Ruminating about the Zero bonus...
Posted: Mon Dec 12, 2005 8:05 pm
So, I was thinking about this, and refelcting on Fire in the Sky which I recently finished reading.
And I was thinking about the "Zero bonus", and the Zero itself, fighter doctrine, and aircraft design.
So bear with me, or not. I am going to ramble a bit, I think, but hopefully it will come back together at some point...
A point made in FITS is that the Japanese military, and especially the IJN pilots had a LOT of influence on the design of the Zero. Indeed, it is common to hear US pilots remark on how easy and pleasant it is to fly when they were given a chance. FITS makes the point that the development of the Zero actually suffered becasue the designers gave the pilots what they wanted, rather than what made a good weapon. In the abscence of information to the contrary (and China certianly was no great proving fround for figuring this stuff out), it seemed reasonable to design a fighter that fighter pilots liked to fly.
And what do fighter pilots like to fly? Nimble, fast, *fun* aircraft. Which the Zero was. But that is not what makes a fighter a good *weapon* - far from it in fact. A good weapon is one which combines lethality with durability and excellence at fighting the enemy on terms favorable to you.
Now, what make a fighter better than some other fighter? In a very simplistic, general sense, fighter A is better than fighter B if all other things being equal, fighter A has a better chance of shooting down Fighter B than the reverse. However, there is one caveat to this.
What if it is the case that Fighter A is MUCH better than fighter B, but only if both sides fight in a certain manner? Of course, I am referring to the "turning fight" that the Zero is so well known for. Now, we all know now that the Zero is a better turning aircraft than just about anything the US had early and mid-war. Hell, even the US knew that. It snot like this was a surprise.
The thing that I think amde the Zero so successful early on is that when it comes to doctrine, it was designed to fight well in what I would call a "natural" style of fighting. In the "simple" doctrine, you get into a fight, and if the bad guy turns away from you, you try to follow him. That is the "natural" reaction, absent training to the contrary. I hypothesize that if you took two identical pilots and placed one in a Zero and one in a Allied plane like a P-40 or F4F, all other things being equal and both pilots being untrained in any kind of "doctrine", the Zero pilot will win, because his plane is better at the obvious doctrine. The planes engage, someone turns, someoen follows, and the Zero wins that fight. The P-40 is better at high speed, slashing attacks, but that is not necessarily "intuitive".
Now, if both pilots have some experience and training, and know better how to recognize doctrine, style of fighting, and such, you could see a different result. While the dogfighting superioroty of the Zero makes it able to succeed in the turning fight, the turning fight is one that demands that the opponenet play along. You cannot force someone to engage in a turning fight if they do not want to - and eventually the Allies figured this out, and would simply refuse to engage. And those that did engage in that manner, died.
It is almost like we need another attribute of squadrons, or pilots, or maybe even leaders...their doctrinal ability. The ability to force the opponent to fight a battle on terms that accentuate your advantages and minimize your liabilities.
A Zero is a lot better than a P-40 in a turning fight, but a P-40 is equal or even better if it can avoid that kind of fight. If we assume that the turning dogfight is the "default" combat that tends to occur when relatively low doctrinal opponenets engage one another (or when high doctrinal Japanese engage lower doctrinal Allies), then early in the war the Japanese high doctrine leaders/pilots will do very well against the low doctrine Allies, *seperate* from their "experience"/skill attribute, which would simply describe how good they are at executing a doctrine in combat, even if it si the "wrong" doctrine.
As the war continues, Allied pilots/leaders become better at refusing the turning fight, and their aircraft become more able to compete in a turning fight even if they do get into one. Japanese leaders attrit, and are replaced by those who are not as adept at avoiding the Allied superior doctrine of the slash and pass, etc. So you end up with the result we expect (Zeroes being *generally* tough for the Allies, but not always if the Allies have leaders that understand how to fight them), while not making the "bonus" effect EVERY allied squadron, since it seems that some actually did quite well, even during the "bonus" time.
