbers required to face the German Tanks. When you look at the sort of numbers that were lost in normandy, I think the Sherman deserved the rep it had. Yes, quantity meant it could hunt in packs and manouevre for the flank shots on the German vehicles, but this is a dangerous game, and suggests innate inferiority rather than anything else.

Artillery: Clear U.S. Superiority

Undoubtedly. No one developed centralised fire control like the Americans did. To be fair, German doctrine didn't call for ongoing and persistent fire support on the sort of scale we eventually saw, but the Americans certainly excelled. The Germans did go to produce excellent defensive fire plans towards the end of the war, but then defensive fire plans was about all they had the resources and tactical position to put together.

Air Power: Clear U.S. Superiority

Indeed. No argument.

Infantry Weapons: The M-1 Garand was the best standard infantry rifle of the war, accurate, high rate of fire, easy to maintain, and very reliable. The U.S. Army and USMC were the only forces equipped with a semi-automatic rifle for the infantry. The MP-44, Tokorav, Gewehr-43, and others were not standard issue. Yes the MG-42 was the best MG of the war, the BAR, M-1919A2-4, BREN, DT, and others were fair to good MG's but couldn't match the MG-42 in rate of fire, ease of operation, reliability, and portability.

Yes, the Garand was the best of the ones widely used, but the German MP43/44 was fairly common by late 44, and was a better weapon again. Your comments about the MG situation are spot on (IMHO) and even more relevant since the Germans were defending for much of the time they faced American forces and a good MG in these circumstances was a great equaliser.

Logisitics: Especially for the people who believe that the Allies won the war by mass production, there should be no argument that the Allies especially the Americans had the best Logistics of the War.

The best logistics of any war up to that point, bettered only by subsequent American logistic operations since.

Intelligence: Ultra gave a priceless advantage to the Allies. Stalin had his own Ultra in the Lucy spy ring. And American code breakers read a good part of all Japanese traffic throughout the War. Tactical Intelligence was hit or miss on both sides. The Battle of the Bulge was a prime example of the failure of specifically U.S. Intel in the war.

Good points.

Personnel: How go you measure the effectiveness of personnel in war? I maintain that the only way to measure it is who won the war?

I disagree. The 300 Spartans lost, yet no one disputes they were more effective man for man than the Persians. Dupuy's approach is one way to measure effectiveness. He is usually the starting point, whether you agree with him or disagree.

I have read various books and studies on the effectiveness of the individual infantryman in World War II. For every battle where the Germans outfought the Allies there is another battle where the Allies outfought the Germans.

Yes there is, but this in itself tells us little, because each battle must be measured in isolation. Victory doesn't always mean a great deal in the context we are discussing. Thermopylae was a defeat, but can any lessons be drawn from it suggesting the Persian levy were better soldiers than the Spartans?

In one study Dupuy used a scientific calculation to measure effectiveness. I have seen other studies using similiar methods with both similiar and different results.

Yes, Dupuy received some crticisms. It was suggested he had used too many Panzer and Panzergrenadier formations when picking his battles to analyse (overrepresenting what was considered the elite of the German forces) and that he mis-rated the effects of defending and air and artillery power. However, all have been refuted to some extent. Germans did better when he picked encounters in which they attacked as well as defended, suggesting if he had got some factors wrong, it didn't affect the overall conclusion. His work has been taken on by others and many other battles analysed. His conclusions are still supportable.

Without going into the studies, I think we can say that a green division didn't generally perform as well as a veteran division who didn't perform as well as an elite division.

Yes, but this was true of all armies.

The One Major Advantage the American Infantry had in the war I believe was that they learned faster than their opponents. The U.S. Army's performance in the early battles in North Africa was a disappointment to say the least. Yet these same divisions learned their lessons and were very effective formations later on in the war. The 45th and 36th Divisions in the Vosges Mountains are an excellent case in point. Due to weather and terrain, the divisions could not effectively use their advantages in supporting arms in the campaign to clear these mountains. They did not have a clear numerical superiority in infantry and in some cases the defenders outnumbered the attacker. Yet these two divisions were extremely effective against the Germans.

