In a book that I recently read, "Operation Sea Lion", by Egbert Kiesser, Cassell Military Paperbacks, 1999 I learnt some things:
- Hitler never wanted to invade the UK. He was a moron and thought that the Brits were, in fact, nazi-lovers-in-disguise. Again, he was a perturbated, dangerous moron.
- Goering, Hitler's "primma donna"

was a moron too. And the guys at the department of production were also of moronic nature. Hermann (a.k.a. "Meyer" :p ) unrealisticaly assigned units, battle-plans and low reinforcements ratios to SeaLion. He lied to the OKH. He slowed the training pilot schools! And the department of production banned, delayed and cut the production of aircraft numbers and types that could have been employed at SeaLion preparation and landing.
- Also, the moronic tactics of Luftwaffe, issued personaly by Herman "Meyer", a good pilot bad a bad planner and organizer, were bassed on Goering's experience in WW1. Not too much attention to lessons from Spanish Civil War, Poland, France and/or the Battle of England itself were neither believed nor approved by Goering. "I have been a top pilot and I know about this stuf! shut up and follow my orders!" was his style. A moron among morons...
- The available resources assigned to barge-building capable of crossing The Channel were divided among Wehrmacht and Kriegsmarine. The overall command over "floating devices" was not clear. The control of the overall operaion was not clear either.
-This created suspicion (promoted by Hitler so he could be left alone smoking ilegal substances and planning moronic wars), resentment, lack of collaboration, duplication of efforts on investigation and desing process. It also disminished the posibility of really building everything that was needed for the crossing.
-The Wehrmacht saw this as a river-crossing operation. This caused a wrong start-point for tactics, planning, resource allocation and barges characteristics planning.
-The Kriegsmarine, was experienced and confident, having been higly successfull in troop transportation before (to China in 1900 by Kaiser Wilhem and to Norway in April '40). But it always planned to start the war on late 40s. And, of course their plan was far more possible than the Wehrmacht plan.
- The Kriegsmarine planned an invasion like this: sea-transport around 7,500 men (1 inf division + 1 cyclist brigade), fly an airborne division (reinforced with a glider-carried army regiment) to capture harbours (Great Yarmouth and Lowestoft) where they could disembarck the 2nd (2 Pz Divisions, 1 Motorized Inf. Div + 1 reinforced Inf. Div) and 3rd waves (6 Panzer and Infantry divs.)
-Kriegsmarine's goal was to capture London and End-of-the-War (check-mate). This plan called for a short and fast crossing, strategic surprise and a very narrow area to control by air-and-sea: easier to do by the small Kriegsmarine. A "strategic commando raid" if you wish.
- The Wehermacht had a different idea (and a different plan). First, they planned for a crossing with about 100,000 men. Then, they decided to 'upgrade' the plan: 260,000 men, +60,000 horses, 34,000 vehicles (trucks, panzers, artillery...), 52 light flak batteries... , including 25,000 paratroopers and glider troops.
-In fact, the Luftwaffe had available on July, 14th, 1940: 750xJu 52 (20 troopers) + 150x Gliders (8 troopers + equipment), with a combined capacity of 16,200 in one jump. They expected 30% to 50% casualties on 1st wave on the beachs (~5,000 troops).
As you see, both visions were really far from each other. With a first wave of +90,000 men, the Kriegsmarine first took it with disbelief, then with open laughter.
Enough! Go and buy the darn book!
