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Many of the books I have read have suggested that the lack of a powerfull strategic element within the Luftwaffe was a massive oversight on the part of the german miltary planners when the rebuilding of their nations armed forces was laid out. I have never been particularly swayed by this line of thought for several reasons. I believe that in a time when the prevailing school of thought on air power was that the bomber would always get through it took a great deal of foresight and guts to stake everything on a highly mobile army. The luftwaffe was not designed to fight hundreds of miles behind enemy lines attacking a countries ability to maintain a war effort but instead on a tactical level, hitting points of concented enemy defense, lines of communication and denying the enemy the use of its own airfields. In the kind of war that the Germans planned the ability to degrade the effectiveness of combat troops to resist both through direct attack and by denying reserves and logistics freedom movement was paramount. IMHO they had learned the lessons of the great war more thouroughly when it came to joined up fighting that any other major European (world?) power.

The German's knew that their best chance of successfully executing any future military operations relied on a swift victory as they did not have the resources neccessary to sustain long, drawn out campaigns. This was borne out by the war in Poland and the assualt westwards through the low countries and France. The Battle of Britain was undoubtably a turning point for the Germans even if it was not as catastrophic a reversal as the destruction of an entire army at Stalingrad but you could argue that the reasons for the survival of the RAF had more to do with the change in emphasis in target selection rather than the type of aircraft employed. The main tactical rather than strategic failing was the lack of escort fighter but at that time the only design that even tried to address that issue was the Bf 110. I reckon that had Hitler not felt the need to wipe Bolshivism off the face of the planet then Britain would have been in serious trouble in 41.
The lack of a strategic force only became an issue when the Soviets managed to hold off the Germans and move their production facilities well beyond the range of the Luftwaffe.

In my opinion the only real benefit the allies ever gained from daylight strategic raids with heavy bombers was the attrition of experienced Luftwaffe pilots. The medium bombers were better at closing down the transport infrastructure and fighter bombers far better at interdiction.

http://www.war-forums.com/forums/showth ... ge=1&pp=15 is a good discussion of the related issue of the Allied strategic bombing campaign. It's not the only thread in that section either[:)]

The German air force was really intended for use as 'flying artillery', I don't think their lack of heavy bombers had any major effect on the war's outcome.

The Allied bombing offensive's contribution to their ultimate victory should not be underestimated. Without Speer's galvanising of the German war economy, military industrial production would have dropped off considerably. Additionally, vast resources were tied up in Home Defence that could have been deployed at the fronts, it's estimated that by late 1944 this amounted to one-third of that available.

They lacked fighters planes, pilots and generally the manpower that is needed to struggle with a superior enemy, thanks god. You can have all the aces you want, if you don´t have the mass you´re lost.

this is always a interesting arguement

I think something most people don't think about, is that the LW didn't really have any mem bombers either

most of there planes were designed for something else that could be changed over in times of need

they were mail planes, transports, airliners, they didn't have proper bombbays, defense gun placements, or bombloads

the Ju 52 and Ju 86 were early bombers for them

the closest they came to a true Heavy bomber was the FW 200 and as I said, it was a converted airliner

the Germans almost won the war they had planned on, it was mistakes and blunders that lost the war for them, not the lack of a heavy bomber

HARD_Sarge

my bad, made a mistake on the Ju 88, that was designed from the start to be a fast bomber

ORIGINAL: Hard Sarge

this is always a interesting arguement

I think something most people don't think about, is that the LW didn't really have any mem bombers either

most of there planes were designed for something else that could be changed over in times of need

they were mail planes, transports, airliners, they didn't have proper bombbays, defense gun placements, or bombloads

Don't fully agree here. The Heinkel He-111 may officially have been designed as a civil airliner (and indeed a few were operated by Lufthansa) but it was always intended for military service. It's a reflection of its usefulness that it remained in service as a bomber throughout the war, although I suspect this is in some way down to Germany's inability to construct an improved medium bomber.

ORIGINAL: EricGuitarJames

Don't fully agree here. The Heinkel He-111 may officially have been designed as a civil airliner (and indeed a few were operated by Lufthansa) but it was always intended for military service. It's a reflection of its usefulness that it remained in service as a bomber throughout the war, although I suspect this is in some way down to Germany's inability to construct an improved medium bomber.

IMHO it had much more to do with the fact, that air battles over Eastern Front were fought in totally different conditions, so even less advanced planes could be used effectively there. Until 1945 none of the sides was able to keep full air superiority over the whole combat area, so He-111 or Ju-87 could be used there simply because they were able to avoid Soviet fighters.

As for the main topic, I think that Luftwaffe planners did the best thing they could - they actually made their airforce "compatibile" with main doctrine of Wehrmacht. Wehrmacht gained "flying artillery" which was probably as much, if not more important in securing its early victories then tanks and motorized divisions. Problems started, when mayor doctrine failed - instead of short, separated camapaigns, Germany were fighting long war. Against the UK they needed medium range escort fighters and bombers with real defense abilities. Against USSR... well, they needed much more planes and pilots that they ever had. Against USA they could only pray.

Basically, Germany had no resources to pursue ALL possible options for their airforce, so they have chosen the one that suited their strategic war plans best.