I disagree. I think American performance on the Cassino line was patchy the year after Kasserine (If memory serves one or other of the formations you mention served on the Rapido river, where things went very badly (was it the 36th? Were they called the Texan division or something? I can check if you can't confirm) Anyway, all Armies learn the lessons as they become more experienced. The Germans were masters at it. Also, by late in the war, the Wehrmacht was a shadow of what it had been. It would be difficult to see how a more experienced and better equipped Allied Army could have failed to perform better against them by late 44 or early 45. One of the difficulties of measuring is that the German Army that rolled into Russia (probably the Wehrmacht at it's peak) never faced the Western Allies. We can't compare like with like.

Other Factors relating to Combat Effectiveness: I believe the Germans had the best staff organization at the operational levels. The Germans were past masters at redeploying troops to shore up weak points in their lines. The Battles around Aachen and Metz are cases in point. Staff work was what enabled the Germans to do this.

I agree. The Germans did indeed perform well at Staff Officer level.

Motivation of the Troops I believe was a wash, with no clear advantage on either side.

I think the Werhmarcht edged it. Some of the units crossing the Meuse as early as 1940 lost 50% of their effectives crossing the river. Late in the war, they were defending their own territory with a terrible enemy in the east about to defeat them. I think campaigns like Normandy can only be understood if one assumes a greater motivation on the part of the German soldier.

The Germans had a priceless advantage in the early parts of the war over everyone else. They had a solid cadre of combat experienced Officers and Senior NCO's that most of the other armies lacked. Yes the other armies also had combat experienced leaders but not in the numbers that the Germans had.

Yes, but in September 1939, they had the same experience everyone else had. They got only two weeks campaigning for some of them in Poland and a couple of months in France. I also think this is partially offset by the fact that by the time the Allied Armies were in serious conflict with the Wehrmacht, the Wehrmacht had half bled to death on the eastern front.

Stalin's purges of the Red Army's officer corps prior to 1941 hamstrung the Red Army through 1943. The U.S. Army did not have the numbers of experienced troops to rapidly expand the army effectively. The Western Allies had suffered through a depression in the 1930's and only started to expand their armies at the last minute. It takes time to create an effective army and the performance of western troops in the early part of the war reflects the years of neglect heaped upon them.

All good points.

The USMC was probably the only example in the war where a Green Division performed as well as a Veteran Formation in all cases. But the USMC used a different method to form its divisions, it transferred a core of combat experienced Officers and NCO's to the new divisions when formed. The USMC also had another priceless advantage in the numbers of combat experience Marines still serving from the Banana Wars of the 1920-30's.

I don't have enough experience of the USMC to be able to comment. I would just point out, though, that the conditions under which they fought were far removed from the conditions in Europe against a different enemy. They also had their own learning curve (compare the near disaster at Tarawa with operations later against Iwo Jima and Okinawa).

The British Army was hamstrung with an outdated organization at the start of the war and later in the war was operating with a severe shortage of manpower. Also in some ways Churchhill was as bad as Hitler in some of the decisions made about senior commanders, Richie in North Africa for example. Both the French and British Armies were also at a disadvantage because of the First World War. Both armies remembered the losses from the first war and were haunted by it. Where the Germans took the lessons of the WW I and applied them correctly in my judgement to WW II, the French and British did not early in the War.

Some good points, although I think many Allied Commanders survived the war in their positions because the Allied Leadership was not as demanding as the German Leadership. Had they been working for Hitler, I don't think any of the senior Allied Commanders in Normandy would have gotten through the 12 weeks without being replaced. I suspect it was respect for the Werhmacht that saved so many of them from the chop. Steady plodding victory was enough because the senior leadership understood what they were fighting.

I believe that most people lose sight of World War II by looking through rose colored lens. It was probably the last war fought that everyone believed in, no matter which side you were on. Yes the German Army accomplished some amazing things in the war. But so did the U.S. Military.

Yes, they do, but these spectacles exist for both AXIS and Allied supporters. Most of the academics and soldiers who have discussed this that we have referred to would have been Americans, yet many do not believe the US soldier outperformed their German counterpart. Don't get me wrong, Allied formations like the Airborne divisions stood comparison with anything they faced. On the whole, though, I think the war lasted as long as it did because the Germans generally (not always, just usually) fought so well.

