European Guantanamo - more info
Posted: Thu Nov 03, 2005 4:45 pm
I'm here to give more information about my issue.
As I said in the last thread, I had 1 army of 21 corps totalling about 170,000 men. They were facing 2 divisions of field force and 4 divisions of garrision of Britain's in Britain-protected Mecklenburg without a single fight for nearly one year. There were no fleet there for the better part of the no-fight time. However, 20-plus divisions of (neutral) Swedes were stationed there for the whole of the time.
My problem is I started to send orders to move this army away from the protectorate after the first two months of no fight - neither on field nor in the form of siege, but my army was stuck there never inching away from the quagmire and no fight of any sort took place in this quarantine period.
Not till Swedes turned hostile to me my army finally made it out of there. As an additional note, I broke this army into three formations in the hope that, led by leaders with higher initiative ratings (my corps leaders were better than their senior in this regard), these three smaller groups could maneouvre more easily. Scarcely this disintegration had occurred before Sweden issued a DOW. It thus remained unknown to me how large a part such an army division had played in the army's eventual escape from this Guantanamo.
As I said in the last thread, I had 1 army of 21 corps totalling about 170,000 men. They were facing 2 divisions of field force and 4 divisions of garrision of Britain's in Britain-protected Mecklenburg without a single fight for nearly one year. There were no fleet there for the better part of the no-fight time. However, 20-plus divisions of (neutral) Swedes were stationed there for the whole of the time.
My problem is I started to send orders to move this army away from the protectorate after the first two months of no fight - neither on field nor in the form of siege, but my army was stuck there never inching away from the quagmire and no fight of any sort took place in this quarantine period.
Not till Swedes turned hostile to me my army finally made it out of there. As an additional note, I broke this army into three formations in the hope that, led by leaders with higher initiative ratings (my corps leaders were better than their senior in this regard), these three smaller groups could maneouvre more easily. Scarcely this disintegration had occurred before Sweden issued a DOW. It thus remained unknown to me how large a part such an army division had played in the army's eventual escape from this Guantanamo.