For anyone who hung in there through all that, thanks.
And I was thinking about the "Zero bonus", and the Zero itself, fighter doctrine, and aircraft design.
So bear with me, or not. I am going to ramble a bit, I think, but hopefully it will come back together at some point...
A point made in FITS is that the Japanese military, and especially the IJN pilots had a LOT of influence on the design of the Zero. Indeed, it is common to hear US pilots remark on how easy and pleasant it is to fly when they were given a chance. FITS makes the point that the development of the Zero actually suffered becasue the designers gave the pilots what they wanted, rather than what made a good weapon. In the abscence of information to the contrary (and China certianly was no great proving fround for figuring this stuff out), it seemed reasonable to design a fighter that fighter pilots liked to fly.
And what do fighter pilots like to fly? Nimble, fast, *fun* aircraft. Which the Zero was. But that is not what makes a fighter a good *weapon* - far from it in fact. A good weapon is one which combines lethality with durability and excellence at fighting the enemy on terms favorable to you.
Now, what make a fighter better than some other fighter? In a very simplistic, general sense, fighter A is better than fighter B if all other things being equal, fighter A has a better chance of shooting down Fighter B than the reverse. However, there is one caveat to this.
What if it is the case that Fighter A is MUCH better than fighter B, but only if both sides fight in a certain manner? Of course, I am referring to the "turning fight" that the Zero is so well known for. Now, we all know now that the Zero is a better turning aircraft than just about anything the US had early and mid-war. Hell, even the US knew that. It snot like this was a surprise.
The thing that I think amde the Zero so successful early on is that when it comes to doctrine, it was designed to fight well in what I would call a "natural" style of fighting. In the "simple" doctrine, you get into a fight, and if the bad guy turns away from you, you try to follow him. That is the "natural" reaction, absent training to the contrary. I hypothesize that if you took two identical pilots and placed one in a Zero and one in a Allied plane like a P-40 or F4F, all other things being equal and both pilots being untrained in any kind of "doctrine", the Zero pilot will win, because his plane is better at the obvious doctrine. The planes engage, someone turns, someoen follows, and the Zero wins that fight. The P-40 is better at high speed, slashing attacks, but that is not necessarily "intuitive".
Now, if both pilots have some experience and training, and know better how to recognize doctrine, style of fighting, and such, you could see a different result. While the dogfighting superioroty of the Zero makes it able to succeed in the turning fight, the turning fight is one that demands that the opponenet play along. You cannot force someone to engage in a turning fight if they do not want to - and eventually the Allies figured this out, and would simply refuse to engage. And those that did engage in that manner, died.
It is almost like we need another attribute of squadrons, or pilots, or maybe even leaders...their doctrinal ability. The ability to force the opponent to fight a battle on terms that accentuate your advantages and minimize your liabilities.
A Zero is a lot better than a P-40 in a turning fight, but a P-40 is equal or even better if it can avoid that kind of fight. If we assume that the turning dogfight is the "default" combat that tends to occur when relatively low doctrinal opponenets engage one another (or when high doctrinal Japanese engage lower doctrinal Allies), then early in the war the Japanese high doctrine leaders/pilots will do very well against the low doctrine Allies, *seperate* from their "experience"/skill attribute, which would simply describe how good they are at executing a doctrine in combat, even if it si the "wrong" doctrine.
As the war continues, Allied pilots/leaders become better at refusing the turning fight, and their aircraft become more able to compete in a turning fight even if they do get into one. Japanese leaders attrit, and are replaced by those who are not as adept at avoiding the Allied superior doctrine of the slash and pass, etc. So you end up with the result we expect (Zeroes being *generally* tough for the Allies, but not always if the Allies have leaders that understand how to fight them), while not making the "bonus" effect EVERY allied squadron, since it seems that some actually did quite well, even during the "bonus" time.
For anyone who hung in there through all that, thanks.