One last point I'd make. This has nothing to do with bravery. Nothing I've said questions the bravery of the Allied forces concerned, just some of those other factors we put on top of the courage it takes to fight.

Regards,
IronDuke

ORIGINAL: Koper

One comment on the supposed "elite" character of the early German SS formations...

You can roughly divide German Waffen SS development on 3 periods.

In first period units like LAH mot regiment/division and various SS battalions and regiments were more considered as elites due to the political support then for anything else. Their combat record was not really impressive (LAH regiment was routed in Poland and Totenkopf was more known from massacre of UK prisioners then from other traits) compared to Wehrmacht units. In general, SS units were taking more casualties then Heer to achieve the same results.

This is true. There was some concern they suffered disproportionately in Poland.

In second period, 1941-1943, Waffen SS recieved much more attention. Main reason for that was change in priorities - Totenkopf performance in Demiansk pocket in 1942 was used by Himmler as a proof, that stubborn and hard to break soldiers are the ones that are now needed. This way Waffen SS recieved much more political support, which allowed to develop core of their units from motorized infantry to either tank or tank/mech formations. Since attrition on the Eastern Front was very high, Waffen SS due to the better support units quickly became elites simply because they were recieveing replacements on time, while Wehrmacht was not. And Waffen SS was not single example of political factor in creating elites (Herman Goering Panzer Division).

Recent research suggests that when it came to receiving equipmment, the Waffen SS did not receive preference over Heer formations. It just might seem that way because they were persistently rebuilt and returned to the front. They were generally larger than their Heer equivalents, but don't seem to have been favoured when it came to receiving replacement equipment.

Regards,
IronDuke

Original: Dragoon 45

Col. Dupuy was one of the earliest people trying to quantify the performance of troops in war. To me all efforts to quantify performance in war are a waste of time. There are too many intangibles to consider to make a cold mathmatical equation work. Being good at war is an art not a science. The former Soviet Union tried to quantify things to a high degree using such things as Norms. They tried to take the human factor totally out of the equation and in my estimation did very badly at it. I know of no calculation that will determine if a unit stands to the death or bugs out at the first hint of hostile fire. How do you factor in the morale level of a company which is holding the key position in your entire area? Did they just get mail from home or did they just lose their very popular Company Commander? The U.S. Army tries hard to quantify training. They publish volumes of manuals with common tasks and MOS specific tasks yearly. They index and cross reference this tasks to rank and MOS. Common Task testing is a yearly ordeal every unit goes through. All of these efforts are geared towards having a common training level by rank and MOS throughout the Army. In most cases its works fairly well. But what the U.S. Army has never been able to Quantify is the intrinsic values held by the soldier himself; loyality to comrades, desire to perform so as to not let the team down (peer pressure), fear of personal failure, patriotism, and others. All of these factor affect performance in combat to one degree or another.

In a lot of ways, the one thing that a wargame has never been able to do is to factor in these human qualities in combat. The best ones average out the combat performance of a nation's soldiers and use a probability equation to determine if they will break or hold. But these equations do not address the motivation of the troops in a situational manner, but rather in an historical manner as to what they did at the time. No game can actually address the effects of the battlefield on morale adequately. Some games get it closer than others but without that unique human factor it is all probablity. One man in the right place at the right time can have totally unanticipated results in a combat action, that is what awards for valor are for. Conversely the wrong man at the wrong place at the wrong time can cause the best plans to go south. In both instances the rank and duty position can be anything.

The U.S. Military is now developing a new concept called "Fourth Generational Warfare" and a lot of smart people are developing the facts and assumptions behind the concept. Fourth Generational Warfare the way I understand it is based on fighting a force without a national border to defend (terrorism) that fights in mostly urban terrain to blend into the population. I am sure I do not have the full concept down but so-far I see nothing that is new to me. It is just a restatement of warfare as it is conducted today. Why did I bring this up? I brought this topic up for the excellent reason that once again the human factors (motivation, morale, training, etc.) have come to the forefront in trying to understand an enemy who does not conform to previous enemies. Any endeavor that involves humans must be dependent on the human factor for its success or failure.

Dragoon,
I accept what you are saying, but many of the imponderables you rightly mention are a problem only if predicting what is going to happen. In the case of studying WWII, it has all happened, and the studies made are valid in trying to understand what went on. We do not need to predict (something you rightly say is impossible) how a unit will perform because we have the historical record there to tell us how they reacted. It is seeking to explain why things happened the way they did that causes the problems.

Others have mentioned wargames. I think what wargamers realised very early on was that it was difficult to understand how the Germans did as well as they did when you simply matched up the OOBs and rated the different weapons systems. In an attempt to simulate troop quality and doctrine (or whatever else an individual designer thought was esponsible) we got higher German combat values, or higher German movement values.

I have no problem accepting that games are wrong and should not give Germans higher troop qualities, but if not, I need to understand what caused the Allies to struggle.

Regards,
IronDuke

ORIGINAL: KGV

ORIGINAL: Dragoon 45

German Units fought with fanatical courage on the Eastern Front to the end of the war.
.

It is more than likely that the fanatasism shown by the veteran members of the Wermacht had more to do with a degree of understanding of the kind of revenge the soviet army had in mind for them rather than their level of training. Many were under no illusions that the red army would, and did in Prussia and Silesia, repay in kind the attrocities dealt out by SS AND Wermacht units in the Ukraine etc.

Or of course they could desert and be strung up by the Feldgendarnerie

There has been much made about the attrocities on the Eastern Front, committed by both sides. As a motivating factor attrocities or the threat there of can inspire troops to very high levels of bravery and stubborn resistance. How wide spread these attrocities were I don't think we will ever know for sure. The German side downplayed them when committed against the Soviets and vice versa. And both sides probably exaggerated them when committed by the other side. But the fact remains that the troops on both sides believed that the attrocities were committed. This led to further attrocities.

Motivating troops to perform in combat is very hard to do. The troops must believe that they are fighting for some reason that makes sense. Weither it is the protection of their homeland, liberation of a downtrodden people, or simple revenge can all be factors that will cause troops to perform far above the norm. By the Fall of 1944, I would argue that few soldiers in the German Army believed that they could still win the war, and possibly this belief congealed earlier than that. So what motivated the German Soldier to perform so well even in the closing days of the war? I can give examples, we can argue over them, and vice versa. I don't believe that anyone will ever have the complete answer.

But going back to the original question was the German Soldier overrated and the American Soldier underrated? In a lot of cases yes and in others no.

ORIGINAL: Dragoon 45

Hitler was an asset for the allies undoubtedly. Hitler committed many blunders throughout the war, relieving excellent commanders such as Manstein, insisting on holding hopeless positions, and most importantly never actually putting the German economy on a war-time footing. Hitler's many mistakes are legendary and it would take a book to document them all.

Edited by IronDuke for brevity.

Fair points, particularly the economy argument. Not as well known as the stand and fight blunders.

The German soldier has many excellent qualities, among them the willingness to take heavy losses if necessary, initiative, tactical acumen, and others. German Units fought with fanatical courage on the Eastern Front to the end of the war. But was the German soldier a supersoldier, no. German Armor was excellent when it worked. The Mk IV was a workhorse that was reliable and able to be upgraded as the war progressed. But both the Panther and both series of the Tiger were very unreliable. Operational Readiness rates for the Tigers were normally less than 50% and the Panthers were not much better. The German heavy tanks were plagued with engine and transmission problems throughout their service life along with inadequate suspension. The Panther was prone to catching fire at inopertune times throughout its service life also.

I don't believe they were super soldiers, just usually marginally better. I also thought the problems with the Panther (deployed in far larger numbers than the Tiger) were ironed out by mid 44 so I think those remarks a little harsh. I think pound for pound it was the outstanding tank of the war.

Also mentioned in previous posts are examples from the First World War. Normally accounts from that war emphasis the horror of serving in the trenches and little is actually mentioned about troop quality. I believe everyone in this forum will agree that the Allies wasted troops' lives at a tremendous rate. But I would argue that American troops in World War I stood head and shoulders above any other troops committed by the Allies. For instance at the Battle of the Argonne in particular the Battle of Belleau Wood, U.S. Forces (both Marine and Army) breached the German trench system completely, the first time this had happened in the war. Throughout the War the Germans had developed tactics that prevented the French or British from making any major gains in the trench fighting. Indeed part of the French Army mutineed because of the blunders of its high command. The British Army was quite adept at portraying limited gains as a great victory as were the French. The only actual success for the British in the entire war was at Cambrai and it was squandered by poor planning. If you check KIA figures for the entire war you will find that the British and French lost over twice as many men as the Germans lost on all fronts.

I sense a man who has read Mosier? I think the whole "US infantryman in WWI was superior" argument is way off to be honest. It just doesn't stand up. For example, one German assessment of the AEF read:

The initial attack was carried out according to schedule but the successive waves showed great inaptitude in following up the advance. Officers as well as men did not understand how to make use of the terrain. Instead of seeking protection when they encountered opposition they merely fell back. To crawl backward or forward on the ground or to advance in quick jumps does not seem to by understood by the Americans. They remain lying on the ground for the time being, and then just stand up again and try to advance.

Neither in mass formations nor individually do the Americans know how to conduct themselves in an attack.

The higher command, also, did not understand how to grasp quickly the new situation and exploit it to the best advantage. After the infantry had reached its objective the higher command failed. They were not familiar with the tactical principles in the use of divisions and attack units for the destruction of the enemy. It was therefor possible for the [German] Army Detachment, under the most difficult conditions, to extricate itself from its precarious situation in one night, and, with only a short distance intervening between it and the enemy, to occupy new positions of resistance…

That was written about 1st Army. After the Argonne, one German wrote:

The American Infantry is very unskillful in the attack. It attacks in thick columns, in numerous waves echeloned in depth, preceded by tanks. This sort of attack offers excellent objectives for the fire of our artillery, infantry and machine guns.

Essentially, Pershing refused to allow the Americans to fight under British or French control for reasons of his own, so they went into action and suffered in the same way the British and French had done in 1915 and 1916. Their refusal to listen to French and British hard experience cost a lot of lives. The Americans disheartened the Germans because they offered the necessary manpower to overwhelm them, and they knew it, but American performance on the battlefield, although enthusiastic, would not have unduly worried the Germans had they had enough men to compete.

The performance of the BEF at this stage of the war (and of the french) was better, based on years of hard experience getting the tactics for offensive action right (in a war whose technology had usually helped the defence).

Regards,
IronDuke

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

Original: Dragoon 45

Col. Dupuy was one of the earliest people trying to quantify the performance of troops in war. To me all efforts to quantify performance in war are a waste of time. There are too many intangibles to consider to make a cold mathmatical equation work. Being good at war is an art not a science. The former Soviet Union tried to quantify things to a high degree using such things as Norms. They tried to take the human factor totally out of the equation and in my estimation did very badly at it. I know of no calculation that will determine if a unit stands to the death or bugs out at the first hint of hostile fire. How do you factor in the morale level of a company which is holding the key position in your entire area? Did they just get mail from home or did they just lose their very popular Company Commander? The U.S. Army tries hard to quantify training. They publish volumes of manuals with common tasks and MOS specific tasks yearly. They index and cross reference this tasks to rank and MOS. Common Task testing is a yearly ordeal every unit goes through. All of these efforts are geared towards having a common training level by rank and MOS throughout the Army. In most cases its works fairly well. But what the U.S. Army has never been able to Quantify is the intrinsic values held by the soldier himself; loyality to comrades, desire to perform so as to not let the team down (peer pressure), fear of personal failure, patriotism, and others. All of these factor affect performance in combat to one degree or another.

In a lot of ways, the one thing that a wargame has never been able to do is to factor in these human qualities in combat. The best ones average out the combat performance of a nation's soldiers and use a probability equation to determine if they will break or hold. But these equations do not address the motivation of the troops in a situational manner, but rather in an historical manner as to what they did at the time. No game can actually address the effects of the battlefield on morale adequately. Some games get it closer than others but without that unique human factor it is all probablity. One man in the right place at the right time can have totally unanticipated results in a combat action, that is what awards for valor are for. Conversely the wrong man at the wrong place at the wrong time can cause the best plans to go south. In both instances the rank and duty position can be anything.

The U.S. Military is now developing a new concept called "Fourth Generational Warfare" and a lot of smart people are developing the facts and assumptions behind the concept. Fourth Generational Warfare the way I understand it is based on fighting a force without a national border to defend (terrorism) that fights in mostly urban terrain to blend into the population. I am sure I do not have the full concept down but so-far I see nothing that is new to me. It is just a restatement of warfare as it is conducted today. Why did I bring this up? I brought this topic up for the excellent reason that once again the human factors (motivation, morale, training, etc.) have come to the forefront in trying to understand an enemy who does not conform to previous enemies. Any endeavor that involves humans must be dependent on the human factor for its success or failure.

Dragoon,
I accept what you are saying, but many of the imponderables you rightly mention are a problem only if predicting what is going to happen. In the case of studying WWII, it has all happened, and the studies made are valid in trying to understand what went on. We do not need to predict (something you rightly say is impossible) how a unit will perform because we have the historical record there to tell us how they reacted. It is seeking to explain why things happened the way they did that causes the problems.

Others have mentioned wargames. I think what wargamers realised very early on was that it was difficult to understand how the Germans did as well as they did when you simply matched up the OOBs and rated the different weapons systems. In an attempt to simulate troop quality and doctrine (or whatever else an individual designer thought was esponsible) we got higher German combat values, or higher German movement values.

I have no problem accepting that games are wrong and should not give Germans higher troop qualities, but if not, I need to understand what caused the Allies to struggle.

Regards,
IronDuke

What instances are you referring to where the Allies struggled? In Normandy perhaps? Only two veteran American Divisions (82 Abn and 1st ID) were committed through the Normandy beaches. I would also argue that the British and Canadian divisions committed through the beaches were green also. The British 7th Armored Division was in theory a veteran division but sure didn't show that in the early battles in Normandy (Villers Bocage, etc.). Green Troops make mistakes, it is how they learn in combat. And the German units in Normandy had a core of combat experienced leaders. Green troops vs experienced troops will normally show the green troops in a less than favorable light most times. I would also argue that the British troops early in the war were hindered to a large degree by inept commanders. And the British were not alone in this area, the American Division and Corps Commanders in the early days of North Africa are examples of this also. I would go back to something I posted in this thread earlier, "There are no bad troops, just bad leaders". The intangibles are what motivates troops to fight. Was the German soldier better than the Allied soldier? We can discuss this at length and all of us will have varying opinions on the subject. My own opinion is that the German soldier was no better than the Allied soldier. But I do believe that the German soldier was much better served by the Staff at levels from the Army and Corps level down than the Allied soldier. To my way of thinking this is what accounts for the performance of the German soldier throughout WW II.

I must disagree with KG ERWIN in one aspect of the argument he presents. The U.S. Army did not form divisions the way he refers to. I don't have the exact figure but I recall the strength of the U.S. Army was approximately 100,000 regulars in 1939. A lot of the National Guard Divisions, those numbered in the 20-40's, were committed as they were when mobilized. Meaning not a lot of personnel changes were made. Some of these divisions performed very well from the initial commitment and others didn't. The higher numbered divisions were formed from drafts of trained (not combat experienced) personnel from other formed units in the states. In a lot of cases these trained drafts only had at best one to two years experience in the Army. There was not a large pool of combat experienced leaders available in the U.S. Army prior to D-Day. Those combat experienced troops the Army possessed were still in combat either in the Med or Pacific. Yes the U.S. Army experienced large problems when it expanded. What has always surprised me is how well a lot of these green units performed when first committed to combat.

To me wargaming is trying to change history. Where is the fun in it, if you know before hand what the outcome is and there is no way it can be changed. The fun is in can I change history if I do something different in a given situation. Trying to understand these intrinsic factors is part of trying to change history. What would have happened if Hitler had not declared war on the United States? What would have happened if Patton not Eisenhower was appointed CinC of SHAEF? What would have happened if the M-26 was developed and produced in time to equipment the U.S. Armored Force prior to D-Day? And the list goes on.